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ABSTRACT
Economic crises are such powerful socioeconomic disasters that, not surprisingly, they are
usually explained by powerful socioeconomic pressures, such as global financial
speculation, structural economic failure, or populist demands. This thesis, in contrast,
identifies the crucial role of elite politics.
From the 1950s through the 1980s politics inside a tiny circle of high Mexican officials
made the difference between economic crisis (when the exchange rate crashes) and
stability. In the 1950s and 1960s, competing grupos, or cliques, within the ruling party
abided by a "cooperative" system. The grupo whose leader won the internal contest for
presidential nomination, hence automatically won the election, would do better, but losing
grupos retained important posts. Such assurance of political survival allowed elites to
defend the political system's long-run interests, not just their narrow self-interests, and
avoid economic crises. In the 1970s and 1980s, "struggle" emerged as power conflicts
became all-or-nothing, erupting in massive expenditures, other economic gambles, and
crises. Public spending soared in pre-election years (27 percent in 1975, 22 percent in
1981), when grupos vied to build support for their leader's presidential nomination.
Slashing it in the actual election years (0 growth in 1976, 8 percent decline in 1982,
excluding debt payments) was too late to avert economic crisis.
Most studies of economic crises in developing nations focus on what went wrong - and
find too many possibilities. By scrutinizing Mexico's economic stability in the 1950s and
1960s (when nations such as Brazil and Argentina suffered repeated crises), this thesis is
better able to discover the critical characteristics of political success that later eroded. The
relationship between state and society did not change; the system of elite politics did.
Many interviews with high officials reveal how this system worked, and illuminate
important facets of Mexican economic history.
The more general lesson is that politics at the heart of the state is not just a small replica of
society. While external constituencies endure, elite factions survive or die politically. How
they handle mutual conflicts can have momentous effects on a nation.
Thesis supervisor: Suzanne Berger
Title: Raphael Dorman and Helen Starbuck Professor of Political Science
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Preface
It is no secret how arduous writing a Ph.D. thesis can be, but it is easily forgotten -
especially by the author - how much thought and encouragement others may contribute.
Another doctoral candidate who attended a colloquium I gave at MIT to present my
research expected the members of my thesis committee to grill me - and was not
disappointed - but afterwards remarked to me, I think a little surprised, "They want you to
succeed." Many people, including my committee, helped immensely in my project. This
preface is a very partial acknowledgement of the role a few of them played.
An important impetus for me to undertake a doctorate in political science was
auditing "Political Economy I," a class taught at MIT by Suzanne Berger and Michael
Piore, both subsequent members of my thesis committee, introducing some of the principal
thinking about the state and the economy. A magazine editor at the time, I discovered
vistas that I wanted to be able to bring together into some broader intellectual landscape.
That task is the goal of preparing for general examinations (partial though one's efforts
may inevitably remain), but then comes the effort to extend a part of that landscape: the
thesis. Now one finds oneself peering as if through a dense fog, guided by hunches,
experiences, even prejudices, wondering at once whether any picture at all might emerge
and how one could assess its fidelity if it should. Here one's thesis advisor plays a critical
role. I long ago lost track of how many proposals, chapter fragments, and other relevant or
irrelevant writings my advisor, Suzanne Berger, read. Her excellent perceptions about
them, not to mention the sheer time and energy she devoted to reading them, helped me to
focus my more interesting and useful ideas in this thesis, and to reject a great deal that was
a convoluted way of saying the obvious, that would not hold up to scrutiny, or that, when I
thought about it twice, fundamentally bored me. Suzanne had the intellectual generosity to
be at once tough-minded about sloppy thinking yet open-minded to what I am quite certain
are unusual - and I hope may prove to be important - avenues of thinking.
Michael Piore crucially helped me shape the framework of my research and
argument. One seemingly simple example will have to suffice. In Mexico interviewing
former officials about how economic policy was made under the old regime from the
1950s through the 1980s, I felt overwhelmed by the seeming boundlessness of the task.
Mike suggested what seems obvicas: that I make a list of individuals I would ideally like
to interview, alive or dead, who could articulate the principal differing perspectives on
each administration. I should interview all I could, and for those no longer alive or
unwilling to talk, I should seek substitutes - colleagues, proteg6s, sons in politics. Not only
did this approach give me a more manageable list of interviewees; the interviews gave me
as solid base as I could find to construct the historical account. Chappell Lawson's
continuing, always reliable advice as to what constitutes sound political-science research -
and what is not a sound argument - his acute perceptions, and even his good editing
suggestions (to someone who was an editor for years!) helped guide me again and again
and again. I am not sure I would have gotten through my thesis without his enthusiastic
help. I am sure it would have taken me longer than it did and would not have turned out as
well. The non-MIT member of my committee, Roderic Camp of Claremont McKenna
College, a well known Mexico scholar, generously read evolving drafts of my thesis. He
helped reassure me that, even if my arguments about the Mexican political elite might be
challenged, they are at least serious. When he was at MIT, Jonathan Fox, now of the
University of California at Santa Cruz, introduced me to Mexican politics.
On two separate trips to Mexico, the Instituto de Investigaciones Econ6micas (IE)
of the National University of Mexico kindly accepted me as a visiting researcher. Within a
stone's throw of the Economics Faculty and Law Faculty, which the great majority of
former high Mexican officials I interviewed had attended, it allowed me to feel, in some
small measure, part of the story too - aside from providing an academic home away from
MIT. I am particularly indebted to the director, Alicia Gir6n; to Professor Teresa Gutierrez
Haces, who introduced me to the IIE and helped me find my way around my subject; and
to the head librarian Ernesto Reyes, who, in addition to steering me aroun, :he dozens
upon dozens of National University libraries, became my good friend. Ernesto's wife
Susana Gutierrez and his son, also Ernesto, helped transcribe a massive quantity of taped
interviews. To anyone who does interviews in a foreign language, I recommend - as do
they! - employing the best recording equipment money can buy; the sound quality was
sometimes horrible. My friend Cecilia Divila, a translator and professor of French (for a
while also at the National University), employed her fine sense of language and great care
for words in helping with particularly horrendous passages. At the same time, I bear
responsibility for all quotes; I did not use anything that I did not carefully listen to myself.
On the list I constructed of Mexican officials I would ideally like to interview, I
had to find alternates for the dead, but for almost none of the living. Even former
presidents of Mexico, finance secretaries, and interior secretaries very seldom declined
interviews, and they told me the story as they saw it. The political class, as Mexicans call
it, takes research with a seriousness and deference one would hardly find in most countries;
as I point out in the thesis, half of those officials were professors at some point in their
careers. Many talked at length, even on two, three, or four occasions. I am especially
indebted to Victor Urquidi, a distinguished Mexican economist whose career in the public
sector and academia spans the decades from the 1940s to the present; to the economist and
former finance secretary Mario Ram6n Beteta, who likewise answered sometimes tough
questions on numerous occasions; to Julio Rodolfo Moctezuma, also a former finance
secretary, who talked with me for hours (there were three cassettes to transcribe!) a few
months before his untimely death; and to Guillermo Barnes, a younger ex-official who
gave me introductions when I most needed them at the beginning. These four were
associated with the Finance Ministry, but officials associated with the economic left, such
as Javier Alejo or Jos6 Andres de Oteyza, and so-called political dinosaurs (a silly term),
such as Augusto G6mez Villanueva, were no less generous of their thoughts and time.
I did my best to send quotes to interviewees to check for accuracy, though I was
unable to locate a small number in the month available after finishing the thesis. I did not
ask them whether they agreed with my conclusions but only whether the specific
quotations reflected what they meant to say. In some cases the answer was no or not quite
- despite the tape recordings (nothing can be more misleading) I had unintentionally
distorted what they meant - and as best I could, I corrected these problems. A few who had
talked on the record asked me to take interviews off the record, but in the end all but one
happily left everything on the record. Even in the case of that individual, who did not
dispute the quotes' accuracy, I left them on the record. (A few individuals' remarks were
originally off the record, and of course they stayed that way.) I was adamant about keeping
citations on the record: I want to attribute remarks to individuals not only so I can be held
accountable for verifiable statements, but also because the right story is often elusive. Two
credible sources say one thing; four say another; and it is not a question of dissembling but
of genuinely different perspectives and understandings. Though I reach my conclusions, it
is important that readers and future scholars know who said what.
However, I do not mean to implicate anyone I interviewed in any of my arguments,
and this is not just the usual boilerplate. I know I quote individuals in paragraphs where I
reach conclusions that they sharply disagree with (even if the quotations per se are
correct): they sometimes told me so. Far more might they disagree with my theories about
elite cooperation, elite struggle, and economic policymaking. To repeat, these theories do
not derive from anyone I interviewed; I do not speak for one political current or another. If
my ideas received an impetus from any Mexican, it was Jorge Castafieda in The
Inheritance (La herencia), a bestseller available to read (I did not interview him). But I
formulated and presented my basic ideas (not to say that they did not evolve) in a
colloquium in February 1999 before it came out. The thinking is mine, right or wrong.
I will only very briefly acknowledge gratitude to friends and family. The entire
Ortiz family of the Casa Gonzailez helped to make Mexico City my second home, indeed a
city that I came to love for all its problems, as did the Pueblita family during an earlier
stay. My parents Mark and Marion and my sisters Kate and Ellen must have been
concerned more than a few times when I abandoned a 15-year journalism career do to a
Ph.D. in political science. Their sustained support has meant more than they know. My
cats deserve credit for enduring one rather long stay in Mexico City, where the feline world
is as fierce as the rush-hour traffic. My friend Pam Varley considerately looked after them
in Boston the second time I went to Mexico, even if her dog was not precisely pleased.

Chapter 1
Introduction: Politics at the Heart of the State
The defining characteristic of economic crises, such as struck many Latin American
nations in the 1980s, the European Monetary System in 1992, and East Asia in the late
1990s, is a crash in the value of the national currency. Since the exchange rate links the
domestic economy to the world, such a crash can produce enormous ruin. In December
1994 the dollar value of Mexicans' bank accounts plummeted to less than half what it had
been days earlier. The banks, which had taken out what seemed at the time cheap foreign
loans,' now needed more than twice as many pesos to repay them, so they raised interest
rates to astronomical heights, for example, driving mortgages, variable-rate in Mexico, to
over 100 percent a year. Of course, no one who could pay 100 percent interest would have
mortgaged a house in the first place. Some committed suicide; most realized that, under
Mexican law, it can take a bank five years to foreclose, and the owner has a right to buy
the house back at auction, so along with many commercial borrowers, they just defaulted.
The banking system failed, and bailing it out cost Mexican taxpayers $100 billion dollars.
Meanwhile, as always, devaluation ignited inflation. Essential imported inputs,
ranging from semiconductors for computing equipment to corn for tortillas (Mexico is not
self-sufficient in basic grains), suddenly cost twice as many pesos as before, so firms that
had to buy them raised the prices they charged consumers. Mexicans' spending power
eroded as price increases, led by prices of basic necessities, outpaced wages, in a cycle that
continued long after the crash. For example, in late 1996 wages increased 15 percent, as
agreed in a government-business-labor "pact" to control inflation, but prices rose faster.
The Mexico City Metro fare went up 30 percent, the fare on minibuses went up 25 to 50
percent (depending on the distance traveled). Just taking the minibus and subway to and
from work could eat up a quarter of the daily minimum wage. Though the concentrated
export sector grew rapidly in the second half of the 1990s, by 2000 real the minimum wage
was barely more than half what it had been before the crisis (Aguayo 2000, 199).
Economic stability, that is, avoiding crisis, is critical for sustaining growth in
developing countries. Whatever else can be said about the "Washington consensus" that
promoted freeing trade, deregulating markets, and selling off state enterprises, it distracted
attention from the real scourge, economic crises. Overall, neither trade barriers nor the
portion of the economy controlled by the state sector had any significant effect on growth
across developing nations from 1974 through 1995 (Rodrik 1999, 137-39). Some of the
most protectionist economies did badly, while others such as India maintained or increased
their growth rates (Rodrik 1999, 75). However, economic instabilities that provoke and are
provoked by crises - high inflation and black-market premiums for the currency -
undermined growth at better than the 99 percent confidence level.
In defining a crisis economists usually do not distinguish between an uncontrolled
crash and a planned devaluation - they just gauge the percentage by which the value of the
currency falls (Esquivel and Larraifn 1998, 10-11)2 - but there is a difference. A planned
' On Mexican banks* foreign borrowing, see CAirdenas 1996, 189; Sachs 1998, 249.
2 Some economists also count a speculative attack on a currency as a crisis even if it is unsuccessful, but
determining whether such an unsuccessful speculative attack has occurred is difficult (Esquivel and Larrain
devaluation, when financial authorities decide to make the local currency exchange for
fewer U.S. cents (or other hard currency), and make the new parity stick, can be harsh
indeed. But there is a political difference between one government that makes an economic
decision and another that cedes the decision, willy-nilly, to currency speculators, and there
is an economic difference, too. Mexico's planned devaluation in April 1954 provided the
basis for two decades of stable growth and has never been called a crisis; its botched effort
to devalue in December 1994, which collapsed in an uncontrolled crash, has always been
considered a crisis. A planned devaluation is a painful measure to stabilize an economy. A
currency crash, which like any financial crash exceeds all warranted bounds - the Bank of
Mexico would say that it "withdrew from the foreign exchange market" (Urquidi), 3 letting
the peso plunge as far as speculation would take it - is an economic crisis.
Economic crises are such wide-reaching societal disasters that, not surprisingly,
most efforts to explain their political causes focus on comparably wide-reaching
relationships between state and society, such as powerful interest groups' capturing the
state, or failure of the underlying industrial model. However, the causes of economic crises
can be far more circumscribed, if not less powerful. Politics at the heart of the Mexican
state - politics within a small circle of high officials, not reducible to interests of broader
societal factions - was for decades critical to economic stability or crisis.
In the 1950s and 1960s competing grupos, cliques within the Mexican political
elite united more by career, educational, and family ties than by ideology, maintained a
"cooperative" system: The grupo whose leader won the ruling party's internal contest for
presidential nomination (and automatically won the proforma election) would do better,
but - the feature that defined cooperation - even losing grupos could expect to survive.
Some members would retain high public posts and would be contenders for the presidency
the next time. This expectation of political survival forged a mutual interest in the system's
long-term stability and allowed the state to avert economic crisis.
In the 1970s and 1980s "struggle" emerged as internal contests over presidential
succession grew increasingly all-or-nothing. Since losers expected to be and were expelled
from politics, these internal succession conflicts trumped concerns about economic
stability. As the presidential nomination approached in the fifth year of each six-year
administration, rival grupos within the party engaged in massive public spending and other
economic gambles to build support for their leaders to be chosen as the candidate. In the
sixth, final year of each administration, when elections were held, public spending was
always slashed and other harsh measured were taken to stabilize the economy - now real
control over power was no longer in dispute - but economic crises erupted. 5
1998, 10). And I specifically want to distinguish between states that can avoid an uncontrolled currency
collapse, despite an attack, and those that cannot.
I Whenever I quote or cite an individual without giving a written source, the information comes from a
personal, on-the-record interview. The dates and locations of each interview are given in the bibliography, so
to avoid literally hundreds of repetitions, I omit them in the text.
4 As discussed later, most scholars refer to camarillas, but the term connotes more nearly a mafia than a
political group in everyday Mexican. Grupo politico, orjust grupo, the word used by politicians themselves
and in ordinary conversation, seems preferable.
5 My argument shares something with the "elite settlement" literature, which sees bargains among major elite
factions as essential to consolidating democracy (see Field. Higley, and Burton 1990; Burton and Higley
1987; Field and Higley 1985).
This is a story of elite politics writ large. It focuses on a particular nation in a
particular era: Mexico from 1952, when the ruling-party system was consolidated, through
1988, when it faced its first real threat at the ballot box. Since during that period the ruling
party always won elections by landslides (the opposition never got more than 15 percent of
the vote and never even effectively protested electoral fraud) and incorporated key societal
groups (the principal labor, peasant, and middle-class organizations belonged to the party
and were largely manipulated by it), elite politics mattered more than in most nations at
most times. But there is a general point, too. No matter how deep one looks within the
state, one cannot find some inner core exempt from politics, some unitary leviathan that
only needs to manage politics between itself and society. On the contrary, the heart of the
state has its own politics, its cliques that are not mere reflections of external societal
pressures, but have important mutual relationships. Indeed, societal interests tend to endure
and reassemble, while elite factions survive or die politically. When such factions fear for
their political existence, other considerations come second. If all such factions can expect
to survive even though they lose a particular succession contest, then their common
interest in the system's long-term prospects helps sustain stability.
The economics of crises
For all the diversity of economic crises, their basic mechanics share commonalities.
Financial panic always drives the crisis per se. Although accounts of how it provokes
crises, notably Charles P. Kindleberger's Manias, Panics, and Crises, are nothing new, and
the phenomenon itself is as old as capitalism, only in the 1990s did economists develop
formal "second-generation" models showing that self-reinforcing financial panic can drain
a nation's hard-currency reserves and cause an exchange-rate crisis, even if nothing is
fundamentally wrong with its economy (Obstfeld 1996). The analogy is to a run on a bank
that is solvent, in that it has ample income to pay depositors in the long term, but illiquid,
in that it cannot pay them all at once (Sachs 1998, 249-50). Actually, all banks are illiquid
in this sense. What banks do is accept short-term deposits, in checking and savings
accounts, and issue long-term loans such as mortgages. Since they cannot call those loans
if there is a run, they would be at continual risk of collapse did not the Federal Reserve (or
other central bank) stand behind them as a lender of last resort.
In effect, developing nations have no lender of last resort. Of course, their central
banks act as lenders of last resort for debts in their own currencies, but for their debts in
hard currencies, which often run into the tens or hundreds of billions of dollars, they
obviously cannot. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) sometimes lends a limited
amount of hard currency if a nation commits itself in negotiations to accept a string of
"conditionalities," but to stop a run, a lender of last resort must lend immediately and
unconditionally. If a core of speculators starts trading the local currency for dollars (or
other hard currency), no matter how irrational their initial impetus, others will rationally
fear that the central bank may soon be out of reserves; whether the nation is solvent and
could service loans in the long term is irrelevant. They follow suit demanding dollars, the
central bank does run out, and the currency crashes. The Asia crisis has been explained as
this kind of problem. Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs (1998, 2) say: "International
financial markets demonstrate a high degree of intrinsic instability, or to put things another
way, the East Asian crisis is as much a crisis of Western capitalism as Asian capitalism."
If this explanation of the Asia crisis is correct, contagion caused financial panic in
most countries: Thailand, which arguably had economic problems (Eichengreen 1999,
145), suffered a crisis, so nervous investors started pulling funds from other countries that
were nearby or seen as similar, and the panic spread, causing crises. Domestic political
shocks can likewise cause a crisis. For example, when Mexican President Adolfo L6pez
Mateos declared in 1960, not long after the Cuban Revolution, that his was a government
"of the extrcme left within the Constitution," he hoped to placate leftists who supported
Castro and, at the same time, placate the private sector by promising no constitutional
change. But nobody paid attention to "within the Constitution"; capital flight took off; and
the government avoided a crash only by spending months restoring business confidence.
Since unstable international financial markets allow economic crises to occur -
monetary flows dwarf trade, approaching 10 percent of the world's annual output every
day (Eatwell and Taylor 1998b, 4) - a better global financial architecture could certainly
help prevent them (Kindleberger 1986, Eichengreen 1999, Eatwell and Taylor 2000). As
George Soros says, "Stability can be preserved only if a deliberate effort is made to
preserve it" (1997, 51). Barry Eichengreen notes that there is "no shortage" of such
proposals: "The French government has one, the German government has one, the
Canadian government has one, the US government has one" (1999, 1) as do the IMF, the
G-7, the G-22, George Soros, and Barry Eichengreen. Proposals include better financial
regulation and "transparency" (though such efforts are inevitably trying to catch up with
the last crisis, not anticipating the next one), controls on capital flows to slow panics (since
panic can be self-reinforcing, merely slowing it can provide time to prevent a crisis, not
just postpone it), and a global lender of last resort (unlikely to be implemented any time
soon). The global financial architecture matters. Since the erosion of the Bretton Woods
system of fixed exchange rates, which maintained unusual financial stability in the 1950s
and 1960s, growth rates have fallen by a third (Eatwell and Taylor 1998a, 1) - and they
will look worse after the current worldwide recession.
However, global financial architecture is a limited instrument. Neither Bretton
Woods nor the pre-World War I gold standard, the most successful such architectures,
prevented repeated crises in developing nations. While there were none in Mexico in the
1950s and 1960s, in Argentina failed efforts to stabilize the economy ended in four
military coups (against Peron in 1955, Frondizi in 1962, Illia in 1966, and Onganfa in
1970), while in Brazil they culminated in a president's suicide (Vargas in 1954), another's
resignation (Quadros in 1961), and a military coup (against Goulart in 1964). Conversely,
Mexico erupted in crisis in 1982 even though oil revenues cushioned it from the worst
economic shock (contrary to a popular misimpression, its oil revenues continued to
increase through 1982 despite a price dip), while South Korea, an oil-importer hit by
powerful external shock, avoided crisis (Rodrik 1999, 78). Though in theory panic alone
can cause crises, in practice, it usually strikes nations with economic problems. As
Eichengreen notes, national policies "still determine whether or not the economy strays
into the zone of vulnerability" where crises are likely (1999, 138).
The IMF has traditionally blamed poor "macroeconomic fundamentals" for pushing
economies into a vulnerable zone. This problem arises from the relationship between the
money economy - cash, credit, finance - and the "real" economy of goods such as
automobiles or hair cuts. To increase their purchasing power, unions seek higher wages,
middle-class groups press for welfare benefits, or business interests lobby for subsidies.
The usual metaphor referring to these as conflicts over income "distribution" is
unavoidable but, it is worth noting, not quite apt because it suggests conflicts over dividing
up a physical quantity of goods. In fact, the conflict is over that far more fungible thing,
money promising a quantity of goods, which can grow rather faster than the goods
themselves. Governments in developing nations have typically caused this problem when
they run large budget deficits - paying more in welfare benefits, business subsidies, wages
to state workers, and other expenses than they collect in taxes and other revenue - by
"printing" money. They not only literally print bills but write checks on their accounts at
the central bank that exceed deposits (they have usually had unlimited authority to so), so
that, as individuals and firms deposit those checks in their bank accounts and write more
checks, the amount of money in circulation increases. 6 Governments may also run deficits
and print money to compensate for shocks such as natural disasters (recovering from an
earthquake or hurricane can put serious financial pressure on poor countries) or external
shocks (a U.S. interest-rate hike can suddenly increase the cost of servicing debt).
If the money supply, the monetary promise of output, is thus allowed to rise faster
than real output, the disparity will somehow be closed. Inflation is the typical way to break
the promise: people get the money - paper wages, paper profits, paper welfare benefits -
but its value erodes, so they do not get the goods.7 Moderate inflation is not a mortal
problem, but it can lead to one: overvaluation. The central bank has typically fixed the
local currency against a hard currency such as the dollar, or at least kept the exchange rate
within some band, to anchor the economy - firms know how much local currency they will
need to import industrial inputs or service foreign loans, investors know how much interest
they will earn on domestic bonds compared with foreign ones. The problem arises if the
prices of domestically made goods rise because of inflation, while a relatively fixed
exchange rate holds the prices of imports down, so everyone tries to get a better deal by
buying imports. As one Mexican ex-finance secretary is said to have joked, very seriously,
you can measure overvaluation by the length of the line to cross the border in Tijuana to
shop. If it is half an hour, the exchange rate is fine; if it is two hours, the peso is
overvalued; if it is three hours, crisis is imminent (Cirdenas 1996, 194). The surge of
imports and decline of a country's exports, as the overvalued exchange rate makes them
more expensive abroad, open a trade deficit. To cover it, the government has to spend its
hard-currency reserves or take out foreign loans.
At some point speculators may doubt that the government can or will continue
spending and borrowing dollars to maintain the exchange rate, so they start selling their
domestic stocks, bonds, or other financial assets and turn in their pesos, or other local
currency, for dollars to stash in Miami or Switzerland. When they thus attack the peso,
hard-currency reserves really plummet. At some point the central bank can no longer
secure dollars to keep exchanging for pesos, so the currency does crash (Krugman 1979).
Debates about the economic causes of crises do not center so much on what generic
mechanisms can produce them as on which mechanism contributed the most in a given
6 If the government borrows from the private sector, the effect may not be inflationary, but financial markets
in developing nations are typically thin, and large budget deficits are mostly covered by printing money.
7 Inflation increases with the velocity at which money changes hands as well as with the money supply. The
typical IMF assumption that velocity is constant may often be incorrect (Taylor 1988, 11), but there is little
disagreement that massive budget deficits and monetary creation can lead to inflation and crises.
case,8 and each culprit carries its political agenda. Self-reinforcing panic, spreading from
one nation to another, points to an inadequate international financial architecture, hence
blames the financial interests and governments of advanced nations for failing to
strengthen it. Poor macroeconomic fundamentals blame profligate governments of
developing nations, while external shocks blame actors such as the Federal Reserve,
which, for example, doubled global interest rates in 1979. The IMF blames the Asia Crisis
partly on inadequate financial supervision (IMF staff 1998, 18-19) - domestic financial
bubbles and crashes can erupt in exchange-rate crises as speculators flee the currency -
while others blame the IMF for pushing financial deregulation too fast.
Political explanations of crises
Though there have been a few efforts unravel how the politics of financial regulation - and
deregulation - can lead to economic crises,9 the overwhelmingly dominant approach to
explaining domestic political causes of economic crises has focused on the poor
macroeconomic fundamentals of budget deficits, inflation, and overvaluation, and the
distributive conflicts that can lie behind them. Political economy literature has taken this
approach in part because it is relatively feasible. Even if external shocks are present, the
effects of macroeconomic fundamentals can be distinguished. For example, the effect of
higher global interest rates on government deficits via debt payments can be separated
from the effect of increased public spending on business subsidies or welfare programs
without corresponding revenue. Virtually no one has sought political causes of financial
panic per se. No doubt this is partly because panic often has external causes such as the
contagion in Asia, and when the causes are domestic, as with L6pez Mateos' infamous
remark about his government of the extreme left, they may be only part of the picture and
hard to relate to other economic policymaking. Also, when macroeconomic fundamentals
are sound, as in Mexico in 1960, panic is easier to control.
There are two different but overlapping ways of understanding the effects of
distributive conflicts on macroeconomic fundamentals: First, are societal interests, such as
unions, business groups, and political parties, organized so as to minimize distributive
conflicts or aggravate them? Do institutions of conflict management help limit monetary
promises of goods - wages, profits, public spending - to the volume of goods really
produced? Second, how autonomous is the state from distributive conflicts? Even if
societal pressures for excessive monetary promises of output cannot be really resolved, is
there adequate state autonomy to resist or repress them?'o
8 For example, Eichengreen 1999, 143-169; Radelet and Sachs 1998; and Krugman 1998 evaluate how well
competing theories apply to the Asia crisis; Eichengreen and Wyplosz 1993 do the same for the European
Monetary System crisis of 1992; and Taylor 1988, 75-143; Kahler 1985, 358-59; and Golub 1991 do the
same for the 1980s wave of developing nations' crises.
9 An excellent example is Kessler (1998) on economic problems that contributed to Mexico's 1994 crisis.
10 I omit in this chapter theories about structural economic problems, namely the "exhaustion" of import
substitution and the "fiscal crisis of the state." They are used to explain some of Mexico's and other Latin
American crises of the 1970s and 1980s but are rather unlike most of the political economy literature, so
rather than complicating the discussion here, I focus on them separately in chapter 2.
After the Asia crisis, it was widely argued that, as Dani Rodrik puts it, "democratic
institutions are the institutions of conflict management par excellence" (1999, 84)."
Democracy, he says, was critical in nations that best weathered the Asian crisis:
First, [it] facilitated a smooth transfer of power from a discredited set of politicians to a new group of
government leaders. Second, democracy imposed mechanisms of participation, consultation, and
bargaining, enabling policymakers to fashion the consensus needed to undertake the necessary policy
adjustments decisively. Third, because democracy provides for institutionalized 'voice,' the South
Korean and Thai institutions obviated the need for riots, protests, and other kinds of disruptive
actions. (1999, 92)
Oddly, until the mid-1980s - the fall of the Eastern Bloc seemed to mark a shift in attitude
- the usual thinking was that democracy destabilizes economies by giving voice to
demands for immediate consumption. 12 Stephan Haggard, while not entirely subscribing to
the itheory, summed it up neatly: "Distributional coalitions flourish in democracies; only
strong states can tame them" (1985, 510). Certainly, many democracies or supposed
democracies - Chile before its 1973 military coup, Russia in the 1990s - have plunged into
economic crisis, while many authoritarian regimes - South Korea in the 1970s and 1980s,
Mexico in the 1950s and 1960s - have enjoyed sustained stability.
Democracy is too broad a category to be useful in this discussion, but particular
types of democratic institutions may manage conflict better. In the 1970s, when the tug and
pull of American pluralism was thought.to cause inflation, the "democratic corporatism" of
European nations such as Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, or
Austria, where encompassing "peak associations" represented labor and business groups in
centralized bargaining, came to be seen as the successful way to manage conflict. These
institutions were specifically seen as effective in avoiding currency crises because of their
ability to implement firm wage and price controls and thus maintain macroeconomic
stability (Katzenstein 1985, 95). If organized in peak associations that understand their
responsibility for long-term economic success, lkbor and business are more likely to agree
to real wage increases in line with productivity improvement; monetary promises of output
rise with real output. Conversely, many competing interest groups that vie to boost wages,
profits, welfare, and subsidies are seen as exerting powerful distributive pressures. Since
no particular wage bargain or business subsidy has discernible effect on the national
economy, no one group cares much, or even can do much, about overall inflation. Leaders
that secure smaller benefits are just blamed for being ineffective.
Because corporatism channels societal pressures through centralized associations
likely to be unresponsive to their members, it may improve governability at some sacrifice
of democracy. Philippe Schmitter argues that its "very success at keeping political life ruly
and effective has been purchased at the price of . . . disregard for the individualistic norms
of citizen participation and accountability characteristic of a liberal democratic order"
(1981, 323). Corporatism is quite compatible with undemocratic regimes. Not unlike Spain
and Portugal while they were fascist, several authoritarian Latin American nations were
seen as organized along "state corporatist" lines, incorporating societal groups into official
sectors (Stepan 1978). In particular, the Mexican Workers Federation, National Peasants
Federation, and National Federation of Popular Organizations (middle-class and
professional associations), incorporated into the ruling party in the 1930s, are widely
" Similarly. Jeffrey A. Frankel (1998) and Martin Lee (1998), chairman of Hong Kong's Democratic Party.
12 Samuel Huntington (1968) helped launch this idea. See also O'Donnell 1973; Skidmore 1977; Goldthorpe
1978, 202; Lindberg 1985, 45; Kaufman 1985, 489.
thought to have improved the government's ability to resolve distributive conflicts and
sustain more stable macroeconomic policies (Haggard and Kaufman 1992b, 293).
The way political parties are organized may affect the state's ability to manage
distributive conflict. Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman argue that parties based on
strong class or ideological divisions promote "bidding wars" as candidates vie with each
other to buy electoral support. A quintessential example would be the sharply split Chilean
electorate before 1973 (1992b, 295): the Conservative landed oligarchy and big business
on the right, the Christian Democratic center of small business and professionals, and the
working-class Socialist and Communist left. In such a situation, bidding wars for votes
"reinforce cleavages among social groups and undermine efforts to maintain
macroeconomic discipline" (1992b, 271). Conversely, a system of two "broad catchall
parties" based on multi-class coalitions more along U.S. lines, as in Colombia or Costa
Rica, discourages politicians from appealing to narrow class or societal interests (1992b,
279-80). Such parties "are capable of sustaining macroeconomic stability [because they]
mute the conflicts among contending social forces, facilitate relatively stable ruling
majorities, and thus discourage abrupt swings in policy" (1992b, 271-72).
Such arguments about institutions of conflict management consider how to
peacefully resolve distributive conflicts among social interests, but it is not always
necessary to resolve them; controlling or quashing them may do quite well. Rodrik writes
that South Korea, hit in the early 1980s by a much worse external shock than Mexico or
Argentina (both of which have oil), nevertheless took harsh measures to avoid crisis while
they succumbed to it: "Adjustment was swift and somehow nonpoliticized" (1999, 81).
Nonpoliticized, indeed! The state slashed government spending, fired many public-sector
workers, eliminated farming subsidies, broke national unions, cut real manufacturing
wages 10 percent, and, in case anyone objected, jailed political opponents (Haggard 1990,
134-36; Amsden 1989, 101-105). But Korea avoided economic crisis and resumed rapid
growth, while Mexico and Argentina, along with most of Latin America, suffered the "lost
decade" of the 1980s.
Thus the other line of thought about the politics of macroeconomic stability: even if
institutions do not in any real sense resolve distributive conflicts, can the state control
them? Is it "autonomous" enough to impose necessary sanctions? Economists' perennial
call for independent central banks that resist inflationary pressures is one form of the idea,
but it is also applied to economically activist states. For example, Chalmers Johnson argues
that the success of East Asian states depended on protecting economic managers from
politics: "Political leaders reign, holding off interest-group pressures that would undermine
economic growth and performing safety-valve functions, while a technocratic,
economically rational bureaucracy.., actually rules.... [W]henever the politicians have
tried both to reign and rule, economic disaster has followed" (1986, 560, 563). Haggard
and Kaufman similarly conclude that while states threatened by coups and regime changes
are vulnerable to economic instability, "strong authoritarian governments [that] have
managed either to establish dominant party systems or to proscribe electoral politics
entirely over extended periods of time" are better at maintaining stability (1992b, 271).
Peter Evans (1995) identifies the principal characteristics of the autonomous state.
It may have its panoplies of political institutions - the presidency, military, and congress -
but an elite corps of officials, a bureaucracy in the sense that Weber used the term, must
really manage the economy. They should be recruited and promoted on merit within a
civil-service system; should enjoy long-term careers (not move in and out of the private
sector); and should be rewarded basedon those careers (not bribes or external pressures).
They should share a common purpose and commitment, forged perhaps during their
education at a prominent national university. Ideally, Evans argues, this autonomous elite
should be attentive to the private sector - in this case state autonomy is "embedded" - but
communications should occur in formal meetings, not on social occasions such as business
lunches that lend themselves to bribery and influence peddling. Evans sees embedded
autonomy, such as typified by the Korean state in the 1970s and 1980s, as the key to
economic success (1995, 12, 49, 58-59), and several authors specifically attribute
macroeconomic stability to state autonomy along the lines he describes (Nelson 1990a, 21
Nelson 1990b, 341; Haggard and Kaufman 1989, 269-70; Remmer 1993, 402).
Methods of investigation
Identifying the political causes of economic crises and requisites of avoiding it is a tricky
proposition. The first question about the way I do so in the case of Mexico is whether my
definition of a crisis as an uncontrolled crash, when the government abandons any attempt
to manage the exchange rate, might arbitrarily bias the whole project. It does not because
there is no important disagreement over when crises occurred. No economic study of
Mexico disagrees that they erupted in 1976, 1982, and 1994,13 and no one refers to the
1954 devaluation (or any other episode in the era before 1970) as a crisis. What happened
in 1987 could be debated. There was a controlled exchange rate for major industrial
imports and a free exchange rate for most other purposes. On November 18 the Bank of
Mexico let the controlled rate fall' 4 until it reached a par with the uncontrolled rate
(Cirdenas 1996, 148). By economic measures the crisis was severe,15 but unlike in the
other cases, the Bank of Mexico did not allow reserves to be depleted, and afterwards the
government carried out a successful stabilization. It is most sensible to call 1987 a crisis
followed by a stabilization. In any event, what it is called does not matter greatly because
domestic politics cannot be said to have caused it. Non-political factors, namely the
October 1987 U.S. stock market crash on top of a disastrous economy since 1982, weighed
heavily. Politics did, however, contribute to inflating the economy before the crisis and can
usefully be examined without attributing the crisis to it.
Any effort to understand the political causes of economic crisis is complicated by
the fact that non-political factors always play some role. If not for financial panic, which
ultimately arises from investors' psychology, a c:isis would not be a crisis. Sidney
Weintraub (2001) tries to decide which causes of crises are the most critical essentially by
summarizing external factors (adverse shocks, financial contagion) and internal political
factors (excessive budget deficits and monetary growth, irrational policies) and then
pronouncing on which type appears more important. But the two types cannot really be
13 Not only was the fall in value of the peso large; an index incorporating the percentage fall in the value of
the currency, the percentage rise in interest rates, and the decline in the ratio of foreign reserves to domestic
monetary aggregates also indicates "severe" crises in 1976, 1982, 1987, and 1994 (Heath 1999, 7).
14 Technically, the exchange rate, defined as the number of pesos per dollar, rose. But to avoid this
counterintuitive way of speaking, I follow some economists such as Eichengreen, who in effect use the
opposite definition, the amount of U.S. currency per dollar, and speak of the exchange rate as falling when
the currency is devalued.
15 Heath's index classifies 1987 as more severe than 1976 and less severe than 1982; 1994 was the worst.
weighed against each other; they are fundamentally different; there is no commensurate
scale. If both kinds of factors can be identified, then both are the cause.
Even if domestic political factors never fully cause a crisis, explaining them is
useful. As Eichengreen argues, financial panic does not often attack an otherwise sound
economy. To put it differently, a better international financial architecture could reduce the
damage that financial panic causes, but as long as it has yet to be built - and at least since
the early 1700s no international financial architecture has been adequate to prevent crises
such as the South Sea Bubble and the Bank of Ayr collapse (Kindleberger 1989, 250) -
governments had better do what they can to maintain stability. Thus, understanding what
politics helps maintain stability or cause crises is valuable.
In particular, understanding the domestic politics of Mexico's 1976 and 1982 crises
is useful because, for all the dispute about them, almost no one disputes the importance of
internal causes. 16 In effect, since it is not under debate, I need not debate it. It is worth
noting that Mexico is a special case in this regard. The broader Latin American debt crisis
after 1982 was caused in good part by external shocks, particularly the Federal Reserve's
precipitous 1979 interest-rate increase to "whip inflation" and declining commodity export
prices (Fishlow 1990), but the general argument does not apply well to Mexico. It only
took on dangerous levels of debt in 1981 (Buffie 1990, 442, Lustig 1998, 21) - more than a
year after the Fed had already raised rates - and though oil prices dipped modestly in 1981,
its total oil export revenues rose almost 50 percent that year, then another 13 percent in
1982 (Cirdenas 1996, 142). Moreover, the Mexican crisis could not have been caused by
financial contagion spreading from other countries because it was the first.
Why not just look for the political causes of sound or unsound macroeconomic
fundamentals, rather than of economic stability or crisis per se? In the Mexican case, it
would mean looking at the same events anyway. But if one wants to explain economic
crisis, trying to designate some macroeconomic danger zone as a proxy for it only
complicates matters. There are many macroeconomic fundamentals to consider, such as
budget deficits, money creation, inflation, current-account deficits, and overvaluation. How
would one construct a formula that designated some combination of fundamentals as
sound, others poor? Where would one draw the line? Economists have not found anything
remotely close to a confident answer (Esquivel and Larrain 1998, 36-37). One reason such
a line could never be drawn as that some critical domestic factors behind crises are
unrelated to macroeconomic fundamentals and should be considered in their own right. For
example, when oil prices dipped in June 1981, Mexico's president fired the director of
Pemex for lowering its prices along with the rest of the world, then Mexico proceeded to
raise its price, demanding more per barrel and losing half its market for a few months. As
the private sector concluded that economic policymaking had become completely
16 Bazdresch and Levy 1991, Buffie 1990, Cirdenas 1996, Heath 1999, Maddison 1992. Newell and Rubio
1984, Reynolds 1977, Solis 1981, and Zedillo 1985. The "exhaustion of import substitution" argument
(Boltvinik and Hern6ndez Laos 1981 and others) discussed and rejected in chapter 2 for the Mexican case,
points to internal causes. The "fiscal crisis of the state" (Fitzgerald 1978), also discussed and rejected in
chapter 2 for the Mexican case, sees the international economic system as causing internal fiscal deficits. Ros
(1987) sees the 1982 crisis as a mixture of internal and external causes. Lustig (1998, 26), citing sources
across the political spectrum, says, "Most analysts agree that the [1982] Mexican crisis was the result of
expansionary government policies that resulted in higher inflation and a growing balance-off-payments
disequilibrium." However she says that worldwide recession contributed to the 1976 crisis (1998, 19).
irrational, billions of dollars fled the country. The power struggle that lay behind this oil-
price fiasco and contributed directly to the 1982 crisis needs to be considered.
My investigation would be in trouble if Mexico avoided crises in the 1950s and
1960s just because the global economy in that era, under the Bretton Woods system of
fixed exchange rates, was more stable. But that cannot have been the only reason. As
mentioned, even under Bretton Woods and the pre-World War I gold standard, the most
stable eras for the international economy, poor nations suffered repeated crises. Moreover,
Mexico avoided crises despite that fact that it was unusually vulnerable. The peso was
always freely convertible to the dollar and Mexico did not control flows of financial
capital, 17 even during the post-World War II era when many advanced nations such as
France and Germany, let alone nearly all developing nations, did exercise such controls.
Mexico always faced the dangers of capital flight that have increased in most of the world
since the 1970s. Ernesto Fernandez Hurtado, a Bank of Mexico official since the early
1940s and its director from 1970 to 1976, says, "Any international crisis or internal crisis
of confidence could affect us. We had to manage the economy with exquisite care."
Mexico might have fallen victim to numerous crises in the 1950s and 1960s.' In
the early 1950s, as inflation reached 30 percent, the peso became overvalued, and reserves
kept falling - by $42 million dollars in 1953 (Cirdenas 1994, table A-21), and $43 million
in the first few months of 1954 (Alemin Velasco 1997, 247) - the finance minister became
convinced there would be a crisis if he did not devalue. 19 In 1958-59, after the most
powerful Mexican strike wave of the second half of the twentieth century provoked capital
flight, the government had to go to the IMF for a loan to avoid crisis (Ortiz Mena 1998,
86-87). L6pez Mateos' ill-calculated remark about his being an administration of the
extreme left provoked more capital flight, indicated by $200 million dollars of "errors and
omissions" in the 1961 balance-of-payments accounts, as the Harvard economist Raymond
Vernon noted: "Only heavy fresh credits from the Export-Import Bank and other public
sources saved the Mexican peso from crisis" (1963, 122). In 1963-64, contenders for the
ruling party's presidential nomination surreptitiously borrowed at least $200 million
dollars abroad and spent them on investment projects to build support, causing inflation
that could well have led to a crisis (chapter 3). Anti-authoritarian protests in 1968 ended in
the slaughter of perhaps hundreds of demonstrators at Tlatelolco Square, but while Paris
protests that same year contributed to macroeconomic instability and devaluation, the peso
remained so stable that the IMF used it in a loan package to support the French franc (Ortiz
Mena 1998, 114). Indeed, between 1965 and 1970 the IMF used the peso to support
17 Lance Taylor wrote in 1984 that Mexico was "virtually the only developing country in which the
economically powerful classes have the privilege of such an open capital market" (Maxfield 1990, 75). The
usual explanation is that the 2000-mile border with the United States made currency or capital controls
impossible to enforce (Maxfield 1990, 72). I find this idea implausible - even in the nineteenth century major
capital flight took the form of transfers between banks, not bandits running briefcases of hundred-dollar bills
across the Rio Grande - but I am not sure what the real reason is. Perhaps it had to do with the powerful
Mexican banking sector's ability to survive the Revolution and shape financial legislation. In any event, the
only post-revolutionary attempt to enforce exchange controls was abandoned in the 1930s (ibid.).
18 Ortiz Mena, Izquierdo, Urquidi, Carrillo Gamboa, Romero P6rez, Carvajal, and others describe these
episodes, as detailed in chapter 4.
Finance Minister Antonio Carrillo Flores noted in the February 2, 1954, entry in his diary (provided by his
son, Emilio Carrillo Gamboa) that he had been worried since the previous August or September about the
possibility of a crisis unless he devalued. Numerous subsequent entries discuss the same worries.
currencies including the Canadian dollar and British pound (Ortiz Mena 1998, 114, 151). It
is far from obvious why Mexico enjoyed such stability.
Given that two decades of economic stability followed by two with repeated crises
call for some explanation, the next question is how to decide what caused the difference. I
focus on the era from 1952, when Mexico's ruling-party regime was consolidated, until
1988, when it faced its first serious electoral threat, because most major political
characteristics remained essentially the same. In particular, as discussed in chapter 3, the
extent of the Mexican state's autonomy from society and its institutions for resolving - or
suppressing - societal conflict did not fundamentally change. Thus, I can investigate what
could have made the difference between the period of economic stability and the period of
crises by looking for plausibly relevant political characteristics did change.
Obvious as this method seems, most efforts to investigate economic crisis and
stability in Mexico have not taken it but have overwhelmingly concentrated on explaining
what caused the crises after 1970. This one-sided search can easily go astray because it is
not hard to discover political and economic problems, especially in a poor country, and it is
a temptingly short step from discovering them to blaming crises on them. But did they
really cause the crises? By looking back at the period of economic stability, one can better
tell whether real or imagined problems actually had anything to do with the crises. Looking
for the requisites of stability is also useful because they are likely to be some fairly stable
set of characteristics. It seems doubtful that Mexico avoided crises for two decades when
most Latin American nations succumbed to them just because of a series of accidents.
Something must have been behind its success, and if that thing fell apart in about 1970,
then its loss may go a long way toward explaining the crises.
It is not necessarily easy to determine what political characteristics were essentially
stable over decades in a nation, but fortunately, there is widespread agreement about many
of the most important ones in Mexico from 1952 through 1988. As discussed in chapter 3,
the Partido Revolucionario Institutional (PRI) - the party that, in the strange political
landscape of Mexico, was seen as the institutional embodiment of the 1910 Revolution -
faced no real threats to its political dominance. By official counts, which were never
seriously challenged, it always won important elections by landslides - until the evening of
July 6, 1988, when, to the utter surprise of everyone, as discussed in chapter 8, an
opposition candidate came close to winning (or might have won but for fraud). The PRI
never faced a threat of insurrection during this period. Indeed, the authoritarian Mexican
regime outlasted any other such regime in the twentieth century except arguably the Soviet
Union (depending how one counts it), and even most democracies.
Mexican institutions of conflict resolution, or suppression, are widely agreed to
have remained robust. The party incorporated and largely controlled the most important
social organizations, from workers to peasants, architects to economists, in overarching
federations. Indeed, if anything, the state's ability to circumscribe societal protest grew
more effective during the 1970s; it changed the wrong way to explain crises. Powerful
protests erupted in the 1958-59 strike wave and the 1968 demonstrations, but the economy
remained stable. The worst economic crisis of the period, in 1982, could hardly have been
caused by societal pressures. As The Economist noted in the wake of the crisis:
Even though [President Elect Miguel] de la Madrid faced six opposition candidates in the July
election, none of them looked credible .... The urban middle classes voted en masse for the
conservative National Action party; even so, it won only 14% of the vote. The left-wing parties did
even worse. ... Outside congress, the government so thoroughly dominates the Confederation of
Mexican Workers and the National Peasant Confederation that they are ineffective lightning rods of
dissent. (September 4, 1982, 48)
Haggard and Kaufman consider Mexico one of those states where "the general security of
officeholders and the nature of party systems seem.., conducive to stable macroeconomic
policy" (1992b, 288).
It is doubtful that Mexican state fully met Evans' conditions for autonomy (if,
indeed, any state ever did), but the extent of autonomy that it did enjoy certainly was not
lost after 1970.20 High officials were always a tight-knit a group, bred in the National
University. By the 1960s and 1970s, more than 70 percent had graduated from "the
university" (Camp 1980, 78); the name did not even need to be mentioned. Here common
values were forged, as one political generation taught and recruited the next (Camp 1980,
94). Except in the Foreign Ministry, there was no civil service that made promotions based
on merit, as Evans requires, but this was as much the case before 1970 as after. And the
state maintained a certain distance from business. In contrast to the revolving door between
the university and government, there was practically none between private and public
sectors. From 1946 through 1988, only 4 to 7 percent of the individuals who moved into
high political office had been business leaders (Camp 1995a, 132; Smith 1979, 88).
The most plausible hypotheses about characteristics of Mexican politics that
changed in about 1970 and could have made the difference between economic stability and
crisis include the following: 2 1
* Cooperative rules to manage relations among grupos within the political elite, or
"revolutionary family," as it is often called, eroded in increasing power struggle.
* The Finance Ministry managed the economy independently from a separate political
arena in the 1950s and 1960s (enjoyed autonomy) but lost its independence afterwards.
* An "ideological escalation" (Hirschman 1979, 85) that spread across Latin America in
the late 1960s provoked powerful conflicts and undermined coherent policymaking.
* The state spent massively 22 to buy back political legitimacy lost when it crushed anti-
authoritarian protests in the massacre at Tlatelolco Square in Mexico City in 1968.
* President Luis Echeverrfa (1970-76) spent massively and disrupted the political system
in seeking to install a personal dynasty.
Public data is useful to a point in weighing these hypotheses. Turnover among
cabinet ministers who typically led grupos, which shows a sharp jump after 1970, tells a
lot about officials' political security. The cycle of public spending over each six-year
administration, which from the 1960s on always peaked in the fifth year when presidential
hopefuls contended for the party's nomination (not in the sixth year when elections were
held), indicates what political purposes the spending could have served. But interviews
were needed to understanding the data. For example, even though turnover surged among
20 Centeno (1994, 35-41, 46-47) argues that the Mexican state met Evans' requisites of autonomy.
21 As noted, I have omitted the argument about structural economic problems here; I discuss it, and criteria
for evaluating it as an explanation of economic crises, in chapter 2.
22 When I refer to massive spending as causing economic crisis, I always mean spending without comparable
increases in revenue. High levels of public spending do not cause inflation and crises; large budget deficits
financed by printing money do. In fact, as long as government investment is reasonably efficient and
balanced by adequate revenue (or even based on prudent borrowing), it often improves growth. Of course,
there is rarely any great political incentive to increase spending and taxes equally; major tax increases have
been powerfully resisted in Mexico, no matter how desirable the proposed uses. Thus, politicians' spending
is shorthand for giving in to pressures to spend without raising comparable revenue.
high officials after 1970, it was essential to know if they saw their careers as increasingly
unstable; only their recognizing this instability could erode cooperative norms.
On other matters interviews and memoirs were the only possible source. To decide
if Finance had political independence from some separate political arena in the 1950s and
1960s, one wants to know whether former officials say it was independent and to
understand the internal line of command by which the state responded to threats of crises.
Developments inside the political elite even bear on Tlatelolco, the state was so firmly
ensconced in power. Since the PRI never faced a threat to its continuing rule, how could
concerns about political legitimacy within a portion of the middle class - but not business,
labor, or peasants, and precious little of the state-manipulated media - turn policymaking
upside down? If important grupos inside the political elite split over Tlatelolco, rejecting
the president's repression as illegitimate, then it might become a serious political problem.
I systematically interviewed high officials from 1952-88 in agencies with different
functions and political orientations, including five of the six living ex-finance secretaries 23
from the period and all four living ex-directors of the Bank of Mexico, as well as others
from the state's financial sector. I interviewed others from often more activist ministries,
namely Planning and Budget, Presidency (not the president's office but a separate ministry
that planned investment), Industry and Commerce, and State Industries (responsible for
public enterprises); and yet others from more directly political ministries such as Interior
(charged with maintaining order and running the secret police) and Labor.24 When a high
official was deceased or unavailable, I attempted to interview a proteg6 or son in politics
who could represent his view. I also found useful written memoirs and some secondary
sources (far the most important on elite politics being Jorge Castafieda's The Inheritance:
Archaeology of Political Succession in Mexico).25
Where I found near unanimity, I report it. For example, contrary to what has long
been inferred, I discuss in chapter 6 that no important faction of the political elite split with
President Diaz Ordaz over Tlatelolco. In other cases, of course, I found disagreement, for
example over whether officials under Echeverra were more leftist than in earlier
administrations. In part because the tight-knit nature of the political elite made it extremely
difficult for outsiders to find out what was going on inside - or even for part of the elite to
know what another part was doing - much of what would seem to be a matter of fact is
debatable. Wherever there was disagreement, I have tried always to report opinions that
differ and to explain my conclusions.
23 Julio Rodolfo Moctezuma, who was extremely generous of his time and thought, died since talking with
me. The finance secretary I did not interview was Jos6 L6pez Portillo, subsequently president. His son's
account of economic policymaking during the period (L6pez Portillo Romano 1994) traces his point of view
in considerable detail - I assume accurately - along with others'.
24 Some ministries changed names several times, so to avoid confusing non-Mexican readers, I have chosen a
generic English name and stuck with it. Finance is Hacienda y Cridito Ptiblico; the Bank of Mexico is Banco
de MWxico; Planning and Budget, transformed in 1976 from what had been Presidency (here I change names
since the function changed importantly) is Programaci6n y Presupuesto; Presidency is Presidencia; Industry
and Commerce is Economia (1952-58), Industria y Comercio (1958-76), Comercio (1976-82), and Comercio
y Fomento Industrial (1982-88); State Industries is Bienes Nacionales (1952-58), Patrimonio Nacional
(1958-76), Patrimnonio y Fomento Industrial (1976-82), Energia, Minas e Inbudustria Paraestatal (1982-88);
Interior is Gobernaci6n; Labor is Trabajo y Previsi6n Social.
25 La herencia: Arqueologia de la sucesi6n presidencial en Mixico. The English version is a truncation.
Accounts of the Mexican economy are almost never based on interviews and
almost never focus on the politics among grupos.26 This double omission is not accidental:
until the mid-1990s when the ruling-party system was demonstrably on its way out,
particularly after the opposition's landslide victory in July 1997 in races for the Mexico
City mayor and council, a study like mine would have been almost impossible. In the
1980s Roberto Newell and Luis Rubio attempted to analyze elite politics but noted that its
"closed nature.., prevents a detailed analysis of the individual agreements or alliances at
different times; the allocation of resources does give a clue as to what sectors, in general,
have benefited in each sexenio" (1984, 267). Unfortunately, their very method of looking
for clues to elite politics based on what happened outside, though the only one available
when they were writing, inherently turns elite politics into a reflection of society. If elite
politics matters in its own right, interviews are essential to learning about it.
There are other powerful reasons why accounts of the Mexican economy have
usually ignored elite politics. Two economic traditions have dominated Mexican economic
thinking: Marxism, long taught at the National University, and neoclassical theory, which
gained acceptance as economists increasingly went to the United States for training.
Marxism sees the political "superstructure" as emerging from the technological base;
relations among cliques of high officials are not supposed to be great motives for good or
ill. Neoclassical economics, similar to Marxism in this regard, explains an economy in
terms of market structures and interest-group pressures. In these schemes, grupos within
the political elite are mere epiphenomenona: why bother to interview officials?
The confirmation that ideology blinded economic studies to grupos is that analyses
of most other Mexican politics, from academic research 27 to street gossip, have placed
grupos squarely in the center of events. For example, after the PRI lost the presidency in
July 2000, the great question was how the contest to control it would play out among
contending grupos: that of Francisco Labastida, former governor of Sinaloa who had won
the nomination but lost the election; Roberto Madrazo, a political boss in the state of
Tabasco who had unsuccessfully fought for the party's presidential nomination; or half a
dozen others. Why should economic policymaking be fundamentally unlike other Mexican
politics? From the 1950s through the 1980s grupos were, in some real measure,
autonomous from external constituencies, but unlike Evans' picture of the autonomous
state, they did not form an internally seamless whole. Thus, I investigate how they
managed their mutual conflicts. Could they adequately resolve them, reaching a reasonably
unified positions vis-a-vis society? Or did their internal struggles to gain the upper hand
cause or exacerbate external economic problems?
Organization of the thesis
My arguments fall into four principal themes:
* Mexico's vulnerability to crisis arose not from societal or electoral pressure but rather
from internal conflicts within the political elite, especially over presidential succession.
This vulnerability existed throughout the period from 1952 through 1988.
26 An important exception is Centeno (1994), who argues that the ascent of Salinas' tight-knit grupo made it
ossible to rapidly bury Mexico's dirigiste economic regime and adopt neoliberal policies.
For example work by Roderic Camp, Peter Smith, Rogelio HernAindez Rodriguez, Joy Langston, Francisco
Suirez Farfas, Centeno, and others discussed in chapter 5.
* A cooperative method of resolving those conflicts (all grupos could expect to survive
politically) allowed the state to avoid crises before 1970, and its erosion in elite struggle
after 1970 produced crises. The 1982 crisis was the epitome of elite struggles.
* The Echeverra administration from 1970 to 1976 was a transition period, as the earlier
cooperative era eroded in struggle. Echeverria's dynastic ambitions and mismanagement,
in a broader climate of ideological escalation, led to the erosion of elite cooperation.
* Although the rules of elite cooperation continued to be well known, restoring the
cooperative system became increasingly difficult; struggle built on itself.
Chapters 2 and 3 consider the usual arguments that socioeconomic forces caused
the crises. Chapter 2 rejects underlying "structural" economic problems in Mexico's case.
This is a popular approach to explaining crises, for example, in the view that excessively
statist economic management caused the Asia crisis. One favorite culprit in Mexico's case
is the "exhaustion of import substitution," the overuse of protectionism and other industrial
policies to promote domestic production of formerly imported goods. The other is the
"fiscal crisis of the state," as internationally connected business (both multinationals and
large domestic firms) threaten capital flight to extract subsidies and avoid paying adequate
taxes. Chapter 3 looks at how the Mexican state managed to suppress societal pressures for
income redistribution that can causes crises, how it avoided the "macroeconomics of
populism," in Rudiger Dornbusch's phrase. Much of this argument is not controversial
among Mexico scholars, yet just how the state was able to incorporate and control societal
interests in official associations is worth consideration, given the prominent role that such
interests play in most explanations of economic crisis. Chapter 3 then argues that grupos
within the political elite, particularly as they contended over the all-important presidential
succession, could exert powerful enough economic pressures to cause crises.
Chapters 4 and 5 look at why, despite this vulnerability, Mexico avoided crises in
the 1950s and 1960s. Chapter 4 rejects the possibility of Finance Ministry independence or
of any truly separate political arena. The president, defending Finance from rivals within
the government and rallying the entire state to halt threats of crisis, was the political
authority, even if he relied on finance ministers' technical expertise. Chapter 5 examines
who Mexican political elites were and how the grupo structure worked, as interlocking,
informal cliques operating principally within the central administration and prohibited
from mobilizing external societal factions. The unwritten rules of elite cooperation
established in the traumatic 1951-52 presidential succession - that grupos must not reach
out to mobilize societal pressure against the president and, in exchange, could expect
political survival - were key to avoiding crises. This promise of political survival was the
greater incentive the president could offer grupos when he curtailed their spending; it was
the coin more valuable than money itself in buying loyalty. Not only does data on turnover
in high office point to unusual career stability precisely during the 1950s and 1960s, but
officials themselves recognized that stability.
Chapter 6 considers why coiperation eroded under Echeverria. Tlatelolco did not
undermine support for the president and national government except among a limited
portion of the middle class, did not generate societal organizations remotely powerful
enough to threaten the regime, and thus did not provoke state spending to buy back
legitimacy. There were two principal problems. One was the broader Latin American
climate of ideological escalation: as political elites came to envision a great contest to
shape inevitable change, grupos feared that the stakes in winning or losing had increased,
and elite cooperation weakened. The other problem was Echeverria. Obsessed with
bringing social justice to Mexico but lacking any capacity for coherent administration, he
promoted massive, disorderly spending programs and rapidly dismissed officials when
things did not work out as he hoped. A master at behind-the-scenes machinations, he also
used massive spending and dismissed officials to try to build a dynasty - unique in the
1952-88 era - by installing a politically weak boyhood friend in the presidency.
Chapters 7 and 8 focus on elite struggle: grupos' fear of political exile, hence their
use of massive spending and other economic gambles to promote their leaders as the
party's presidential candidate, and presidents' acquiescence to such gambles in their efforts
to manage the dangerous period of political succession. Both Jos6 L6pez Portillo (1976-82)
and Miguel de la Madrid (1982-88) tried to restore political and economic order as they
saw it, but struggle continued partly because, once initiated, it built on itself - the very
informality of the old cooperative rules made them hard to restore once they had seriously
begun to erode - and partly because these presidents committed their own errors. Struggle,
not leftist big spenders or other usual culprits, caused the 1982 crisis. During the no-holds
barred 1981 presidential nomination contest, real public spending surged 26 percent of
GDP, and the public-sector deficit swelled from a precarious 5.6 percent of GDP to a
disastrous 12.0 percent of GDP. Though real public spending other than interest payments
was cut by 8 percent in the election year 1982, it was too late. Struggle cannot be said to
have caused the 1987 crisis - a deep, ongoing recession and the 1987 U.S. stock market
crash were too important - but the usual political mechanism was at work, inflating the
economy and worsening the crisis, as Carlos Salinas sent the Mexican securities market
soaring 500 percent in the nine months leading up to his presidential nomination.
Chapter 9 considers other cases where the lessons of this economic account may
apply. Some form of elite cooperation and struggle surely plays an important role in
aspects of politics everywhere that never can be fully defined by written law. Accounts
suggest that intra-elite power struggle contributed to the 1994 Mexican crisis, the 2001-
2002 Argentine crisis, and the 1997 Thai crisis. Explicit elite power-sharing pacts helped
Colombia maintain economic stability in the 1970s and 1980s and helped Bolivia end
hyperinflation that had reached 10,000 percent or more in 1985.

Chapter 2
Structural Economic Failure?
Some misconceptions about Mexico's economic crises need to be cleared away before
focusing on their causes. When an economy plunges into such a great disaster as Mexico's
did in the 1970s, it is easy to think that the disaster arose from deep "structural" economic
problems. At least early as the 1950s and 1960s, inefficient agriculture across Latin
America, seen as a legacy of colonial exploitation, was widely blamed for failing to
produce enough food to consume at home or crops such as cotton and coffee to export, and
thus as the underlying source of economic crises (Hirschman 1985, 54). After the recent
Asian crisis, even though nobody had predicted it (Krugman, 1998, 1), formal economic
models were rapidly developed to demonstrate that "crony capitalism" was to blame
(Eichengreen 1999, 138). The IMF blamed state-directed lending and failure to provide
good economic data (IMF staff 1998, 19), while Jeffrey A. Frankel, a member of the
Council of Economic Advisers, pointed to "Asian economic flaws," including "patterns of
corruption, industrial policy and other excessive government interference in the economy"
(1998). Charles Wolf, Jr., a fellow in international economics at RAND, summed the
problems up as "the legacy of the so-called Japanese development model, and its perverse
consequences" (1998).
Mexico's economic crises have likewise been blamed on structural economic
problems. Unlike in the Asian case, these structural problems were discovered before the
crises - a point in their favor since, if such problems really exist, they should be evident
before a crisis brings them to notice. Marxist dependency theory, notably Andre Gunder
Frank's Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution?, written largely at the National
University of Mexico and published in 1969, saw the capitalist core's domination of the
Third World as blocking its development, while neoclassical theory, notably lan M. D.
Little, Tibor Scitovsky, and Maurice Scott's Industry and Trade in Some Developing
Countries, published in 1970, saw excessive state intervention and protectionism in the
Third World as undermining efficiency. These lines of thought yielded specific
explanations of the crises. On the one hand, E.V.K. Fitzgerald (1978) argued that both
multinationals and large-scale domestic capital wielded their international connections,
threatening divestment and capital flight, to demand public subsidies and cheap
infrastructure while refusing to pay adequate taxes, and thus caused the "fiscal crisis of the
state." On the other hand, Clark W. Reynolds blamed Mexico's 1976 crisis on its
"artificial" statist measures such as trade protection stifling import competition as well as
excessive subsidies for basic goods such as electricity, fuels, telecommunication, and even
roads (1977, 998). When presidents de la Madrid, Salinas, and Zedillo attributed Mexico's
economic crises to the old economic model (El Financiero 15 December 1996, 68), they
meant the same problems as Reynolds saw.
Ideological distinctions between these arguments - fiscal crisis and industrial
inefficiency - should not be exaggerated; with different emphases, left, right, and center
could and did make both. Like Fitzgerald, Reynolds pointed to subsidized public goods
and excessive tax breaks, while dependency theorists such as Fernando Henrique Cardoso
(now president of Brazil) and Enzo Faletto could agree that exhaustion of the protectionist
model caused economic crises (1979, 204). Moreover, the arguments are complementary.
Industrial inefficiency makes tax revenue harder to extract, since it squeezes profits and
wages, thus aggravating fiscal crisis. The economic historian Enrique Cardenas makes a
careful, centrist argument taking both approaches in analyzing almost the whole period of
one-party rule in Mexico; 28 a wide spectrum of economists espouse variations of the same
basic ideas, 29 and political scientists often accept them in the course of other arguments. 30
The exhaustion of import substitution
The most widely accepted account of Mexico's industrial problems is the "exhaustion"
(agotamiento) of import substitution. Import substitution, using trade barriers to block
manufactured imports and thus stimulate domestic industry, was a legacy of the
Depression when trade was cut off and World War II when industrial goods were scarce,
but after the war it was widely adopted as deliberate policy and promoted by the U.N.
Economic Commission on Latin America. Initial import substitution to stimulate the
manufacture of basic consumer goods such as textiles and processed foods is said to be
"easy": the technology is known, investments are moderate, economies of scale are
limited, and a small market is adequate. The question is what to do once nearly all such
goods are already made at home. Economists became concerned about possible exhaustion
of import substitution in the mid-1960s (Hirschman 1979, 69). Alternative strategies, such
as exporting manufactured goods or "deepening" import substitution to include industrial
inputs like chemicals, are deemed "hard." Domestic firms and labor will oppose these
strategies since they require challenging entrenched interests. Lowering trade barriers to
improve efficiency and boost exports at least initially threatens profits and wages. Import
substitution of industrial inputs is supposed to require more advanced technology, and
economies of scale put a premium on more extensive markets than exist in developing
countries (the poor are effectively outside the modern economy), so promoting it means
favoring multinationals. Not wishing to erode domestic political support, the state
postpones such industrial restructuring, instead spending and resorting to other short-term
expedients to inflate growth. These policies put the nation on the road to economic crisis.
The chain of reasoning that ties economic crises to structural economic causes has
several vulnerable links. Structural problems concern manufacturing, agriculture, or other
industrial processes that arise in the real economy and can be described in models that do
not consider money,3' but economic crises, when the exchange rate of the currency
collapses, are inherently monetary. Some argument must lead from structural industrial
problems to monetary crisis. In the case of Mexico it breaks down at several points.
28 Cirdenas 1994, 1996. He states his theory succinctly in his book covering 1950-94 (1996, 19).
29 Golub 1991 summarizes structural arguments about Latin American crises, and Lustig (1998, 17) notes
that Mexico's economic crises are widely attributed to industrial exhaustion, but disagrees. On the left, Tello
(1979, 205-6) says that Mexico's economic problems in 1970-76 resulted from long-standing structural
problems, while Hector Guill6n Romo (1984, 13) says that the nation's "financial and monetary problems
[were] only a manifestation of the crisis of the model of accumulation; in no way should they be considered
the cause of this crisis." Boltvinik and Hernindez Laos (1981, 482) and Casar et al. (1990, 9) make
interesting arguments about industrial problems, which they say caused economic crises. Though Kaufman
(1979) principally argues that industrial problems caused Latin American military coups, he also provides a
particularly good account of how they could have caused the preceding economic crises.
0 See Smith 1991, 325-27; Collier and Collier 1991, 602; Basfiez 1996, 160; Lawson 2000, 272; Bruhn
1997, 62-63; Basave 1996, 39.
31 Structural problems in the banking sectors are the exception, but were not a concern in Mexico until 1994.
To begin with, Mexico made relatively successful industrial transitions. It
completed the "easy" stage of manufacturing basic consumer goods not by 1970, nor even
by 1960, but by 1950 - but there was no crisis. In 1950 imports fell to only 7 percent of the
consumer goods used in the economy, and that portion remained unchanged through 1970
(Villarreal 1977, 71). Moreover, at least as early as 1960 government officials understood
the need to push beyond producing consumer goods - to manufacturing aluminum instead
of kitchen pans, engine blocks instead of assembled cars - and saw that these advanced
processes might involve larger investments and more sophisticated technologies (Vernon
1963, 116-17). In fact, they articulated the problem before the academic economic
literature on "hard" import substitution began to appear. "Fabrication programs" providing
trade protection and tax incentives for heavy intermediate goods such as steel and
chemicals and some capital equipment (Ros 1994, 172) helped transform these sectors into
the motor of the economy, as they grew more than 11 percent a year (Table 2-1). Auto
construction advanced from merely assembling imported kits of parts to producing major
components such as transmissions. The overall economy sustained better than 6 percent
growth per year. Current account deficits in the 1960s averaged a "moderate" 2.76 percent
of GDP, accordin to Francisco Gil Dfaz, Mexico's current, economically conservative
finance secretary.2 Angus Maddison, known for long-term growth studies, considers that
total public foreign debt remained "modest" in 1970 at about $4 billion dollars (1992, 158,
133), or 12.7 percent of GDP (Gil Dfaz 1984, 340).
The state turned to promoting manufactured exports during the 1970s (Banco
Nacional de Comercio Exterior 1971), reducing protection on established consumer-goods
and raising it for advanced industries it sought to encourage. Effective protection, a
comprehensive measure of trade barriers, fell from 28 percent in 1970 to only 5 percent in
1980 on basic consumer goods, while it increased from 41 percent to 53 percent on heavy
intermediates and from 77 percent to 109 percent on consumer durables and capital
equipment (Ros 1994, 174).3 These advanced industries received protection and duty-free
access to inputs in exchange for export commitments (Ros 1994, 172-73). Of course, they
did not always meet their commitments, but, overall, they led manufacturing exports,
which grew on average 10 percent annually from 1972 through 1979 and 10 to 15 percent
from 1979 through 1984 - before any trade barriers came down.: Industrial policies also
promoted key sectors, for example, pressuring automakers to build modern factories in
Mexico's northern industrial cities in the late 1970s (Bennett and Sharpe 1985).
Productivity figures paint a similar picture.35 Total factor productivity (overall
efficiency) in capital and durable goods grew 3.5 percent annually from 1973 through
1980, faster than in any OECD country except Japan. It also did well in heavy intermediate
goods: 2.5 percent annually in chemicals and 3.2 percent in non-metallic minerals such as
glass and clay, in both cases faster than in any OECD country, including Japan. It was -1.3
percent in basic metals such as steel, a bad record, though not as bad as the United States.
32 Gil Diaz 1984, 341. This is the average for 1960-70 from Table A-3, without adjusting for inflation. The
table yields a slightly lower figure as adjusted for inflation. The current account deficits for 1958-70 given by
Buffie (1990, 399) average 1.9 percent of GDP.
33 Maddison (1992, 180) reports a broadly similar pattern of "implicit protection," the difference between
world and domestic prices.
34 All manufacturing export figures are from Table 2-2; my general conclusions parallel Ros 1994. Export
figures are taken from business cycle peak to peak to smooth out yearly fluctuations.
3 All total-factor productivity figures are from Hernindez Laos and Velasco Arregui 1990. 662.
Table 2-1 Real manufacturing growth (percent per year)
1954-64 1964-72 1972-79 1979-84 1984-90 1990-94
Manufacturing 8.0 8.9 6.5 1.2 3.3 2.3
Consumer goods 6.0 7.4 5.0 1.6 1.7 0.8
Light intermediate 8.5 7.9 6.8 1.6 2.2 -0.9
Heavy intermediate 11.0 11.3 7.6 3.3 3.7 2.2
Capital/durable 12.5 11.7 8.9 -2.2 6.6 5.9
Growth is measured from business cycle peak to business cycle peak.
Data for 1954-1964: Manufacturing output in 1960 pesos, Ros and Vtzquez 1980
Data for 1964-1994: Manufacturing output in 1980 pesos, Nacional Financiera (Economia mexicana en
cifras) 1990 and 1995
Table 2-2 Real growth of manufactured eXports (percent per yei
1964-72 1972-79 1979-84 1984-90 1990-94
Manufacturing 8 10 10 12 13
Consumer goods 7 8 -2 6 12
Light intermediate 9 10 2 7 2
Heavy intermediate 8 9 10 12 8
Capital/durable 10 11 15 20 18
Growth is measured from business cycle peak to business cycle peak.
All figures exclude maquiladora assembly export platforms.
Figures for 1964-72: Real exports in 1960 pesos, Ros and VAzquez 1980
Exports in current dollars, 1972-1981: Lopez Portillo 1982 (Sexto informe de gobierno: Sector comercio)
Exports in current dollars, 1982-1990: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geograffa e InformAtica 1996
(Anuario Estadistico 1995)
Exports in current dollars, 1991-1994: Banco de M6xico, Indicadores del Sector Externo, various issues.
All figures for exports in current dollars are originally from the same Banco de M6xico series.
Real exports: Exports in current dollars deflated by producer price index (1982=100) from The Economic
Report of the President 1995
Total factor productivity across Mexican manufacturing grew 1.2 percent annually in
1962-73, then picked up to 1.5 percent annually in 1973-80. This is not a poor record,
particularly considering that developing nations tend to grow by accumulating capital, not
by using it more efficiently. Deepak Lal, a prominent critic of industrial promotion, agrees
that Mexico's total factor productivity performance was "quite respectable by international
standards" (Maddison 1992, vii).
These results are not so surprising. Calculations based on standard trade theory
show that even in the short-term, protectionism has small economic costs ("welfare loss");
its main effect is to transfer resources from consumers, forced to pay high prices, to
protected firms. Once the trivial size of these "welfare losses" was noted, economists
favoring free trade had to discover presumed ancillary costs of protectionism such as
influence buying and corruption to sustain the case against it (Shapiro and Taylor 1990,
863-65). As long as firms face some market competition, higher profits thanks to
protectionism may boost long-term growth by giving them resources to invest. And, again
in Lal's words, "market forces continued to operate.. . because the vigor of the private
sector helped to maintain competition" (Maddison 1992, vii). Even the most concentrated
sectors could count on at least four major firms (Casar, Mairquez, Marvin, Rodrfguez, and
Ros 1990, 36, table 2.3).
One reason for Mexican industry's relatively successful performance is that the
private sector did not uniformly demand protection (as some economists suppose); firms
that purchased industrial inputs to produce final products sought to limiti trade protection,
notes Luis Gim6nez Cacho, an entrepreneur who bought steel and other inputs to fabricate
construction materials. Committees comprised of officials from Finance, Commerce and
Industry, and business chambers would meet to debate what levels of tariffs and import
quotas to set, he points out: "If the users said the domestic product was bad, the
government would allow imports, without tariffs, without quotas." Gilberto Borja
Navarrete, president of Grupo ICA, one of the largest industrial and construction consortia
in Mexico, agrees that state officials, after meeting with industry representatives, including
the industrial users of products, would protect domestic industry "only up to a certain
limit." Tariffs on earth-moving equipment that ICA manufactured averaged around 15
percent in the 1970s; if domestic firms charged more than that margin above world prices,
the government would let imports in.
Protectionism surely was not problem-free. Manuel Surez Mier, a former Bank of
Mexico official and professor at the Technological Institute of Mexico (ITAM), doubts the
overall figures on effective protection; import quotas and other non-tariff trade barriers
make them hard to estimate: "As a consumer, I can tell you that all of us waited until we
had a trip abroad to shop for clothing. And those industries - textiles and apparel - didn't
survive well." Says Sergio Ghigliazza, director of the Center of Latin American Monetary
Studies: "Mexico produced sheet iron at 60 or 70 percent above world prices. And the
quality was so bad that 30 percent of it had to be thrown out. Suddenly when it could be
imported from the United States or Japan, the cost of stoves and refrigerators fell 50
percent."
Only large firms could handle the bureaucratic procedures to import materials and
components that they incorporated in exports duty-free; coping with the paperwork was
too much of a burden for smaller firms (Mancera). Likewise, managers of smaller firms
could doubtless spare less time to meet with officials in the general process of setting
tariffs and quotas - and had less clout if they did meet with them. Partly because of these
difficulties, by far the worst industrial problems arose in sectors of small, competitive
firms producing traditional consumer goods. Battered by overvaluation and crises as well,
and starved for capital, they were unable to invest, and many folded. Suirez Mier notes
that after trade barriers came down, multinationals such as Levi bought some of the very
same manufacturing plants and restored them to efficient production.
Nevertheless, 10 percent real annual growth of manufactured exports and relatively
good total-factor productivity for the 1970s is not a picture of massive industrial failure.
Moreover, had the heavy-intermediate and durable-good industries favored by industrial
policies been very inefficient, they should have collapsed when trade barriers were slashed
from 1985 through 1987 - this period, after Mexico entered the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), saw a much more dramatic trade opening than after it entered
NAFTA in 1994. Factories cannot be transformed from industrial disasters to export
miracles overnight, but far from collapsing, these advanced industries prospered. Their
annual export growth increased, to 12 percent annually in heavy intermediates and 20
percent in consumer durables and capital goods, from 1984 through 1990. The post-1985
industrial structure and trade pattern were just an extrapolation of the past (Moreno and
Ros 1994, 134-35), with the exception of textiles and apparel (as noted by Suairez Mier),
which increased their market share. As Juan Carlos Moreno and Jaime Ros argue (1994,
135), "The outstanding export performance of Mexico's manufacturing in the 1980s is
thus, to a large degree, a legacy of the import substitution period."
This industrial progress should have made it easier to balance manufacturing trade
after 1970 than it had been earlier. In 1960 increasing growth by 1 percent required a 1.5
percent increase in imports36 - mainly capital and intermediate goods - but because of
progress in these advanced industries, by 1970 increasing growth by the same 1 percent
only required a 0.8 percent increase in imports (Villarreal, 1977, 92). Why then did
manufacturing trade deficits at business cycle peaks rise from $0.5 billion in 1972 to $7.8
billion in 1979, fall to $3.5 billion in 1984 still under the protectionist regime, then explode
to $30 billion in 1994, after a decade under the free-market regime? 37
Overvaluation of the peso was the problem. The peso appreciated 50 percent from
1970 through 1975; after the 1976 crash brought it back to its 1970 level, it appreciated 40
percent through 1981 (Cirdenas 1996, 213). As it thus came to buy 40 or 50 percent more
foreign goods, imports reached insane levels. The trade deficit was directly proportional to
the level of overvaluation (Graph 2-1). Mexico's problem was not that import substitution
become "exhausted"; rather, the overvalued peso reversed it and turned the clock back. In
1970 Mexico imported about 6 percent of its basic consumer goods, but by 1981 it was
importing more than 12 percent, the same level as before 1950 (Villarreal 1990, 307).
Overvaluation can permanently harm manufacturing, as industries are swamped by imports
(Krugman 1990), and once factories close, subsequent devaluation may not bring them
back. Mexican industry's resilience despite macroeconomic chaos is the surprise.
36 That is, the income elasticity of imports was 1.5 percent.
37 Sources for manufacturing trade figures are given in Graph 2-1 data notes. These figures exclude export-
oriented maquiladora plants (really foreign industries manned by cheap Mexican labor) and thus indicate
growth of exports from domestic-oriented industries created by import substitution. The worst trade balance
under the protectionist regime was $18.6 billion in 1981, not a cyclical peak.
Graph 2-1: Manufacturing trade balance and peso overvaluation
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Estadistico 1995), tables 17.6, 17.7. Figures for 1991-94 are from Banco de M6xico, Indicadores del Sector
Externo, nos. 152, 155, 173.
Peso overvaluation is from Cirdenas 1996, 213 (1970 value = 100).
-20
-40
36
Graph 2-2: Total Mexican trade balance
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There is another trouble with the argument about exhaustion of import substitution.
Suppose it had caused structural manufacturing problems. To erupt in economic crisis,
these problems would have had to translate into actual economic slowdown, impelling
politicians to borrow and spend, but there was no such slowdown. The "recession" of 3.8
percent growth in 1971 (Cairdenas 1996, 214)- so it was called in Mexico at the time -
was no more than the norm for the year a new administration took office (Buffie 1990,
413-14). And that growth was achieved despite the fact that Finance excessively slashed
public investment (Moctezuma). If such a modest slowdown could force the state to
borrow and spend, why did virtually zero growth in 1953, the first full year President
Adolfo Ruiz Cortines held office, not do the same? Despite the 1976 crisis, growth under
President Echeverria, from 1970 through 1976, slowed only slightly, from the 6.6 percent
average of the 1950s and 1960s to 6.2 percent (Maddison 1992, 159).
Under L6pez Portillo, oil exports surging from nothing in 1976 (new reserves were
found a few years earlier) to over $16 billion in 1982 (Villarreal 1990, 312) would have
swamped any manufacturing troubles. There was no structural need for the 1982 crisis:
growth exceeded 8 percent a year as it approached , 2 percent above the norm. Though
world oil prices dipped moderately in 1981, Mexico's export revenues kept rising. Given
Mexico's enormous resources - its total exports grew 28 percent a year in current dollars
in the 1970s, not far behind South Korea's meteoric 35 percent a year38 - how could
industrial exhaustion have forced politicians to borrow and spend?
Not only is the theoretical connection between protectionism and economic crises
tenuous; across countries, there is no consistent evidence of such a connection. either.
Nations with large price distortions such as caused by protectionism were actually slightly
less likely to succumb to the 1982 wave of economic crises than those with small price
distortions (Rodrik 1999, 77-78). Colombia, the most economically stable Latin America
nation in the 1980s, maintained relatively high tariffs until 1990. Maddison concludes that
Mexico's "catastrophic slowdown" in the 1980s v as not caused by the "inefficiency of
dirigisme. It was the result of major errors in macroeconomic policy - attempting to push
growth too fast and ignoring the cannons of fiscal responsibility and sound money" (1992,
4). The question is why Mexican leaders chose such hazard-prone policies.
The fiscal crisis of the state
A more direct argument about structural failure is the "fiscal crisis of the state" or, in
Mexico's case, the "Pact of 1958." The idea is that an implicit pact among government, the
private sector, and labor forced the state to provide infrastructure, supply basic goods such
as petroleum products and electricity at below cost - thus broadly subsidizing profit and
wage growth - but blocked the state from raising sufficient taxes or charging enough for
those basic goods to avoid excessive fiscal deficits. As mentioned, this argument is often
combined with the one about structural industrial problems, which put added pressure on
the state to try to sustain profits and wage growth. In any event, with or without structural
industrial problems, swelling public-sector deficits can very well cause crises.
The most convincing case is that the implicit pact arose from a powerful wave of
strikes in 1958-59 by railroad and telegraph workers, teachers, and other public-sector
38 Export figures in current dollars from U.N. Statistical Yearbook, various years.
unions. Like much of the political elite, Adolfo L6pez Mateos, who faced these strikes first
as labor secretary and then as president, saw them in the context of series of devaluations
that had provoked inflation and eroded real wages in 1938, 1948, and 1954, helping radical
labor leaders gain rank-and-file support (Ortiz Mena; Izquierdo 1995, 19). 39 Recalling his
years as labor secretary, the president told his new finance secretary, Antonio Ortiz Mena,
"We would manage to get an excellent raise, then prices would go up, everything we had
gained would be lost, and we would have to start all over. There is no way out of that path"
(Izquierdo 1995, 18). He gave Ortiz Mena orders that political stability depended on
sustaining growth, controlling inflation, and avoiding another devaluation (Ortiz Mena,
Izquierdo). The argument about the Pact of 1958 holds that, to achieve those goals, the
government provided an array of business incentives to sustain investment; for example,
state-owned firms furnished subsidized electricity, gasoline, and rail transport; "new and
necessary" industries were given tariff protection and other tax breaks. Profit and interest
income were taxed very lightly - tax collection was less than 10 percent of GDP - to
sustain investment and discourage capital flight. Since the peso was always freely
convertible to the dollar, and investing in Mexico was more risky than investing in the
United States, after-tax profits on Mexican investment had to be higher to persuade the
wealthy to keep their money at home (Ortiz Mena).
Nothing in the pact could budge, it is argued: Increasing prices charged by state
firms or reducing business subsidies would discourage investment, force firms to raise
their prices, and cause inflation. Raising taxes on profits or interest would erode savings
and provoke capital flight, while raising taxes on wages and salaries might provoke
another strike wave. Although revenue covered current government spending, there was
not enough to finance public investment, notably in the state-owned oil company, electric
companies, and railroads. The state could only keep borrowing, first from the Bank of
Mexico and then from abroad, until at some point lenders finally balked, and the whole
economic scaffolding collapsed in crisis.
The argument is entirely logical, and though some developing countries collected
far higher taxes - about 25 percent of GDP in Brazil, as compared with 10 percent in
Mexico (Kaufman 1985, 482-83) - Mexico was in an unusually difficult situation. As
mentioned, wealthy Mexicans had always been able to send capital abroad because of the
historical absence of currency or capital controls, and they repeatedly did so, while capital
controls made the same tactic significantly harder for wealthy Brazilians. Threats of capital
flight are said to have foiled repeated attempts beginning in 1960 to close loopholes and
reform taxes (Maxfield 1990, 88-93).
Much has been made, in particular, of an aborted 1972 tax-reform proposal (Solis
1981, 72-77; Buffie 1990, 418-19; Cirdenas 1996, 96; Maxfield 1990, 88-93). Echeverria
was convinced that tax reform was essential to his plan for "shared development" - not just
growth but equitable growth - according to Javier Alejo, head of the working group that
drafted the tax proposal. State Industries Secretary Horacio Flores de la Pefia, the leader of
the economic left under Echeverri'a, was a strong supporter (Flores de la Pefia)40 ; the more
39 Chapter 4 describes these events in more detail.
40 As mentioned, when I quote or cite an individual without giving a written source, the source is always a
personal interview. If it could be ambiguous which interview ! am citing about a statement, I insert the
individual's name. Dates and locations of al! interviews are listed in the bibliography.
conservative Finance Minister, Hugo Margaiin, supported tax reform with some cautions;
only some Bank of Mexico officials may have opposed it (Solis 1981, 74).
The aim of the 1972 proposal was principally to make the tax system more
equitable and reduce evasion. Different types of income, such as salaries, business profits,
rent on real estate, and interest on bonds, had been taxed separately; authorities could not
even tell if one tax return on interest and another on wages came from the same individual.
Also, bonds and shares were held anonymously. The measure agreed on within the
administration in late 1972 required all income to be reported jointly, except on interest
and dividends, but bonds and shares could no longer be held anonymously (Solis 1981,
74). Finance Minister Hugo Margaiin and other officials met twice in December 1972 with
leading bankers, industrialists, and their retinue of attorneys; Leopoldo Solis (1981, 76),
director of economic planning in Presidency, recalls that "private sector representatives
were very critical and presented a common front against both bills." Their principal
argument, seconded (if indeed not proposed in the first place) by Bank of Mexico officials,
was that tax reform would precipitate capital flight (Maxfield 1990, 92). 4' Government
officials responded that if wealthy Mexicans sent their capital to the United State or
Europe, they would only have to pay taxes there (Alejo). According to Solis, the finance
minister, who had been ambassador to Washington, "showed all his diplomatic skill in
overlooking the carping tone of the private sector representatives and went on to explain
the bills point-by-point" (1981, 75-76). He did not win them over. A few days later the
Mexican Council of Businessmen, an elite group of business leaders, is said to have met
privately with Echeverri'a (Maxfield 1990, 92), and he dropped the bill.
Why did Echeverria drop the tax proposal? He himself gives no clear answer. He
says the private sector never come to speak with him personally about it (as opposed to
talking with economic officials in formal meetings). He explains that though some cabinet
members promised that fiscal reform would "solve all Mexico's economic problems,"
adopting it was not so easy. Theirs were only "partial views." But for all he says, it is far
from clear what his own synoptic view was that they missed: "Theorists who write lovely
books but never get out of their libraries [do not realize that] nobody invests just to create
jobs and pay taxes. Capital needs to reproduce itself and make profits in order to invest
more. The capitalist's efforts have to be rewarded." Such points surely did not escape
Leopoldo Solis, Javier Alejo, or anyone else involved in the tax reform effort.
Does this episode demonstrate the impossibility of tax reform, or at least one
significantly increasing revenue from wealthy individuals? Some academics say so
(Maxfield 1990, 88-93). Suirez Mier, who worked on tax reform under Alejo, says it never
passed because "there were too many interest groups, both in the cabinet and in the private
sector close to the government, such as bankers and industrialists." Ortiz Mena says that
tax reform was possible and indeed that some occurred while he was finance secretary in
the 1960s, but argues that danger of capital flight did limit the possibilities: "The idea that
you could just tax capital from one day to the next and nothing would happen is the gravest
error. If you impose harsher conditions on capital here than in the United States, it will go
to the United States. You have to carry out fiscal reform gradually." If he had been finance
secretary in the 1970s, he says he would not have substantially raised taxes, particularly
not on capital. Especially given Pemex's increasing oil income, he argues, public-sector
revenue was adequate to support sustained, broad-based development.
41 Alejo, Izquierdo, and Suirez Mier concur but do not mention the Bank of Mexico's making the argument.
Other former officials, including Ortiz Mena's economic advisors Victor Urquidi
and Rafael Izquierdo, do think substantial tax reform was feasible (Izquierdo, Urquidi,
Alejo, Oteyza). Solis sees the 1972 failure as a political bungle. At the time Echeverria's
leftist rhetoric was beginning to frighten businessmen whose prevailing mood, according
to a survey commissioned by Solis, was "full of confusion and.., fears that the country
was being led to socialism" (1981, 72). He suspects that they reacted "purely on
ideological grounds... rather than as managerial personnel who would have assessed the
issue in strictly rational terms" (1981, 93). Moreover, Echeverria did not mobilize workers
to support tax reform, though they would have benefited as it affected principally unearned
income, but then when inflation took off as a result of budget deficits, he did mobilize
them to support wage increases that only caused more inflation (1981, 100). Solis is certain
that pushing these wage increases against business opposition required at least as much
political clout as passing the 1972 tax reform would have (1981, 84). Alejo says that the
reform was perfectly feasible. Echeverria and Margaiin should not have done what Finance
always did - bargain with business privately - but instead just sent the bill to the Chamber
of Deputies: "Taxes (impuestos) are not negotiated, they are imposed (impuestos)."
Rafael Izquierdo, economic advisor to L6pez Portillo from 1976 through 1982 as
well as to Ortiz Mena from 1964 through 1970, concedes that a tax reform would have
caused capital to leave Mexico but says it would have returned. Capital had fled before and
returned soon enough to Mexico's favorable business climate. Why should it not do the
same when wealth holders saw that public finances were sounder after a tax reform and a
growing economy offered good investment opportunities?
Further reason to suppose that tax reform was possible is that, though oddly it is
little mentioned in debates on the topic (Solis 1981, Buffie 1990, Maxfield 1990), some tax
reforms did pass, one in November 1974, another in 1981. The 1974 legislation required
all forms of income except interest to be reported jointly (Alejo). Fixed-interest-rate bonds
were taxed at 12 percent if the owner was identified, 16 percent if not (Villarreal 1977, 97,
107), and gasoline prices were doubled (Alejo, Suarez Mier) - this last measure partly to
raise short-term revenue, partly as a decoy to draw attention from the rest of the package
(Alejo). The gasoline prices did indeed create a storm, but despite them, Echeverria is
widely considered to have remained one of the most powerful Mexican presidents, at least
until the 1976 crisis. Between a small excise tax increase in 1973 (Buffie 1990, 419) and
the 1974 reform, total tax revenue rose from 8.1 to 10.3 percent of GDP (Buffie 1990,
422), a far from trivial amount. Another tax reform was passed in 1981, abolishing
volumes of paperwork and bureaucracy on some 36 federal and 660 local taxes (Ibarra),
and establishing a new value-added and corporate income taxes. Taxes collected from low-
income brackets (between one and five minimum wages) fell 50 percent, while those
collected from high-income brackets (more than 15 minimum wages) tripled (Moreno and
Ros 1994, 128, 141).
The more definitive problem with the theory that the Pact of 1958 produced
inevitably widening budget deficits is that the deficits were not widening. They remained
"very moderate" throughout the 1950s and 1960s, in the judgment of Gil Diaz, Mexico's
current finance secretary (1984, 341). It is true that federal government budget deficits in
the 1950s were lower than in the 1960s. Data in Table 2-3 on the government deficit
excluding debt payments, which is the most reliable (see Appendix 2 data notes), shows an
average surplus of 0.3 percent of GDP under the Ruiz Cortines administration (1952-58), a
deficit of 0.6 percent of GDP under L6pez Mateos (1958-64), and virtually the same small
deficit, 0.8 percent of GDP, under Diaz Ordaz (1964-70). Alternatively, Table 2-4 shows
exactly the same average deficit of 1.4 percent of GDP (now including debt payments)
under L6pez Mateos and Diaz Ordaz. But nothing can be concluded from the federal
government alone: state-owned enterprises accounted for roughly half of public spending.
Though data on the total public-sector is only available since 1960, it points to decreasing
deficits, averaging 3.3 percent of GDP from 1960 through 1964 under L6pez Mateos and
2.1 percent of GDP from 1965 through 1970 under Dfaz Ordaz (Table 2-4). Anyway, a
deficit of 2 or 3 percent of GDP in an economy growing 6 percent a year is a long way
from disaster. Mexico's fiscal performance met the Maastricht Treaty's requirements for
European monetary union (Ortiz Mena 1998, 289).
Further, the Pact of 1958 could not itself have caused public-sector deficits to soar
under Echeverria and L6pez Portillo because those presidents broke it. Not only did
Echeverria increase the weight of the public sector from 20 percent to 30 percent of GDP,
after which L6pez Portillo increased it from 30 percent to 45 percent of GDP, but they
broke the confidence built up between public and private sectors in the 1950s and 1960s.
Though there had been frictions, such as the ruckus about L6pez Mateo's "government of
the extreme left," officials, and above all finance secretaries, always worked to patch them
up. The Echeverria administration's relations with business were gratuitously and
unnecessarily acrimonious (Sainchez Navarro). Echeverria departed from the text of his
1973 state of the union message to improvise an attack on "little rich men" who engaged in
capital flight, were "despised by the people," and led their sons "to social inadaptability, to
drug addiction, to irresponsibility" (Solis 1981, 82). When a nervous private sector formed
the Businessmen's Coordinating Council to bridge various existing groups, Echeverrfa's
finance secretary and close friend Jos6 L6pez Portillo brilliantly declared its innocuous
principles ("private business is the basic unit of the economy") to be "an impossible
admixture of Saint Thomas Aquinas' ideology, the Manchester School, eighteenth century
utilitarianism, Ayn Rand's execrable literary product:ons, and ideas of the Mexican
Revolution.... [F]rom there to Nazi-fascism is one mere step." 42
If the Pact of 1958 had still been operating, the enormous fiscal deficits under
Echeverrfa - 10 percent of GDP - should have resulted from a revenue squeeze, even as
the government struggled to hold spending down. Just the opposite happened (Table 2-5).
Spending exploded, and even increased revenues could not keep pace. As Edward F.
Buffie notes (1990, 422-23) in a careful study of Mexico's economic performance, while
federal government revenue growth was "relatively strong" at 2 percent of GDP from 1970
to 1976 (thanks largely to the 1974 tax reform), "enormous" spending increases- 6 percent
of GDP - swelled deficits (Table 2-5). If state-owned firms are added to the picture,
between 1970 and 1976 revenue grew 5 percent of GDP, while spending soared 10 percent
of GDP. Nor can it be argued that business pressure for subsidies forced the state to
increase expenditures because business clamorously and incessantly opposed them. And
after 1977, when new oil fields came on line, there was certainly no lack of revenue.
Pemex's net revenue to the state - deducting its own spending but including taxes it paid to
42 The quote is from Tello 1979, 123; the characterization of it is my own.
Table 2-3 Federal government budgets 1953-70 (percent of GDP)
Revenue Spending* Spending Surplus or Surplus or
excluding deficit* deficit
debt excluding
service debt service
Ruiz Cortines
1953 7.9 9.0 7.7 -1.1 0.2
1954 8.7 10.7 9.3 -2.0 -0.6
1955 8.7 9.9 7.9 -1.1 0.9
1956 8.9 10.0 8.4 -1.0 0.6
1957 8.2 9.6 7.9 -1.4 0.3
1958 9.0 10.1 8.5 -1.1 0.5
Lopez Mateos
1959 7.4 8.1 7.8 -0.7 -0.4
1960 8.1 9.5 9.2 -1.4 -1.1
1961 7.1 8.0 7.5 -1.0 -0.4
1962 7.5 8.3 7.9 -0.8 -0.4
1963 7.9 8.5 8.1 -0.6 -0.2
1964 7.6 9.2 8.7 -1.6 -1.1
Diaz Ordaz
1965 8.2 10.7 10.0 -2.5 -1.8
1966 8.2 9.4 8.6 -1.2 -0.4
1967 8.4 9.8 8.9 -1.4 -0.6
1968 8.8 9.9 9.0 -1.1 -0.1
1969 9.0 10.9 10.0 -1.9 -1.0
1970 9.1 10.8 9.8 -1.7 -0.7
* Data for total spending and the resulting deficits from 1953-58 are problematic because they include
amortization of debt; see Appendix 2 data notes. Data excluding debt service is not problematic, nor is data
from 1959 on.
All data is originally from final annual federal government budgets (gasto ejercido) in Secretarfa de
Hacienda y Cr6d&lito Publico (SHCP), Cuenta de la Hacienda Pdblica Federal, various years.
1953-58 spending and total debt payments are from INEGI 1994 (Estadisticas Hist6ricas de MWxico), Table
17.10. Revenue in current pesos is from INEGI 1994 (Estadisticas Hist6ricas de Mixico), Table 17.6
1959-70 spending and total debt payments are from Izquierdo 1995, Table VII.5. Amortization, deducted
from total debt payments (interest and associated expenses are left), is from Izquierdo 1995, Table VII.4.
Revenue is from his Table VII.8
GDP is from Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geograffa e Informitica (INEGI) 1994 (Estadfsticas
Hist6ricas de Mdxico), Table 8.1.
For further discussion of data sources and the question of amortization, see data notes table in Appendix 2.
Table 2-4 Public sector budgets, 1960-70 (percent of GDP)
Federal government
plus state enterprises
Revenue Spending Surplus or
deficit
Federal government alone
Revenue Spending Surplus or
deficit
Lopez Mateos
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
Diaz Ordaz
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
* Public sector includes the federal government, state enterprises,
banks, and other off-budget items.
Mexico City, the net deficit of public
All spending figures include interest payments.
Data gives revenue received and spending paid out during the course of the year (gasto pagado) as opposed
to the amounts in final budgets (gasto ejercido), which may not actually be received or paid during the
calendar year. This is the only type of data available for the public sector before 1965.
Federal government is from Izquierdo 1995, Table VII. 15, originally from Secretaria de Hacienda y Cr&6dito
Puiblico (SHCP) 1981 (Estadisticas definanzas pdblicas 1938-80).
State enterprises and public sector for 1960-70 is from Izquierdo 1995, Table VII.22. The 1960-64 data was
originally reconstructed by a Finance-Bank of Mexico working group, and should be treated with caution
(Table VII.22, note 1). State enterprises and public sector for 1965-70 is originally from SHCP 1982
(Estadisticas Hacendarias del Sector Ptblico 1965-1982).
Current GDP to calculate percentages: INEGI 1994 (Estadisticas Hist6ricas de Mxico), Table 8.1
Public
sector*
Surplus or
deficit
N.A.
-2.9
-2.5
-2.7
-3.7
-4.8
-0.9
-1.2
-2.4
-2.2
-2.2
-3.8
N.A.
14.8
14.5
15.1
15.6
15.0
17.5
16.7
17.0
17.1
17.5
17.3
N.A.
17.4
16.8
17.2
18.5
18.9
18.4
17.9
19.0
18.7
19.0
19.4
N.A.
-2.6
-2.3
-2.1
-2.9
-3.9
-0.9
-1.2
-2.1
-1.6
-1.5
-2.1
7.4
8.1
7.1
7.5
7.9
7.6
8.2
8.2
8.4
8.8
9.0
9.1
8.1
9.6
8.5
8.8
9.5
9.4
9.8
9.1
10.0
9.8
10.2
10.9
-0.6
-1.6
-1.5
-1.4
-1.6
-1.8
-1.6
-0.9
-1.6
-1.0
-1.2
-1.8
Table 2-5 Public sector budgets, 1970-82 (percent of GDP)
Public sector*
Revenue Spending Surplus
or deficit
Government**
Revenue Spending Surplus
or deficit
Pemex
Revenue Spending Surplus
or deficit
Diaz Ordaz
1970
Echeverria
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
18.9 22.3 -3.8
18.4
18.7
20.2
21.1
23.1
23.8
Lopez Portillo
1977 24.2
1978 25.5
1979 26.2
1980 27.8
1981 27.7
1982 30.1
20.5
22.9
25.8
27.0
31.9
32.0
29.5
31.0
32.2
34.6
41.3
46.4
-2.5
-4.9
-6.9
-7.2
-10.0
-9.9
-6.7
-6.7
-7.4
-7.9
-14.7
-17.6
8.7 9.7 -1.0
8.4
8.6
9.3
8.8
10.0
10.7
10.2
10.5
10.1
7.5
8.3
6.2
8.8
11.6
12.4
11.6
13.3
15.5
13.6
14.2
15.2
16.7
20.8
26.5
-0.4
-3.0
-3.1
-2.8
-3.3
-4.8
-3.3
-3.7
-4.9
-9.2
-12.5
-20.2
3.3 2.7
3.2
3.1
2.8
4.0
4.1
4.0
4.9
5.8
7.4
12.1
11.6
15.8
3.0
2.7
3.0
3.2
4.1
3.6
3.9
4.8
5.5
5.8
7.5
7.5
* Public sector revenue and spending include the federal government, state enterprises, the Mexico City
government, and some off-budget items. The deficit also includes the net deficit of public banks and is
therefore slightly larger than the difference between revenue and spending.
** Government spending and revenue includes the federal government and Mexico City government.
All spending figures include interest payments.
Source: Buffie 1990, 422-23, 435-36
0.6
0.2
0.4
-0.2
0.8
0.0
0.4
1.0
1.0
1.9
6.3
4.1
8.3
the federal government - rose from 0.4 percent of GDP in 1976 to 6 percent of GDP in
1980-82. In 1982, the year of the crisis, its net revenues were 8 percent of GDP, as large a
portion of the economy as all tax revenues had been in 1970. The question is not why the
Mexican state faced an inevitable revenue squeeze but why it spent so profligately.
Structural problems versus perception of them
There is a common problem with both structural theories about Mexico's crises: the
exhaustion of import substitution and the fiscal crisis of the state. Suppose long-term
structural problems were at work beneath the surface of things. Still, they had not
manifested themselves in 1970. With a sustained 6 percent growth, there had been no
economic slowdown; budget deficits had shown a marginally decreasing trend; current-
account deficits were low and stable. Except for a small intellectual current on the left,
everybody thought the economy was doing just fine. Even those like the political scientist
Miguel Basaifiez who saw structural problems underneath concede that that they were not
widely appreciated; the dominant view of the Mexican economy was "triumphalism"
(1996, 153; likewise Tello 1979, 11). Government officials saw excellent economic
prospects. 43 The encomiums on the economy of the president of the Federation of Business
Chambers hardly need to be detailed (Tello 1979, 11). Octavio Paz, unflinching critic of
his nation that he was, wrote in 1972 that its "economy has made such strides that
economists and sociologists point to Mexico as an example for other underdeveloped
countries" (1985, 230). Fausto Zapata, a close Echeverria advisor, says:
For many lucid thinkers, with an ability to see into the future, such as Pablo Gonzilez Casanova in his
book Democracy in Mexico, the economic model had failed by creating many more poor people than
rich. .. . But they were a critical minority. The majority of us lived in total autocomplacency. In the
eyes of the majority, the economy was a marvel.... This sort of autocomplacency was morally
reprehensible, but businessmen, social leaders, labor leaders, government, church, and all the great
institutions were convinced that, as it was, the country was working very well.
The point is not to minimize Mexico's severely inequitable income distribution
(though it was improving slightly), but rather to establish that the broad consensus saw the
economy as doing excellently. The consensus did not see "structural" problems, nor were
they evident in growth, budget deficits, or foreign borrowing. How could they then force
the Echeverria administration to suddenly loose spending? In political terms, they did not
exist. Economists could say grave troubles would surface - and perhaps they would; surely
no economy can continue on a dead-reckoning course forever - but these were unproven
theories about the future. Politicians do not turn economic policymaking around because of
such theoretical arguments. In Mexico there was no manifest economic failure.
43 Bracamontes, de la Vega Dominguez, Mancera, Moreno Valle, Romero Kolbeck, Moctezuma agree, not
only that they saw the economy as doing well but also that the general view saw it as doing well.

Chapter 3
The Macroeconomics of Elite Conflict
The claim that such momentous social consequences as economic crisis or stability was
caused by politics among small grupos of high officials within the heart of the state, a
politics not driven by broad societal interests, may seem strange. In some form or other the
"macroeconomics of populism" - MIT economist Rudiger Dornbusch's phrase capturing
the idea that weak or misguided politicians facing organized societal pressure seek to
bolster support by granting welfare benefits, allowing wage increases, and making other
expenditures far greater than the state can afford - is an entirely plausible way to explain
inflation and crisis (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991). A guide written for the OECD on how
to avoid economic crises singles out two political factors, both variations on Dornbusch's
theme: "the government's degree of independence from the demands of competing interest
groups and political parties" and its "life expectancy," in that if elections are approaching
or a coup feared, incumbents are more likely to inflate the economy (Haggard, Lafay and
Morrison, 1995, 43-44). Moreover, the Mexican administrations of Luis Echeverria (1970-
76) and Jos6 L6pez Portillo (1976-82) are widely called populist in that sense.
Yet the usual story does not apply. The principal political cause of Mexico's
economic crises was rival grupos' internal contest for the presidential nomination."44 Public
spending in the 1970s and 1980s always plunged in actual election years, when the control
over power was never in dispute, but rose in the previous, pre-electoral years when rival
grupos within the ruling party sought to build support for their leaders to be the nominee.
Such intra-elite conflict did not inevitably cause crisis any more than incumbents'
spending to buy votes in democracies inevitably does, but intra-elite conflict was the
Mexican system's inherent vulnerability, the political weakness that could lead to
economic crises. The critical difference between stability and crisis depended on
controlling it, rather than on controlling relations between state and society.
Much of this chapter will not be controversial among those who study Mexico. In
particular, the initial discussion of how Mexican state worked largely concurs with
conventional opinion. But a clear picture of the state is essential to the overall argument of
the chapter, and since finally that argument is so unlike the usual ones about economic
crisis, each piece of it is worth spelling out carefully.
Centralization of political power
The high Mexican politics of presidential succession and national policy, the politics that
mattered enough to cause economic crises, was principally waged within the central
administration; elections never decided who held political power. Explaining why this
curious situation existed requires a sketch of the whole political system because it was,
precisely, a whole; to look at only a piece of it, such as how the state controlled unions,
44 External economic shocks can cause crises, and investor panic is always involved, as noted in chapter 1.
As mentioned there and discussed further in later chapters, economists widely consider internal causes to
have predominated in 1976 and 1982, while contagion from the U.S. stock market crash was salient in 1987.
But I do not need to consider these matters here. I only argue that the usual theories about domestic political
causes of crisis do not apply to Mexico; the key domestic political cause was conflict among grupos.
rais& as many questions as it answers. The president for his six-year term, and the federal
bureaucracy under him, virtually were the government. Though called the ruling party, the
PRI per se - its National Executive Committee and the rest of its apparatus - had no
independent power. As Octavio Paz said, it gave "blind obedience to each president in
turn. .... The party has not produced a single idea, not a single program, in [all its] years of
existence!" (1985, 241-42). The party's corporatist sectors - the labor unions, peasant
associations, and even middle-class groups such as the College of Architects, legally
incorporated by the state - were also dominated by the president and bureaucracy and had
as their mission "the control and manipulation of the people," Paz said. As for the Senate
and Chamber of Deputies, they "have been, and still are, two groups of chatterers and
flatterers who never offer any criticism whatsoever; . . . the judicial power is mute and
impotent; . . . freedom of the press is more a formality than a reality" (1985, 245-46).
Despite differences in emphasis, no serious observer disputes this essential account
of the old Mexican state (Hernaindez Rodrfguez 1992, 242). 45 Even when the conventional
view of how the central bureaucracy dominated society is questioned, the fact that it did is
not. For example, Jeffrey W. Rubin (1996, 85) writes that "while social scientists in the
1970s were right to characterize the postrevolutionary Mexican regime as authoritarian and
hegemonic, they were wrong about the nature of that hegemony." Instead of a single
"triumph of state building, .... multiple regional arrangements - each a distinct
combination of bargaining, coercion, and alliances - together reinforced the power of the
center." In investigating Mexicans' ability to occasionally form autonomous groups that
defend grass-roots interests rather than being manipulated by the state, Jonathan Fox
explicitly notes that, even in the 1990s, the broader system was "still largely dominated by
an authoritarian corporatist brand of machine politics" (1994, 151-52, 158).46
Despite how often it is painted, this picture remains somewhat strange, even to
Mexicans who grew up within it. Mexicans are, arguably, a revolutionary people; since the
waning years of Spanish rule, there have been three full-scale revolutions and uncounted
lesser uprisings (Knight 1990, 87). Worker insurgency for democratic governance has
repeatedly erupted (ibid.) despite the terrible costs - death, imprisonment, unemployment.
Peasants have repeatedly invaded private estates to claim a little land, also sometimes at
terrible cost. Moreover, corporatist groups cannot be just repressive; as Fox says, to be
effective they must represent "some member interests at least some of the time" (1992, 28).
Two historical legacies help explain why the stable Mexican regime nevertheless
concentrated so much power in the national administration and president. First, although
all Latin America experienced centralized Spanish rule, in Mexico it merely overlaid a
centralized Aztec empire. The Mexican president's authority, to quote Paz again, has
rested at least in part on "the Aztec archetype of political power: the tlatoani, or ruler, the
pyramid" (1985, 315-16): "The tlatoani is impersonal, priestly, and institutional - hence
the abstract figure of the president corresponds to a bureaucratic and hierarchic corporation
like the Institutional Revolutionary Party .... The president is the Party during his six-year
45 Pablo Gonzilez Casanova's Democracy in Mexico (1970, originally published 1965). was a comprehensive
and powerful account of the system. Lawson 2000, 268-69, summarizes features of the old regime and
provides a recent list of references. Bailey 1988, 31; Cornelius and Craig 1991, 23-26; Ortiz Salinas 1988,
14-18; Bruhn 1997, 33 ff; Luna 1988, 252; Suarez Farias 1988, 308; and Hernindez Rodriguez 1984, 8-10,
are just a few authors who succinctly describe the principal political features of presidential control over a
hegemonic party and official corporatist organizations.
46 Likewise Foweraker 1989, 112; and Fox 1992, 1.
term; but, when it ends, another president appears, and is only another incarnation of the
Party." (The "party," in this sense, is a common but somewhat confusing shorthand for the
entire political system, not the subordinate electoral apparatus.)
The second historical legacy was the 1910 Revolution - always written with a
capital "R" - bequeathing, on the one hand, broadly shared ideals, and, on the other, deep-
seated fear of societal violence. Wayne A. Cornelius and Ann L. Craig write:
A residue of the widespread violence of [the 1910 Revolution and its aftermath], which killed one of
every seven Mexicans, is a general fear of civil disorder and uncontrolled mass mobilization. The
prospect of another wholesale disintegration of the social and political order is viewed with alarm not
just by Mexico's elites but also by a majority of the poor. Their personal economic risks in a period of
protracted political violence would be much greater than those of the elite.
An even more important legacy of the 1910 to 1940 period was the symbolic capital that accrued
from events and public policies pursued during those years: the Revolution itself; the radically worded
Constitution of 1917; the labor and agrarian reforms of [President Lizaro Cirdenas in the 1930s]; and
Cirdenas' expropriation of foreign oil companies in 1938. (1991, 14)
A 1963 survey of political culture in several democracies (a category that some American
political scientists thought Mexico belong to) discovered a dichotomy that every
subsequent study has confirmed: Mexicans' pride in national political institutions coupled
with cynicism about their government's actual performance. Faith in the Revolution and
the president endured despite a bureaucracy that was often arbitrary and corrupt, at least on
the lower levels that interacted with the population (Almond and Verba 1965, 310-11;
Craig and Cornelius 1989, 353-54, 375-76). Asked to respond in 1969 to the statement that
"the individual owes first loyalty to the state and only secondarily to his personal welfare,"
92 percent of Mexicans agreed; of the five nationalities surveyed, Italians were second
likely to agree, at 48 percent (Stepan 1978, 96).
The violence of the Revolution also helped persuade the political elite to accept
presidential authority. In extensive interviews with high officials of the 1950s and 1960s,
Roderic Camp found their "most striking universal belief" to be an "emphasis on peace
and order" (1984a, 134). If they had not participated in the Revolution itself, they had seen
first hand the violence that engulfed Mexico. As one said:
I helped my father take pictures of men who were to be executed by the various sides during the
revolutionary period. As a young boy, I saw and talked to men who were brave, melancholy, or crying
just before they were killed. I also helped my father.. . pick up the dead men in the streets after an
engagement by opposing forces. All of this made a lasting and profound impression on me, and is
something I would never want my children to witness. (Camp 1984a, 42)
Even after the Revolution, really a civil war among shifting military factions, supposedly
ended in 1920, democracy did not bring peace and order. Elections were always followed
by revolts, and losers were executed. The ballot box failed as a real means to determine
who won political contests, serving instead only as the first step toward more violence.
Forging a dominant party was a strategy to shape a workable political system in
these circumstances. In 1929 President Plutarco Elfias Calles brought together those
factions that would join one ruling party and defeated in battle those that would not. As a
practical alternative to democracy, a president presiding over a centralized political system
served as the ultimate arbiter. Pablo Gonzailez Casanova, who published an eloquent
indictment of the authoritarian Mexican state in 1965, carefully qualified it by noting that
trying to apply democracy after the Revolution would have been "senseless"; it would only
have meant "respect for the conspiracies of a semi-feudal society" (1970, 68-69).
The state that emerged from the Revolution, fought under the banner of democracy
but in a society unprepared for democracy, looked one way on paper but worked another.
Jos6 Andr6s de Oteyza, former state industries secretary says, "The PRI was called a
political party, but it wasn't a political party, it was a whole political system. It is said that
there were three powers, but there was only one. The system was called federal, but it was
centralized." As a document, the Mexican Constitution of 1917 derives in many ways from
the American Constitution, resting sovereignty in the people; dividing power among
executive, judiciary, and legislative branches; and providing checks and balances
(Gonzailez Casanova 1970, 11). Indeed, partway into Vicente Fox's current administration,
the first time one party has not controlled all branches of government since the PRI was
founded, those provisions have turned out to matter; the checks and balances are even
looking perilously close to mutual checkmate. But as long as the PRI dominated the state,
the executive determined policy and political succession. On entering office presidents
would use their overwhelming control of Congress to pass a flurry of constitutional
amendments, adding up to several hundred over the course of seventy years (Cornelius and
Craig 1991, 31).
Some of the president's power was de jure. The Constitution and laws gave him
complete control over the executive branch and state-owned enterprises (Ortiz Salinas
1988, 15-16). He could appoint and dismiss, without congressional approval, all cabinet
secretaries, from Finance and Interior to Justice and Tourism, as well as the governor of
Mexico City (Cornelius and Craig 1991, 33). He had equal power over state enterprises:
Pemex and the electric utilities; railroads, airlines, and telecommunications; industrial
giants such as steel mills and chemical plants. As President Miguel de la Madrid wrote,
cabinet secretaries and directors of state enterprises, along with everyone under them, were
mere "auxiliary collaborators dependent on the unique office-holder, the president" (Ortiz
Salinas 1988, 14). Victor Urquidi, economic advisor to the finance secretary in the 1950s
and 1960s and president of the Colegio de Mexico for two decades, wryly notes: "The
MacArthur Foundation once asked me how to develop a program that would interest
policymakers in Mexico. I said, 'There's only one policymaker in Mexico. He's the
president.'"
Even more important were the president's extra-constitutional powers as defacto
head of the ruling party. It dominated Mexican politics, and he dominated it. As de la
Madrid wrote, "Even though the party has its own bosses, it recognizes the incumbent
president of Mexico as its highest leader" (Ortiz Salinas 1988, 16). Fernando Solana, a
former professor of political science who held four posts as cabinet secretary, broke off an
interview to correct the misusage (the same that Paz committed) of referring to the regime
itself as the PRI: "The PRI was not important. I never was in the PRI. The correct term is
the political system." The PRI's National Executive Committee was appointed and
dismissed by the president, and its financing came from the Interior Ministry (Camp 1993,
142). Legal authority to certify opposition parties and run elections was under likewise
under Interior (Cosfo Villegas 1975, 101).
The president's dominance of the party translated into control over the legislature,
courts, and (though not so effortlessly) state governments. The PRI supplied every
governor and senator and more than two-thirds of federal deputies until 1988 (Cornelius
and Craig 1991, 60-61). That year it lost its super-majority in the Chamber of Deputies,
and thus lost for a time its unconditional ability to pass constitutional amendments, but it
regained it in 1991. The Constitution still prohibits elected officials from serving
successive terms - talk about term limits! - thus making an elective career impossible.
Legislators owed their nomination and hence election to the president and his entourage;
their advancement depended on him or his successor (Cornelius and Craig 1991, 25),
always a cabinet secretary appointed by him. Thus, bills were approved almost
automatically (Gonzalez Casanova 1970, 20; Cornelius and Craig 1991, 31). Since
governors did manage states, they were far the most important officials outside the central
administration, but the president could unseat them, too, through informal pressure or
formal "withdrawal of powers," removing the governor, legislature, and other authorities
in one fell swoop (Cornelius and Craig 1991, 33, Gonzalez Casanova 1970, 24). Typically
governors were deposed if they failed to maintain order, as when Eduardo Angel Elizondo
of Nuevo Leon was unable to handle students riots and "the federation," as it was said, but
in fact the person of President Luis Echeverria, decided he should resign (Bravo).
Supreme Court judges, appointed and dismissed by the president thanks to
automatic legislative approval, were politically irrelevant (Cornelius and Craig 1991, 31:
Lawson 2000, 283). Three presidents, including Ernesto Zedillo in 1994, dismissed the
entire bench (Dillon 2000, A-3). Though in theory the court could challenge a law's
constitutionality, a decision applied only to the particular defendant whose case had been
heard and set no precedent, so that if others disobeyed the supposedly unconstitutional law,
they would be prosecuted anyway (Dillon 2000 A-3, Aguayo 2000, 285). And the court
had a staggering workload, for example, issuing 6,573 rulings in 1999 (Dillon 2000, A-3).
Presidential authority rested on force, too. Mexico was not a police state - it was
said that the state used "two carrots, then a stick" (Collier and Collier 1991, 578) - but if
need be, coercion was available. Interior managed the infamous Federal Security
Directorate, the secret police. Particularly in crisis moments such as the summer of 1968,
says Urquidi, "They had spies everywhere." Interior knew more about union activities in
the Colegio de Mexico, which Urquidi was president of, than he did. "The force of the
Mexican president had two sources: legitimacy and the legitimate use of force," says
Victor Bravo, advisor to a former presidential contender and son of a cabinet secretary.
Bravo explains what he means by the "legitimate" use of force:
I am not talking about the atomic bomb - no - the police, the public prosecutor, intelligence services,
hidden tape recorders. If someone was homosexual, I mean photos taken of him with a friend. J.
Edgar Hoover didn't have the atomic bomb, but files on individuals, no? Suppose in the fourth year of
Echeverrfa's administration my father, the education secretary, had asked his friends who were rectors
of universities to support [the presidential contender he favored] Mario Moya Palencia. If Echeverria
had found out, he would have gotten rid of my father. He would have driven him out. Suppose my
father had said, "I'm not going; no one who replaces me will be as good an education secretary." "Oh
yes? Well, then, it seems you didn't pay your taxes." If it wasn't by fair means, it was by foul.
Big business and the Catholic Church had real political bases and the ability to
negotiate with the executive branch (Gonzailez Casanova 1970, 41, 50; Cornelius and Craig
1991, 56), 4 7 and the U.S. government could never be ignored. But the ruling party
incorporated and regulated the most important other societal organizations, notably the
Mexican Workers Federation, the National Peasants Federation, and the National
Federation of Popular Organizations (professional and middle-class associations).
The state's corporatist apparatus was built in part on the kind of informal patron-
client relationships that pervade much of Mexican society. For example, the ubiquitous
street vendors in Mexico City pay a local boss to occupy space, as if public sidewalks were
47 Gonzilez Casanova says the military had defacto political power and could bargain independently with
political rulers, but most authors do not see it as having more clout than any other part of the bureaucracy.
for rent, while the boss keeps local authorities and rival vendors at bay. Mafioso-like
caciques dominate many poor communities, acquiring followers, often going around with
armed guards (Cornelius 1975, 146), and collecting "donations," ostensibly for travel,
bribes, and other costs of negotiating with government officials (Cornelius 1975, 143). For
all their inflated commissions, they do manage to secure benefits such as land titles, water
service, or street grading from politicians (Cornelius 1975, 159). Those politicians, who
are in turn vying with each other to prove their effectiveness to higher authorities, require
the caciques to produce mass supporters for rallies, prevent social unrest, and avoid
building alliances with other communities (Cornelius 1975, 159-60).
The state's control over corporatist sectors 48 rested not just on informal patron-
client relationships but on Mexicans' loyalty to revolutionary ideals, a bureaucracy that
made some concessions but blocked grass-roots mobilization, and armed force. In the
1930s President Lizaro Cirdenas, a champion of land reform and worker rights, drew on
his radical populist image to officially incorporate social sectors (Collier and Collier 1991,
571). Unions were splintered when the administration began, but labor leader Vicente
Lombardo Toledano established the primacy of his umbrella group, the Mexican Workers
Federation, and cemented its ties to the state (Knight 1991, 274-77). Though the story had
its odd twists, as when (in accord with its "Popular Front" strategy) Moscow rescued his
federation by ordering powerful Communist unions such as rail and electrical workers to
join, Lombardo's belief that unions should ally with progressive, Revolutionary currents in
the state was critical (Bizberg 1990, 321). The Cirdenas administration did not forget to
repay the federation, granting it subsidies and installing leaders in political office,
including 30 in the Chamber of Deputies. Peasants who benefited from agrarian reform
were organized in ejidos, communities to jointly manage expropriated lands, were split
from Lombardo's urban workers, and were required to join the official National Peasants
Federation (Stepan 1978, 61; Knight 1991, 257-58). Government employees, cordoned off
from the rest of urban workers, were later incorporated in the "popular" sector.
As Alfred Stepan argues in comparing Mexico with other Latin American states,
this corporatist structure, elaborated over succeeding decades, assured that Mexican
worker and peasant organizations "do not, and cannot, exercise group sovereignty, but
rather perform the role assigned to them" by the political elite (1978, 61). Many features of
the system contributed to that end. Fragmented unions, covering only 16 percent of the
workforce and often representing employees of only a single firm (Middlebrook 1991, 9) -
the average union in the Mexican Workers Federation had fewer than 150 members
(Middlebrook 1995, 267) - faced enormous obstacles to collective action. They depended
on government subsidies instead of collecting membership dues (Camp 1993, 122), and
though in theory workers could vote to be represented by whichever union they chose, in
practice if official corporatist leaders were threatened, they could postpone votes, get
ringleaders fired, and sink the whole process in the state-controlled courts (Perez Arce
1990, 110). Strikes had to be recognized as legal by so-called conciliation and arbitration
boards, with one member from the government, one from the official labor movement, and
one from management (Middlebrook 1991, 4; Franco G. S. 1991, 110)- in short, by state-
controlled boards - or workers who participated could be fired (Stepan 1978, 65). Between
48 Statements that the state effectively controlled corporatist sectors include Stepan 1978, 61-66; Cornelius
and Craig 1991, 85-92; Collier and Collier 1991,574; Camp 1993, 121-125; Middlebrook 1991, 9, and 1995,
27; Smith 1979, 54; Newell and Rubio 1984, 272; and Frank 1969, 314.
1963 and 1993, a mere 2.2 percent of strike petitions under federal jurisdiction, covering
the most important industries, were recognized as legal. During the ongoing economic
recession of the 1980s - depression really - real Mexican wages fell nearly twice as fast as
the Latin American average (Middlebrook 1995, 269), yet there was not a single general
strike in Mexico, as compared with eight in Argentina and two in Brazil (265-6).
Corporatist labor leaders had every incentive to control rank and file demands and
mobilize them to rally behind the PRI at elections because their careers advanced within
the political system, not the labor movement per se. They were called charros, as one of
the most infamous was nicknamed for his habit of dressing like a cowboy. Francisco P6rez
Arce, an anthropologist, says that in workers' eyes, "a charro is someone who has an
office (the union's office) and has a political career (in the PRI) and will probably become
a congressional deputy, or is one, or already was one" (1990, 109). Even if national and
state legislatures had no real legislative power, lucrative seats in them rewarded labor,
peasant, and "popular" sector leaders for maintaining discipline (Hernandez Rodrfguez
1992, 244-47). And trouble-makers could be sacked (Cornelius and Craig 1991, 33), as, for
example, when President Carlos Salinas ostentatiously jailed the Pemex union leader,
Joaqufn "La Quina" Hernandez Galicia, a corrupt cacique who at least defended workers,
to replace him with another corrupt cacique who did not even defend workers (Camacho
Solis). The Mexican Workers Federation consistently opposed democratization, from the
anti-authoritarian protests in 1968 through the opposition campaigns of the 1980s, as
democratization might threaten leaders' own careers (Cornelius and Craig 1991, 90). They
were well advised to prevent general strikes, which could have led to their losing control
over the rank and file (Middlebrook 1995, 268).
Though state control over society was never complete - there were eruptions, to be
discussed - it was pervasive. Peasants and unorganized workers were notoriously the
easiest to manipulate (Collier and Collier 1991, 582; Cornelius and Craig 1991, 85; Smith
1979, 53-54), but even presidents of professional associations such as the College of
Architects could be bought off by being inducted into government (Gamboa). Protest could
be manufactured, too; although proving any given case is difficult, the technique was
widely recognized. For example, in 1966 President Diaz Ordaz told the then rector of the
National University, Ignacio Chivez Sanchez, "You are going to make a terrific
ambassador to France when you have finished at the end of the current year." Chaivez said,
"Thank you, but I am considering running for a second term." Diaz Ordaz turned to the
person on his left and muttered, "This idiot doesn't understand." The government shortly
organized a little riot that ended Chaivez' career as rector.49
Media control was critical in containing protest: it could not spread since one
pocket could never even learn that another existed. Here the state's principal leverage was
economic. It bought print coverage by strategically placing government, state-enterprise,
and party advertisements, which on average accounted for half of all newspaper ad
revenue, while agencies that reporters covered often handed them monthly cash payments
larger than their salaries (Lawson 2002. 31, 35). The state paper manufacturer, PIPSA,
which controlled the importation as well as production of newsprint, could ignore accounts
payable by friendly outlets and, on rare occasion, shut off supplies to unfavorable outlets
(Lawson 2002, 33). On June 22, 1966, when new monkeys arrived at the zoo and the
president inaugurated a new project, someone who must have had a perilous sense of
49 Suirez Mier. His source is the person who was on Dfaz Ordaz's left.
humor in the layout department of El Diario de Mixico switched captions, so the one
under President Diaz Ordaz' photo read, "The zoo has been enriched." The newspaper was
forced to announce its own demise (Krauze 1997, 687). Journalists could mouth all the
nebulous Marxist rhetoric they wanted, providing a faqade of diversity, but reporters who
found out too many damaging facts could, as a last resort, be murdered (Lawson 2002, 46).
Emilio Azcairraga, Jr., owner of the only important television network, Televisa,
proclaimed that his "only boss" was the president of Mexico (Riding 1989, 313) and that
Televisa "consider[ed] itself part of the government system" (Lawson 2002, 30).
Labor insurgencies
If populist economic pressure caused economic crisis in Mexico, it should have done so in
the late 1950s, not after 1970. In the authoritative History of the Mexican Revolution Jos6
Luis Reyna says that a 1958-59 strike wave led by the railroad union "was the first
important proletarian social movement that, momentarily, reached the point of putting the
political system in crisis. It is without doubt the most important movement that has arisen
since 1935" (Pellicer de Brody and Reyna 1978), that is, since the corporatist system was
consolidated.50 Reyna could not have forgotten to compare 1958-59 with the so-called
labor insurgency of the 1970s, since he wrote those words in 1978, just after it ended. But
the powerful 1958-59 grassroots movement, far from provoking the macroeconomics of
populism, only ushered in the most stable, rapid growth Mexico has known.
The strike wave began with pocketbook demands and only later became a threat to
the political system. Initial labor protests arose in 1956 among electric-utility workers and
Mexico City teachers (Carr 1991, 133). In 1957, after wages of the 60,000 railroad workers
had been eroding for some years, especially as compared with those in other critical
industries, several sections of the union successfully pressed corporatist leaders to convoke
a study commission on the matter. But in May 1958, the leaders rejected the commission's
proposal to raise salaries 350 pesos a month, a 38 percent increase for the average
railworker intended to restore real purchasing power to what it had been in 1948,51 and
instead asked for only 200 pesos. With presidential elections approaching in July, Mexico
City teachers, along with telegraph, oil, and electric-utility workers - all public-sector
unions except for some of the electric workers - were now petitioning for raises, as well.
The fact that the rail and telegraph workers controlled communication lines was
essential: they had more capacity to organize on a national scale outside the corporatist
structure than practically any other Mexican unions at the time. A supine media could and
did lambaste them, but press censorship could not prevent local sections from keeping each
other abreast of developments. A group in the railroad workers salary commission led by
one Demetrio Vellejo of Oaxaca not only sought the 350 pesos raise but began to take
moves that threatened the corporatist leadership, telegraphing a wildcat strike plan to all
sections: work should stop at ten o'clock on June 25 for two hours, two more hours the
50 I cite Reyna alone since he wrote the section of the history on the 1958-59 strike wave. Except where noted
to the contrary, the account of the 1958-59 strikes is his from his account but is consistent with other histories
such as Smith 1991, Krauze 1997, and Bizberg 1990.
51 The raise was to be applied across the board, regardless of railworkers' differing pay levels. Reyna (175)
cites a source as saying that the average railworker's wage was 916 monthly in 1957 and that the 350 peso
increase (for a total of 1266 pesos) would have provided the same real purchasing power as in 1948.
next day, and so on until their demands were met - or the nation would be paralyzed just as
presidential elections were to be held. The government and corporatist union bet the
wildcat strike would not happen, but they bet wrong. It went like clockwork and spread
across the nation, increasingly paralyzing transport. On June 30, President Adolfo Ruiz
Cortines offered 215 pesos, and the insurgents accepted. They had won - the first round.
After another series of strikes, the government granted railworkers the opportunity
to call a leadership vote in August, and Vallejo was elected, 59,759 votes to 9. But the
union did not know when to stop. It made more demands: a 32 percent raise for train
dispatchers, another 16.7 percent for all railworkers, 10 pesos a day for rent. It even
petitioned to improve the inept rail management, for example, not charging U.S. mining
companies 20 percent less than Mexican farmers. The "railroad workers effect" spread:
electric utility and telegraph workers attacked their corporatist leadership; Pemex workers
proposed to install "authentic labor democracy"; telephone workers cut off service briefly.
Even Fidel Velaizquez, perpetual leader of the official labor movement, noticed discontent
and announced that social justice was just a "myth" in Mexico. When the railworkers
union threatened more strikes before Easter 1959, the Federal Arbitration and Conciliation
Board took the usual step of declaring them illegal, but this time the government meant it.
On Holy Thursday 13,000 workers were fired; on Easter Sunday 10,000 railworkers were
jailed (Krauze 1997, 635-6). In the end as many as 20,000 lost their jobs, means of
subsistence, and in many cases company-supplied homes. Charged with "social
dissolution" and half a dozen other crimes, Vallejo was locked up until 1971. The upshot
was, the Mexican historian Enrique Krauze says, "the subordination - complete or partial -
of virtually all groups within the society" (1997, 663).
Facing powerful strikes, wage demands, and a presidential election (which could
not be allowed to descend into chaos, even if a loss was inconceivable), the government
spent heavily in 1958 - real expenditures excluding debt service grew 14 percent (Table 3-
1) - but long before the fateful 1959 Easter weekend that ended the strikes, the new
president, Adolfo L6pez Mateos, and his finance secretary, Antonio Ortiz Mena, agreed
that inflation must be stopped (Ortiz Mena). As they cut spending 5 percent in real terms
that year, inflation fell to a mere 2 percent, incredibly low for a developing country, and
averaged about that level for the next five years. How politics among high officials and
grupos in the central administration allowed those cuts to be enforced is a story for later
chapters, but that they were made is clear. The only real, if temporary, threat to the
political system since its consolidation in the 1930s produced no economic crisis.
Might the so-called labor insurgency of the 1970s, even if less powerful than the
1958-59 strikes, have contributed to the 1976 crisis? There are two problems with that
idea. First, in contrast to much union activity in other Latin nations such as Brazil and
Chile, Mexico's labor insurgency was largely instigated by the administration, and it never
overwhelmed the state's resources to control it (Collier and Collier 1991, 601). Second,
unlike in 1958-59, major disputes did not even originate in wage demands that could affect
macroeconomic performance but rather sought union democratization, or at least the
ousting of charro leaders. The relative lack of wage demands is not surprising, as the
economy had been growing rapidly for years, and organized labor, corporatist though it
was, had benefited handsomely from that growth. Indeed, today all studies agree that
income distribution was improving at least slightly in the 1960s (Buffie 1990, 409), and
migration studies indicate that new arrivals to Mexico City found jobs quickly, more than
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Table 3-1 Federal government spending growth and budget deficits, 1947-70
Real spending growth GDP growth Surplus or deficit (percent of GDP)
Total* Excluding Total* Excluding
debt service debt service
Aleman
1947 12.7 12.2 3.5 -0.3 0.9
1948 26.1 27.8 4.1 -1.5 -0.2
1949 29.4 32.2 5.5 0.4 1.9
1950 -12.2 -14.0 10.0 0.0 1.3
1951 12.7 12.0 7.7 0.2 1.6
1952 28.4 32.5 4.0 -0.8 0.7
Ruiz Cortines
1953 -14.4 -15.2 0.3 -1.1 0.2
1954 30.3 32.4 10.0 -2.0 -0.6
1955 -0.2 -8.0 8.5 -1.1 0.9
1956 8.1 13.7 6.8 -1.0 0.6
1957 3.1 1.0 7.6 -1.4 0.3
1958 11.4 14.1 5.4 -1.1 0.5
Lopez Mateos
1959 -17.8 -5.3 3.0 -0.7 -0.4
1960 27.2 26.5 8.2 -1.4 -1.1
1961 -11.4 -14.2 4.9 -1.0 -0.4
1962 7.8 9.9 4.6 -0.8 -0.4
1963 11.3 10.8 8.0 -0.6 -0.2
1964 20.9 20.3 11.7 -1.6 -1.1
Diaz Ordaz
1965 24.2 22.7 6.5 -2.5 -1.8
1966 -6.1 -8.5 6.9 -1.2 -0.4
1967 10.2 10.6 6.3 -1.4 -0.6
1968 9.3 8.3 8.1 -1.1 -0.1
1969 17.3 18.4 6.3 -1.9 -1.0
1970 5.8 4.9 6.9 -1.7 -0.7
* Total spending figures and the resulting deficits from 1947-58 are problematic because they include
amortization: see Appendix 2. Spending excluding debt service is not problematic, nor is data from 1959 on.
Fiscal data is from the same sources as Table 2-3.
GDP in current and 1970 pesos: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geograffa e InformAtica (INEGI) 1994,
Estadisticas Hist6ricas de M-xico, Table 8.1.
half of them in the formal industrial sector (Buffie 1990, 412).
Odd though it may seem, the labor insurgency was cultivated largely by President
Luis Echeverria and petered out when he abandoned it. Even though he had been interior
secretary during Tlatelolco, thus in charge of maintaining political order, during his
campaign he sought to distance himself from Dfaz Ordaz, promising "democratic opening"
and "shared development." In December 1970, two weeks after taking office, he
proclaimed, "How are we going to talk of democracy in Mexico if, when union leadership
is chosen, the process is not democratic'?" (Tello 1979, 43). A new labor law was passed
that theoretically allowed only 20 workers in a plant to demand a revote to determine
which union should represent them (Perez Arce 1990, 110). More important, since the law
could always be skirted, in 1972 Echeverria appointed an anti-charro labor secretary,
Porfirio Mufioz Ledo, who began recognizing important unions outside the corporatist
federation, such as the National Iron and Steelworkers that came to represent employees at
the Spicer and Zapata Consortium factories (P6rez Arce 1990, 111).
The core of the labor insurgency was the Democratic Tendency of the electrical
utility workers. After the government had nationalized American Foreign Power in 1960
(really a takeover via the U.S. stock market), its relatively democratic union - the
corporatist bureaucracy often left multinationals to handle their own labor affairs - and the
larger charro union in the state-owned Federal Electricity Commission were legally
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required to combine. 52 The vote was delayed and delayed because the more democratic
union, led by Rafael Galvain, did not want to be swallowed up, and the charro union,
which was allowed to sign up more new workers, wanted to be sure it would have an
overwhelming majority. As Echeverria entered office and turned up the democratic
rhetoric, so did Galvain, and now the corporatist conciliation and arbitration board decided
it was time to hold union elections. The charro union, led by Francisco Perez Rios, easily
won, but Galvin said the ballots had asked which union workers belonged to, not which
they wanted to represent them, and so fought the vote all the way the Supreme Court, of
course futilely. Believing as Lombardo had under Cirdenas that labor should ally with
progressive, Revolutionary currents within the state, he petitioned to strike, hoping that the
president would himself step in. But only after the conciliation and arbitration board
declared the strike illegal, and the charro union had signed a contract with the electric
utility to represent all workers, did Echeverria decide enter the fray. First he called a
congress to decide the matter (even if it had legally been decided) but then worked out a
pact creating the Unique Electrical Workers of Mexico, whereby Perez Rios would have
the highest post, general secretary, but Galvain would be second-in-command.
It is important that only the president's extra-legal, if not illegal, intervention -
after Galvain lost the vote, the Supreme Court confirmed the loss, and the proposed strike
was defeated - kept Galvain's Democratic Tendency afloat. This was not a powerful grass-
roots revolt from below, like the railworkers' in 1958-59, but the powerful hand of Luis
Echeverria, reaching down to manipulate action like some deus ex mnachina.
Emilio Carrillo Gamboa, director of Telmex, which faced the largest actual strike
under the administration, also over union control rather than wages and also decided by
Echeverria rather than by legal procedures, says the president and labor secretary
52 Except where noted to the contrary, this account is from Bizberg 1990, 304-25. It is essentially consistent
with others such as P6rez Arce 1990, 109-113, Hellman 1983, 244-246; Middlebrook 1995, 222-225; and
Carrillo Gamboa interview.
.;upported dissidents because they wanted "to get rid of" long-time corporatist union boss
Fidel Velazquez: "They felt that the real leader of the labor movement in Mexico should be
the secretary of labor." 53 And since the labor secretary served at the will of the president,
Echeverrfa would really be in control.
By 1973, facing rising inflation and presidential succession - the choice of official
candidate, of course, not the election per se - the government began to start favoring the
corporatist structure (Bizberg 1990, 314; Perez Arce 1990, 112; Franco G. S. 1991, 114).
All Echeverria had to do was abandon the Democratic Tendency, and, to make a long story
short, the corporatist labor structure destroyed it in 1976 and cleaned up the rest of the so-
called labor insurgency within a couple of years (P6rez Arce 1990, 113). While 3.0 percent
of strike petitions had been recognized as legal under the conservative Dfaz Ordaz, only
1.9 percent were under Echeverrfa (Middlebrook 1995, 166). There were no remotely
powerful enough "populist" economic demands to cause an economic crisis.
Under L6pez Portillo from 1976 through 1982, unions continued to be dependent
on the state, as no one recognized better than Carlos Tello, the leftist secretary of state
industries whose nationalist economic project sought their support. He wrote in 1981:
On the one hand, union leaders say they will put organized labor at the service of the developmental
project of the state . . .On the other hand, . .. the labor movement has wandered off course, suffered
bureaucratization, lost the impetus it had under CAirdenas, grown more slowly, failed to advance in its
organizational structure, become depoliticized and divided, generally succumbed to antidemocratic
and repressive practices, and allowed workers' real salaries to fall.. . .This double character, with its
ups and downs and changes at the margin, has continued for a long time. (Cordera and Tello 1981a.
72)
Real earnings suffered declines under L6pez Portillo ranging from 7 percent in
manufacturing to 20 percent in the public sector (Buffie 1990, 434),5 and after peaking in
1978 and 1979, federal jurisdiction strikes (those in major national industries) fell sharply
(Bizberg 1984, 181), long before the crisis approached. 55 Under de la Madrid (1982-88),
even as real minimum wages fell by half (Middlebrook 1995, 257), the percentage of
legally recognized strikes continued to decline (Middlebrook 1991, 12). Mexican labor
quiescence contrasted with protest in other large Latin American nations (Middlebrook
1995, 265). This is not the way that populist demands cause economic crises.
Political elites' spending cycle
Electoral spending in developing nations, as governments try to buy support at the polls, is
widely supposed to cause macroeconomic instability that can lead to crises. 56 Stephan
Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman argue that even authoritarian regimes often see elections
as referenda and use spending to "legitimate their rule" (1992a, 31); Korea shows evidence
of such an electoral cycle (1992b, 290). Barry Ames concludes that politicians in Latin
3 Hellman 1983, 242, and Schmidt 1991, 78, reach the same conclusion.
54 Bizberg 1984, 168, likewise shows real declines throughout the L6pez Portillo administration, in both
manufacturing wages and minimum wages, except for a roughly 2 percent increase in 1981.
5 Middlebrook 1995, 165, shows a sharp increase in strikes from 108 in 1981 to 675 in 1982. These would
have responded to rather than causing at least the first crisis (uncontrolled devaluation), in January 1981. But
Bizberg says the overwhelming majority were one-day strikes at local radio stations; otherwise strike activity
fell in 1982 (1984, 180). He calculates that the number of person-days lost per 1000 workers peaked in 1980,
fell to only 16 percent that level in 1981, then rose to 50 percent that level in 1982 (183).
56 Haggard and Kaufman, 1989, 272; Nelson 1990a. 23; Nelson 1990b. 340; Heath 1999, 10-11.
America, like their counterparts elsewhere, used a significant portion of expenditure -
building infrastructure, recruiting state workers, or providing welfare benefits - as "a
weapon for survival" (1987, 1): "Because governments running for reelection.sought to
buy support" spending rose significantly during election years (1987, 27, footnote 12). 57
This argument does not fit Mexico. From 1952, when Miguel Henrfquez Guzmin
ran a powerful opposition presidential campaign, until 1988, when Cuauht6moc Cairdenas
again seriously challenged the ruling party, there was no meaningful electoral competition.
Opposition parties never got more than 15 percent of the official vote (Aguayo 2000, 242).
And as Gonzailez Casanova (1970, 124) noted in Democracy in Mexico (democracy was
for him a hope, not a contemporary fact), "Civil life has not reached the level at which
authorities become compelled in their own interest to register carefully the votes of the
opposition - that is, the level at which not doing so would provoke serious conflicts." Even
in 1988, when the official count showed the ruling party getting a bare 50 percent of the
votes cast (Aguayo 2000, 242), the PRI was not concerned that things would go badly until
election night itself.58
Ames suggests that there might have been an electoral spending cycle in Mexico
anyway because the margin of victory mattered to "a host of lower-level politicians on
their way up" (1987, 33). But no Mexico scholar believes that lower-down politicians
controlled a significant portion of public spending. Why should the president,
constitutionally prohibited from reelection, hazard massive expenditures on lower-down
politicians? (A little for some favorites would hardly matter.) As for cabinet secretaries
who played an important role in approving expenditures, they always rose through the
central administration, never through elected posts. What would they care about armies of
politicians running not only for electoral posts but lower-level ones?
Political succession was never decided in elections; the transfer of power was never
in play then. The contest for the party's nomination was the real one, no matter what the
office. A precandidate had to demonstrate support not because the party feared it might
lose the election but because it wanted him to prove he could maintain political order.
Braulio Maldonado, a governor of Baja California who may have written the only inside
account of the political system prior to the 1990s (and was duly ostracized), describes the
candidate who secures the president's endorsement:
[T]he contender has. . . given the shirt off his back, he has made countless promises, often at the price
of his own dignity. He has been mercilessly exploited by hundreds of politicians, labor bosses,
peasant leaders, and by mercenary journalists. ..- . He has already made arrangements for the
disbursement of the public budget, or even for his own salary, for the period of his incumbency. [But
once he has secured presidential approval] the process is exceedingly easy, and battle is won, victory
having been secured in governmental anterooms. Now the labor unions, the peasant organizations, the
popular sector and the party declare him to be the Official Candidate. (cited in Smith 1979, 274-75)
Much as with this gubernatorial hopeful, cabinet secretaries vying in the big race, the
presidential nomination, sought to demonstrate widespread support among political
currents - high officials, governors and state delegations, labor - to show that they could
maintain national political order.
57 Because of the way it is done, Ames' regression does not determine a percentage by which spending rose.
Remmer 1993 finds little evidence of an electoral cycle in Latin America from 1982 through 1991. The
reason is that this was the disastrous decade following the 1982 crises: "By the time elections approached,
Latin governments in the 1980s were often less than master than the victim of the economy" (405). Her data
is not relevant to Mexico from 1970 through 1982, when there were plentiful resources.
58 See chapter 8.
Electoral-year spending did occur in the 1950s (Table 3-1), but it never caused an
economic crisis. As Henrfquez Guzman mounted the last serious opposition presidential
campaign before the political system was fully consolidated in 1952, real government
spending soared - 12 percent in 1951, then 32 percent more in the election year 1952,
years when annual GDP growth averaged 6 percent.59 The powerful strikes by rail and oil
workers, teachers, and other public-sector unions that exploded during the 1958 election
year were quelled with wage increases as well as repression. Most of those wage increases
were borne by state-owned enterprises such as the railroads and Pemex, whose accounts
for those years are not available in federal budgets, but teachers are on the federal budget,
and other spending might have been an expedient to quell unrest. Having inched up only 1
percent in 1957, real government expenditure swelled 14 percent in the election year 1958.
The political system was quite capable of wielding spending to keep peace at the polls if
need be. However, spending was tightened after these two crises, falling 15 percent in
1953 after the election and 5 percent in 1959 after most strikes were quelled. Overall
government deficits remained small, around 1 percent of GDP.
After 1960 public spending surges became increasingly concentrated in the pre-
election year. A regression designed to capture how the political cycle affected public
spending - as distinct from economic factors such as GDP (increases provide resources to
spend) or foreign reserves (increases indicate that external resources are available) - shows
that from 1961 through 1988, spending typically rose 11 percent in each administration's
fifth year, when the pre-electoral contest over the nomination occurred, and fell 12 percent
in the sixth year when elections took place. These figures are significant at better than the
99 percent confidence level (Appendix 1).
The data before 1965 are poor: federal government spending rose fastest in the
election year 1964 and the post-election year 1965 (Table 3-1), but state-owned firms,
comprising about half of total public-sector expenditures, were not incorporated in the
budget, and Finance Ministry sources unanimously say that political spending was
concentrated precisely in them (Ortiz Mena, Urquidi, and Izquierdo). The only figures
(though approximate) on total public-sector spending, reconstructed by a Bank of Mexico-
Finance Ministry working group, show the biggest increase of 16 percent in the pre-
electoral year of 1963, then a slightly lesser increase of 14 percent in the election year of
1964 (Table 3-2). They show the largest deficit in 1964, but deficits including interest
payments (as this data does) typically lag spending increases on actual programs.
Whatever the correct statistics are, it is clear that presidential hopefuls used public
spending to build support for their candidacies. Donato Miranda Fonseca was secretary of
Presidency, a ministry distinct from the president's actual office that allocated public-
sector investment. According to Finance Secretary Antonio Ortiz Mena, Miranda Fonseca
let the ministries of Public Works and of Communications and Transport undertake large
investment programs, hoping to gain their support for his candidacy. But the most flagrant
case was Benito Coquet, director of Social Security, the principal welfare program for
workers. 6 A long-time ally of President L6pez Mateos - indeed his former boss in the
59 Data excludes debt service. Excluding debt service highlights the current political uses of spending;
moreover, the fiscal data net of debt service is more accurate (see table).
0 The account of these events is taken from Ortiz Mena, Izquierdo, Urquidi (Finance), Romero Kolbeck
(Bank of Mexico), and Moctezuma (Presidency). Some facts are taken from some interviews, others from
others, but all stories are consistent.
Public sector spending growth and budget deficits, 1960-70
Real spending
growth
Federal
government
plus state
enterprises
GDP
growth
Surplus or deficit
(percent of GDP)
Federal Public
government
plus state
enterprises
sector*
Lopez Mateos
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
Diaz Ordaz
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
*Public sector includes the federal government,
the net deficit of state banks.
state enterprises, Mexico City, other off-budget items, and
All spending figures include interest payments. Data gives revenue received and spending paid out during the
course of the year (gasto pagado) as opposed to the amounts in final budgets (gasto ejercido), which may not
actually be received or paid during the budget year.
Data is the same as in Table 2-4. As mentioned there, the data from 1960-64, reconstructed by a Finance
Ministry-Bank of Mexico working group, should be treated with caution.
Table 3-2
4.9
4.6
8.0
11.7
1.0
7.3
15.9
14.3
3.7
4.2
12.8
6.3
8.0
9.3
-2.6
-2.3
-2.1
-2.9
-3.9
-0.9
-1.2
-2.1
-1.6
-1.5
-2.1
6.5
6.9
6.3
8.1
6.3
6.9
-2.9
-2.5
-2.7
-3.7
-4.8
-0.9
-1.2
-2.4
-2.2
-2.2
-3.8
Education Ministry in the early 1940s - Coquet sought to build support for his presidential
candidacy by taking out massive "floating" loans (contracted with foreign banks but not
formalized on the books or even known to Finance) to speed construction of a national
network of medical centers, housing complexes, movie theatres, and other projects. They
came to light shortly after Victor Urquidi, the finance minister's economic advisor, had
painted a rosy picture to Washington financial circles, including the Treasury, IMF, and
World Bank, of Mexico's modest foreign borrowing requirements for the coming year, and
embarrassed him for having appeared deceptive or incompetent (Urquidi). The Social
Security budget, after averaging 225 million pesos annually from 1959 through 1962,
soared to 892 million in 1963 and then 2,176 million in 1964 (Izquierdo 1995, 131), a $200
million-dollar increase for the two years, or nearly a fifth of Mexico's total accumulated
foreign debt.6 1 In 1965 authorized foreign borrowing jumped from $92 million to $360
million, as the "floating" loans were, perforce, put on the books (Ortiz Mena 1998, 145).
This borrowing and spending was a principal factor posing a threat of economic crisis in
1965, according to Finance sources.
In this case, Social Security spending appears to have followed an electoral as well
as a pre-electoral cycle, quadrupling in 1963 but then moire than doubling again in 1964.
The timing cannot be completely wrong: even if Coquet was trying to build support for his
candidacy, medical centers and other construction could not be stopped dead just because
he lost. But investment spending could also be registered on government books a year or
more after actual construction (Moctezuma). Of course, contractors always receive lump-
sum payments after corresponding portions of the work are completed, but peculiarities of
the Mexican system could delay putting payments on the books much longer. For example,
President Diaz Ordaz once asked Julio Rodolfo Moctezuma, then director of public
investments, how much some recently built schools had cost. Moctezuma found that there
was afideicomiso for the schools (often confusingly translated as "trust fund"), an ad hoc
construction fund backed by a public bank. As construction proceeded, thefideicomiso
paid the contractors, but the Education Ministry, still lacking funds for the schools, paid
nothing. Eventually the ministry would reimburse the fideicomiso, with interest, but it had
not yet done so when Diaz Ordaz asked Moctezuma how much the schools had cost the
government. Thus his answer was: so far, nothing.
The fact that some significant portion of physical investment, though just what
proportion cannot be determined, was made substantially earlier than indicated by fiscal
data reinforces evidence for a pre-electoral cycle. It means that some spending registered in
the election year actually paid for investments made earlier; the spending with political
impact during the election year was less than indicated. Some spending in the pre-electoral
year likewise paid for investment made earlier. The nomination contest simply started
somewhat before the data suggests, in an administration's fourth or even third year.62
For the next two decades the pre-electoral cycle is clear and powerful (Table 3-3).63
Under Dfaz Ordaz, when economic growth averaged 7 percent a year, public spending
6 I translated just the increase in Social Security spending to dollars at the exchange rate of 12.5, then
divided by accumulated foreign debt in 1962 from Ortiz Mena 1998, 148.
62 Ortiz Mena mentioned that Diaz Ordaz (who of course ultimately became president) was already
concerned about rivalries for the candidacy in the third year of the administration.
6 Except as noted, data excludes interest, but total spending is also provided in Table 3-3. In some sense
public spending net of interest gauges the real political effect, while spending with interest measures the
political effort to spend. In any case, the same pre-electoral spending pattern emerges if interest is included.
Table 3-3 Public-sector spending growth and budget deficits, 1966-1988
Real spending growth
Total Spending
Spending excluding
debt service
4
9
7
13
3
6
21
23
11
26
2
0
12
17
21
26
18
-16
-4
-3
0
10
-13
3
9
7
13
1
7
21
25
10
27
0
-2
12
17
21
22
-8
-17
1
-7
-13
-1
-9
GDP growth
6.9
6.3
8.1
6.3
6.9
3.8
8.2
8.5
5.1
5.7
4.4
3.4
9.0
9.7
9.2
8.8
-0.6
-4.2
3.6
2.6
-3.8
1.9
1.2
Surplus or deficit (percent GDP)
Total surplus Surplus or deficit
or deficit excluding debt
service
-1.4
-1.9
-1.5
-2.1
-1.4
-2.0
-3.5
-5.2
-5.2
-8.5
-6.8
-4.6
-4.5
-5.0
-5.6
-12.0
-14.7
-7.4
-5.8
-6.8
-12.3
-13.4
-9.9
-0.3
-0.7
-0.2
-0.7
0.2
-0.5
-1.8
-3.5
-3.3
-6.5
-4.2
-1.8
-1.6
-2.0
-2.4
-7.2
-0.6
6.1
5.9
5.4
5.0
7.4
8.4
Both the federal government and state enterprises are included in all figures; Mexico City and some other
items not on the federal budget and not available in consolidated figures are not included.
All figures are net of amortization, the correct method (see Appendix 2).
Revenue is from Salinas 1992 (Cuarto Informe de Gobierno), 161 ("Ingresos presupuestales del sector
ptiblico federal").
Spending is from Salinas 1992, 168 ("Gasto neto devengado del sector publico presupuestario").
GDP in current and 1980 pesos is from Cardenas 1996, 214-15, Table A.4.
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
(excluding interest) rose 7 percent in 1968, 13 percent in the pre-election year 1969, and
only 1 percent in the election year 1970. The largest deficit, though small, at 0.7 percent of
GDP excluding interest (2.1 percent of GDP including it), was also in the pre-election year,
1969. Under Echeverri'a, when growth averaged 6 percent a year, public spending rose 10
percent in 1974, 27 percent in the pre-election year 1975, and none at all in the election
year 1976. Again the largest deficit, now serious at 6.5 percent of GDP excluding interest
(8.5 percent of GDP including it), was in the pre-election year, 1975.
L6pez Portillo pushed growth to 8 percent a year before the crisis hit, but public
spending rose far faster, topping out at a 22 percent increase in the pre-electoral year 1981;
the deficit excluding interest payments was also by far worst that year, at 7.2 percent of
GDP (the next worst, in 1980, was only 2.4 percent of GDP). Although de la Madrid, then
in charge of monitoring expenditure as planning and budget secretary, was known as a
fiscal conservative, he did not enforce cuts agreed to early in 1981. On the contrary, Jos6
Ram6n L6pez Portillo, son of president L6pez Portillo and himself an official in Planning
and Budget under de la Madrid, concludes that his former boss "proved to be flexible
enough to.. . disguise his own economic position in order not to endanger his political
future" (L6pez Portillo Romano 1994, 147). As late as August, still relying on data from
April - before world oil prices dipped, and before conflict over presidential succession
caused Mexico to irrationally raise its price and drive half its customers away - Planning
and Budget's statistical director, one Carlos Salinas, estimated a deficit of 470 billion
pesos. Only 45 days later, after de la Madrid's nomination, his estimate rose by two-thirds
(L6pez Portillo Romano 1994, 168). Had de la Madrid slashed spending before the
nomination, he would surely have undermined his support (Oteyza, S, irez Mier, L6pez
Portillo Romano 1994, 169; Castafieda 1999, 397-98). Budget cuts began immediately
after the nomination, and in January, six months before the election, the peso was
devalued. Public spending other than on interest actually fell 8 percent during the election
year 1982, and the deficit excluding interest was a mere 0.6 percent of GDP. But because
of enormous interest payments on debt contracted earlier and the economic crisis, the total
deficit rose to 14.7 percent of GDP.
Though the next administration was mired in recession, economic manipulation
followed the usual pattern. Real public spending (still excluding interest payments)
plunged 13 percent in 1986; practically held its own, falling only 1 percent, in the pre-
electoral year 1987; then sank 9 percent in the electoral year 1988. Some caution about this
expenditure is in order. Though the worst total deficit was in 1987 (13 percent of GDP),
the budget excluding the burden of interest payments was in substantial surplus (7 percent
of GDP). Still, spending was concentrated in politically strategic areas. For example,
public-bank lending soared from 22 percent of GDP in 1985 to 33 percent of GDP in 1987
(Table 7-1) - an increase conveniently not reflected in fiscal accounts. Moreover, the
securities market posted a record run-up of over 500 percent in real terms from January
through September (Basaifiez 1996, 254), a financial adventure in which not only wealthy
but middle-class Mexicans widely shared. 65 As economic czar since eliminating his chief
rival in 1986, Carlos Salinas helped inflate that run-up - and along with it expectations
about his ability as economic manager if nominated as the official presidential candidate -
according disparate sources including Finance Secretary Jestis Silva Herzog and State
64 Chapter 7 details the account that follows.
65 Chapter 8 details these events.
Industries Secretary Francisco Labastida (also the party's presidential candidate in 2000).
Beginning October 6, two days after Salinas won the presidential nomination and a week
before the 1987 U.S. market crash, the Mexican market began to fall sharply, ultimately
sinking further than any other in the world (Basave 1996, 154).
Many candidates for presidential nomination not only used spending, but hid it; the
data itself, hard enough to analyze in a developing country before the advent of computers,
became politicized. For example, in 1973 President Echeverria made his boyhood friend
L6pez Portillo finance minister. Sensing what this promotion meant, L6pez Portillo boldly
remarked in his first conversations with Bank of Mexico Director Ernesto Fernaindez
Hurtado, "You understand that I am on a direct road to the presidency of the republic."
Before long L6pez Portillo's extravagant spending habits, helping him along that road,
clashed with the Bank of Mexico's customary fiscal conservatism. Sergio Ghigliazza, then
a third-ranking bank official, recalls that he became the primary liaison with Finance
because higher-ups stopped even talking to each other. In one meeting L6pez Portillo
pronounced a figure for the public-sector deficit that Ghigliazza knew to be half the size of
the real deficit because all government revenue was deposited in Bank of Mexico accounts
and spending was withdrawn from them. Ghigliazza kept raising his hand to make this
point, but the finance secretary refused to call on him, so he finally stood up and blurted it
out. L6pez Portillo banged his fist on the table and ended the meeting. Thus was the
Finance Ministry's figure for the deficit determined.
Not only presidential hopefuls but the president himself had motives to inflate the
economy as the nomination approached. The better it appeared to be doing when he
designated his preferred successor, the less opportunity any potential opposition had to
organize. This was a consideration of utmost gravity. Serious threats to the political system
never came from below; they always arose when a disgruntled faction of the political elite
rebelled, mobilized societal sectors, and waged an opposition campaign, as Henriquez
Guzmin did in 1952 and Cirdenas did in 1988 (Hernandez Rodriguez 1992, 262;
Langston, 1997b, 3). 6 6 Salinas, who in addition to being president of Mexico had grown up
inside politics, says that the president's greatest responsibility during succession was "to
keep confrontation between different grupos and currents from tearing the ruling party
apart" (Castaiheda 1999, 317). An inflated economy discouraged factions from splitting off
- they would have had a harder time mobilizing support - and gave the president latitude
to designate his preferred successor. Gustavo Carvajal, a former president of the PRI
whose father was interior secretary, observes:
The moment of greatest spending was an administration's fourth and fifth years [not the sixth year
when elections were held]. That was its strongest moment, when it consolidated projects; the whole
government structure was involved in public works - ports, dams, irrigation. Investment strengthens
the party; there is plenty of work to go around; the private sector has good profits. As a result, the
nation is generally free of conflicts when the presidential candidate is named.
As soon as the presidential successor was "revealed," the traditional cargada, or
cavalry charge, of party officials, labor bosses, peasant leaders, and anyone else who
mattered - but particularly the losing candidates themselves - was obliged to congratulate
the winner. At this point a political schism and opposition campaign became hopeless;
everyone important had endorsed the winner, and anyone who broke off would look like a
spoiler. Cairdenas and Henrfquez Guzmin both split off well before the nomination - and
66 Chapters 5 and 8 detail these elite rebellions.
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in conditions when important economic sectors had been hurt. It was the period before the
nomination when economic troubles must not surface.
The economic logic of presidential succession is grim. Hopeful candidates, always
high officials, had incentives to build support by spending and hiding that spending. Their
grupos had the same incentives, only more so: the candidate himself had already achieved
the pinnacle of any normal Mexican political career as cabinet secretary, but his followers'
still incomplete careers depended on his advancement. Thus, their "low blows" (golpes
bajos) attacking rivals notoriously occurred even when the candidate himself did not seek
them. The president, ultimately in charge of spending, could not trust officials whose data
he depended on. Anyway, he had good motives to spend or allow them to spend, if only to
make them all think they were real presidential possibilities so they would not split off,
launch an opposition campaign, and cause a political crisis. The puzzle is not that
economic crises occurred - actors' self-interest tended toward producing them - but rather
that the Mexican political system averted crises repeatedly during the 1950s and 1960s.
The next two chapters take up the question of why it succeeded so well.
Chapter 4
The Crises That Didn't Happen
One problem with theories about socioeconomic pressures causing Mexico's crises is that
they do not really have any way to explain economic stability, except as a somehow natural
state that would obtain, barring specific problems. 67 The very terms themselves - the
exhaustion of import substitution, fiscal crisis of the state, or macroeconomics of populism
- focus on the problems, as if stability could be expected in their absence. But stability is
not such a natural state; if anything, crises are the natural state of developing countries. 68
They may happen differently under democracies and military dictatorships, under statist or
free-market regimes, but they repeatedly happen. As mentioned, even the Bretton Woods
system of fixed exchange rates did not save developing nations from repeated crises in the
1950s and 1960s, and Mexico was unusually vulnerable since the peso was freely
convertible to the dollar even when most European currencies, let alone developing
nations' currencies, were not. The Mexican state's ability to control and dissipate pressures
that could have erupted in crises is the biggest puzzle. Its crises of the 1970s and 1980s are
not so hard to explain; its earlier stability is.
As well, understanding the political causes of Mexico's subsequent crises depends
on understanding its macroeconomic success in the 1950s and 1960s. Crises can arise from
any number of problems: external economic shocks that deplete hard-currency reserves,
financial contagion from other nations, internal political shocks that provoke capital flight,
politicians' efforts to inflate growth, confusion about how economies works. Any account
that tries to trace a series of crises to one underlying cause is vulnerable to the criticism
that the circumstances leading to each crisis differed. However, it is much less likely that a
series of lucky accidents could have allowed a state to maintain economic stability in the
face of various threats. If some constellation of political characteristics helped dissipate
various threats that could have erupted in crises, then it must have been a key requisite of
economic stability. If after it eroded, the nation succumbed to a series of different types of
crises, then its loss is an important underlying causes of those crises, whatever conjunctural
factors may have entered as well.
67 Arguments such as Haggard and Kaufman's that political systems that structure state-society relations in
particular ways do better at resisting distributive (or populist) pressures - for example, that political systems
do better if parties are based on multi-class coalitions rather than if they are based on sharp class divisions -
do propose an explanation for economic stability. But they do not apply in the case of Mexico, since state-
society relations did not significantly change circa 1970.
68 Developed nations, too, suffer crises, but since the 1930s (when what we now call developed nations were
considerably less developed), they have done so less often and have been less damaged. The 1992 crises of
several European currencies did not particularly weaken growth, certainly not remotely to the extent that the
crises beginning in 1982 harmed many poor nations. Britain did rather well after George Soros broke the
British pound. One difference is that developed nations tend not to borrow so heavily; developing nations
borrow precisely to develop, as the United States did in the late nineteenth century. When developed nations
do borrow - as the United States has massively in recent decades - it is often by issuing bonds in their own
currency. The British financial system did not collapse after the pound fell because it operated in pounds, not
in dollars or instruments that had to be repaid in dollars. Another difference is developed nations' greater
political stability, precisely elite cooperation in the sense that important political players expect to endure.
whether they win or lose a particular election, rather fearing that they may be banished forever by some
strong man's demagoguery or general's coup.
Since formal institutions in Mexico were often one thing, while power was really
exercised in quite another way, it is not obvious who had authority over macroeconomic
policy. There are two basic views as who had that authority before 1970:
* Finance Ministry independence. A fiscally conservative Finance Ministry controlled the
economy and was independent from some separate political realm, in particular from the
contest over presidential succession. This theory comes in two distinct variants: one that
Finance owed its independence to long-standing elite traditions and norms; the other that
Finance maintained its independence from the rest of the political system via an alliance
with the banking and financial sector. Both variants, instances of the general idea about
state autonomy, seem possible: a Finance Ministry independent from the contest over
political succession and staffed by well-educated, well-paid officials who enjoyed secure
careers might well have had the capacity and incentive to maintain economic stability.
* Presidential authority. A powerful president with authority to determine policy - and
orchestrate coherent state action to enforce that policy - defended the political system's
long-term interests, high among them economic stability. This view seems plausible, too: a
sufficiently powerful executive might also have the capacity and incentive to avert crises.
As Mancur Olson argues, "A secure autocrat has an encompassing interest in his domain
that leads him to provide a peaceful order and other public goods" (1993, 567).69
A banking alliance?
Many former officials as well as scholars see Finance Ministry independence as the basis
of economic policymaking in the 1950s and 1960s. The consensus among scholars is that
Interior, Labor, other political ministries, and the subordinate corporatist apparatus was in
charge of maintaining political order, coopting groups that caused problems and if
necessary repressing them, and that the interior minister's primacy in this political arena
normally allowed him to become the next president (Centeno 1994, 77-78). In a separate
arena, the tecnicos in Finance and the Bank of Mexico managed the economy, says Miguel
Angel Centeno: "For all intents and purposes [the finance minister] had absolute control
over the budget and general economic policy of the government. .... [Finance] could even
resist presidential efforts to curtail its autonomy" (1994, 78-79). The Mexican political
scientist Miguel Basaifiez goes to far as to say that "politicians were in charge of political
problems; ticnicos were in charge of economic and financial problems; and specialists
[such as in the ministries of Education or Public Works] were in charge of general
government services" (Basaifiez 1996, 66).
Schematic as the idea seems - when have those in charge of political problems
stayed away from the public purse, and when have investments in schools or infrastructure
been managed by mere specialists? - it does have support among some former Mexican
officials. Jos6 Andr6s de Oteyza, the leftist minister of State Industries under L6pez
Portillo, concurs that political and economic management were separate before 1970:
The PRI never was a political party in the strict sense of the word; it was a political system that
brought together distinct political forces and harmonized solutions among them. Under the umbrella
of the PRI were currents of the center, center right, center left - not extremes, never fascists or
communists, but a broad political compass - and that pluralism and its representation in the
69 Olson states his claim almost as a political theorem, with the caveat that the autocrat's mortality and the
difficulty of managing political succession could undermine the economic order. I am only proposing the
idea a political possibility: in the right circumstances, things might work as Olson suggests.
government allowed a sui generis form of democracy. I accept sui generis, but in the end it was
democratic, plural, representative. It was why the system lasted for so many decades, for even though
some express the opposite opinion, it never was a particularly authoritarian or repressive regime.
In a country where neither the legislative nor the judicial branches had much weight at all, the
real equilibrium of forces was determined at the heart of the executive power, in the president's
cabinet. Within it were secretaries or ministers who represented different interests. To caricature the
situation, the agriculture minister represented modern, mechanized agriculture, while the agrarian
reform minister represented the poorest peasants. The industry minister obviously advocated for his
industrial concerns, while there were representatives of intellectuals, academics, progressives. And the
president managed this whole political contest, reserving the last word for himself.
For decades this contest was basically political, not spilling into economic management. That
was delegated to the treasury secretary, the secretary of finances, who had enormous force but really,
really, never played a role in presidential succession. It was only the politicos politicos who really
could reach the presidency. There was an unwritten rule that to truly be a presidential candidate you
had to have a certain electoral experience. All the presidents of that era had it - Cirdenas, Alemain,
Ruiz Cortines, L6pez Mateos, Diaz Ordaz - they had been governors, senators, deputies. The real
competition for the presidential candidacy took place among those political ministers such as interior
or labor. Finance had enormous economic power - uncontested economic power - but precisely the
contest for the presidency took place among the key political figures.
Manuel Suairez Mier, a former high Bank of Mexico official at the other end of the
Mexican political spectrum from Oteyza, concurs that an unpoliticized Finance Ministry
before 1970 was critical to economic stability:
There was a firewall between financial and political management. Political leaders trusted financial
managers and left them fairly free; the quidpro quo was that they didn't have a political future. It was
perceived that for economic success, you couldn't mingle the checkbook with political power.
This separation derived from the administration of Porfirio Diaz [before the Mexican Revolution].
His so-called cientificos had a great deal of status and income, but no access to political power. After the
Revolution, Adolfo de la Huerta was the last finance minister who aspired to be president. [His 1923
revolt was brutally quashed.] Look at President Lizaro Cirdenas - he was very leftist but throughout his
administration maintained a conservative finance minister.
Both factors seen as giving Finance independence from the political arena -
economic leverage derived from the ministry's alliance with a powerful, fiscally
conservative domestic banking sector, and simply the force of elite traditions and norms -
could of course have contributed to the same end. The argument about economic leverage
is particularly intriguing because it seeks to explain not only the Finance Ministry's
independence before 1970 but its loss of independence afterward. The idea is that
politicians need financing to cover budget deficits, so as long as foreign loans were
relatively scarce in the 1950s and 1960s, either they had to borrow from the domestic
banking sector, or they had to rely on Finance's connections with the World Bank, IMF,
and other international agencies to secure funds. Thus, Finance had substantial leverage
vis-a-vis the political arena. However, after the first oil shock, when First World banks
courted Latin American borrowers to lend out the multi-billion-dollar deposits they
received from OPEC, Mexican politicians could ignore Finance (Maxfield 1990, Centeno
1994, 83).70 As Mexico's own oil exports boomed - new oil fields that made the nation a
net exporter came on line in the mid-1970s - the politicos could really sideline Finance.
It is true that Finance maintained close ties with private banking. Antonio Ortiz
Mena, finance minister from 1958 through 1970, writes:
Right from the start of the L6pez Mateos administration (in 1958] I1 organized frequent meetings with
the principal businessmen to explain economic policies ... . I maintained permanent contact both with
70 The argument about the source of Finance-Banking strength comes from Maxfield, but she uses it to
explain the state's ability to promote investment, not its ability to sustain economic stability.
individuals and with organized groups. My relationship with the Bankers Association of Mexico and
the Mexican Association of Insurance Companies was most significant, as they had great economic
importance of their own and exercised influence over other business groups as well. (1998, 83-84).
This close relationship between Finance and private bankers preceded the Revolution, and
during the 1920s, Agustin Legorreta, Sr., owner of one of the largest banks, the Banco
Nacional de Mexico (now Banamex), cemented an enduring relationship between Finance
and his family by helping to settle foreign debts and secure new loans (Maxfield 1990, 41).
Logical as the theory sounds, it runs into problem after proble;.i. If it were right,
Finance should have been weak from the 1930s through the early 1950s. Its expertise was
not needed to secure foreign loans because none could be had: Mexico was in default. As a
result, argues Sylvia Maxfield, a principal proponent of the theory, during this period
"Mexico followed a policy of loose money and high deficit spending" (1990, 76). Though
Eduardo Suairez, finance minister from 1934 through 1946, considered himself Keynesian
(Maxfield 1990, 78), this widely held view about his macroeconomic policies is incorrect
(Cirdenas 1993, 675): both fiscal and monetary policy was conservative. 71 From 1934,
when President Cirdenas took office and appointed 3uairez, through 1954, when Maxfield
says the "inflationary system of deficit financing" (1990, 76) came to an end, government
budget deficits never exceeded 1.6 percent of GDP and were often balanced by surpluses;
they averaged a mere 0.3 percent of GDP (Cirdenas 1994, table A.25).
Could fiscal deficits have been small precisely because, in the absence of foreign
lending, powerful Mexican banking interests would not lend to the government either?
Until 1936 the Bank of Mexico, which had the authority to create money, was a quasi-
private institution with real independence, but in 1938 Suairez achieved its submission to
the administration (CQirdenas 1993, 680). Until the mid-1990s, the government had the
legal and practical authority to overdraw its accounts in the Bank of Mexico as it saw fit,
that is, to write checks no matter how much they exceeded its deposits (Ghigliazza). The
Bank of Mexico found out about the checks when they were presented for payment, and at
the end of the year overdrafts were converted into government bonds. In short, the
government could print money. 72
Maxfield goes on to argue that the Finance-banking alliance gained strength in the
1950s when Mexico regained access to foreign loans: "[Finance] was finally ab'e to
impose its preference for tight monetary policy, with the assistance of foreign allies:
international creditors" (Maxfield 1990 16, see also 83 ff.). The problem here is that
Finance expertise was not needed to get foreign credit: the whole debacle of the "floating"
loans that provoked inflation and might have led to crisis in 1964 occurred precisely
because Social Security and other state enterprises managed to go on a foreign borrowing
spree without even letting Finance know.
Finally, idea that loans from American banks recycling petrodollars allowed
Echeverrfa to circumvent Finance and spend massively after 1970 is not quite right,
regarding either the timing or precise mechanisms. The Echeverri'a administration went on
its first spending spree in late 1971, before the energy shock, hence before banks could
possibly have been recycling petrodollars. And even after banks were pushing loans, 75 to
7 Cirdenas argues that private banks, the public, and external shocks, rather than the state, contributed to
sometimes expansionary monetary growth.
72 Likewise Romero Kolbeck says the Bank of Mexico always had to honor government overdrafts. C6rdoba
1994, 253, notes that the Bank of Mexico only achieved "full autonomy" via a constitutional amendment
passed in April 1993, though just how complete even that autonomy was has been debated.
85 percent of the expansion of the monetary base that contributed to inflation consisted of
printing money domestically (Cdrdenas 1996, Table 111.3, 99). What changed was that the
long-standing political possibility to run large deficits was now being abused.
Elite norms of Finance independence?
Finance independence could instead have depended on elite norms respecting an economic
arena distinct from the political. Some evidence suggests that this might have been the
case. For one thing, high economic officials of the era did consider themselves ticnicos, as
opposed to polfticos: Ortiz Mena speaks of his predecessor, Antonio Carrillo Flores, as "a
tecnico, not a politico." Carrillo Flores comments in his private diary on a dinner with the
Federation of Bureaucrats (March 16, 1954): "I am convinced that it is difficult to
understand 'the politicos' [his quotation marks]. The devil himself wouldn't tempt me to
that side."73 President L6pez Portillo, an economic official outside of Finance in the 1960s,
as well as subsequent finance minister, says that Finance was seen as "owner of all the
intimate secrets of an exclusive area, which no one, not even the Presidents, dared enter"
(cited by Centeno 1994, 80). In the 1920s and early 1930s, when Plutarco Elfas Calles, first
as president and then jefe mdximno behind the scenes, forged a collection of warring
generals into the ruling party, he deferred to this tradition. Finance Secretary Alberto J.
Pani brought in financial experts from the pre-revolutionary administration, and Miguel S.
Macedo, who wrote the legal framework for banking, was a prot6g6 of the pre-
revolutionary finance minister (Maxfield 1990, 39-40). Cirdenas, who decisively ended
Calles' defacto reign, made Finance Secretary Suairez arbiter in distributing public funds,
and Suirez's successors continued to play this role (Camp 1993, 134).
A well-educated, well-paid, secure staff doubtless strengthened Finance. Mario
Ram6n Beteta, finance secretary under Echeverria, says, "Officials in Finance and the
Bank of Mexico knew their business. If in any part of the government there was a true
public-sector career, it was there. We rose rung by rung - there were no subsecretaries just
30 years old - and we gained respect for knowing about economic matters." Rodrigo
G6mez, director of the Bank of Mexico from 1952 through 1970, would hire promising
graduates and send them abroad to study further. On their return, he would place them in
low-level jobs for a few years so they could learn how Mexico worked (as distinct from
how economic theory worked); they were paid generously and had good prospects for
advancement in the bank or Finance Ministry (Beteta). These financial areas of
government moreover were considered clean. In Distant Neighbors, Alan Riding regales
readers on a chapter full of corruption stories but parenthetically notes that in "the Foreign
Ministry, the Bank of Mexico, and parts of the Finance Ministry, officials enjoy a solid
reputation for honesty and professionalism" (1989, 121). Luis Jimenez Cacho, a steel-
industry entrepreneur, says that under President Miguel Alemain, whose administration
from 1946 through 1952 was regarded as corrupt, if one got a public-sector loan, one was
expected to hand over a known percentage of it in the form of a briefcase of hundred-dollar
bills. But the briefcase did not go to the Bank of Mexico officials who competently
assessed alternative projects and decided on loans. It went to three "buddies" of the
president, who presumably distributed the contents through the political machine.
73 The diary for 1954, minus some personal references, was provided by his son, Carrillo Gamboa.
If Finance independence depended on elite norms, first, it had to be cordoned off
from some separate political arena, especially from the contest for the presidency. Was it
really? Ortiz Mena denies that he was a presidential candidate. At the beginning of L6pez
Mateos' term in 1958, he handed the president a letter renouncing presidential ambitions in
exchange for full confidence in his economic management, and as the 1963 nomination
contest approached, he assured then Interior Secretary Diaz Ordaz that he was not a rival
(Ortiz Mena). 74 But Ortiz Mena's two top advisors, Victor Urquidi and Rafael Izquierdo,
insist that he was a candidate, despite the famous letter.75 They say, for example, that his
1962 Plan of Action, presented as Mexico's response to President John F. Kennedy's
Alliance for Progress, was in effect a campaign platform. Julio Rodolfo Moctezuma,
director of public investments under Dfaz Ordaz and subsequent finance secretary, sees the
letter as evidence that Ortiz Mena was not a candidate, but then adds: "You never could
tell for sure. Ortiz Mena was such a clever politician, denying interest in the presidency
could just have been a way of angling for it." Carrillo Flores records an intriguing
discussion about his own possibilities for the presidency in his diary (23 February 1954).
"What an awful burden Finance can be!" he muttered to President Ruiz Cortines. The
president replied, "And you think this is such a lovely chair? I wouldn't recommend being
a candidate for it." Replied Carrillo Flores, "I'd rather be dead." The president's reaction:
"Oh, don't take every word I say so seriously. You know how I talk with you."
Whether Ortiz Mena was really a presidential contender is unanswerable (Carrillo
Flores is not considered to have been). No doubt each source, Ortiz Mena included, recalls
the situation as he sees it, but there never was nor could be a definitive list of presidential
precandidates. Whatever the president was actually thinking, he had to persuade everyone
that there were several powerful contenders so as to keep them and their grupos playing
within the system, not splitting off to challenge it from the outside. Names of supposed
precandidates, realistic or far-fetched, were leaked to the press or whispered among the
political elite. The president sent supposed candidates to talk with the private sector or
carry messages to former presidents as hints that they were in the game. Like Alfonso
Coronal del Rosal, head of the Federal District under Diaz Ordaz, they would deny that
they were candidates even though everybody else thought - and acted - as if they were.
Then the president picked one. If the president had tricked a few into thinking they were
real candidates when they were in fact just "filling," he would take the secret to his grave
because, having been forced to deceive close collaborators, he had no other choice.
As far as the political system went, a widespread impression that someone was a
candidate was equivalent to being a candidate, and too many people saw Ortiz Mena as at
least an outside possibility for Finance to have had true institutional independence. If he
assured Diaz Ordaz he was not a rival, it was only because Dfaz Ordaz thought he was a
rival, and Diaz Ordaz was no political innocent.
Ortiz Mena's very letter renouncing his candidacy actually raises doubts about the
notion of Finance independence from the presidential succession. If such independence had
been institutionally accepted, why should he write the letter? The letter seems more like
one finance minister's strategy to distance himself further than the norm from presidential
succession, and therefore build more confidence about his policy decisions.
74 Jos6 Patrocinio GonzAilez Blanco, director of public investments under L6pez Mateos. subsequently
interior minister, and Ortiz Mena's son in law, concurs that Ortiz Mena was not a candidate.
75 So does Romero Kolbeck, former director of the Bank of Mexico.
Any debilities that the finance minister was thought to have as a presidential
precandidate were, at best, provisional. There was a hesitancy in some quarters to make
him the candidate, until one fine day, September 22, 1975, to be exact, Finance Minister
L6pez Portillo was named the candidate, and everyone accepted him. If some norm of the
1950s and 1960s had kept Finance at the margins of the arena where "politicos politicos,"
as Oteyza calls them, contested for the presidency, it was tenuous.
Even if Finance did maintain some distance from political succession, would the
president grant it "absolute control over the budget and general economic policy of the
government," as Centeno says? There is no doubt that budget authority legally belonged to
the president (Ortiz Salinas 1988, 10-12). The annual budget had to be approved by the
Chamber of Deputies, but it passed everything that the president gave it. Further, during
the course of the year the executive regularly approved massive increases without even
informing the Chamber. For example, budget increases approved in 1965 were 106 percent
of the original budget (Izquierdo 1995, 62). Such increases fell principally under three
rubrics: investment, public debt, and a catch-all called "additional expenditures"
(erogaciones adicionales). This last category regularly exceeded its budgeted level by
more than 100 percent, indeed, by 305 percent in 1970 (ibid.)
The question is to what extent presidents delegated their legal budget authority to
Finance. Those who held high economic posts in the 1950s or 1960s do not dispute that
presidents before 1970 showed great deference to finance ministers' expertise, but they do
not speak of Finance as controlling economic policy independently.76 President Miguel de
la Madrid, who began his career in the Bank of Mexico in 1960, says:
I saw up close that Presidents L6pez Mateos and Dfaz Ordaz placed complete confidence in their
finance secretaries' technical management. But presidents also shared the same basic views as their
finance secretaries - Antonio Ortiz Mena, and before him Antonio Carrillo Flores and Ram6n Beteta
and Don Manuel Suirez. The presidents established the political framework.
If the president decided not to listen to his finance ministry, no one was going to force him
to. When President Echeverra fired his finance minister in 1973, infamously proclaiming
that "the economy is managed from Los Pinos," the presidential office, de la Madrid
doubts that it was any change in ultimate authority: "I think the economy had always been
managed from Los Pinos, but in a different manner." Budgets were balanced or slightly in
deficit under President Cairdenas because himself, though a political leftist, was a fiscal
conservative, probably in reaction to runaway inflation during the Revolution (Cdrdenas
1993, 689), when rival factions printed increasingly useless paper money.
In Ortiz Mena's book about economic policymaking under his stewardship, on
every single occasion when he describes controlling spending or curtailing other ministers'
spending authority, he says needed presidential backing (1998, 97, 99, 142, 168, and 169-
72). Carrillo Flores's diary notes daily discussions with the president about major
expenditures. January 20, 1954: "Meeting with the president, long and cordial.... He
approved the public-works projects, except for Communications." April 7, 1954: "Meeting
last night in the presidential office with [Agriculture Secretary Gilberto] Flores Mufioz
about the [financial resources he sought for two agricultural] banks. No decision reached,
but as I left the president told me I should be 'more firm.'" Fernando Solana, an official in
the National Finance Bank and the Ministry of the Presidency in the 1960s (later holding
76 Ortiz Mena, Urquidi, Izquierdo, Moctezuma, Fern6ndez Hurtado, and Beteta. Su6rez Mier and Oteyza,
who belong to a later generation, did not see how the system worked as high officials in the 1950s or 1960s.
several posts as cabinet secretary), suggests that, for example, when the navy secretary
would ask Ruiz Cortines for a million pesos, the president would say, "Of course! Just go
see the finance secretary." Then he would pick up the telephone and tell Carrillo Flores,
"The navy secretary is going to ask you for a million pesos. Don't give him anything."
Perhaps more telling, since stories about how fiscally responsible presidents were
might just be evidence of political deference, Ortiz Mena says that without presidential
backing he could not control spending. In 1963 the public deficit needed to be cut, he
explained to L6pez Mateos: "The president told me that such a fiscal adjustment could be
premature at the moment and that we had to wait to be sure there was no risk of economic
slowdown .... In 1964 it was even more necessary to adjust public finances. ... Again I
proposed that measure to President L6pez Mateos, and again he rejected my proposal. He
said that since it was the last year of his administration, it was extremely important to end
things well" (1998, 97). Spending approved by the president - along with surreptitious
spending by Social Security and other state enterprises - contributed to the inflation that
might have caused a crisis in 1964. Gustavo Romero Kolbeck, director of public
investment under L6pez Mateos (later director of the Bank of Mexico), says that the
president, sometimes backed by Finance, would allocate money for political reasons. For
example, the always powerful Ministry of Water Resources would plead for an allocation
to finish a dam a year early, on the pretext that it might get washed away if the rains came,
before the ministry had even built canals to irrigate fields. Inaugurating a big dam would
provide a political boost for Alfredo Del Mazo, a friend of the president and precandidate
to succeed him.77 If the president wanted to support Del Mazo's campaign, he would
approve the money, according to Romero Kolbeck.
As for the other side of the budget, fiscal reform, it would have been inconceivable
without the president's backing. In the late 1960s Finance developed a tax proposal that
would have provided needed revenue, but it never went through. Even Ortiz Mena's
former economic advisor Victor Urquidi did not know quite why until the late 1990s, when
Ortiz Mena explained: "I went to Diaz Ordaz and said, 'Here I have prepared my full,
comprehensive, tax reform.' The president said to me: 'I have to deal with two big reforms,
the labor law and taxes. I think you'll have to keep your tax reform for a later stage.'" 78
That was the end of it. Julio Rodolfo Moctezuma, director of public investments for much
of the 1960s and finance secretary under L6pez Portillo, says that the exact sequence of
decisions leading up to a devaluation - but it could be any major economic issue - are
difficult to know: "All of us" - he means finance secretaries, directors of public
investment, and other high officials - "can reconstruct little parts of the story, but only [the
president] knows the complete history."
How the president prevented crises
The president, beginning with Ruiz Cortines in 1954, was the one who marshaled state
responses to avert crises. The government had spent heavily in 1952 as part of the effort to
defeat Miguel Henriquez Guzmin, the revolutionary general who split from the system the
previous year to wage an independent campaign, and the Korean War had produced a
77 Camp 1995b. 196, corroborates that he was a friend of the president and precandidate.
78 Ortiz Mena 1998, 163, corroborates the reason Diaz Ordaz rejected the reform.
boom-and-bust cycle.79 Over the two years 1950 and 1951, Mexican exports to supply the
U.S. war buildup had grown 40 percent; the economy had grown 18 percent; and inflation
had hit 30 percent. The inflating peso, fixed at 8.65 to the dollar, became overvalued, and
as the war ended and the United States entered recession, Mexican exports dwindled.
Extraordinary efforts to stabilize the economy failed. Banks were prohibited from lending
out any new deposits at all, or, to put it another way, the reserve requirement was set at 100
percent. The government ran a budget surplus, and growth slowed to a mere 0.3 percent.
Still the Bank of Mexico was losing reserves, $21 million in 1952 and $42 million in 1953
(Cairdenas 1994, table A 21), and $43 million in the first several months of 1954 (Alemain
Velasco 1997, 247), numbers that were worrisome then.
From the moment he was appointed finance secretary in December 1952, Antonio
Carrillo Flores told the president, with a sad feeling, that he thought Mexico would need to
devalue before too long (Carrillo Gamboa), and during the summer of 1953 he started
talking in earnest with the president about devaluation (Carrillo Flores diary). In February
1954 Ruiz Cortines agreed to raise tariffs 25 percent to conserve dollars, but still the Bank
of Mexico kept losing reserves. Carrillo Flores' diary records daily movements: "Today we
lost $1.6 million dollars" (February 24), "lost 1.2" (February 26); "still losing dollars"
(March 1), "dollar tranquil" (March 2), "serious dollar problems" (April 9), "still bad"
(April 10), "much better today" (April 11); "$10 million plundered" (April 14). Carrillo
Flores and Bank of Mexico Director G6mez became convinced that devaluation was
inevitable and wanted to carry it while a cushion of reserves remained.80
All involved knew that, no matter how successful, devaluation would have serious
political consequences. No one knew better than the secretary of Interior, Angel Carvajal,
in charge of maintaining domestic political order. When he learned about the plans, he
called Carrillo Flores: "He begged us to hold off the measure, he said the impact would be
terrible," the finance minister notes in his diary (April 14). Carrillo Flores himself was
deeply concerned. Shortly before the devaluation, he played golf with his friend Juan
Sinchez Navarro, president of Grupo Modelo, a conglomerate that produces beers
including Corona and a variety of industrial products. Sainchez Navarro recalls:
Carrillo Flores played golf horribly that day. He always played badly, but this time his clumsiness was
unbelievable. "Tonio, what's the matter?" I said. "No, nothing. I'm tired." He played right to the end.
To raise his spirits, I invited him to a match where an extraordinary Mexican boxer, "the Rat" Macfas,
was playing against a black American. Macias' style was elegant, and he dominated opponents
rapidly, but during the match Carrillo Flores seemed absent. The spectators loved the way the
Mexican played, and by the eighth round, they began to scream, "Finish him off!" They were
screaming, no? The Rat knocked him out, and Carrillo Flores didn't even notice. A week later the
peso was devalued.8'
Easter Saturday, the beginning of the Holy Week and a bank holiday, the President
himself displayed "concern and sadness," recalls his press secretary, Humberto Romero
Perez.:
79 The conventional view is that excessive spending was the problem (Ortiz Mena), but Cdrdenas (1996)
argues persuasively that it was not, and the Korean War boom-and-bust cycle was. My account of the
economics of the episode is from CAirdenas 1996, 44-47. In any event, the cause of the problem does not
matter to my argument that the president provided the authority to control it.
80 Carrillo Flores diary. Also Carrillo Gamboa. Fern6indez Hurtado, Ortiz Mena.
81 Sinchez Navarro said the next day, but Carrillo Flores' diary shows that the boxing match was Saturday
April 10 and the devaluation was Saturday April 17.
Ruiz Cortines asked me, "Humberto, how long will it take to assemble the radio and television
press?" I imprudently remarked, "Sefior President, it must be very important." He said, "Look, I'm
not going to tell you why. Simply and without ado, how long will it take?" "Two hours," I said. When
I had radio and TV journalists assembled, he said they should come in - I saw Carrillo Flores there -
and the President said to me, "This is the hardest thing I have ever had to do in office." I kept
wondering what it could be: there hadn't been any earthquakes, Popocateptl hadn't erupted, nothing.
He was conscious how the consequences of a devaluation would impoverish people. Even if the
situation may improve later, the poverty is serious. He said to me, "I am going to devalue the Mexican
peso." But he said that after everyone was assembled, so I couldn't have committed an indiscretion.
Ruiz Cortines announced that, whereas 8.65 pesos had bought a dollar the day before, it
would now take 12.5.
Representatives of the president's office, Interior Ministry, Finance Ministry, Bank
of Mexico - so-called politicos and tecnicos alike - as well as the private sector agree that
unified action of the political elite was crucial to the devaluation's success. 82 It was crucial
both to maintain secrecy before the devaluation and to resolve protests afterwards. A
number of officials knew about it in advance. Besides the president, finance secretary,
director of the Bank of Mexico, and interior secretary, those in the know included Industry
and Commerce Secretary Gilberto Loyo; National Development Bank Director Hernindez
Delgado; Public Works Bank Director Manuel Sinchez Cuen; and Finance Ministry
officials Rail Ortiz Mena, Rail Salinas Lozano, and Ra6l Noriega (Carrillo Flores diary,
Ortiz Mena 1998, 36-37). Given the central role Labor Secretary Adolfo L6pez Mateos
would later play holding wages down, it seems inconceivable that Ruiz Cortines would
have blindsided him while informing Interior Secretary Angel Carvajal. But complete
secrecy was maintained. Sinchez Navarro only found out why his friend the finance
minister had been so distressed when the devaluation was publicly announced.
No doubt the image of seamless unity glosses over inside discords. For example,
Victor Urquidi, then director of the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America, recalls
that after the devaluation, Benito Coquet, the president's confidential secretary (later the
big-spending Social Security director), called a secretive meeting to seek advice. Having
confirmed years later that the meeting was concealed from the finance secretary, Urquidi
concludes, "Coquet's fear was that Carrillo Flores might be deceiving the president about
what was going on." When there is only one real policymaker, deception is a principal
means to affect policy.
But if there was less than unity of thought within the political elite, the unity of
action was impressive. Political ministries immediately set about controlling the "three or
four months of terrible crisis" that followed the devaluation, as Sinchez Navarro describes
that tense period. Some 50,000 strike petitions - so fragmented was Mexican labor - kept
Labor Secretary Lopez Mateos working around the clock, living and sleeping in the
ministry, hammering out salary agreements (Romero Perez). He had been told by the
financial authorities that he could raise salaries up to 15 percent without provoking enough
inflation to endanger economic stability; raises would have had to be almost 50 percent to
restore the former dollar value of salaries. The labor secretary's constituency is precisely
organized labor - and even if officials could not mobilize external support against the
political system, they always wanted to show that they had broad support within it - but he
82 Romero P6rez; Gustavo Carvajal (son of the Interior Minister and subsequent president of the PRI);
Carrillo Gamnboa (finance secretary's son); Fernindez Hurtado (Bank of Mexico); SAinchez Navarro.
kept the average raise to 10 percent. 83 Interior Secretary Carvajal was deployed to calm the
private sector - the dollar value of everyone's bank account had, of course, plummeted -
as well as labor and campesino leaders (Gustavo Carvajal). His job was to make sure the
devaluation would not produce political conflicts, says Romero Perez: "He used political
manipulation, political experience. Above all he attended to the state governors."
Only the president could have marshaled this broad response, but while demanding
that his secretaries support him, he reciprocated by supporting them. Carrillo Flores was
under enormous pressure. Pubic anger at the devaluation forced him for the first time ever
to go around with a bodyguard; his father said he should be "ashamed" (Carrillo Gamboa).
The atmosphere when he addressed the Bankers Convention was "icy" (Carrillo Flores
diary, 26 April 1954), while the U.S. Treasury's attitude was "harsh and disagreeable"
(diary, September 15), and in its useful fashion, it said it would give Mexico a loan only
after it restored confidence (December 16). Agustin Legorreta, the president of Banco
Nacional de Mexico who maintained close relations with Finance, told Carrillo Flores that
the talk in the street saw a cabinet shake-up as inevitable (December 15), while ex-
president Alemain, playing golf with the finance secretary, said the government had "lost
prestige" and needed "changes" (December 18). Rumors circulated that the exchange rate
would not hold, even that another devaluation had occurred (Carrillo Gamboa), and in
three months reserves sank 50 percent (Ortiz Mena 1998, 37). Four times the finance
minister offered to resign, for example, telling the president that people had lost confidence
in him and he needed to go (diary, November 1). But Ruiz Cortines did not like the idea of
changing secretaries. He finally told Carrillo Flores, if he resigned, "What will people say
about me? 'That old pendejo [not polite Spanish], why didn't he fire him before?' If I
thought you were not capable, I would have thrown you out earlier. Now don't come to me
and say it's time to go" (Carrillo Gamboa). By the end of 1954, reserves were returning,
Carrillo Flores notes in his diary: "we got 2 1/2 [million] dollars" (December 16); "we got
1 1/2" (December 18). Mexico ended the year with $205 million dollars in reserves, just
clearing'the magic $200 million Carrillo Flores had promised in September. The basis was
set for sustained, stable growth.
Finance played an important role in assuring that the militant 1958-59 strike wave
did not erupt in economic crisis. For one thing, continuity across administrations helped
ensure expert financial management. Ortiz Mena, a close friend of Carrillo Flores since
school days (Ortiz Mena), had been his designated successor for some time (Carrillo
Gamboa). When Carrillo Flores had represented Mexico at the Finance Ministers of the
Americas Conference in late 1954, he brought Ortiz Mena as an alternate delegate and
even said openly to the U.S. delegation that if he were to leave, Ortiz Mena would take his
place (Ortiz Mena 1998, 38). After L6pez Mateos took office in December 1958, Ortiz
Mena - surely working with Carrillo Flores, who became ambassador to Washington 84 -
sequred a $90 million dollar stand-by loan from the IMF and $100 million from the
Export-Import Bank, on top of the Bank of Mexico' existing $356 billion in reserves and a
pre-arranged $75 million stabilization fund (Ortiz Mena 1998, 86-87). Though there is no
available data for total public-sector spending, the government, at least, ran a budget
surplus of 0.5 percent of GDP in 1959 (C'irdenas 1996, 51).
83 Carrillo Gamrnboa interview, on financial authorities' approving 15 percent raises and L6pez Mateos'
keeping average raises to 10 percent.
4 I do not have specific evidence for this supposition, but I cannot conceive that it is incorrect.
However, none of these financial measures would have done any good had the
presidents - first Ruiz Cortines, then L6pez Mateos - not organized a powerful, united
front against the strikers. Here was a project that Finance would have lacked all authority
or ability to carry out, even if it had been politically independent. At a minimum, the
secretaries of Labor, Interior, Industry and Commerce, and Communications and Public
Works were deployed to end the strikes; military units and police were mobilized
nationwide. For example, the Industry and Commerce secretary announced to the wives of
railworkers that they would lose their government-supplied housing if the strikes continued
(Salinas Lozano). Communications and Transport managed to prevent the two railroads it
ran, the Southeast Line and Sonora-Baja California Line, from joining the strikers
(Bracamontes). The way the authorities bought off some workers with raises, fired many,
evicted families from their houses, provoked violence, filled jails to overflowing, and
locked up ringleaders for a decade was not a pretty picture. But it certainly was a concerted
effort to maintain economic stability; no government official provided support to the
strikers (Salinas Lozano, Gonzalez Blanco, Carrillo Gamboa). Krauze writes:
The political system, in chorus, lined up behind the actions of the government. In the Lower House
the deputies repudiated 'the foreign elements which the union leadership supported. ... .' The judicial
power maintained a prudent silence. Big business enthusiastically approved. The Church did not open
its mouth but breathed easier after the blow had been delivered to the enemies of Christianity. Even
Siempre!, the least dependent magazine among the 'not so dependent' elements of the press, criticized
the 'unbelievable blindness' of Vallejo... (1997. 638)
When L6pez Mateos took office in December 1958, in the midst of this turmoil, he
also faced an internal dispute over budget authority among Finance, State Industries, and
the so-called Ministry of the Presidency, a new ministry distinct from the president's
office. Finance's ultimate victory is often interpreted as demonstrating its political
independence: Centeno says that L6pez Mateos himself tried to limit its budget authority
but "failed to control [its] power" (1994, 80). In fact, it was L6pez Mateos who rescued
Finance's primacy over the budget.
The administrative reorganization plan (Ley de Secretarias) that caused all this
trouble started out as an attempt to solve several problems that had cropped up under Ruiz
Cortines. Carrillo Flores had felt he lacked adequate information to decide on investment
priorities for the whole public sector, so, in consultation with the president, had established
an Investment Commission within the Finance Ministry. It investigated and had to approve
not only all federal government investment, as when Education built schools or Hydraulic
Resources dams, but also state-enterprise investment, as when Pemex drilled oil wells or
Altos Hornos smelting ovens. However (further evidence that Finance alone could not
have managed the economy), ministries and enterprises would withhold information from
the commission, so Carrillo Flores suggested that it be placed directly under the president,
who could enforce cooperation (Moctezuma, Romero Kolbeck).
With this problem in mind, president-elect L6pez Mateos asked Eduardo
Bustamante, a former finance undersecretary, and Manuel Moreno Sainchez, a Mexico City
lawyer and politician, to draft an administrative reorganization. Adapting French ideas
about medium-range planning and Italian ideas about control of state enterprises -
enterprises which, in Mexico, had been treated as quite autonomous from the government
itself - they proposed a new Ministry of Planning and Budget and a renamed and
strengthened Ministry of State Industries (Moctezuma).85 As the name implied, Planning
and Budget was to plan and manage the budget (Carrillo Castro 1981, 494). Meanwhile,
also at the president-elect's request, Antonio Ortiz Mena and his brother, Finance
Undersecretary Ratil Ortiz Mena, developed an economic plan for the administration (Ortiz
Mena 1998, 40-45; Moctezuma). Julio Rodolfo Moctezuma, Rauil Ortiz Mena's private
secretary at the time and later director of public investment, says it laid out Mexico's most
pressing problems clearly, organized data that had not been available in useful form, and
projected development in different economic sectors for some years to come: "Probably no
one at that time but Don Antonio [Ortiz Mena] had such a complete vision of the public
sector. Everything that would be known as his program of Stabilizing Development was
based precisely on that planning effort." On the other hand, Moctezuma says,
Bustamante's administrative reorganization plan was "well done and well drafted."
There was just one little problem: who was going to have budget authority?
Bustamante's proposal gave Planning and Budget that authority and strengthened State
Industries because he thought he would be named secretary of an economic ministry other
than Finance (Ortiz Mena 1998, 46; Romero Kolbeck, Izquierdo).86 When the plan came to
light shortly after the new administration took office, Ortiz Mena was obviously concerned
(Ortiz Mena 1998, 47; Moctezuma). A cabinet dispute ensured, and what emerged, says
Moctezuma, was a "rather strange plan." The proposed Planning and Budget Ministry was
renamed Presidency and given some of the former responsibilities of president's private
secretary and the old Investment Commission, as well as medium-term planning functions
and a rather unclear authority over spending. Rafael Izquierdo, economic advisor to Ortiz
Mena, writes: "There was no way to reconcile Presidency's responsibility for the 'public
spending program' with Finance's responsibility for 'the general expenditure budget'"
(1995, 46). The patched-together bill of course sailed through the Chamber of Deputies.
Bustamante was named state industries secretary, and Donato Miranda Fonseca, an
experienced politician with no economic policymaking background, was named secretary
of Presidency. This appointment was surely a strike in Ortiz Mena's favor.
The powerful strike wave, threatening the government without but lacking support
within, turned out to be just what Ortiz Mena needed to persuade the president to continue
delegating authority to the fiscally conservative Finance Ministry. He appealed to L6pez
Mateos, arguing that splitting budget authority between ministries, as the law seemed to,
would only cause excessive spending, inflation, another devaluation, wage erosion, and - a
point that resonated with the new president from his previous job as labor secretary - more
strikes. Ortiz Mena handed over his famous letter renouncing presidential ambitions and
asking for full confidence in his economic management. L6pez Mateos agreed: "For me
85 This ministry was called the Secretaria de Bienes Nacionales before 1958, the Secretaria de Patrimonio
Nacional after 1958 (Ortiz Mena 1998, 46), and later changed its name several more times. To avoid
unnecessary complications I have called it State Industries throughout - it managed state industries.
86 Jos6 Patrocinio Gonzlilez Blanco, who was subdirector of public investments in Presidency from 1960-61
and director from 1961-64 - and is, moreover, Antonio Ortiz Mena's son-in-law - but was chancellor in the
London embassy when these events took place, says that Bustamante designed a strong Finance Ministry
because he thought he would be finance minister. This is the only account I heard that conflicts with the
history laid out in the text. I find it hard to believe, not only because Ortiz Mena, Izquierdo, and Romero
Kolbeck disagree, but also because Antonio Carrillo Gamboa, Carrillo's Flores's son. is so confident that
Ortiz Mena was the principal if not exclusive candidate to succeed Carrillo Flores.
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avoiding devaluation is a political problem; for you it is an economic problem."87 Each
budget request would now require a signature from Finance as well as the president.
Even once budget authority was thus delegated, the system required continuing
support from the president. Some ministers would try to pressure Enrique Caamafio
Mufioz, the legendary finance undersecretary who actually signed requests, by getting the
president's signature first, so Ortiz Mena went to the L6pez Mateos again. To avoid this
sort of problem, the president now agreed to require Finance's signature before he would
look at a budget request, and Diaz Ordaz did the same (Ortiz Mena 1998, 168). The
Directorate of Public Investment, under Presidency, continued to allocated investments as
the Investment Commission had, but Finance would approve the total investment budget
(Ortiz Mena 1998, 47; Moctezuma, Romero Kolbeck).
However, as mentioned, the president could always decide to override the system.
If L6pez Mateos wanted spending to exceed the level Ortiz Mena thought prudent because
his presidential term needed to end well, he had his way. If the president wanted to finance
some big dams to support a hopeful candidate to succeed him - or just to make that
candidate think he had a chance - the dams would be financed. Finance retained budget
authority as long as the president delegated that authority.
When Ortiz Mena became concerned about runaway public-enterprise spending, he
had to appeal to the president again, now Diaz Ordaz. Finance had approved transfers from
the government to decentralized enterprises, but they had enjoyed considerable autonomy,
like the major businesses that they were, with their own income and ability to borrow
abroad - as Social Security under Benito Coquet (institutionally a public enterprise, not a
ministry) so vividly demonstrated. Pemex had even begun refusing to turn over to the
government the gasoline taxes it collected at the pump (Ortiz Mena 1998, 170-71).
Running from flagrant to surreptitious, state enterprise spending was big enough to help
inflate the entire economy and contribute to the danger of crisis in 1964.
Ortiz Mena did not turn to banking-sector connections or invoke political tradition
to control state-enterprise spending; as always, he went to the president. Shortly after
taking office in December 1964, Gustavo Diaz Ordaz agreed to pass a requirement that all
state enterprises should deposit revenues and other receipts - such as from foreign loans -
in Bank of Mexico accounts and should withdraw all expenditures from those accounts
(Ortiz Mena 1998, 99, 172), thus effectively submitting Social Security, Pemex, electric
utilities, steel mills, railroads, and the rest to Finance oversight." Even Diaz Ordaz, that
Interior Ministry operative who repeatedly provoked violence to destroy grass-roots protest
(Krauze 1997, 634, Aguayo Quezada 1998, 213), called Ortiz Mena's scheme ensure
compliance "machiavellian." Once a year, without warning, in one of his regular meetings
with each major state enterprise director, Ortiz Mena would pull out the enterprise's books.
If the purpose of some expenditures had not been verified, he would remind the director
about the embezzlement laws and ask for an accounting. The procedure was not
machiavellian but "simply realistic," Ortiz Mena told the president (1998, 173).
Economic stability could not have depended on Finance Ministry independence,
not only because Finance repeatedly had to resort to the president to guarantee its budget
87 All information about Ortiz Mena's discussion with the president, and the strike's use in supporting his
argument, is from the interview with him; his book (1998) is consistent but offers less detail.88 There is data on all public-sector spending, including state enterprises, after 1965 precisely because of this
new system.
81
authority and restrict that of other ministries, but also because its sphere of action, though
broad, was still far too narrow to manage an entire economy and avert crises. Why should
labor and interior ministers, those politicos politicos, risk their political capital controlling
strikes and pacifying governors, just to back up ticnicos at Finance? Unless the finance
minister controlled them, a notion no one has ever suggested, the idea is nonsensical. The
very concept of politically independent management over an entire economy seems
detached from any realistic picture of how things could work. An independent central bank
might plausibly manage monetary policy and the exchange rate, but how could the political
arena somehow cede control over the whole spectrum of economic management to some
separate technical sphere? What is politics without money? Authority for managing the
economy rested with the president.

Chapter 5
The Unwritten Rules of Elite Cooperation
If presidential authority averted economic crises in the 1950s and 1960s, why was it unable
to do so in the 1970s and 1980s? To put it another way, aside from Aztec and Spanish
traditions of concentrated authority, constitutional powers of the executive, the apparatus
of the party and corporatist sectors, and the threat of the secret police - aside from powers
that the president controlled throughout those decades - what additional lever or incentive
might presidents have controlled before 1970 and lost after 1970? What did the authority
consist of that allowed presidents before 1970 to marshal the whole panoply of state to
make devaluation work; to take away the Ministry of the Presidency's budget oversight
even if it existed on paper; to require ministries to solicit the signature of Finance's
notorious spendthrift, Sefior Caamafio, on all budget requests; or to force state enterprises
to make earnings and expenses transparent by passing them through that most rigorous
accounting system, the Bank of Mexico? What requisite did the political system have
earlier, and lose later, so that it did not need to use expenditure to buy compliance?
The unwritten rules of elite cooperation - prohibiting grupos from mobilizing or
overtly organizing interests to challenge the president's authority, and in exchange
assuring them of political survival - were the critical requisite. In the promise of survival,
the president wielded a political currency more powerful than the monetary currency of
pesos. When grupos began to fear for their survival after 1970. budget control eroded.
Grupos who feared permanent banishment had every incentive to spend - and disguise that
spending - to win their candidate's nomination and assure continued access to power. As
the moment arrived for the president to nominate his successor, political blindness closed
in on him because his cabinet secretaries - on the one hand, his eyes and ears and, on the
other hand, competitors to sway his biggest decision - had every incentive to mute and
hide developments. And even if the president knew what was happening - and he did in
gross terms if not in all specifics - as grupos feared for their survival within the political
system, he feared that they might split off and threaten the system from without. He thus
had every incentive to avert this threat by using pesos to buying them into the system.
Mexican political elites
Before turning to the unwritten rules, it is useful to consider, first, who Mexican political
elites were and, second, what gnrupos were and how they worked. Particularly old-time
"dinosaurs," as the technocratic generation of Carlos Salinas dubbed its predecessors, have
been caricatured out of all proportion. A typical enough politico is Augusto G6mez
Villanueva. In his private office in an old row-house in Mexico City - many politicians
maintain consultancies, law firms, or other businesses for periods when they are out of
public office - he even keeps, beside his heavy wooden desk, a three-foot-high plastic
dinosaur. Son of a railroad worker and small-time politician, he attended the National
Preparatory School by taking night classes, received a political science degree from the
National University at age 35, and later taught there. He rose to become secretary of
Agricultural Reform in the 1970s, the ministry overseeing redistribution of land from large
hacienda owners to peasants. He met in initial informal dinners with the Democratic
Current that later split from the PRI in 1987 to run a powerful opposition campaign, but his
sense that the group was plotting behind President de la Madrid's back angered him deeply
- and still does - as if were a fundamental moral violation. In his 70s he represents
Aguascalientes in the Chamber of Deputies and seems quite unwilling to forsake politics.
The political event of overwhelming importance, at least for elites who were born
before 1940 and dominated high office through the early 1980s, was the Revolution and its
violent aftermath, roughly from 1910 through 1930 (Camp 2002, 113, 250). Numerous
interviews with officials of the 1950s and 1960s persuaded Roderic Camp that the most
powerful lesson they had drawn from that experience was the importance of "nonviolence
and the need to promote cooperation" (Camp 1984a, 153). One thing the Mexican
Revolution did not bequeath, so unlike other powerful social revolutions in France, Russia,
and China, was any demand for ideological homogeneity (Camp 1995a, 100). One could
legitimately espouse a range of beliefs from being nineteenth-century liberal to socially
oriented Catholic and "heterodox Marxist," as Finance Undersecretary Jesus Silva Herzog
called himself (Camp 1984a, 121 and chapter 6). Perhaps the unifying theme was a fervent
yet pragmatic nationalism (1984a, 100).
The political elite, which has always enjoyed more prestige than the private sector
(Camp 1990, 86), was forged in the National University of Mexico, particularly the Law
and Economics Faculties. More than 70 percent of high officials in the 1960s and 1970s
had graduated from "the university" (Camp 1980, 78); one did not even bother to mention
its name. In country where no more than 2 percent of the population had a university
education (Camp 1980, 197), the licenciatura, or primary professional degree, was a
virtual requisite for the politica& etite. It carries such distinction that even former presidents
of Mexico are properly addressed as licenciado. Politicians contacted by Camp identified
professor-politicians as their most important socializing influence: each generation taught
and recruited the next (1980, 94). Of 34 most influential Law Faculty professors that
politicians identified, 24 held high office, including Antonio Carrillo Flores and two earlier
finance ministers, while only three had held no public office (Camp 1980, 178). Of the 12
most influential Economics Faculty professors from 1929 through 1950, 11 held
government posts, including, for example, Industry and Commerce Secretary Gilberto
Loyo. Half of all high officials were professors at one time or another (Camp 1980, 169).
For all their academic leanings - Mexican presidents spoke clear, formal Spanish, for they
had to perform as both symbolic sovereign and working chief executive - political elites
saw themselves as intensely Mexican. Their homes and offices display a devotion to
Mexican art, which in some real measure they created. There would have been no Rivera,
Tamayo, Orozco, or Siqueiros had the political elite not commissioned their public murals.
The "political class," as that common Mexican phrase for it suggests, was
essentially self-contained. It is well established that there was no unified power elite in
Mexico; there was a separate political elite, business elite, and church elite. Among the two
hundred persons Camp identified as members of the Mexican political or business elites,
only one individual belonged to both groups (2002, 12). After speaking with numerous
politicians in the early 1960s, Raymond Vernon characterized their view of businessmen as
"ruthless, money grabbing opportunists, utterly devoid of social consciousness, without
culture or refinement, imitating the worst in North American society, extravagant without
limits." The point could be overdone, since some prominent politicians and businessmen
were friends, and business certainly had continual and powerful access to the highest
political authorities (Gonzilez Casanova 1970, 50; Ortiz Mena 1998, 83-84), but the
groups were sociologically distinct. More than 80 percent of high Mexican public officials
were middle class, from families of teachers, lawyers, doctors, and the like, and essentially
all were native-born (Smith 1979, 197). If not the National University, they attended other
public universities. By contrast, more than half of entrepreneurs were upper class, from
families of entrepreneurs or large landowners, and almost half were of recent foreign
origin (ibid.), often from Germany, Spain, or other European nations. They studied at the
few prestigious private universities, such as the Catholic Ibero-American University in
Mexico City or the Technological Institute of Monterrey.
Grupos within the political elite
Political grupos, close-knit groups of high public officials based on personal loyalties
between leader and followers, constituted an informal but essential structure principally
within the central administration. Forged from contending battlefield factions during the
Revolution, though antecedents go back to the nineteenth century (Camp 1990, 85, 90),
they came increasingly to be bound together by family, career, and - especially -
educational ties, principally from the National University classroom. 89 A body of work by
Peter Smith, Marilee S. Grindle, Roderic Camp, Rogelio Hernandez Rodriguez, Joy
Langston, Francisco Suirez Farias, Miguel Angel Centeno, and other scholars concurs in
seeing these grupos as a rational response to the Mexican political environment. They
generally use the term camarilla, but it connotes more nearly a mafia than a political group
in everyday Mexican (Hernmindez Rodn'riguez 1984, 101). Grupo, the word mostly used by
politicians themselves, the media, and nearly everyone else including taxi drivers, seems
preferable. 90 In a system where elections never decided who held power, there was no civil
service to determine advancement in the bureaucracy, and formal rules counted for little, if
grupos had not existed, they would have had to be invented.
An important societal characteristic underlying grupos' formation is Mexicans'
comparative lack of diffuse social trust. One author writes: "Whether or not circumstances
justify it, there is nothing in the universe which the Mexican does not see and evaluate
through his distrust. It is like an a priori form of his oversensitivity. The Mexican does not
distrust any man or woman in particular; he distrusts all men and all women" (Ramos
1962, 64, quoted in Camp 1980, 15). Even if this characterization may be exaggerated,
survey studies have consistently found low levels of social trust in Mexico (Craig and
Cornelius 1989, 372). The society-wide response is to entrust critical tasks to people who
are intimately known and thus trustworthy, de conflanza. Both villain and hero in the soap
operas have their circle of trusted (and often armed) men, hombres de confianza; if one
returns home late at night in Mexico City, one's middle-class friends insist on calling their
taxicab driver de confianza. Confianza is the basis of grupos (Camp, 1990, 88). For
example, when a new manager was appointed in 1970 to one of the subsidiaries of
CONASUPO, the state enterprise that distributes basic grains, he installed his trusted team:
"I found that although I had many friends, there were few I trusted enough to invite them
89 There were somewhat similar mentor-disciple relationships in the Catholic Church and military (Camp
2002, 21-22).
90 Langston 1998, 19. also notes that politicians she interviewed generally talk about gnrupos politicos rather
than camarillas, though she uses the latter term.
to help me. There are three people I brought here whom I trust blindly .. . . I trust them
with my prestige, with my signature and with my honor" (Grindle 1977, 49).
Aside from the matter of trust, in a bureaucracy with practically no formal rules for
advancement, forming grupos was rational for leader and followers alike (Langston 1995,
255). In a mere collection of atomistic individuals, how could the president and top
officials, confronting queues of job aspirants, have the remotest idea who would be
competent, let alone trustworthy? And competence was essential: sustaining political and
economic stability in the 1950s and 1960s was no mere accident. Likewise, how could
those job aspirants, especially at an intermediate or lower level, establish their good
reputation? Grupos answered the problem for both parties. They were tight-knit enough for
an individual to prove his capacity for hard work - 16-hour days are not uncommon for
high Mexican officials - competence, and trustworthiness (Langston, 1995, 256).
Developing a competent grupo gave the leader an advantage because his prospects
depended in good part on how well his area of government ran (Langston 1995, 257-58);
for example, de la Madrid says L6pez Portillo gave him the presidential nomination in
good part because he had built an efficient and cohesive grupo. In exchange for followers'
good performance, the leader was responsible for their advancement (Langston 1995, 256;
Centeno 1994, 146; Camp 1993, 103). Thus, when he went from one post to another, they
followed him or moved, on his recommendation, to work for one of his allies.
This system could produce enormous turnover. For example, when Ernesto P.
Uruchurtu was forced out as head (jefe) of Mexico City partway into the Dfaz Ordaz
administration - he lost control of a squatters' riot (Camp 1995b, 710) probably instigated
by Dfaz Ordaz himself in a move to oust him - his replacement in this key cabinet post,
Alfonso Corona del Rosal, replaced almost the entire top management. General and
licenciado Coronal del Rosal, a graduate of the Military College and the National
University born two years before the Revolution broke out, had enjoyed an unusually
varied political career during the period when the regime was still being consolidated - as
military officer, state bank director, political campaign manager (when campaigns still
mattered), federal deputy, senator, state governor, president of the PRI, and secretary of
State Industries - and had made unusually varied contacts.
On September 20, 1966, with four years to go in the administration, out went
Mexico City's second-in-command, licenciado Arturo Garcia Torres - "whose resignation
the President of the Republic accepted," notes Corona del Rosal (1995, 160) - to be
replaced by licenciado Rodolfo Gonzalez Guevara, Corona del Rosal's second-in-
command from State Industries and from the PRI before it. Out went the chief
administrative officer, licenciado Luis Coudurier, "who also resigned his post," to be
replaced by Corona del Rosal's candidate, licenciado Guillermo Lerdo de Tejada.9 1 As the
comptroller who would monitor expenditures, Corona del Rosal installed a colleague from
the National Bank of the Army and Air Force; as labor director, a long-time friend from
the Law Faculty; as public works director, a Pemex engineer he had worked with in State
Industries; as medical director, a doctor who was a personal friend; as director of social
action, an orator whose ability to express "the spirit of the Revolution" he had admired in
the PRI. The director of interior, of transit, of administration, and of markets were likewise
replaced. The police chief, a general fortunate to have known Corona del Rosal from the
Military College, stayed in his job. Corona del Rosal only kept two individuals in their
91 The remainder of this paragraph is from Corona del Rosal 1995. 160-63.
posts with whom he does not specifically mention a connection: the "honest and capable"
treasury director (who collected revenue, but did not spend it) and the director of the
Mexico City judiciary.
The wave of personnel change when a new secretary or director installed his team
in second-level positions would reverberate, as his appointees likewise brought in theirs in
third- or fourth-level positions. When Jorge de la Vega Dominguez, who had parlayed his
presidency of the College of Economists into political office (Langston 1995, 265),
followed his former boss Carlos Hank Gonzailez as director of the food-distribution
company CONASUPO, even though he was Hank's hombre de confianza (Langston 1995,
268), he appointed his own team of 28 new directors and managers, who in turn brought in
their teams. By the time all the shuffling was over, of 78 mid-to-high-level administrators
that Grindle interviewed for her detailed study of careers in that state enterprise, only 12
had survived the transfer of power, and even those were in different positions (1977, 39).
Bureaucrats below the managerial level were generally protected by law and union
contracts (Grindle 1977, 62, footnote 5), but they occupied the other side of a great divide
marked by authority, prestige, education, and income.
Unlike factions of the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party, which required career-
long commitments, published official membership lists, and had established headquarters
(Langston 1998, 23), Mexican grupos were fluid, defined by degrees of friendship, trust,
and mutual benefit, not a binary mathematical function. The leader has his equipo, his
immediate team of subordinates who arc de comfianza (Grindle 1977, 40), but over time he
places equipo members on other areas of the administration, creating a broader and
somewhat less tight-knit grupo (Grindle 1977, 50). There is some overlap among grupos.
and all successful politicians end up belonging to several different grupos during the
course of their careers (Camp 1990, 106).
In particular, followers were explicitly allowed to abandon a grupo and join another
with which they had secondary ties if the leader's career was blocked (Langston 1995, 255:
Camp 1976, 63-64). Jorge Gamboa, a high official under Manuel Camacho Solis when he
contended for the presidency at the end of the Salinas administration, confirms: "One is
with a leader as long as he keeps rising and opening new opportunities; when he ceases to.
one has to look elsewhere." For example, after Echeverri'a defeated Coronal del Rosal for
the presidential candidacy in 1969, he invited Corona del Rosal's second-in-command,
Gonzailez Guevara, to accompany his electoral campaign; candidates often sought to mend
bridges with their rivals' grupos. Knowing that he could no longer promise advancement,
Coronal del Rosal urged his friend and long-time collaborator to take the offer, but he
refused, saying that he felt doing so would be "opportunistic" (Corona del Rosal 1995,
278). Gonzailez Guevara's refusal, says Corona del Rosal, "demonstrated his rectitude and
loyalty, but I continue to think he made a political error." Jos6 L6pez Portillo, who
supported the other principal losing candidate in 1969, Secretary of Presidency Emilio
Martinez Manatou, avoided the same error. For abandoning his boyhood friend Echeverria
during the nomination contest - understandably because Martinez Manatou was his boss -
he suffered a demotion, but soon enough Echeverria began to resurrect L6pez Portillo's
career, right up to the presidency of the republic. Was L6pez Portillo in Martinez
Manatou's grupo or Echeverri'a's? The question is meaningless. First he was in one, then,
when it could get him nowhere, he joined the other. And when he became president, he
reached back to appoint his old leader Martinez Manatou secretary of public health.
Politicians were somewhat secretive about grupos. In the course of research on
them, when Joy Langston informally raised the topic with a Mexican graduate economics
student at MIT - particularly since the 1970s an advanced economics degree from a
prestigious U.S. university has been an excellent route into the political elite - he blushed,
told her to read Roderic Camp, and left the room (1994, 18, footnote 42). More
experienced politicians will talk about grupos, especially what they looked like decades
ago, but precisely because of their fluidity and the measure of secrecy that surrounded
them, they can give only a very partial picture of who belonged to which one. There was a
reason for caution: just as presidents did not want cabinet secretaries mobilizing peasants,
bankers, or university rectors, they did not want grupos openly organizing to promote
candidates. By contrast, Japanese Liberal Democratic Party factions publish membership
lists because the prime minister did not chose his successor; a vote of officially listed
faction members did (Langston 1998, 28-29).
The political grupos that mattered were concentrated in the national administration,
both federal ministries and state enterprises, the only real branch of government. Just as
there was a division between public and private sectors, so there was one within the state
between, on the one hand, the political elite in high administrative office and, on the other
hand, the electoral and corporatist apparatus. This division was deep and powerful, even if
grupos did spill over into a few top party posts such as president of the PRI or elected
offices such as governor. Among all cabinet secretaries from 1946 to 1982 - the highest
officials after the president and the only ones eligible to succeed him - 60 percent had
exclusively administrative careers (possibly combined with professorships or other outside
positions), and essentially all the rest combined administrative with electoral or party
experience; only one had just electoral experience, and none at all had experience just in
the party (Hernandez Rodriguez 1984, 42). In a study of public-sector careers, Peter Smith
concludes that a background in elective office was "something of a liability in the quest for
admission to the upper-level circles of power and prestige, whose ranks have become
dominated by lifelong bureaucrats" (1979, 186).
While electoral office did not offer a career at all since there was no reelection, the
corporatist sectors did provide a career for labor and peasant leaders, with money and
opportunities for graft, but it was a separate track from that of the political elite, requiring
effective work in the trenches to control unrest and mobilize support, rather than a
licenciatura. Here the electoral branch served its useful function; a term as deputy or in
some other electoral office was typically awarded corporatist leaders to repay their labors
(Hernaindez Rodriguez 1992, 244); there were even informal quotas for each sector in the
Chamber of Deputies, which changed over time with the sectors' perceived importance.
The unwritten rules
There were two unwritten rules of elite cooperation. The first was that if grupos challenged
the president's authority by overtly mobilizing either their own members or societal
groups, they would be destroyed. To put this rule another way, grupos could not act as
factions; they could not reach out into society at large. There was an underlying logic here:
if such mobilization were once initiated, since elections could not decide who won, there
would be no way short of violence to end it. The other rule was that as long as grupos
stuck by the system - pitching proposals to the president, criticizing alternatives, even
impugning opponents' motives, but ultimately accepting presidential authority and not
challenging it via external pressure - they could expect to survive. Jorge Gamboa, director
of Mexico City development under Manuel Camacho Solis, says there were two means for
controlling conflict: "One was the absolute power of the President. The incumbent
president decided, and that was that. The other was that, as long as you behaved well, were
loyal to the system, and maintained discipline, you were guaranteed a political post."
Political survival was the incentive the president could offer if he curtailed ministers'
spending or limited their reach, the coin other than money available to buy loyalty.92
Some authors such as Sylvia Maxfield divide the Mexican state between a
"Cairdenas coalition" - workers, peasants, small industry, and ministries tending to them
such as Labor and Agrarian Reform - and a "bankers alliance" among Finance, the Bank
of Mexico, and private-sector finance (1990, 56, 85). This view is not necessarily wrong
from a certain perspective: significant ideological differences and policy disputes existed
within the state; bankers and the private sector did exercise great influence, with Finance
as well as directly with the president; and there were high officials who sought to defend
the interests of workers and peasants. But grupos that contended over presidential
succession were not necessarily united by ideology at all. For example. Jos6 Andr6s de
Oteyza, the most powerful leftist minister under L6pez Portillo, supported the conservative
planning and budget minister, de la Madrid, for the presidential nomination. And, most
important, no minister in his right mind would have openly mobilized workers or peasants
or bankers to promote a presidential candidacy. As Victor Bravo noted, if his father the
education minister had so much as enlisted university rectors to support his preferred
presidential successor, President Echeverria would have fired him on the spot.
It is universally agreed that presidential hopefuls could not even openly declare
their own candidacy, much less mobilize support for it.93 Asked whether, as governor of
Sinaloa in 1987, he would have directly told President de la Madrid that he supported one
presidential contender or opposed another, Francisco Labastida, himself the PRI's
presidential candidate in 2000, replied, "No, no, no, no, no." If he had done so and picked
the wrong candidate, it would have been destructive not only to his own political career but
to the state of Sinaloa. De la Madrid likewise says no one would pointblank express
support for or opposition to any presidential hopeful. There was just one telling exception
in 1987. After a faction calling itself the Democratic Current tried to build overt support
for Cuauht6moc Cairdenas, the president of the PRI announced at a party assembly that
doing so was prohibited by the rules, and the group was expelled. 94
Dr. Salvador Nava's attempt to build a coalition supporting his gubernatorial
candidacy in 1961 had the gravest consequences. Having served as a reform mayor within
the PRI, the medical doctor rallied a following and naively registered as a candidate for a
position that mattered, governor of San Luis Potosi. He was called to Mexico City to talk
with the then president of the PRI, Corona del Rosal. The following dialog took place:
Corona del Rosal: Doctor, you are not going to be the PRI candidate for your state's governor.
Nava: General, you must be mistaken; the party hasn't even held its convention yet in San Luis Potosi.
Corona del Rosal: With or without the convention, you are not going to be the party's candidate, doctor..
. . because in addition to votes, you need something else.
92 For other statements of much the same rules, see Camp 1980. 17, and 1976, 62; Langston, 1995, 247;
1997a, 8: and 1997b, 27; SuArez Farfas 1988, 306.
93 Langston, 1997a, 8; Cornelius and Craig 1991. 37; Urquidi. Bracamontes.
9 The story is detailed in chapter 8.
Nava: What else? The President's benediction?
Corona del Rosal: No, doctor, the President doesn't need to get mixed up in this.
Nava: Then I need your good graces?
Corona del Rosal: Let's suppose so, doctor.
Nava: I don't accept that, because you are not the party; the party is its members, and it is their votes I
seek.
Corona del Rosal: Wait a bit, doctor, and later it will be another matter. For the moment, I will make you
federal deputy from the first district, and I will give you back the money you spent on your campaign.
Nava: General, I am not looking for employment. The people called me to seek the candidacy for
governor because they have confidence in me. (Aguayo 1998, 207-8, citing court testimony).
Nava was backed into running an opposition campaign and fraudulently defeated. Groups
that supported him were destroyed. Some supporters were killed in violence provoked by
federal agents (Aguayo 1998, 208-13), others jailed, and the rest terrified.
The unwritten rules not only prohibiting societal mobilization but also assuring
political survival in return were consolidated during the tumultuous 1951-52 presidential
succession. Miguel Alemain, president from 1946 to 1952, had marginalized two important
and overlapping political currents: revolutionary generals and the left. The portion of
military men in national political office had declined from some 30 percent in the 1930s to
19 percent in the early 1940s, but Alemain slashed it to a mere 8 percent (Camp 1995a, 49,
126) - and since military men had to run the ministries of Defense and of the Navy, that
was probably as close to a bare minimum. Alemain filled his administration with
classmates from the Law Faculty of the National University; it was said in the Law
Faculty, "Here you study to be president" (Krauze 1997, 586). He reversed agrarian
policies of distributing large haciendas to peasants and fought the not-yet-supine labor
movement. In 1948 when a coalition representing workers in railroad, petroleum, and
electrical industries protested falling wages, the government threw its support behind a
pliable rival leader, the infamous El Charro himself. Instigating baseless legal challenges
and seizing headquarters with the help of a hundred Federal Security police disguised as
workers (Middlebrook 1995, 140), El Charro broke the labor coalition. Under Alemdin real
minimum wages fell by a third (Middlebrook 1995. 214).
But Alemain's mistake was trying to retain power beyond his constitutional term
(Servfn 2001, 119-27; 204-8). His propaganda to that end was recognized by U.S. State
Department and British Foreign Service dispatches (Servin 2001, 122). He bombarded the
nation with publicity for "prolonging" his tenure; political figures ranging from a state
governor to a labor federation publicly proposed the idea; the party president called for
Mexico to be "Alemanized"; the official labor congress declared him "worker of the
fatherland"; all state legislatures rendered homage to him (Cosfo Villegas 1975, 118-19).
Generals - the political faction most likely to oppose him - were pressured to sign a
statement agreeing to any constitutional amendment that might support lengthening the
presidential term or allowing reelection (Cirdenas 1973, 399-400).
Alemain's own finance secretary, Ram6n Beteta, privately expressed fears that if
the Korean War should spread to a U.S.-Russian confrontation, a political current would
try to extend Alemain's term in office and "take extreme measures against the left"
(Cirdenas 1973, 417). Abelardo Rodrfguez, a former president of Mexico, spoke out
against reelection, and when Alemlin's private secretary sent intermediaries to ask Gen.
Lizaro Cirdenas, perhaps the most revered Mexican president of the twentieth century,
what he thought of re-election, he said they were welcome to make his opinion public:
"Only the false friends of President AlemAin desire his reelection" (Cirdenas 1973, 440).95
Finally, Gen. C6indido Aguilar, Alemin's former political mentor, warned the president
against seeking reelection: "It's going to cost you your life" (Krauze 1997, 559).
Alemain's backup strategy (proceeding in parallel with the reelection plan) was to
establish a dynasty by installing Fernando Casas Alemain, a cousin (Smith 1991, 345) who
had practiced law with him, served under him before he became president, and, according
to the historian Enrique Krauze "owed everything to him" (1997, 559). By September, a
month before the official candidate was to be selected, a Unity Group for Casas Alemain, a
Group of a Million Workers, and a Federation of University Affiliates and Workers -
whoever exactly they might have been - and numerous statewide organizations declared
support for Casas Alemain (Cosfo Villegas 1975, 114). Organizations beholden to the
government do not lightly come out for a candidate: a mistake can bring enormous
political harm. Even Newsweek declared Casas Alemin the president's choice (Krauze
1997, 559). Then Casas Alemain lost the nomination.
The campaign against President Alemin's plans had actually begun a year earlier.
Gen. Miguel Henrn'quez Guzmain, backed by military officers, peasant groups, and labor
unions, sought the official party's nomination - the last time in almost four decades when
powerful currents within the PRI would openly mobilize to threaten its internal
machinations. Gen. Marcelino Garcia Barragfin, whom Alemain had forced out of the
governorship of Jalisco, was a campaign leader; many others had held high posts under
Cirdenas, including the director of agrarian reform and secretary general of the National
Peasant Federation (Cosfo Villegas 1975, !27). They protested the corruption of Alemin's
"group of intimates" and demanded a democratic process for selecting the candidate
(Pellicer de Brody and Reyna 1978, 46-47). When the PRI leader warned that party
members were prohibited from engaging in electoral "propaganda," henriquistas countered
that "the president of the party does not have the authority to indicate the exact date when
free party members can voice their support" (Pellicer de Brody and Reyna 1978. 47). But
by March 1951 they saw they had no chance within the party, broke off, and mounted an
opposition campaign.
Here the role of one individual, ex-president and general Lizaro Cirdenas, seems to
have been critical, both in dooming the henriquistas challenge and in blocking Alemain's
dynastic ambitions. The former president was Henrifquez' friend, and his wife and son
Cuauhtemoc Cairdenas (the same who would split from the PRI in 1987 to run the next
powerful opposition campaign) openly supported his campaign, but the general would not.
He told his friend: "You only get to national office by one of two routes: the unanimous
support of the people, so clear that the government is forced to recognize the triumph, or
government sympathy for the candidate" (1973, 452). Of course, it was inconceivable that
"unanimous support of the people" could even be recognized, so controlled was the press.
Henriquez' presidential bid was defeated amid electoral fraud, legalistic maneuvers, and
bloodshed. His party was falsely accused of supporting a violent demonstration, and,
officiously citing articles 29 and 41 of the electoral code (suitable articles could be found
to justify almost anything), the Interior Ministry dissolved it. Olga Pellicer de Brody writes
in the History of the Mexican Revolution: "From that time on, members of the political
bureaucracy fully accepted that the unique manner of arriving at the cusp of power was to
95 Ratil Salinas Lozano. a high official in the 1950s and 1960s and father of Carlos Salinas, says Cirdenas
forced Alemin to back down by threatening to run himself.
submit to whatever decision the incumbent president might make" (Pellicer de Brody and
Reyna 1978, 60).
However, factions within the party who feared Alemin's dynastic ambitions used
the external henriquista challenge to force the president to abandon them. According to
Krauze, Cirdenas threatened to join Henrfquez and even take to the battlefield unless
Alemdin backed down (1997, 559-560). Frank Brandenburg, an American political scientist
who spent ten years interviewing Mexican political figures in that era, says that ex-
presidents Lizaro Cirdenas and Avila Camacho "forcefully stepped back into
Revolutionary Family leadership" to block Casas Alemin's nomination (1964, 106):
Toppling [him] required the firm action of these two senior members of the inner circle. .. . Through a
process of back-scratching and log-rolling that involved former presidents, military men, regional
strongmen, and other individuals, a modus vivendi emerged.... [A]II factions.., would lend support to
the candidacy of Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, a noncontroversial career civil servant. (1964, 107)
Cosfo Villegas, who was one of the most acute observer of Mexican political elites,
and lived through those events, ridicules this story as having been told for years without a
shred of evidence (1975, 16), and indeed neither Krauze nor Brandenburg cites a source.96
However, Cosfo Villegas concedes "the grave danger that Cirdenas and other public
figures would take their opposition to the field of arms" to prevent Alemain's personal
reelection (1975, 120). Why would his attempt to appoint a crony and establish a dynasty
not face the same threat? Cirdenas' political prestige, his past as a revolutionary general.
his close relationship with Henriquez, and the roster of military officers in the henriquista
campaign, posed an enormous peril to Alemin and the political system. Even if the actual
events did not occur as reported by Krauze and Brandenburg, their functional equivalent
did: political elites understood that Alemain was forced to compromise with other factions.
Gustavo Carvajal, whose father was interior secretary under Ruiz Cortines and who was
himself latcr president of the PRI, says that Casas Alemain generated powerful opposition
within the political system:
Ex-President Avila Camacho, who had great force and moral authority with the political class, used a bit
of a strong arm behind the scenes, and ex-President CArdenas was a figure of stability for the country ...
The majority of cabinei secretaries said: 'Ruiz Cortines is the man, the most institutional, the most
respectful. the one who will not generate conflict.' When the president opted for him, everyone supported
him .. .The president had to make consultations. He didn't say. 'l'm going to pick my friend so-and. o.
He consulted with power groups, ex Presidents, the private sector, the labor federation, the church, and so
on. And from those consultations the candidate emerged.
In office Ruiz Cortines coopted the symbols of Henn'quez' campaign, attacking the
Alemain administration as corrupt, prosecuting ex officials, launching a campaign against
private-sector "monopolizers" for driving up prices of necessities, and even fining some
16,000 firms for that infraction (Pellicer de Brody and Reyna 1978, 20). Of critical
importance for the political system, Pellicer de Brody notes, once the renegade party was
destroyed. "whichever [henriquistas] wanted to participate in exercising power and opted
for reconciliation were permitted to obtain high positions in the administration almost
immediately" (Pellicer de Brody and Reyna 1978, 56). 97 The portion of military men in
national office rose from 8 percent under Alemain to 14 percent under Ruiz Cortines (Camp
1995a, 126).
9 Both Suirez Farfas (1988. 317) and Camp (1976, 52-53) tell essentially the same story. but SuArez Farfas
does not cite a source either, and Camp cites Brandenburg. Nor does CArdenas himself say anything in his
diary (1973) about participating in the episxode.
07 Likewise Langston 1997b. 23. citing additional sources.
The promise of political survival gave presidents the leverage they needed to
handle economic threats. Gustavo Carvajal notes that the way the system handled the
1951-52 presidential succession produced "great unity within the government. That is why
the secret of the [1954] devaluation was kept with enormous caution." Humberto Romero
P6rez, press secretary to President Ruiz Cortines, likewise sees government unity as '
critical to the devaluation, and Ernesto Fernaindez Hurtado, a bank of Mexico official since
the late 1940s and its director from 1970 through 1976, says that an essential factor in its
success was a "clear, sustainable agreement with the government, that it was not going to
give in, as it always used to when devaluations caused prices to rise, that it would not
allow excessive salary increases, nor would it increase the fiscal deficit as a percentage of
GDP.... It was important that there was no Ministry of Planning and Budget" - that is, no
rivalry between ministries, such as did emerge after 1970, over budget authority.
The 1958-59 strike wave also highlights how important the rules of elite
cooperation were to the political system. The point is not just that, as mentioned in the last
chapter, ministries including Labor, Interior, Communications and Transport, and Industry
and Commerce, as well as police forces and military units, collaborated in ending the
strikes. As well, the context of falling wages in key government sectors and labor unrest
boiling up a year before the 1957 presidential nomination among the electrical-utility
workers and Mexico City teachers (Carr 1991, 133) was favorable for a dissident political
grupo that might have wanted to launch an opposition campaign, as had happened in 1952
and would happen again in 1988. But no faction did; no political grupos reached out to
support the strikers (Salinas Lozano, Gonzilez Blanco, Carrillo Gamboa); the political
system closed ranks behind the president (Krauze 1997, 638). Though the societal context
was propitious for an external challenge, the rules of elite cooperation prevented it.
Elite cooperation and economic stability
One principal reason to believe that elite cooperation was the crucial political requisite that
allowed Mexico to avoid crisis in the 1950s and 1960s is the timing: It was an important
characteristic of the Mexican state that existed in the 1950s and 1960s and was lost in the
1970s and 1980s. While the relationship between state and society did not significantly
change from the 1950s through the 1980s - the corporatist structure remained very much
intact; unions never posed any real challenge; the official party kept winning elections by
landslides; and the opposition was not even capable of seriously protesting electoral fraud
until 1988 - the relationship among grupos did change.
The two decades before 1970 were a period of unusual elite cooperation, when
grupos had high and realistic expectations of political survival, while the next two decades
were an era of mounting struggle, as grupos' survival became increasingly unpredictable.
It is widely accepted that the incoming president always appointed cabinet secretaries from
grupos that were not his own, assuring a post not only for appointees themselves but for
their followers (Camp 1976, 57-58; Smith 1979, 51; Suirez Farfas 1988, 306; Langston
1997a, 8) - until Echeverria disrupted the pattern in 1970 (Centeno 1994, 153; Schmidt
1991, 154; Cosfo Villegas 1974, 20-21). It would be ideal to directly gauge whether grupos
enjoyed more continuity and stability in the 1950s and 1960s than before that era or after,
but it is extremely difficult to trace changes in their makeup over decades. Extensive
interviews would be required to determine who belonged to which one at which moment,
and answers might well conflict because of grupos' fluidity, informality, and secrecy. As
Langston, who has done extensive interviews about grupos, notes (1994, 5): "1. Everyone
is in a group. 2. Most deny it vigorously. 3. Most have ties with other groups, whether
competing or not, whose affiliation, however casual, is denied as well."
A practical alternative is to gauge the stability of cabinet secretaries' careers. As in
the case when Coronal del Rosal was governor of Mexico City (one of the most impoiant
cabinet posts), when cabinet secretaries moved, a long train of officials normally followed
(Hernindez Rodriguez 1987, 21). For example, in a mid-administration shake-up in 1979,
L6pez Portillo fired the secretaries of Planning and Budget, Interior, and Foreign Relations
on one day. That year turnover among high officials (subsecretaries, director generals, and
directors) was 58 percent in Planning and Budget, 50 percent in Interior, and 45 percent in
Foreign Relations (the only area of government with a true civil service); by comparison
turnover in Agriculture was 15 percent and in Presidency (an office, not then a ministry)
was 19 percent (Bailey 1988, 78). 9 8 If more cabinet secretaries' careers ended prematurely,
their grupo's and followers' promise of a political futures thus became more uncertain.
Cabinet secretaries enjoyed unusual stability precisely during the 1950s and 1960s.
In studying cabinet careers, Rogelio Hernandez Rodriguez traced what portion of the
original group of secretaries in each administration was replaced. There was considerable
instability before 1952, as Alemin replaced 35 percent of his original cabinet in the course
of the administration (Hernaindez Rodrnguez 1992, 254). That figure understates the real
threat to political factions, since it does not count Alemain's exclusion of leftists and former
revolutionary officers who led the henriquista mutiny. From 1952 and 1970, when by all
accounts diverse factions were included in the cabinet, so that instability would be captured
in data on secretaries' careers, dismissals fell dramatically. Only about a tenth of the
cabinet - from 5 to 16 percent - was replaced in the course of each administration
(Hernfindez Rodn'riguez 1992. 254). In the 1970s dismissals surged, as practically two-thirds
of each cabinet - 58 percent under Echeverria and 65 percent under L6pez Portillo - was
replaced (ibid.). In reaction to the infighting under L6pez Portillo, de la Madrid says he
sought to name a well-functioning, homogeneous cabinet, and his was the most stable after
1970, but still he replaced 52 percent of his secretaries. 9 Salinas replaced 62 percent of his
- often two, three, and even four times. As he himself said, apparently referring to his
tenure, "In that tremendous battle [for political power], it is very difficult to think that
whoever accedes to the responsibility of cabinet secretary at the start of an administration
will still be in the same position by the middle or the end" (Castafieda 1999, 239-40).
A different gauge of instability reveals interesting subthcmes. While Hernaindez
Rodn'riguez counted whether original appointees survived the administration, turnover
counts how rapidly officeholders were changed, from a low of one-third change per
administration (one director of the Bank of Mexico over three administrations from 1952
through 1970) to a high of five per administration (Salinas went through almost an attorney
general a year). Average turnover during an administration then provides a gauge of
instability. Two different groups of officials are counted as a cross-check: first, all cabinet
98 Bailey also includes turnover in Defense, where the secretary did not change - it was 24 percent - but he
notes that the figure is inflated, as a number of the changes are the same individuals shifting among positions
in the ministry. Also, Defense was its own area, outside the normal political circuit.
SHernindez Rodriguez does not provide comparable data for de la Madrid and Salinas. so I used his criteria
(1984. 21) and data from Camp 1995b, 904-40. and Aguayo 2000. 274-77, to calculate the figures.
members plus the directors of the Bank of Mexico and of the largest state enterprises
(Social Security, Pemex, and the Federal Electricity Commission); second, the highest
posts, as designated by one of the best informed observers of the entire period, Victor
Urquidi, an economic official in various positions from 1940 through 1964, president of
the Colegio de Mexico until 1985, and advisor to several presidents (Tables 5-1 and 5-
2).1° In both cases, a turnover of about 1.3 under Alemain (1946-52) drops moderately to
about 1.0 under Ruiz Cortines (1952-58) and L6pez Mateos (1958-64), then rises
moderately to about 1.3 under Dfaz Ordaz (1964-70). Though underrepresenting instability
under Alemain as before, the data suggests that something began to erode before Echeverria
took office. But there is a sharp discontinuity after he entered office in 1970, as turnover
surges to 2.0. It declines under de la Madrid, most dramatically among the highest officials
designated by Urquidi, no doubt reflecting de la Madrid's efforts to achieve more stability.
However, his exclusion of the left, provoking the first elite split since Alemain, means that
real instability was higher than the figures indicate and was not at all easy to control.
Instability then reaches record levels under Salinas.
Contemporary officials were well aware of the unusual stability in the 1950s and
1960s. For example, Jos6 Patrocinio Gonzilez Blanco rose from director of public
investment under L6pez Mateos in the early 1960s to interior secretary under Salinas in the
1990s; his father was labor minister from 1958 through 1970; his father-in-law was Ortiz
Mena; and he is related through his wife to the Salinas family. He says:
Even though the Constitution talks of secretaries. [during the 1950s and 1960s] common usage and
the newspapers referred to the labor minister, the finance minister. Under the L6pez Mateos and Diaz
Ordaz administrations, the labor secretary stayed on 12 years: the finance secreta-y was in office 12
years; and it appeared that the head of Mexico City would do likewise, but he finally left because of a
personal quarrel with the president. Interior enjoyed continuity, too, since the secretary ascended to
being president. The idea was to provide continuity in areas of risk.
"That stability ended with Diaz Ordaz," says Luis Enrique Bracamontes, undersecretary of
public works from 1958 through 1964 and secretary of public works from 1970 through
1976. "Afterwards came instability among high officials, which continued in all
administrations."
Numerous other members of the political elite agree that the 1950s and 1960s were
an era of unusual stability in office, and that instability surged after 1970 (Romero P6rez,
Beteta, Ortiz Mena, Gonzailez Blanco, Carrillo Gamboa, Suarez Mier). Javier Alejo doubts
that the change under Echeverri'a was significant, noting that many of his replacements
were explained by special circumstances such as illness. However, Alejo was one of the
younger officials who rose to prominence after 1970 and did not hold high office
beforehand. If one takes special circumstances into account in the 1950s and 1960s,
turnover is practically zero. Doing so would require investigating departures one by one, as
an official story that someone left for health reasons is not infrequently a cover-up. Thus,
none of the data used take special circumstance into account. It seems safe to assume that
officials did not get sick more often after 1970 than before.
Elite cooperation is a logical reason why Mexico could have maintained economic
stability in the earlier decades, and its subsequent loss is likewise a logical reason why
Mexico would have succumbed to crises. It is clear enough why the president could have
~00 I also include in Table 5-3 the highest posts as designated by Enrique Cirdenas, an economic historian
who has written about the entire period. This table points to the same basic trends, but to avoid needless
complexity I have not discussed it in the text.
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relied on elite cooperation - the promise that grupos would survive in exchange for not
taking disputes outside the system - to check or curtail spending. If what grupos wanted
was continuing to share in political power, as attempts to explain politically motivated
spending assume (Ames 1987, 1), the cooperative rules assured them of it directly. Such
assurance was worth more than the uncertain chance of trying to grab more power at
particular junctures by manipulating the public purse, particularly given the small chance
that the power grab would succeed. Of course, no system is perfect, grupos could have
more power or less power, and there were attempts to use the public purse, as in
presidential hopefuls' 1963 investment spree. But once the president found out what was
going on, he could clamp down on the problem - in the 1964 case by forcing state
enterprises to pass income and expenditures through the Bank of Mexico where they could
be supervised - because he had a powerful incentive to assure obedience and was not
intimidated into having to buy it.
Loss of elite cooperation could erupt in spending because, though grupos could not
openly mobilize support for a candidate, they could and did contend covertly.'°0 As
Bracamontes says, they built support for their preferred candidate "with great discretion,
through intimates, friends de confianza, no? Someone would say to me, 'I would like to
introduce you to [Agriculture Secretary] Gilberto Flores Mufioz.' I would say, 'Thank you,
but I already know him.' Since he was a secretary and I was an undersecretary, I had had
dealings with him on occasion. Or partisans of [Public Health Secretary] Ignacio Morones
Prieto would say the same. The idea was to keep building supporters."
Though campaigning was sub rosa, the president was well aware of it - and far
from oblivious to the results. He knew he could not impose a powerfully disliked candidate
without risking a crisis such as had erupted in 1951. In fact, a former PRI secretary and
cabinet minister told Roderic Camp, the cost of imposing the wrong candidate could be no
less than destruction of the political system (1976, 82). Thus, in everyday discussions with
political actors in Mexico - and outside; the candidate could not be strongly opposed by
the United States or the Catholic Church either (de la Madrid) - the president performed
what was called an auscultaci6n, the medical procedure of listening to a patient's
heartbeat. It was a subtle matter of culling information, not stirring up unwanted opinions
and pressures. For example, de la Madrid has said: "When I became President, I know that
L6pez Portillo had not made explicit consultations [as to which candidates different groups
favored]. Yes, he had been checking the lay of the land, making an auscultaciln, asking.
But express consultation, I think not" (Castaneda 1999, 159-60). The president of the PRI
helped with the auscultaci6n (de la Madrid). Says Rafael Moreno Valle, cabinet secretary
under Diaz Ordaz and the president's closest friend late in his life:
I believe that the president of the party [based on his discussions with political groupsl exchanged
opinions with the president. As well, the Interior Ministry had agencies to investigate political
questions [Moreno Valle probably means the Federal Security Directorate] and provided reports to the
secretary, who passed them to the president: there are political currents in this state leaning this way,
in another state leaning that way. In other words, they would go along performing an auscultacion of
national opinion.
There were of course no official results of the auscultaci6n, and whatever
conclusions the president drew he guarded closely, so as to keep all contestants hopefully
10' Camp 1976, 73; Langston, 1995, 249; Grindle 1977, 52; Cornelius and Craig 1991, 37; Newell and Rubio
1984, 71; Suirez Farfas, 1988, 316; and de la Vega Dominguez. Castafieda 1999, from beginning to end, is
about such conflict.
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playing the inside game of presidential succession - and not splitting off for fear of losing.
In his Political Memoirs Corona del Rosal, president of the PRI in 1963, describes the
curious and secretive process that led to the destape, or the uncovering of the winner,
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz. Corona del Rosal discussed with President "some of the members of
his cabinet, who the public [a euphemism for political elites] considered possible
candidates. I will say that I presented my viewpoint with care, because we were talking
about persons who merited my respect" (1995, 141). He proceeds to list practically the
entire cabinet, as if, thirty years later, it was still necessary even for the president of the
party to preserve his impartiality, not to cast his lot with a candidate who might in the end
lose. But, political survivor that he was, he ferreted out the successful candidate's identity:
As for the interior minister, Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, I remembered that years earlier, when we were senators,
licenciado L6pez Mateos called him "Gustavito" and, along with other members of the Senate, used to
comment on his intelligence and ability .... For his part, President L6pez Mateos kept indicating his
recognition of and affection toward licenciado Diaz Ordaz, that master of juridical knowledge and vast
culture, whom he tacitly indicated as his successor (1995, 141-42).
The destape of the candidate was a strange dance of president and political elites,
all aware that things could go terribly wrong if some line were crossed, no one quite sure
just where that line might be. President L6pez Mateos called Luis G6mez Z., a Railroad
Workers leader who had tried to foment an independent federation but had been defeated
and coopted back into the system, along with Napoleon G6mez Sada, leader of the Mining
and Metalworkers, to make speeches lauding the winning candidate at the public destape.
They emerged from the president's office brimming with enthusiasm - but in the dark as to
who that candidate was (Corona del Rosal 1995, 142). Corona del Rosal claims he was not
even given a specific name, but he knew. Standing before the National Executive
Committee, he announced that "the majority of statewide party committees, labor leaders,
and labor federations have expressed their solidarity for the candidate, licenciado Gustavo
Diaz Ordaz" (Corona del Rosal 1995, 143). He notes: "My words were received with a
unanimous public approval: the whole [executive committee] and all who had come as
spectators stood up and applauded" (ibid.).
The executive committee and the spectators had no option but to applaud. If
opponents had wanted to organize so much as a discussion of the winning candidate, or of
the auscultaci6n, they would have had to read each others' minds in a split second.
Anyway, members of the executive committee did not even occupy the second rung of
power below the president, but the third or fourth, and were in no position to object. When
that committee later announced the result to the much larger party convention, it had no
alternative but to applaud, either. Immediately the cargada of all important groups in the
PRI, and above all the losing candidates, had to hail the new dauphin (Langston 1997a, 8).
All danger of an elite split and political succession crisis had passed.
Problems could occur during the sub rosa campaign for the presidential nomination
because it was not always as polite as the intimate chats Bracamontes describes. There
were golpes bajos, low blows aimed at competitors. News leaks were a favorite form, as
when a report prepared by presidential contender de la Madrid's Planning and Budget
Ministry, detailing administrative disorder and corruption in Pemex under presidential
contender Jorge Dfaz Serrano, made its way into the feisty weekly Proceso (Castafieda
1999, 185). In addition to building alliances with governors, senators, or labor unions, says
David Ibarra, finance secretary under L6pez Portillo, candidates might "win the favor of
the president, say yes to him even when he was wrong." Of course, one of the principal
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issues to humor the president about was the level of public expenditure. And one could use
that expenditure to strengthen alliances. Ibarra notes: "If I have a governor who
sympathizes with me, I give him more to spend, or if I'm the finance secretary, I increase
his credit line. There are any number of different methods, the same as in any country."
Except, of course, that the goal was to win the official party's nomination, not popular
votes. And entire grupos had an incentive to deliver golpes bajos or spread money around
even if the leader did not explicitly direct them to, since they would prosper if he did. For
example, a member of Jorge de la Vega's gnirupo in CONASUPO told Grindle that if de la
Vega supported the winning presidential candidate and thus became a cabinet secretary,
"his entire [team] will follow him and we'll all have positions in the Ministry."' 10 2 The
campaign for the presidency, though sub rosa, could perfectly well affect economic
policymaking. The next chapters discuss how it repeatedly did so.
102 Grindle never identifies de ia Vega Domfnguez by name, only as the director of CONASUPO, but he was
the only person who held that position from 1971 to 1976 when she was doing her research.
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Chapter 6
The End of Stability
Luis Echeverria's presidency was a transition, ending an era of stability and beginning one
of crises, but different in many ways from both. The question of why it broke from the past
turns, first, on a clear account of just how it broke from the past. At least three principal
features are widely agreed on as marking that break, even if their underlying causes are
disputed: massive spending increases and fiscal deficits; conflictive and erratic
policymaking; and unprecedented dismissals and turnover of high officials, all by
comparison with the 1950s and 1960s. Pointing to policymaking conflict and high turnover
does not automatically implicate elite politics as the cause. Fundamental, unresolved
socioeconomic problems could perfectly well provoke policy conflict, as well as frequent
dismissals, as one official after another failed to solve them. However, it turns out that the
problems lay in ideological escalation directly disrupting the political elite, as well as
Echeverria's own obsessions and errors.
The n,assive spending increases and budget deficits have been discussed: the state's
weight in the economy swelled from the 1960s norm of 20 percent of GDP to 30 percent of
GDP, at the same time that the public sector's deficit rose from 3 percent to 10 percent of
GDP. These deficits contributed directly to the 1976 economic crisis.
The way high officeholders started churning far more rapidly through posts has
also been discussed, but its particularly dramatic character in the economic area is worth
noting. Diaz Ordaz changed only one economic minister, promoting the state industries
secretary, not an especially important cabinet position at the time (Finance had extended its
sway over state enterprises via its budget control), to a more prominent post as governor of
Mexico City.103 Echeverrfa went through three ministers of Finance, two of Presidency,
two of State Industries, two of Industry and Commerce, and three of Labor.
Left and right alike saw policymaking under Echeverrfa as conflictive, even if they
diagnosed its underlying causes differently. Many authors describe the conflict as an
ideological rupture between "monetarists," led (until he was replaced) by Hugo Margalin in
Finance, who sought to control monetary growth, budget deficits, and inflation, and
"structuralists," led (until he too was replaced) by Horacio Flores de la Pefia in State
Industries, who sought to boost ublic spending in an effort to solve underlying structural
problems (Basaifiez 1996, 83).' Says Javier Alejo, state industries secretary after Flores de
la Pefia, "Clearly, there had been conflicts between the left and right for a long time, but
during the Echeverria administration, they became more radicalized and more intense." 10 5
Mario Ram6n Beteta, principal finance undersecretary and then finance secretary, says: "I
had to have it out frequently with the president [to try to control spending], and not so
much the president, because he and I had a good relationship, but with Flores de la Pefia
and his team. I had a very bad relationship with them; they were very irresponsible." Says
103 Finance Minister Ortiz Mena was replaced within the last six months of the Diaz Ordaz administration,
but in a sign of things to come, it was at the behest of president-elect Echeverrfa. Also within the last six
months, Rodrigo G6mez died and was replaced.
'( Likewise Luna 1983, 457; Tello 1979, 91-92; L6pez Portillo Romano 1994, 96-97.
105 Officials who likewise saw policymaking under Echeverria as highly conflictive include Zapata (who
specifically speaks of it as ideological), Moctezuma, Mancera, Suirez Mier.
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Flores de la Peiha, "There was constant, daily conflict over how to manage economic
policy." David Ibarra, Mexico City director of the U.N. Economic Commission on Latin
America and a participant in important administration economic discussions, sees those
conflicting interests and pressures in policymaking as arising from structural economic
problems: "The old economic model was deteriorating; it had reached its limit in terms of
foreign trade; it required a more equitable income distribution to be sustainable."
Policymaking is also agreed to have been erratic and inefficient. Not to mince
words, the historian Enrique Krauze says that "inconsistency, contradiction, and sheer
unconsciousness reigned supreme" (1997, 748). Leopoldo Solis, director of economic
planning in the Ministry of Presidency and considered conservative by the left, describes
how, after carefully planning investment priorities, the administration suddenly dropped
them in 1971, making "drastic" 23 percent across-the-board investment cuts to pursue an
ill-advised anti-inflation effort promoted by Finance (1981, 47-48). Then, when it turned
out that the cuts only aggravated a recession that had already been in the making, other
ministries led the attack on Finance, and joined a race to invest in whatever projects could
be slapped together fastest, yet again ignoring planned priorities as investment rose more
than 100 percent in two years (1981, 64, 67-68). Carlos Tello, a left-leaning economic
official under Echeverrfa and state industries secretary under L6pez Portillo, describes the
episode in strikingly similar terms: "To reverse its success in creating a recession, the
public sector had to move full speed ahead with programs to improve employment and
income distribution. Haste combined with inexperience, since many of the efforts were
entirely new.... The resulting investments were sometimes inefficiently implemented and
not productive" (1979, 78).
Economic policy was, as Tello repeatedly argues, caught in a cycle of "brake and
accelerate" (1979, 81, 87-89, 109):106 expenditure grew less than 10 percent in 1971, 1974,
and 1976 - within the 1960s norm - but surged more than 20 percent in 1972, 1973, and
1975 (Table 3-3). Management was also erratic and inefficient at the ground level. For
example, Victor Urquidi saw the L,.zaro Cirdenas steel mill as useful. "But they built it at
great speed with six or eight suppliers from different countries. I went to visit the plant
when it was just beginning operations, and I was told, 'That's the British group; that's the
German group - they don't like each other - and the French are down there.'"
A persuasive explanation as to why the Echeverrfa administration's economic
policymaking broke so decisively with the past needs to account for at least these principal
aspects of the break - massive spending and deficits; conflictive and inefficient
policymaking; and rapid turnover among high officials. Aside from socioeconomic
theories discussed in chapters 2 and 3, the principal candidates focus specifically on this
administration. They are:
* The state's loss of political legitimacy at Tlatelolco. Perhaps the most common account
sees Mexico's economic development and modernization during the 1960s as creating a
middle class that began to demand a greater share in governance and more democratic
institutions. When the state violently repressed these demands in October 1968 at
Tlatelolco, it lost political legitimacy. Echeverrfa changed the course of government to
regain that legitimacy or, at least, to buy off dissent.
106 Oteyza, also on the left, agrees about that policymaking turned conflictive and erratic under Echeverria.
Solana calls it "badly managed" and "highly unproductive."
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* A split within the political elite over Tlatelolco. An argument that complements the
previous one holds that factions of the political elite themselves split over Tlatelolco.
Impelled in part by sons and daughters who had been on the streets, an important faction
broke with Dfaz Ordaz, who turned on them as his enemies. This elite fracture, reinforcing
societal pressures, made it impossible for contending grupos to compromise on a
presidential candidate, so Echeverrfa was the first in decades not backed by consensus. He
spent massively to build support within the "revolutionary family" and reunify it.
* A different generation's entrance into the political elite. Echeverria is widely seen to
have ushered into office a new generation of the political elite: it was younger, more
tkcnico, less politically experience, and further left. Sociological change in the makeup of
the elite could decisively alter policymaking.
* Ideological escalation (Hirschman 1979, 85). A polarized external climate - evident, for
example, in Paris 1968, Prague Spring, riots at the Democratic Convention in Chicago,
and, of course, Tlatelolco - infected already polarized Latin American economic thinking.
Marxists were demanding that "the periphery" break its "dependency" on the capitalist
core, while neoliberals were just beginning to make their call for ever freer markets. It is
hard to demonstrate that anyone moved left or anyone else moved right on some clear
ideological scale (as noted, ideologies within the Mexican political elite had long ranged
from liberal to Marxist anyway), but the mere fear that decisive change would occur, and
that losing the contest to shape it might be decisive, could have disrupted policymaking.
* Echeverrfa's dynastic ambitions. After Plutarco Elfas Calles, known as the jefe mniximo,
created a dynasty in the 1920s and early 1930s, three Mexican presidents are widely said to
have tried to do much the same: Miguel Alemain failed: Carlos Salinas failed: but Luis
Echeverrfa did a little better. His obsession to ensconce his brand of policies and a
continuing share of power by installing as his successor a weak politician indebted to him,
his boyhood friend Jos6 L6pez Portillo, could have disrupted the political system.
Political legitimacy
The story about the macroeconomics of populism - pocketbook demands for welfare
benefits and other income redistribution - is less often espoused by Mexico scholars than
the idea that demands were for democratization, and spending was a response to the state's
loss of political legitimacy at Tlatelolco (Newell and Rubio 1984; Bazdresch and Levy
1991, 237, 252). An "environment for a political and economic crisis" was brewing in the
1960s, according to Newell and Rubio, as the middle class acquired a higher standard of
living, better education, and more democratic values (1984, 109-110). This very progress
increasingly alienated that class from the authoritarian state "to the point where political
institutions had begun to lose their credibility and legitimacy as representative... It
became evident, through the explosion and later repression of the student movement in
1968, that the political system faced a dilemma of its own creation: it had organized and
coalesced new social forces, but it had denied them access to institutions or representation"
(Newell and Rubio 1984, 111). When he came into office, Echeverrfa sought to "restrain
the erosion of legitimacy" through aggressive spending that would provide "economic
benefits for virtually everyone" (Newell and Rubio 1984, 122). He tried to buy political
legitimacy, or at least acquiescence, and caused economic crisis.
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Did social movements emerging from Tlatelolco threaten the Mexican states'
political legitimacy, and (on the assumption that it was not going to accept real
democratization) force it to buy support? The fateful summer of 1968 is often seen as the
most important turning point in Mexican history after the Revolution and before the
democratic elections of July 2000. Joe Foweraker (1990, 9): "If 1968 is a historical
watershed, then the subsequent popular movements can be seen as a rising tide of popular
organization, with the thousands of leaders of the generation of 1968 providing the
principal of continuity between tens of apparently separate movements."
This idea that 1968 played a critical role in promoting social movements is
debatable, quite aside from the question of whether such movements forced Echeverria's
break from the past. Neither were Mexicans so docile before that year, nor were their
protests so powerful afterwards. Uprisings during the economic stability of the 1950s and
1960s included the powerful railroad, telegraph, petroleum, and teachers strikes from 1956
through 1959; land invasions and mobilization of the General Union of Mexican Workers
and Peasants in the northwest; Dr. Nava's electoral confrontations with the PRI in San Luis
Potosf; and the Guerrero Civic Union's 1959 protests and two-month strike ousting a
corrupt governor (Knight 1990, 89, 94). On historical balance, admittedly anecdotal since
no better data exists, Alan Knight concludes that "the continuity of social protest [before
and after 1968] is striking. The powerful social movements of the recent past [the 1980s]
rarely lack precedents, and these precedents often display notable similarities: genuinely
innovative social movements (gays and greens, for example) are relatively few and feeble.
This is true not only for peasant movements but also for sindical insurgency or middle-
class democratic demands" (1990, 93). Foweraker himself sees the most important
movements in the 1970s in the insurgent unions (1990, 7). Many of their leaders had been
involved in 1968, but, as discussed, Echeverria promoted this insurgency until he decided
it was no longer useful, whereupon he let the oficial corporatist sector destroy it.
Where were the organized groups that would have had to challenge political
legitimacy? It is easy to imagine in retrospect more concerted demands than actually
existed after 1968. The fact that writers such as Octavio Paz, Carlos Fuentes, Elena
Poniatowska, and Carlos Monsiviis later told of the wrongs committed tends to obscure
the extent to which public quiet was restored and the student movement disintegrated in
the aftermath of the repression (Hellman 1983, 184). The Olympics proceeded as if
nothing had happened (Aguayo 1998, 265). Only one radio station, broadcasting in
English, covered Tlatelolco (Krauze 1997, 726), and though the international press (there
for the Olympics) told much of the story, the Mexican press widely purveyed the version
fed by the administration: foreigners and subversives were behind the protests; soldiers and
demonstrators alike were shot; and about 25 people sadly died (Aguayo 1998, 262, 268).
Even the leftist press such as Siempre! lined up behind the government, blaming Tlatelolco
on "foreign agents" who destabilize poor countries like Mexico, driving them to "the
protection of - or more properly, submission to - the government of the continental
power" (Aguayo 1998, 271-72). The United States has its political uses.
Most of Mexican society either supported the government during 1968 or paid no
attention to it. Asked whether labor and peasants were involved, Echeverria says, "No, no,
that did not occur. Of course, there was a student explosion, but it was very concentrated in
Mexico City and two or three other cities, not nationwide. And the students did raise
important social and political problems." The private sector's relations with the president
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steadily deteriorated because it saw him as anti-business, but not because it cared about
Tlatelolco. Unions supported the government in 1968, and peasants, that bastion of ruling-
party support, had nothing to do with it at all. Like the labor insurgency, peasant land
invasions were largely orchestrated by Echeverria himself (Schmidt 1991, 98-102; Riding
1989, 186-87). Says Dfaz Ordaz's friend and cabinet secretary, Rafael Moreno Valle,
"[Agrarian Reform Secretary Augusto] G6mez Villanueva promoted land invasions. And
there were not only peasants but sometimes workers, tailors, vendors who went to see if
they might get a little piece of land. The law was not rigorously respected." A rural
guerrilla movement centered in the poor, southern state of Guerrero, finally crushed by the
army, always remained isolated from any base of mass support and limited compared with
other Latin American movements (Collier and Collier 1991, 607; Carr 1991, 136).
No polling data on political attitudes shows a decline in Lhe state's political
legitimacy after 1968; Mexicans' traditionally negative attitudes toward an often corrupt
bureaucracy, along with simultaneous pride in national political institutions and especially
the presidency, have turned up in every pertinent study and serve to "legitimize" the
regime Craig and Cornelius note (1989, 354). A survey of low-income adults in Mexico
City taken in 1970, thus after Tlatelolco had erupted and before Echeverria had entered
office to try to buy back support, found that 59 percent approved the government's
repression, 15 percent opposed it, and 26 percent had no opinion (ibid.). Nearly 80 percent
in that survey said that the system of government was "good for the country," and only 8
percent considered it "bad for the country" (Craig and Cornelius 1989, 377, 393, footnote
159). This is not the stuff of which legitimacy crises are made.
Whatever exactly political legitimacy means (did it exist in 1961 when secret police
instigated violence and killed demonstrators supporting Dr. Nava?), the state did in some
real sense lose legitimacy in 1968 in the eyes of many students and intellectuals, as well as
much of the Mexico City middle class 10 7 (that loss would not have been reflected in polling
data on low-income residents just mentioned). But there was no organized response that
could have threatened the regime at all seriously. Student protests, surging before the 1970
election, were the most important continued expression of 1968, but placating them did not
cost Echeverria a massive, 10 percent of GDP, public-spending increase: it cost 1 percent
of GDP. Victor Bravo, son of the education minister, notes that "in 1970 half of the
universities were in full revolution, and it was my father's role to moderate them. He said
to Echeverria what any cabinet secretary in his place would have: 'I will take charge of
calming the movement, but you have to raise my budget.'" Echeverrfa increased the budget
dramatically - by 1 percent of GDP during the administration, a lot of money for schools
and universities but not nearly enough to cause the crisis. There was no major student
protest after a deadly clash on Corpus Christi day, June 10, 1971 - sometimes blamed on
the machinations of conservatives within the government to humiliate Echeverria (Hellman
1983, 204), other times blame on Echeverria's machinations to oust his conservative rival,
Mexico City Governor Alfonso Martinez Dominguez (Krauze 1997, 752), but never
blamed on mere grass-roots conflict - and no student demonstrations at all after 1973.
Crises do not erupt years after the supposed provocation has been quieted.
For loss of political legitimacy to threaten the regime, it would have had to be
expressed at the polls. Not only did the PRI machine continue to flatten the opposition, but
turnout in presidential elections, which fell after 1952 (when there had been something that
107 Zapata particularly emphasizes this point.
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looked like a real choice in Henrfquez), increased steadily from 49 percent in 1958 through
69 percent in 1976 (Smith 1979, 55). In the 1973 midterm congressional elections, middle-
class opposition to Echeverrfa's leftism outweighed any concerns about Tlatelolco, as the
aggressively conservative National Action Party (Riding 1989, 109) made substantial
gains, winning 29 percent of urban votes (Newell and Rubio 1984, 198). Even when more
organizations independent of the corporatist apparatus emerged in the 1980s, they
concentrated on securing immediate needs for land, water, and housing, while avoiding the
dangers of allying with national opposition parties (Cornelius and Craig 1991, 58).10 Of
course, there was electoral fraud, but the PRI would have won anyway, and fraud was not
politically important because the opposition lacked the clout to seriously dispute results.
The overwhelming official electoral victories indicate that Mexicans had no channels to
challenge the state's political legitimacy.
Echeverria himself says his policies derived not from political problems or loss of
legitimacy caused by Tlatelolco but from his long-held beliefs - he recalls a conference he
helped organize as a student on "Critiques of the Mexican Revolution" - and problems he
learned of during his electoral campaign. He went to the remotest villages in jeeps; a map
of his campaign that hangs in his house looks, as his former National University professor
Cosfo Villegas put it, like a military plan to occupy the nation.109 Says Echeverfa:
I was a candidate a year after the events of 1968, and I didn't have any problem because of them....
That was the reality, and my political campaign was practically without opposition. But I understood
that the 1968 movement had raised many problems and demands emerging from the national
situation, channele,' through that neurological center of conscience and reflection, the universities and
technical institutes. I traversed the country minutely [and saw that] higher education needed help;
rural development demanded contact with peasant groups; and labor policy had to be a priority....
Political officials were shut up in their offices, never taking off their ties to go out.
The Echeverria administration's spending was ill timed if it had really been meant
to buy political legitimacy with the middle class. When new democratic administrations or
military regimes try to shore up support, they boost spending thefirst year when they come
into office, then let it taper off (Ames 1987, 26-28). Spending in the Echeverra
administration's first year was austere - too austere, even in the opinion of former finance
officials (Urquidi. Solis, Moctezuma). The big spending surge, 5 percent of GDP, that set
the economy up for crisis came in 1975, years after student protest fell quiet.
The administration's spending priorities are not well calculated to regain
legitimacy, either. Politicians try to buy societal support by increasing social welfare, not
building new steel mills, but as Newell and Rubio themselves point out, Echeverria did the
opposite (1984, 137). Total social sector spending rose from 5 percent of GDP in the last
year of the Diaz Ordaz administration to 8 percent in the last year of the Echeverrfa
administration, that is, by 3 percent of GDP (Table 6-1). But a third of that amount was
paid for by employers' and employees' contributions to Social Security, so social sector
spending from general revenues and borrowing rose by 2 percent of GDP. Half of this was
the 1 percent of GDP increase in education spending. The rest of social-sector spending, a
1 percent of GDP increase, covered all government contributions to Social Security, the
Labor Ministry, Health and Public Assistance, and quasi-public entities ranging from the
108 As discussed in chapter 8. these opposition groups finally did join the Cuauht6imoc CAirdenas campaign in
1988, but only late, cautiously, and reluctantly as they were afraid of being coopted (Bruhn 1997, 112-13).
109 Though the analogy is borrowed from Cosfo Villegas, Echeverria showed me the map before I
interviewed him.
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Table 6-1 Social sector spending, 1970-82 (percent of GDP)
Total social Social Security Employers' and Social sector
sector spending with employers' employees' without employers'
and employees' contributions to and employees'
contributions Social Security contributions
Echeverria
1970 4.8 2.2 1.7 3.1
1971 5.3 3.0 2.5 2.8
1972 6.3 3.2 2.7 3.6
1973 6.3 3.0 2.5 3.9
1974 6.7 3.5 2.9 3.8
1975 7.3 3.6 2.9 4.4
1976 8.1 3.6 3.0 5.0
Growth 1970-76 3.2 1.5 1.4 1.9
Lopez Portillo
1976 8.1 3.6 3.0 5.0
1977 7.8 3.3 2.5 5.3
1978 7.9 3.2 2.6 5.3
1979 8.4 3.1 2.5 5.9
1980 8.1 3.2 2.6 5.4
1981 9.2 3.0 2.5 6.6
1982 9.1 3.2 2.6 6.5
Growth 1976-82 1.1 -0.5 -0.4 1.5
Total social sector spending and Social Security spending from Salinas 1992, 173.
Social Security includes formal-sector workers (IMSS) and government workers.(ISSSTE)
Government transfers to social security (IMSS plus ISSSTE) from Salinas 1992, 177.
Employers' and employees' contributions to social security are calculated as
total Social Security spending minus government transfers
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National Commission for Free Textbooks (of course, government-approved) to Integral
Family Development." 0 The big money went not to social welfare but to industrial
development. State enterprises, which rose ten-fold from 84 in 1970 to 845 in 1976
(Cornelius and Craig 1991, 110),'" accounted for over half the total increase, or more than
5 percent of GDP through 1975, before falling back in the crisis year of 1976.112 In
addition to Pemex, these included, for example, electric generation, railroads, airports and
airlines, petrochemical plants, steel mills, and truck, bus, and railroad manufacturers.
Finally, in the face of powerful external political pressures, the state might spend
heavily to regain support, but why should such pressures decisively disrupt internal
economic policymaking mechanisms? Why should a coherent budget mechanism under
Finance break up in conflict and inefficiency? Why should it cause dismissals of cabinet
secretaries to surge? Societal pressures could produce elite conflict if elites belonged to
societal factions, but the political grupos in Mexico did not. The powerful strike wave
surrounding the 1958 presidential election did not produce erratic policies, inefficiency,
and elite struggle: why should far weaker grassroots pressures do so after 1970?
An elite split over Tlatelolco?
For doubts about political legitimacy to infect the state's internal operation, indeed for
them to have any important effect on policy, some mechanism has to transmit them into
the state. Mexico had nothing close to a free press or independent polls that would even
provide concrete indication of declining legitimacy. If the story is just that Luis Echeverria
perceived a loss of legitimacy - when. it bears repeating, not business, nor organized labor,
nor peasants, and nor those middle-class voters attracted by aggressive conservative
rhetoric in 1973, did - then it is really about the president's belief. If loss of legitimacy was
more than an supposition in Echeverrfa's mnind, if it was an external political fact he had to
act on, it had to be transmitted to him via some intermediate level of the pyramid of state.
A split in the political elite would be an intermediate mechanism transforming a
notion about loss of legitimacy into a fact Echeverrfa had to address. The 1968 movement
might have found a powerful alliance with a group of high officials. If one political-elite
faction decisively rejected the authoritarianism bared at Tlatelolco, while another
steadfastly defended the repression, the ensuing internal split could explain a great deal of
what happened under Echeverria. In fact, the more plausible accounts about loss of
legitimacy turn on such a split. Newell and Rubio argue that Tlatelolco "caused a split in
the political family," infecting the usual agreement about presidential succession:
[The 1969 nomination] appears to have been the first time since Plutarco Ellas Calles [in the 1920s]
that a president unilaterally chose his successor, a feature that would.., weaken the political system's
legitimacy. Dfaz Ordaz's handling of the 1968 crisis created a vacuum in the political system. Since
the Family was very divided as to the actions taken by the government, it could not accommodate or
compromise on the issue of succession. Thus, the apparently unilateral decision regarding the
succession had to be upheld by an ex post coalition, one that the nominee would have to create on his
own; it was this or confront the problems of a rapidly disintegrating political system. (1984, 124).
10 Public Works, a large budget, was also included and should not have been: by the 1990s when the data for
Table 6-1 were compiled, it had evolved into Urban Development and Ecology and was properly classified as
social welfare, but under Echeverrfa it built infrastructure. Its secretary. Enrique Bracamontes, was nick-
named Rapamontes, or mountain-leveler, for his ambitious earth-moving projects.
". Smith 1979, 281, says they rose from 86 to 740 under Echeverria.
112 Calculated from the same data as used in Table 3-3.
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It was once widely accepted that, with many high officials' children in the streets,
the political elite split over Tlatelolco. Moreover, the idea seems plausible, given the
National University's central role in shaping political elites and in the events of 1968. Not
only were students and professors involved in the protests, but the university was occupied
by the military, and its rector, a former cabinet secretary, Javier Barros Sierra, openly
broke with the president, leading mass protest marches and threatening to resign. Yet the
theory of a serious elite split - in fact, any split that went much beyond Barros Sierra
himself - has lost credibility as the old Mexican regime has eroded and information about
its workings has begun to emerge. After examining countless official archives not available
until recently, Sergio Aguayo concludes that after Tlatelolco "the 'revolutionary family'
closed ranks behind the president" (1998, 270, 150). Even ex-president Lizaro Cardenas,
who was deeply troubled by Tlatelolco, publicly blamed it on "international and foreign
elements" (1998, 271)- hence the leftist press' line. As for professors, having taught
politicians was one thing, influencing current policy quite another. Camp concludes in a
study about intellectuals' relationship with the political system that Tlatelolco only ended
up isolating the National University: intellectuals "did not have much influence on the state
in the aftermath of 1968" (1985, 209).
Officials from Finance, the Bank of Mexico, and the Foreign Ministry (Beteta,
Fernaindez Hurtado, Carrillo Gamboa regarding Carrillo Flores), as well as Diaz Ordaz'
confidants at the time (Moreno Valle, de la Vega Dominguez), agree that, tragic as the
events of 1968 were, political elites supported the president. Says Beteta: "I don't mean to
say that afterwards - I speak for myself - we were in agreement with what happened. I
think we all lamented it, and none of us felt indifferent about it, but I think that Dfaz Ordaz
had the complete support of his government, including the principal cabinet secretaries."
Least of all did Echeverria, the interior minister, see any dissent: "I didn't have a problem
with people in the government who were dissidents. No, no, no, not that I remember. There
was a realism about the issue. [Anyone who lacked that realism] wouldn't have accepted a
public post.""13 Perhaps most telling is the testimony of Fernando Solana, at the time
second in command to the National University Rector Javier Barros Sierra. He says
everyone but Barros Sierra stuck by Diaz Ordaz.
Among former high officials interviewed, only three, Javier Alejo, Fausto Zapata,
and Victor Urquidi, saw anything at all resembling an elite split. Alejo points to Emilio
Martinez Manatou, the secretary of presidency who was regarded as a softliner and had a
group of intellectuals under him, including Pablo Gonzailez Casanova, who wrote a long
essay criticizing authoritarianism in Mexico: "They transmitted the state of mind of the
political class and the nation in general." However, Alejo was not at the time a high
official, but a professor at the National University and economist in several economic
agencies. Urquidi, former advisor to the finance secretary and at the time president of the
Colegio de Mexico, whose offices were machine-gunned by government police, says there
were no blocs of protest, only individuals who "sympathized with the students and maybe
protected them if they could." He was summoned by the supposed softliner Martinez
Manatou: "He treated me as if my obligation were to keep a check on professors and
students of the Colegio, as if I were responsible for what they did as citizens. I never had
~ Likewise Ibarra, who was in ECLA at the time ("the government itself closed ranks behind the president.
for good reasons or bad"), and Bracamontes, who was outside the government but had been an
undersecretary for twelve years and would be public works secretary under Echeverria.
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such an unpleasant interview with a high government official before." Zapata, at the time a
federal deputy from San Luis Potosi, agrees that, though Dfaz Ordaz "lost moral
authority," any protest within the government was "minimal and silent."
Furthermore, the 1969 political succession did not work as it should have for an
elite split to have occurred. Echeverria, who as interior secretary ran the state espionage
and repression apparatus and published innumerable diatribes supporting Dfaz Ordaz and
condemning the students (Aguayo 1998, 161), was universally regarded as a hardliner
(Newell and Rubio 1984, 123-24; Carrillo Gamboa).114 Neither the president nor the rest
of the political elite thought the presidential nominee was a compromise candidate, but
rather a successor close to Diaz Ordaz' own way of thinking (Moreno Valle, Carrillo
Gamboa). When during the campaign Echeverria "came out of the closet" as a leftist, as
Manuel Suarez puts it, no one was more surprised and angered than the president himself
(Bracamontes, Beteta, Zapata). The rupture between the two rapidly became bitter and -
extraordinary for the time - public. The president even considered replacing Echeverria as
the candidate, saying to a confidante, "We're going to make this swine sick, and this time
he's really going to be sick" (Castafieda 1999, 347).
Suppose Diaz Ordaz picked Echeverria because he considered the only supposed
softliner, Martinez Manatou, to have betrayed him. Still, Echeverria, a consummate
politician even in the estimation of his worst enemies, should have tried to build support,
reaching out to the dissident grupo and giving some members good posts. He did not. He
demoted Jos6 L6pez Portillo, Martinez Manatou's undersecretary, to an unimportant
undersecretariat of State Industries (Mufioz Ledo), despite L6pez Portillo's having been his
close friend since adolescence. Two prominent economists in Presidency who would
become cabinet secretaries after L6pez Portillo's subsequent meteoric rise were
marginalized: Julio Rodolfo Moctezuma was briefly an advisor to Presidency; Carlos Tello
was made a subdirector general, the fourth level down. Two economists under Martinez
Manatou who played key roles in shaping intellectuals' views were left out, at least for the
time: Ifigenia Martinez, known for her work on income inequality, and Victor Flores Olea,
known for his argument about structural problems. Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, the
prominent sociologist, became rector of National University for two years. It makes no
sense that the only important current within the government seen as sympathetic to
students could have forced the whole political system to change, yet the individuals
involved should have done relatively badly during the succession.
A new and different generation?
The entrance of a new and different generation of high officials could cause a political
break, and such a generation seemed to many contemporaries to burst upon the scene in
1970. Though not everyone lists quite the same set of characteristics, the new officials
were widely seen as different - younger, more ticnico, more leftist (Echeverria, Ortiz
Mena, Urquidi, Carrillo Gamboa, Izquierdo, Beteta; Smith 1979, 281). They were not just
politically inexperienced but unknown, according to the acerbic but knowledgeable Cosfo
Villegas: "President Echeverria invented them, fabricated them out of nothing as if it were
a magic act.... In his original cabinet, one could barely point to two exceptions, [Mexico
114 Echeverria's role in Tlatelolco may have been much more marginal than was thought at the time (Aguayo
1998, 303). This reassessment does not affect to the argument: at the time he was widely seen as a hard-liner.
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City Governor] Alfonso Martinez Domfnguez, who had some political capital, and
[Agrarian Reform Secretary] Augusto G6mez Villanueva, who had saved ten or fifteen
cents. And remember the sad end that the first one met" - deposed six months later after
the Corpus Christi riots, whoever instigated them (1975, 39). Mario Moya Palencia
catapulted at age 37 from director of state cinematography to interior secretary, the top
political post after the president; Emilio O. Rabasa from director general of the
Cinematographic Bank to foreign minister - Cosfo Villegas notes that he had undertaken
the diplomatic mission of attending the Oscars - and so on (1974, 22-24).
It is important to distinguish what was and was not different about high officials
under Echeverria. There was no underlying generational change, in the sense of a
sociologically distinct cohort that would enter office sooner or later and reform how the
government worked. Or, to put it another way. such a change was on the way, and it was
precisely the generation of young professors and students born after 1940 who protested in
1968 (though it was not necessarily the protesters themselves), but it would not reach high
office until the 1980s under Carlos Salinas (Camp 2002, 235). As for officials who entered
in 1970, they were indistinguishable from their predecessors in socioeconomic origin
(mostly middle class, from families of teachers, lawyers, and other professions),
educational level (the licenciatura), and the portion who had attended the National
University- 70.5 under Diaz Ordaz, 68.1 percent under Echeverria (Camp, 1980, 78). The
portion with licenciaturas in economics rather than law rose from 10 percent under Dfaz
Ordaz to 20 percent under Echeverra (Smith 1979, 91), and the Economics Faculty's
orientation had been more leftist since the 1930s (Camp 1984a, 58).115 But not too much
should be made of this shift. Though Economics was the smaller faculty, many of its left-
leaning professors had held high government office, such as the self-proclaimed
"heterodox Marxist" and finance undersecretary Jes6is Silva Herzog (Camp 1984a, 121). It
had been a division of the Law Faculty until 1935, when it split off to become independent
(Camp 1980, 160); the Law Faculty continued to teach some political economy (neither
department was much like what Americans think of as a law or economics school); and
they remain side by side on the National University campus.
Those who saw differences in Echeverri'a's cabinet (himself included) were not
wrong. For all the president's talk of a "generation of youths" (Cosfo Villegas 1974, 20),
his cabinet itself was a mere year younger than Dfaz Ordaz's, 49 years instead of 50 years
on average (Table 6-2); however - a critical difference - it had much less political
experience. Officials' average length of time in the public-sector when named cabinet
secretary had risen steadily from 10 years under Alemain (he had ushered in real
sociological change, replacing a generation of military men with lawyers) to 17 under Diaz
Ordaz, then fell abruptly to 11 years under Echeverra. The effect was more pronounced
than the numbers suggest, as secretaries in more technical areas were often experienced,
despite what Cosfo Villegas says - Enrique Bracamontes, public works secretary, had been
in the public sector for 20 years and a undersecretary in that ministry for 12 - while top
political appointees like Moya Palencia, if they did not quite emerge from the magician's
hat, were relative newcomers to politics. These choices were the president's; they were not
forced upon him. Echeverria himself says he sat at his dining-room table, pencil in hand,
and freely selected them without interference (Castafieda 1999. 71).
~5 Beteta notes that it had this same bent in the 1970s.
114
Table 6-2: Political careers of cabinet secretaries, 1952-82
Average age when Average number of
named cabinet years in government
secretary until named cabinet
secretary
Miguel Alemin 44.6 9.8
Vald6s (1946-52)
Adolfo Ruiz 50.0 11.6
Cortines (1952-58)
Adolfo L6pez 51.7 15.0
Mateos (1958-64)
Gustavo Diaz 50.8 17.5
Ordaz (1964-70)
Luis Echeverrfa 49.8 11.2
Alvarez (1970-76)
Jos6 L6pez 49.1 15.3
Portillo (1976-82)
Source: Hernandez Rodrfguez 1984, 37
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Informed impressions about the makeup of the political elite outside of the cabinet
itself are remarkably at odds. Miguel Mancera, subsequently director of the Bank of
Mexico, says "all the top bureaucracy continued almost as it had been. Ortiz Mena left, but
the rest of the Finance grupo stayed."" '16 Moreno Valle, who would seem likely to notice
change since he was close to Diaz Ordaz, says, "The secretaries, subsecretaries, and some
department heads changed, but in general the bureaucracy was the same.""17 Yet Fausto
Zapata, who rose to high office under Echeverria, believes that the Diaz Ordaz corps was
marginalized and changes among high officials were significantly sharper than in 1958 or
1964: much about Echeverria's administration can be explained by his "almost obsessive
fixation not to repeat the errors Diaz Ordaz had committed. Thus, one of the things he did
was to keep out people he identified as too close to the former president." Carrillo
Gamboa, director of Telmex and son of the former finance minister, says that a whole
generation of experienced officials was shut out of the public sector, more decidedly than
the norm, and the difference was not just in numbers but in their ways of thinking."18
Camp found that, unlike cabinet secretaries, a group of some hundred-plus high
officials under Echeverria - including not only the cabinet but undersecretaries, directors
of large state enterprises, senators, governors, ambassadors, and Supreme Court justices -
actually was a younger generation than it should have been according to the norm:
A single generation has dominated each two successive presidential administrations in Mexico since
1935. .. . In 1970, however, this pattern was suddenly broken, and the impressionistic assumptions of
most observers that President Echeverria was appointing young persons to high-level offices is borne
out rather clearly in our data. Echeverria neglected his own generation (1920) for the younger 1930
generation, selecting 50 (or 40 percent) of his collaborators from this group. This is the first time since
1935 that a single generation did not dominate two successive administrations. (1980, 50)
Prematurely retiring the 1920 generation could well create tension within the elite, if not a
decisive split. But if so, like the inexperience of the cabinet, the youth of this broader
group was the president's choice, not a necessity dictated by sociological change. L6pez
Portillo brought the slighted generation back (Camp 1980, 50), but it might have been too
late. Conflict once triggered is not so easy to reverse.
Ideological escalation
The Echeverria administration broke with the past for two related reasons: the president's
decisions - on matters that go beyond his initial appointments - and the broader climate of
ideological escalation. Albert O. Hirschman, an American economist intimately familiar
with Latin America political economy during the 1960s, saw "ideological escalation" in
the challenges that economists, many of them his friends, increasingly posed to the state
(1979, 84-86). In the 1940s and 1950s a consensus including the U.N. Economic
Commission on Latin America and World Bank had called on Latin American
governments to promote industrialization, long-term planning, and economic integration
among each other. As if these goals were not enough, in the 1960s economists proclaimed
that to get to the root of economic problems, Latin America also must overcome
"fundamental" problems, maldistribution of wealth and "dependency" on the First World -
116 Alejo, finance undersecretary and state industries secretary under Echeverria, emphasizes the same point.
117 Moctezuma, director of public investment under Diaz Ordaz and finance secretary under L6pez Portillo,
does not think there was such unusual change, or at least that whatever change there was mattered much.
118 Beteta. who considers himself an echeverrista though he was in Finance, agrees.
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problems the region had faced for 500 years and was not likely to resolve any time soon.
These more difficult and antagonistic challenges - redistributing wealth threatened
propertied classes and breaking dependency threatened First World governments and
multinationals - "may well have contributed to that pervasive sense of being in a desperate
predicament." Hirschman argues that this pervasive sense may have been a "precondition"
for military coups in South American nations in the 1960s and 1970s.
Though the Mexican political system differed importantly from those in South
American (which of course different importantly from each other), and though Mexico had
no coup, much the same pervasive sense of being in a desperate predicament could have
contributed to the Echeverria administration's sharp breaks from the past. Two powerful
lines of thought took aim along remarkably parallel lines at the political and economic
system, one focusing on economic "dependency," the other on authoritarianism. Andr6
Gunder Frank, a researcher in the late 1960s at the National University of Mexico and one
of the principal authors of dependency theory, wrote that the metropolis (advanced
capitalist nations) extracted resources from the dependent periphery (poor nations such as
Mexico) via a neocolonial economic, political, and social order: "The periphery.., .can
develop only if it breaks out of the relation which has made and kept it underdeveloped, or
if it can break up the system as a whole" (1969, 354). Quite a challenge! Victor Flores
Olea, dean of the School of Political and Social Sciences, wrote that "the capitalist system,
since its earliest phases, shows us precisely the machinery of domination, a chain of
metropolis and satellite nations, which in turn 'satellitize' other sectors of their population,
creating their own internal colonies" (1972, 471). The most prominent critic of the
authoritarian Mexican state, Pablo Gonzilez Casanova, wrote:
The only basic decision for development possible at present would be for an effective democracy
which would expand the internal market, accelerate national decolonization and integration, and
intensify those measures encouraging national independence and negotiation at a level of equality
with foreign powers, particularly the United States. (1970, 147)
These challenges to the economic and political order, impossible to get far with any
time soon no matter how morally justified, were nevertheless accepted at some of the
highest levels of the state. State Industries Secretary Horacio Flores de la Pefia was
undisputedly the leader of the economic left but was far from alone. Labor Secretary
Mufioz Ledo wanted to restructure the "exhausted" economic model and corporatist
political system (Mufioz Ledo)."'19 Carlos Tello, a finance official (later Planning and
Budget secretary), wrote: "Our people are conscious that their misery produces others'
wealth. The accumulated rancor against political colonialism is now reborn against
economic colonialism" (1979, 53).
Even Leopoldo Solis, a prominent economist who was chief economic advisor in
the Ministry of Presidency and mentor to many subsequent high officials, including
President Ernesto Zedillo,120 illustrates how economic thinking shifted in about 1970. In
1967 he wrote an essay debunking the idea that import substitution was exhausted and
criticizing Raymond Vernon's The Dilemma of Mexico's Development for the notion that
the country faced "inescapable obstacles" to continued growth: "In reality, his book is just
119 Ibarra, Mexico City director of ECLA but also an advisor in important administration economic debates,
saw the economic model of the 1950s and 1960s as deteriorating.
120 Camp 2002, 216, describes the mentor relationship with Zedillo and other economic technocrats. It is
widely agreed that Zedillo's administration, more than de la Madrid's or Salinas', was the epitome of
neoliberal policies, "holier than the Pope" in its attitude toward free-market ideology.
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one more of a series of studies that.. . end by raising alarm about this or that problem
impeding the country's economic development. Despite everything, development
continues at a secular rate of 6 percent a year" (Soils 1967, 86). By 1973 Solfs had turned
around. In introducing the section on economic development in Readings: The Mexican
Economy, he says it is "accepted almost unanimously by national economists..,. that
import substitution, as the key element of growth, can no longer continue," and says that
the economic model must be changed to keep income inequality from worsening. He
proceeds to discuss a selection arguing that Mexico's underdevelopment "is rooted
precisely in political, social, and economic subordination imposed by colonial expansion"
(1973, 449-50). Gustavo Romero Kolbeck, ambassador to Japan under Echeverria
(previously director of public investment and subsequently director of the Bank of
Mexico), wrote in 1969 about the "structural problems present in the economy for thirty
years" (quoted in Tello 1979, 35).
One must be cautious about discovering ideological escalation in Mexico. Several
officials expressed doubts that it occurred (Urquidi, Bracamontes, Flores de la Pefia). A
poll of political leaders taken just after the Echeverria administration showed them equally
divided between those who thought that the state's role in the economy was sufficient and
those who thought it should be expanded, but none thought it excessive (Camp 1984a,
147). As discussed in the last chapter, the political elite had held views ranging from
pragmatic Marxist to pragmatic market liberal since at least the 1930s, and it was a tight-
knit group, without the class-based antagonisms found in much of South America. Bank of
Mexico Director Fernindez Hurtado, the anchor of fiscal restraint under Echeverria, and
State Industries Secretary Flores de la Pefia had known one another since they were
classmates at the National University and each in interviews spoke respectfully of the
other. Such friendships were common and moderated ideological conflict (Camp 1980,
208). Hirschman argues that Colombia avoided a military coup in the 1960s and 1970s,
despite the continent-wide ideological climate, because of similar relationships. Political
elites there were divided between defenders of business and the "entrepreneurial function"
and defenders of workers and the "reform function." But unlike counterparts in Argentina,
Chile, or Brazil - elites sociologically linked to external sectors such as the landed
oligarchy or the working class - Colombian elites all belonged to one coherent network:
"Communication between the two groups was often strained, but was never quite cut off,
in part because of personal relationships and in part because, after a while, it became
obvious that the reformers . . . were by no means revolutionaries, but were acting in the
best interests of their brethren (1979, 95).
One would also have to be cautious about arguing that fading memories of the
Mexican Revolution, which had helped forge the elite ethic of cooperation, allowed old
ideological differences to erupt. The widespread violence did not really end in 1920, the
usual date for the end of the Revolution, but in 1930, with the quelling of the last serious
military revolt against the state and of the bloody Cristero religious insurrection. The
typical cabinet secretary under Echeverrfa (the median-aged cabinet secretary) was 9 years
old in 1930, not far at all from the violence. 2 1 Moreover, the ethic of cooperation could be
transmitted through the National University. A poll taken in 1978 of young working-class
women born from the mid-1950s through the 1960s - thus much further from the
12 1 The median birth date of Echeverria's cabinet secretaries was 1921, the mean was 1923. Both figures
calculated from data in Camp 1995b.
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Revolution in age and social origin than high officials under Echeverria - showed that 45
percent of their immediate family members had fought in it, 59 percent had heard stories
about it in childhood, and 54 percent feared the eruption of violence (Stevenson and
Seligson 1996, 66-67). When will the American South to forget the Civil War?
Nevertheless, both officials and scholars widely see relations within the Echeverria
administration as far more conflictive than in earlier administrations, and specifically so in
ideological terms, often described as structuralist versus monetarist. Here the Tlatelolco
massacre, surely the most powerful Mexican political symbol after the Revolution, even if
it produced no powerful societal movements (there were none) and no effective split within
the political elite (there was none), may have acted as a second social convulsion, in some
measure overspreading the legacy of the Revolution. Tlatelolco crystallized broader
ideological and social calls for change - the progressive Vatican II Council, Marxist
dependency theory, criticisms of authoritarianism, anti-Vietnam War protests, Paris 1968,
Prague, Chicago - and broadcast those calls from the Mexico City streets. Cosfo Villegas
wrote that fundamental economic and political criticisms academics had raised about
Mexico's development "did not just spread from some erudite essay, article, conference, or
street gossip. Rather, the 1968 student rebellion gave them spectacular public standing"
(1974, 50). People do not march in the street demanding that the import-substitution model
be replaced, but Ibarra insists, nevertheless, that 1968 provoked the "intellectual ferment"
and "winds in favor of change" that pushed that idea to the fore.
Ideological escalation does not require that there be some lineal scale on which
officials' view move simultaneously left or right, only that they should believe some
fundamental change is coming, however clearly or confusingly envisioned. All sides,
whether for change or against it, whatever exactly it may mean, can see the stakes rising
because whoever controls change is likely to be in power for a long time to come, and
whoever does not is likely to be left out. Grupos may begin to fear for their political
survival, and a cooperative pact may begin to erode. Conflictive and erratic policymaking,
increasing turnover of high officials as one faction struggles with another, and spending
surges to carry out favored policies or build political support could result. Ideological
escalation is impossible to gauge but surely was important.
Luis Echeverrfa
Given the authority of the Mexican presidency, Luis Echeverria could well have been a
powerful cause of his administration's break with the past. He was in three principal ways.
First, if Tlatelolco emitted a signal for change, publicly muted by 1970, he amplified and
broadcast it in a way that promoted intra-elite conflict, as well as conflict with the private
sector. Second, his enormous energy for effecting change, combined with his enormous
incapacity for administrating it, or even for understanding that how government is
administered matters, aggravated conflict and eroded the system of elite cooperation.
Third, the way he sought to solidify his power base by installing a politically weak friend
in the presidency - L6pez Portillo has himself said "truly, I did not have a grupo"
(Castafieda 1999, 116) - further eroded the cooperative system and involved massive
public spending.
If tight-knit Mexican political elites were relatively unsusceptible to ideological
escalation, the president's message of change, time and again attacking the "emissaries of
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the past," made them more vulnerable. He proclaimed the urgent need for change without
explaining what change he wanted. Cosfo Villegas:
Most [Mexicans who favored change] lacked any political or economic power, so their support for it
could only be 'diffuse,' as political scientists say, latent but not active. More important, they did not
even vaguely know what changes should be made, when, by whom, with what methods, or much less
the benefits that they might legitimately expect. For his part, the presidential candidate spoke time
after time about the need for change, but without defining either what it was or might be. (1974, 16-
17)
Newell and Rubio say Echeverrfa's message was that failure to implement his new policies
"would inevitably plunge the nation into civil disorder, thus interrupting the orderly
progress that the nation had enjoyed over the past four decades and opening the way for
'fascist' (authoritarian) regimes" (1984, 130).
Echeverria's supporters make it clear how crucial his role was in propagating the
message of change. Javier Alejo says, "I think Echeverria's great contribution was to have
changed the national ideology because the president acted like a lay preacher, a preacher of
social justice and education, a preacher who called for attending to peasants, for creating
employment." Carlos Tello, like Alejo a qualified supporter of the president, notes that "in
Mexico all socioeconomic reform, all important change of the development model, has
depended on the state's initiation of a mass politics" (Cordera and Tello 1981b, 68). So it
happened in 1970: "In reality, it was the state's own initiative (even if after the shock of
1968) that established the renovating discourse that has impregnated the whole Mexican
social project... [First came] the critique of so-called stabilizing development [of the
1950s and 1960s], and then the feverish search for an alterative model, finally baptized
shared development [Echeverria's slogan for his program of growth with redistribution]"
(Cordera and Tello 1981a, 56).122
If Echeverria's exhortations for change - amorphous change as if calculated to
provoke bureaucrats' fear - exacerbated conflict, so did his disorderly administration. It
was bad luck that someone with no talent for organizing and managing a bureaucracy, yet
who desperately wanted to change everything, became top bureaucrat.
To begin with, Echeverria seemed to want to do everything in excess - not just
spend too much, but even cut too much. His initial bout of economic policymaking
suffered from this second excess. Julio Rodolfo Moctezuma, an economic advisor, later
finance undersecretary (and finance secretary under L6pez Portillo), says:
At the end of 1970 [when Echeverrfa entered office], it was clear that public finances were out of
adjustment. We - Finance, the Bank of Mexico, and Presidency - debated the matter and concluded
that a little braking, not even braking, only a slower pace of increase, and a few other measures,
principally a well-justified increase in electricity rates and in petroleum-product prices, would have
been sufficient. Those measures would have let us keep moving forward, and later we could have
undertaken more serious projects. We communicated the plan to the president. And to all of our
surprise, he considered it not only good, but too cautious. He said that we had to make a greater effort
to cut back. At that point I left the government but I know that the government put on the brakes, and
the result was called a period of economic "feebleness," when all state investment was cut. That
"feebleness" was what in my opinion incubated the later inflation. Around October 1971 the president
sensed pressures because of the lack of spending, and then, I think, took rushed investment measures,
such as to prepare new agricultural land - but massively. Probably they were good projects, but they
were too rushed, and the current of spending became very intense.
122 Basifiez 1996, 155) says that satisfaction with the successes of the 1950s and 1960s dominated public
discourse until the Echeverria campaign itself challenged it.
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As mentioned, Echeverria's critics and supporters alike (Solis 1981, 67-68; Tello 1979, 78)
say the race was on to invest, with haste and often inexperience, in projects that frequently
turned out to be inefficient.
When Echeverria had an idea, rather than implementing it through existing
channels, he just added a new piece to the bureaucracy. Fideicomisos, the off-budget funds
established by public banks for ad hoc projects, mushroomed, says Mufioz Ledo:
"Echeverrfa hated administration per se because he had always held posts as a trouble-
shooter, posts getting rid of particular problems. His idea wasn't to reform the
administration but to add a parallel one, as the whole world knows, to create new agencies.
When he was named ambassador to Australia [L6pez Portillo's attempt to end his behind-
the-scene machinations by sending him as far away as possible], everybody said, 'It's so
he can open afideicomniso for the kangaroos.'"
Decision-making in the 1950s and 1960s had reflected the orderly political system.
The president named secretaries with demonstrated ability in their areas, expected them to
stay through the administration, gave them latitude to manage their responsibilities, but
held them accountable for the results (Bracamontes, Romero P6rez, Gonzailez Blanco).
Gonzailez Blanco, who was director of public investment under L6pez Mateos and whose
father was labor minister from 1958 through 1970, notes that although the Constitution
refers to cabinet "secretaries," through the end of the Dfaz Ordaz administration they were
commonly called "ministers":
They held their posts because of the president's confidence but also because of personal merit. They
were persons whose dismissal would generate uncertainty and loss of confidence, just as their
presence implied certainty and tranquility. It was neither easy to remove them nor necessary because
they knew their responsibilities.
There were virtually no cabinet meetings in that era, 23 says Gonzalez Blanco, "precisely
because the head of each area bore responsibility before the people and the president." The
very architecture of the president's office reflected this delegation of responsibility, notes
Moctezuma, director of public investments under Diaz Ordaz:
The desk in the presidential office was ancient, and in front of it stood only one chair. There were
other chairs around the room, but in front of that desk, only one. It was clear that one person was
responsible to the president.
Not only did Echeverria appoint many secretaries who were inexperienced in
managing the ministries they ran, but he brought chaos to the very structure of
decisionmaking. Moctezuma says:
When Echeverria came into office, he wanted to manage everything directly. He organized meetings,
brought in many people to participate, and the sense of hierarchy was lost. There were meetings at all
hours, going on at the same time in different rooms, and the president would pass from one to the
other, proposing the most diverse topics for discussion. The problem was that everybody attended the
meetings, the individual responsible for the area, others not responsible for it, and others who had
made some incidental remark about it. They all gave their opinions, and decisions were diluted, or
everybody was assigned tasks that bore no relation to each other. Everybody participated, everybody
was together, but at the same time decisions were unclear. This change importantly affected
government structure because the sense of authority that had existed was dispersed and lost. In great
measure, officials' sense of responsibility for their functions disappeared. 124
The left as well as more conservative officials associated with Finance, such as
Moctezuma and Beteta, consider decisionmaking under Echeverria to have been
disorderly. Mufioz Ledo recalls a critical discussion on the exchange rate:
123 Izquierdo 1995, 47, confirms the lack of cabinet meetings.
124 Likewise Urquidi and Barnes comment on the mass meetings that accomplished little if anything.
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At the meeting were Leopoldo Solis [who favored devaluation], Hugo Margaiin [who opposed it],
Ernesto Fernaindez Hurtado [who opposed it]. The president said to me, 'So, what does Mufioz Ledo
bring us?' Everybody was laughing, because I was the youngest of the group. 'Excuse me, Hugo,' I
said - I always used the familiar form - 'You are mistaken. We need to float the peso.' 'The peso
doesn't float; it sinks. Ha! ha! ha!" He was joking. Then the president said, "Well, I have to go now.
We'll have a more ample discussion some other day.'
If groups never really made decisions, and everything was left in a state of
disagreement, then the one who really decided was Echeverrfa, and other officials became
interchangeable and dispensable. Mufioz Ledo, for example, went from undersecretary in
Presidency, where he developed plans that were not adopted to solve the "twin exhaustion"
of Mexico's political and economic models; to labor secretary, where he supported non-
corporatist union currents for a while, carrying out Echeverrfa's machinations against
Velazquez; to head of L6pez Portillo's political campaign. Echeverria fired many
secretaries, moved others around rapidly, and generally agitated the bureaucracy by
reaching much further down into it than previous presidents had. Beteta says:
Echeverria is a man of great social conscience; he was sincerely concerned about the misdistribution
of wealth, he always fought to improve the life of peasants and the poor. ... He never liked to do
things just because that is how they had always been done. He wanted to be an innovator. Thus, if he
thought a cabinet secretary was not adequately doing his job - at least as he saw it - he replaced him.
And he did the same with subsecretaries and director generals, right down to the third rank.
Before Echeverrfa, not only was it unusual for the president himself to reach down and fire
officials at the third rank; it was unusual for him to even talk to them (Beteta).
Echeverria's talent for maladministration was aggravated by a deeper problem, his
"megalomania to be a great Third World leader" (Mancera), his demagoguery aimed at
becoming secretary general of the United Nations (Ortiz Mena),125 his "visions of himself
as a new messiah for Mexico" (Urquidi), even his "monomania, and general mental
disturbance" (Cosfo Villegas, quoted by Krauze 1997, 747). 126 Judgments of him have
been harsh, in good part because the results of his administration were poor, but his
personal ambitions did focus on social goals. Says Urquidi: "He thought of himself as a
big, strong president of Mexico who was going to reduce poverty, improve social
programs, everything. But he had no idea how to accomplish those goals." Fausto Zapata,
undersecretary of information in Presidency: "Echeverria lived the six years of his
administration with a continual sense of urgency. He had a kind of anxiety to advance by
great strides, to correct in six years all the problems that had accumulated in 400, no? And
added to that problem was his very vague notion about the economy."
Though a bad administrator, Echeverria was a master at manipulation, a skill that
he concentrated in good measure on Finance. Carrillo Gamboa says, "Echeverria hated the
finance secretaries. He felt that they were kings that were always disputing the power of
the president. So really what he wanted to do was squash the power of Finance with State
Industries Secretary [Flores de la Pefia]." He could not have picked a better state industries
secretary for that purpose. When Ortiz Mena weakened the 1958 Administrative Law,
concentrating more authority in Finance, he also managed to substantially control most
state enterprises. He gained seats on their boards, supervised government transfers to them,
and finally in 1964 incorporated them into the budget so as to police all their expenditures
125 Kissinger 1999, 720, confirms Echeverria's ambitions to be U.N. general secretary. He asked for U.S.
support, which he was not going to get. Kissinger kept delaying the process until the 1976 economic crisis
and other Mexican troubles "resolved matters without need fr any action by the United States."
126 Likewise Barnes says he "wanted power and wanted to move things left.. . he had personal ambitions."
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(Moctezuma). From 1959 through 1970, on the losing end of that battle was one Flores de
la Pefia, director of the Commission to Control Decentralized State Enterprises under the
Ministry of State Industries. He maintained that those enterprises should be controlled in
their own right, parallel to and independently from the federal government budget, and he
used his access to and information about those enterprises to confront Finance. As a result,
says Moctezuma, "He maintained a somewhat aggressive attitude toward Finance and the
Bank of Mexico, and concretely toward Don Antonio [Ortiz Mena] and Don Rodrfguez
[G6mez]. He had his aim fixed on them both."
Having appointed a state industries secretary who was antagonistic toward Finance,
Echeverria was set to manipulate the resulting conflict. Asked if the president could have
forged some compromise between Finance and State Industries, Ortiz Mena replied,
"Look, Echeverria used Flores de la Pefia to proposed projects in opposition to [Finance
Secretary] Margaiin. I know that because Flores de la Pefia said so to Margain. He did
things because, in fact, the president told him to." In short, Echeverria had no interest in
resolving the conflict between grupos in the two ministries; quite the contrary, he wanted
to use conflict so he could more personally resolve all decisions.
It is widely said, and true to a point, that Echeverrfa finally fired Margaiin in 1973
because of disputes over public expenditure. When Margain drew the line, saying there
was no more left to spend, the president infamously declared that "the economy is
managed from los Pinos," the presidential office, and that he would appoint a finance
secretary who knew how to find resources to spend. That much of the story looks like a
conflict that Margaiin and his fiscal conservatism lost to Flores de la Pefia and his
expensive investment projects, but it was not the whole story because Echeverria replaced
Margain with his boyhood friend L6pez Portillo. Oteyza, state industries secretary under
L6pez Portillo, says that no compromise between Flores de la Pefia and Margiin would
have been feasible "because when Echeverra named L6pez Portillo in Finance, he was
thinking about the presidencial succession, and already he had L6pez Portillo in mind."' •27
This replacement of finance secretaries importantly damaged the political system.
The fact that it was first time any finance secretary had been fired since the 1930s, except
for Echeverra's own request that Ortiz Mena leave a few months early to make way for
Margaiin, and that it thus powerfully symbolized instability, is only one dimension of the
damage. The heart of the problem was Echeverria's deliberate project, dangerously close to
Alemin's in 1951, to install a politically weak successor- dependent on himself and
lacking widespread support among political grupos - in order to perpetuate his policies and
retain some power beyond his term (Camp 1984b, 591).128
Installing a politically weak candidate inherently endangers the system of elite
cooperation because it threatens the bulk of grupos who have been supporting another
candidate and have come to see their future as tied to his success. There is no dispute that
127 Bank of Mexico Director FernAndez Hurtado, an official at the opposite end of the political spectrum from
Alejo, agrees that L6pez Portillo's ascent to Finance was already preparation for his ascent to the presidency.
Zapata agrees that Echeverria was thinking that L6pez Portillo would be his successor when he appointed
him finance secretary but does not think that is why he fired Margdin. Flores de la Pefia notes that Echeverria
specifically requested that he appoint L6pez Portillo in State Industries at the beginning of the administration
so he could learn about economic problems. He thinks Echeverria already was thinking of his friend as a
28ossible presidential successor.28 Smith 1991, 373, and Bailey 1988, 38, agree that Echeverria chose L6pez Portillo because he lacked
political support and would be the easiest candidate to control.
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in 1975 Interior Minister Moya Palencia had widespread support and L6pez Portillo did
not. Moreno Valle says "the only powerful political current was Moya Palencia's," and
Castafieda (1999, 362) reports that informal polls conducted in the Ministry of Education
showed Moya far ahead. Victor Bravo notes that people nick-named the winning
candidate, whose initials are JLP, "Jamas Lo Pens6" - I never would have imagined
him. 129 In fact, Echeverria himself said L6pez Portillo won because he was the one with
the fewest political attachments and debts; his candidate's lack of political support should
be seen as an advantage (Smith 1991, 373).
Precisely this political weakness and an ideological outlook close to his own made
the president think his friend would share power with him when he became president
(Castafieda 1999, 371-72). Says Rosa Luz Alegrfa, a cabinet secretary under L6pez Portillo
and his lover: "L6pez Portillo would take care of the glamour, the paraphernalia and
ceremonies, and [Echeverra] would continue managing the inside threads of politics"
(Castaneda 1999, 372). There were also other signs that Echeverrfa intended to prolong his
power. Toward the end of his term he installed five cabinet secretaries as state governors
and had another nominated for governor as his term ended. Presidents have often sought to
install friendly governors, as they are the only politicians outside the central bureaucracy
who have significant political power, but sending out such number of cabinet secretaries
had no precedent in the 1950s and 1960s. Contemporary political observers understood
that Echeverrfa was trying to build a power base that would outlast his term in office
(Smith 1979, 282).
The other dangerous aspect of installing a politically weak successor was the
machination involved. Castafieda (1999, 352) writes that Echeverria had to use "all the
manipulation and art he had learned during a quarter-century at the heart of the Mexican
political system to assure the success of an inexpert candidate lacking supporters of his
own." One of those manipulations was massive spending in 1975 to build the president's
own support and at least soften opposition to the finance minister though whose coffers the
largesse passed. Total public-sector spending excluding interest (but including it makes no
material difference) increased 27 percent in real, inflation-adjusted terms, or 5 percent of
GDP, in 1975 alone, the year L6pez Portillo was nominated. In fact, if Social Security is
excluded - except for investment, its spending is largely distributed according to formulas
- all major categories rose 30 percent or more: federal government, state-owned
enterprises, and revenue-sharing to states and thus governors.' 30 Spending of the Federal
Electricity Commission, L6pez Portillo's domain before he passed to Finance and oddly
put under Finance control, increased 65 percent in real terms, or 1 percent of GDP.13 1
Mufioz Ledo, as labor secretary, did not fail to notice L6pez Portillo's generosity:
Echeverrfa committed the worst possible mistake, the great historical error of Mexico, in naming the
finance secretary as his successor - a man who didn't know anything about economics and had to
hand out lots of money to be liked by the workers and the campesinos. He formed a Workers Bank,
129 Likewise, Camp 1976, 54-55, footnote 10, says Moya had stronger support from grupos; Rosa Luz
Alegrfa, L6pez Portillo's subsequent lover, quoted in Castafieda 1999, 368, also says he had no grupo; Smith
1979, 288 says the same; Bracamontes thinks Moya "possibly had most support." No source suggests a
contradictory account.
130 Calculated from same data as used in Table 3-3.
13' Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) spending from Salinas 1992 (Cuarto hiforme, clasificacidn
sectoral), 172-77. Echeverrfa himself says he put CFE under Finance (Castafieda 1999, 82) - surely to
promote his candidate; it was under State Industries in other administrations.
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and supported me [raising wages via the Minimum Salary Commission]. But what did L6pez Portillo
do? He said to his boss: "Luis, you don't need to raise taxes. You don't need to reduce spending. The
world is full of money. It's showering us with money."
Alejo believes that Echeverria made some attempt to slow the pace of L6pez
Portillo's spending, and, indeed, the finance secretary was hardly so inexperienced a
politician as not to use the tool himself:
[Public Works Secretary] Luis Enrique Bracamontes and [Water Resources Secretary] Leandro
Robirosa Wade were two of the most respected engineers in Mexico, great builders, extremely
capable. They were close friends of the president since youth, like L6pez Portillo, and capable of
paving over the whole national territory - if you let them! So on one occasion - I am sure of this - the
president called those two pharaohs [as they were called] and L6pez Portillo, sat them down at the
table with me and said, 'Sefior Finance Secretary, the director of the Bank of Mexico tells me that our
expenditures are spilling over the edges. Sefior Secretary, I order you to stop them. Stop them!' Then
L6pez Portillo said, 'Sefior, in fact, we are entering a real danger zone, as I have said various times.'
'Yes, Sehior secretary, but I tell you to stop them. Stop them this very day!"
Perhaps, another cabinet secretary suggested, Echeverria told his friend L6pez
Portillo to stop spending and winked at him behind Alejo's back, because even if the
finance secretary surely oversaw or let pass plenty of spending on his own, Echeverrfa
himself was the biggest spender of them all. When he appointed Mario Ram6n Beteta as
the third finance secretary in his administration - one who unlike L6pez Portillo had
worked his way up through Finance and learned its fiscally conservative ethic - he said
devaluation had to be avoided. Beteta recalls:
I said to him, "In Mexico we are used to obeying the orders of the President of the Republic, and if
you name me, I will accept the post, but I ask you several hours - several hours! - to explain the
situation. I think that we are already in danger of a devaluation, and there would have to be an
important cut in public spending if we want to save the situation. And I will say to you, that you are
not the type of person inclined to cut public spending." He gave me those hours, and I explained my
viewpoint, but he didn't give it much importance, he didn't really think there could be a devaluation.
He continued insisting in more spending. He had a part of the budget directly under him, at his
discretion, providing resources for this and that, with an authentic social concern, without the slightest
bit of corruption. But he kept spending in a disorderly way. When I learned about the spending, as
finance secretary, I held it back. He knew I was going to, so he went around me, using his own
resources in the presidential office.
The deluge of money benefited the president as well as the finance secretary.
Echeverra, says Alejo, approached the end of his administration with "enormous political
force," enough to pick practically whomever he wanted as his successor. Victor Bravo:
Don Luis [Echeverria] was so strong at that time that he didn't even need the consensus of the
National Executive Committee of the PRI. It was enough that one of the three corporate sectors
should speak in support of the candidate and everyone else would say the same. Jesus Reyes Heroles
was the president of the party, and he was the last one to learn [who the winning candidate would be].
There was no meeting of the executive committee, nothing.
The way Echeverria threatened vague change amidst a climate of ideological
escalation, installed a cabinet of unknowns, prematurely sidelined his own generation of
officials who expected to enter, turned a once orderly administrative process upside down,
dismissed officials at an unprecedented pace, installed a finance secretary who knew
nothing of finance, manipulated the system to install that same vassal as his successor, and
spent massively to do so, had serious repercussions. As elites began to lose confidence
about what to expect next, the stakes in conflicts over policy and succession would rise.
Despite making some efforts to repair the old system of elite cooperation - but making
others that only worked against it - L6pez Portillo, de la Madrid, and Salinas, each in
different ways, would continue to erode it.
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Chapter 7
Elite Struggle
Increasingly after 1970, elite struggle permeated the Mexican political system, as policy
disputes merged into conflicts over political succession, succession conflicts became
virulent, and grupos came to fear for their survival. The problem resulted partly from
presidents' individual obsessions and errors, partly from the accumulation of struggle from
administration to administration. Presidents' obsessions and errors had begun with
Echeverrfa. With his anxiety to promote change, he intensified ideological escalation and
thus grupos' fear of political exile; he sought to extend his grip on power behind the scenes
after his constitutional term; and he relentlessly fired and replaced officials to achieve both
ends. Next, President Jos6 L6pez Portillo would almost deliberately promote cabinet
conflict, relishing debates between "thesis" and "antithesis" so he could, as he put it, forge
a "synthesis" - and would not infrequently end up dismissing losers, left and right. Finally,
President Miguel de la Madrid would worry more about imposing the Washington
Consensus on Mexico - not just moving toward a more liberal economy but categorically
installing free-market policies - than about the fracture of the political elite that, it became
increasingly evident, his tactics to secure his economic program were provoking.
Struggle also was cumulative. Once officials saw that losers in policy debates and
succession conflicts were ousted, they feared being ousted themselves and intensified their
efforts to win; opponents could only escalate the conflict by retaliating in kind. To build
tacit support for their presidential candidate, grupos surreptitiously deployed public
spending, manipulated the economy, and deceived the president. The president ignored
these transgressions because the more inflated the economy as the destape approached, the
less likely this dangerous succession struggle was to explode, damaging the political
system - and the harder time dissident elites would have mobilizing opposition against his
preferred successor. The day the new dauphin was appointed, all the party luminaries,
especially his former rivals, were obliged to congratulate him in the traditional cargada, or
cavalry charge. Now, any grupo that split off would be a mere collection of bad losers
facing a united front. The inflated economy might wind up in crisis - it always did - but, at
least, the political system held.
The great organizer
Far from being another Echeverria who sought to shake up the system, L6pez Portillo -
like de la Madrid and Salinas after him - sought in some real measure to restore political
and economic order, as he saw them. The different ways they each failed suggests that
success would not have been easy. When L6pez Portillo took office in 1976, it looked as if
he might relegate the acrimony of Echeverria's presidency to a disagreeable hiatus. Ex-
presidents Alemain and Diaz Ordaz welcomed the new president's inaugural address
extending an olive branch to all sides. Where Echeverrfa had sidelined his own generation
of the political elite, born in the 1920s - a generation that by conventional rights expected
to move into power with him - and had favored a younger generation born in the 1930s,
L6pez Portillo brought the older generation back into high posts (Camp 1980, 50). The
new president reached out to diverse grupos, says Peter Smith in his study of the political
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elite, expressing "the continuity and harmony of postrevolutionary politics" (1979, 303).
For example, Jesis Reyes Heroles, who during his long political career had been an
advisor to President Ruiz Cortines and Pemex director under Dfaz Ordaz, was appointed as
the all-important interior secretary.
L6pez Portillo likewise mended bridges with business and the middle class, whom
Echeverra's aggressive rhetoric and economic debacle had finally infuriated (Newell and
Rubio 1984, 201; Teichman 1988, 114). The private-sector spokesman Juan Sainchez
Navarro, head of the Grupo Modelo, welcomed the new president's inaugural address
criticizing Echeverria and proposing "much more liberal positions with great success." The
administration immediately signed an "Alliance for Production" with private sector groups,
committing both sides to increased investment (Newell and Rubio 1984, 205), and capital
began returning to Mexico (Smith 1979, 312). L6pez Portillo promised to stop printing
money to cover deficits (Buffie 1990, 431) or treating a fixed exchange rate as a fetish
(Newell and Rubio 1984, 216).
The president's conciliatory attitude extended as well to the left and Echeverria's
allies. An electoral reform four months into the administration legalized the Mexican
Communist Party and Socialist Workers Party (Newell and Rubio 1984, 206), introducing
proportional representation to help opposition candidates get elected to the Chamber of
Deputies (Aguayo 2000, 243). Of course, the new rules posed no challenge to the PRI, but
they did promise employment for dissenters. The left achieved real political influence
through another channel: its representatives within the cabinet, particularly Carlos Tello as
secretary of the powerful new Ministry of Planning and Budget and Jos6 Andres de Oteyza
as secretary of State Industries. L6pez Portillo even found room for echeverristas, his ex-
rivals close to Echeverria: former Labor Secretary Muiioz Ledo became education
secretary; former Agrarian Reform Secretary G6mez Villanueva became leader of the
Chamber of Deputies; and former Secretary of the Presidency Cervantes del Rio became
director general of the Federal Electricity Commission (the position that had launched
L6pez Portillo's own meteoric rise.)
L6pez Portillo was almost obsessed with order. He had focused on administrative
reform as undersecretary of presidency under Diaz Ordaz (Mufioz Ledo) and would now
put his thinking to work, proclaiming that "a severe effort of organization, order,
coordination, and planning must distinguish this term" (Carrillo Castro 1981, 503). Julio
Rodolfo Moctezuma, director of the PRI's research institute during the campaign, recalls
that "we thought about public administration reform during numerous, long meetings after
the election. It preoccupied L6pez Portillo; it was lodged in his mind. He wanted a great
scheme of government, a matrix that would give him all the elements to manage."
The great organizer divided government into sectoral cabinets such as economic,
agricultural, and national security cabinets, with a view to maintaining a vision for each
unified sector. But since its establishment in 1976, "the economic cabinet has been where
decisions were made," according to Fernando Solana, who held four cabinet-secretary
posts inside and outside of that inner circle: "If you're not in the economic cabinet, you
don't count. Other secretaries are the president's operatives. If you're a good operative,
you can manage a ministry - Education or Environment. But if decisions don't come from
the economic cabinet, they don't have power." The economic cabinet included the
secretaries of Finance, State Industries, Commerce, Labor, Interior (the principal political
ministry), and the new Ministry of Planning and Budget. Other members were the director
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general of the Bank of Mexico and Rafael Izquierdo, a L6pez Portillo advisor who had
served under Ortiz Mena.132 The new Ministry of Planning and Budget - a strengthened,
renamed Ministry of Presidency - was L6pez Portillo's attempt to resolve once and for all
the old ambiguities in the 1958 administrative reform giving Finance authority over
spending but Presidency authority over investment (Carrillo Castro 1981, 508). It was to
do just what its name said: establish economic plans and supervise public-sector budgets,
both capital and current spending. Finance would just collect revenue.
Of course, the only real power even members of the economic cabinet had was
persuasion. Jos6 Ram6n L6pez Portillo, the president's son and undersecretary of Planning
and Budget, wrote: "It was the exclusive prerogative of the president to decide on
economic policy matters" (L6pez Portillo Romano' 33 1994, 89; likewise Moctezuma,
Tello, and Solana). Miguel de la Madrid, planning and budget secretary after 1979, noted
that the president liked to hear differences aired "so he could arrive at a synthesis." L6pez
Portillo envisioned himself, as he was fond of saying, the "balance point of the scale,"
weighing contending views and discovering the right equilibrium for the nation.
Waves of dismissals
Dismissals resulting partly from tensions already injected into the political system by
Echeverria, partly from L6pez Portillo's formalistic administrative notions, untethered to
important aspects of Mexican politics, would undermine political equilibrium, instill
grupos with fear of losing the presidential succession, and aggravate struggle.
The first wave of dismissals were the echeverristas. Though they had been
appointed as a conciliatory gesture, Echeverria began to use them to establish a rival power
base, or, at least, so Interior Secretary Reyes Heroles persuaded L6pez Portillo, providing
evidence such as secretly recorded phone calls (Castaiheda 1999, 380-82). L6pez Portillo
solved the problem by purging the echeverristas (Langston 1995, 269). "The usual
accusations and calumnies were trotted out" says G6mez Villanueva, who lost his post as
president of the Chamber of Deputies and was dispatched as ambassador to Italy, while his
prot6g6 Fel61ix Barra was charged with fraud (G6mez Villanueva). Mufioz Ledo was soon
expelled from the Education Ministry, and Carlos Sansores P6rez, who had been installed
as president of the PRI at Echeverria's behest, correctly predicted that he would soon go
too (Castaileda 1999, 381). The former president himself was trundled off as ambassador
to UNESCO in Paris, and then, to put him quite sufficiently out of the way, Australia. How
serious Echeverria's plot to retain power may have been, and especially whether G6mez
Villanueva or Mufioz Ledo had anything to do with it, remains somewhat uncertain
because Reyes Heroles had long nourished an antagonism toward them all; it seems he had
fought with Echeverrfa over a girl in high school (Castafieda 1999, 117, 119). But one
point was clear: L6pez Portillo would follow Echeverria's example for resolving conflicts:
132 Oteyza and Ojeda in interviews gave the same list, but Ojeda omitted Izquierdo. L6pez Portillo Romano
(1994, 92) gives the same list but omits Interior. In his interview Tello mentioned repeated disagreements
with the interior secretary in economic cabinet meetings.
133 His full name is Jos6 Ram6n L6pez Portillo Romano. In the text I refer to him as Jos6 Ram6n L6pez
Portillo, the name he usually goes by, but in the footnotes I use L6pez Portillo Romano, his patronymic and
two maternal names, that is, his full "last" name. (The president's full name is Jos6 L6pez Portillo y Pacheco:
upper-class Mexicans often have long names.)
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if it was Reyes Heroles versus the echeverristas, one side was going to go, and in 1977 that
side was the echeverristas.
The ideological escalation that had been building since Echeverria's term now
erupted in a "feud among factions," says Su irez Mier (likewise Alejo, Oteyza, Moctezuma,
and de la Madrid). First came the clash between Finance Secretary Moctezuma and
Planning and Budget Secretary Tello. The usual story is that it concerned the size of the
budget deficit (Bailey 1988, 45): Moctezuma wanted to honor the IMF agreement signed
after the 1976 crisis, restricting public spending, since inflation was still running high;
Tello argued for abandoning the agreement and spending more to revive investment. The
story is not false but is a caricature. Tello advocated greater "economic independence"
from the global economy and a stronger state role in directing industry and agriculture
toward national purposes, for example, satisfying basic consumption rather than luxury
goods, achieving self-sufficiency in food, and promoting critical capital-goods industries
(Cordera and Tello 1981a, 59-66). However, neither official was blind to his opponent's
thinking. As director of public investment in Presidency under Dfaz Ordaz - the antecedent
of the ministry that Tello now headed - Moctezuma had overseen a vast range of state
projects, from steel mills to chemical plants, irrigation systems to schools. Conversely,
Tello was hardly naive about the danger of deficits. He insistently and repeatedly criticized
Echeverri'a's spending as not supported by adequate revenue (1979, 37, 56-57, 61, 199-
202) and warned the current administration about the same problem well before the crisis,
noting three challenges that it must "inescapably confront":
In the first place, its own fiscal crisis, which will tend to widen to the extent that it stimulates the
economy through public spending without substantive measures to finance that spending. Sooner or
later. . . an expansionist state with financial 'clay feet' will undermine basic economic equilibrium.
(Cordera and Tello 1981a, 115; similarly Cordera and Tello 1981b, 60, from a November 1980 talk)
L6pez Portillo wanted to split the difference between Tello's and Moctezuma's
budget proposals, but Tello told him, "You promised me I would be secretary of the
budget. Now you've set the line that I have to abide by Finance's commitments. That is not
what you offered. I'm out." L6pez Portillo tried to persuade him to stay: "If you go, I have
to take Moctezuma out," his idea being to maintain the famous balance of the scale.
"That's your problem," said Tello. He resigned, in effect forcing Moctezuma to as well. 134
This mutual knock-out was not simply a matter of ideological disagreement but of
underlying struggle: a belief that one great faction stood to win all and its opponent to lose
all. After leaving office, Tello wrote Mexico: The Dispute for the Nation depicting a
contest between "nationalists" such as himself and "neoliberals," presumably including
Moctezuma. Tello has a tendency to talk abstractly and avoid naming names; one is not
sure if Moctezuma is a card-carrying member of the neoliberal tribe, or if it is some ideal
category that overlaps in certain respects with the real Moctezuma. In any event, Tello
wrote that Mexico had arrived at a "unique, strategic defining moment, which no one can
escape" (Cordera and Tello 1981a, 14). That is, fundamental change was coming, one way
or another, and only its direction was up for dispute. In the face of inevitabic change,
opposing sides sought "to openly win social consensus and, above all, hegemony in state
management" (Cordera and Tello 198 la, 9). Winning hegemony is not compatible with
mutual political survival. It was a struggle in which losing factions could expect exile.
134 The quotes in this paragraph are from Carrillo Gamboa. He is a friend of Carlos Tello and was director
general of Tel6fonos de M6xico (Telmex). De la Madrid said that L6pez Portillo fired both secretaries
precisely to maintain the balance point of the scale (lafiel de la balanza).
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If the atmosphere of ideological escalation contributed to the Tello-Moctezuma
struggle, L6pez Portillo's administrative thinking, overly formalistic and short on common
sense, did also. "He is a man of great culture and vision, and at the same time playful like a
good intellectual," says Javier Alejo. "So a nutty idea occurred to him": one ministry,
Finance, should collect revenue, and another, Planning and Budget, should spend it. L6pez
Portillo had Tello design the new Finance Ministry and Moctezuma design Planning and
Budget, but when the moment came to appoint secretaries, in his playful matter, he
switched them. "That strategy generated enormous conflict, one that L6pez Portillo himself
created," says Alejo. "He got in the middle of a screaming match and had to fire both." He
also moved Commerce Secretary Fernando Solana to the Education Ministry. Thus, with
the anti-echeverrista campaign still underway, L6pez Portillo expelled three of the four
principal economic secretaries (the fourth was Oteyza' 35 in State Industries).
Now another idea occurred to the president: instead of putting the more leftist
official in Planning and Budget to spend money and the more conservative in Finance to
collect it, the scale would stay in better balance if he inverted roles (L6pez Portillo
Romano 1994, 124; Oteyza). He named David Ibarra, a moderate leftist with long
experience in the activist U.N. Economic Commission on Latin America, as finance
secretary to collect money, and Ricardo Garcia Saiinz, an economic conservative, as
planning and budget secretary to spend it.' 36 Flores de la Pefia quipped, "Now Pepe [a
nickname for Jos6] has put the nuns in the bordello and the whores in the convent" (Mufioz
Ledo). The scheme made a certain sense, but the new planning and budget secretary
proved incompetent.'137 L6pez Portillo charged him, on appointment, with two key
responsibilities: control spending and negotiate a Global Development Plan to harmonize
economic policy. A year later, Garcia Saiinz had produced no plan and, as Labor Secretary
Pedro Ojeda says, "The spenders were eating him up." So on May 15, 1979, he was fired.
L6pez Portillo made that day into a political massacre, also dismissing Interior
Secretary Reyes Heroles - having gotten himself in trouble, he suffered the same fate he
had contrived for the echeverristas - and the foreign secretary. According to Latin
American Political Report (Grayson 1984, 173), it was "one of the most dramatic political
changes" since President Lizaro Cirdenas had exiled his predecessor, the strongman
Plutarco Elfas Calles. In 1979 turnover among high officials (subsecretaries, director
generals, and directors) was 58 percent in Planning and Budget, 50 percent in Interior, and
45 percent in Foreign Relations (the only area of government with a civil service), two to
three times the rate of ministries that did not lose their secretaries (Bailey 1988, 78).
The unwritten rules were not designed to withstand high-profile expulsions of high
officials and grupos early in the administration. The prominence and number of secretaries
expelled by L6pez Portillo could only aggravate realistic fears about what losing the
succession would mean, and thus increase grupos' incentives to win at all costs.
Fear of expulsion even helped motivate a project to build cooperation. The next
official to head Planning and Budget was Miguel de la Madrid, a moderate ec.onomic
conservative who had been finance undersecretary. L6pez Portillo told him, as he had
Garcia Sainz: "You have two assignments: First, control spending, keep it in check. And
second, get me my Global Development Plan" (Ojeda). "The Global Development Plan
135 His full name is Jos6 Andr6s de Oteyza but he can equally be referred to as Oteyza or de Oteyza.
136 Garcia SAinz is universally considered an economic conservative. On Ibarra's ideology, see footnote 140.
137 Interviews with Ojeda, Alejo, SuArez Mier; Grayson 1984, 173.
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was President L6pez Portillo's great dream," agrees de la Madrid. "Neither Carlos Tello
nor Ricardo Garcia Saiinz had managed to fashion one. When they gave him drafts, he
would say, 'But they aren't negotiated!' I think not negotiating was in good part why they
failed. So I dedicated myself to negotiating with all the cabinet secretaries, principally
Finance and State Industries - Oteyza had enormous influence with L6pez Portillo, no? -
but I negotiated his part with each secretary." He succeeded in presenting the plan in May
1980, and according to Jos6 Ram6n L6pez Portillo (whom de la Madrid had in his politic
fashion named as one of his subsecretaries), the plan was "implemented" in 1981 (L6pez
Portillo Romano 1994, 153). In fact, says Suirez Mier, "at the end of the presentation and
big brouhaha, it went into bureaucrats' desks" (likewise Romero Kolbeck). But having
hardly affected economic policy does not mean that it had not succeeded. At the start, de la
Madrid had told his team that if their work went well, it would open greater vistas to them,
meaning the presidential candidacy, but "if it goes badly, we will be thrown out"
(Castafieda 1999, 165) - as Tello and Garcia Siinz had been. The team worked to negotiate
the Global Plan not only out of hope for success but also fear for failure.
Political struggle and capital flight
The next major outbreak of elite struggle - the economic cabinet's gambit to protect itself
from the Pemex director by expelling him from politics - had the effect of undermining
private-sector confidence in policymaking, provoking capital flight, and directly
contributing to the 1982 crisis.
Like all other debtor nations, Mexico faced an external economic shock as the
Federal Reserve raised interest rates from 5 or 6 percent in the mid-1970s to 10 or 12
percent in 1979-80, then almost 15 percent in 1981.1 38But most economists, across a broad
range of perspectives, see Mexico's problems in 1981-82 as primarily internal.'139 Given its
resources, Mexico did not have to wind up in a crisis, certainly nowhere near so bad a
crisis. Between the period just before the crisis, 1979-81, and the period just after, 1982-
84, the real purchasing power of its exports increased 11 percent per year (Diaz Alejandro
1987, 21). No other Latin American nation was remotely as fortunate (Brazil came closest
with 4 percent annual growth), and many suffered declines of 10 percent a year (ibid.).
Mexico's oil exports rose from $10.4 billion dollars in 1980 to $14.6 billion in 1981,
almost a 50 percent increase, and then further to $16.5 billion in 1982 (Cirdenas 1996,
142). They did not really plummet until 1986, four years later. Some nations such as Korea
and Thailand that, unlike Mexico, suffered severe shocks (they imported oil) were
nevertheless able to avoid crisis (Rodrik 1999, 78).
In particular, capital flight forced Mexico into crisis, reaching $12 billion dollars in
1981 alone, three times the trade deficit (Lustig 1998, 23; similarly Buffie 1990, 441). The
problem was not panic spilling over form other nations: Mexico's crisis was the first.
Rather, the government triggered capital flight by running massive deficits, postponing
devaluation (though the finance minister and Bank of Mexico director repeatedly urged it),
138Economic Report of the President, 1995, Table B 72. The interest rates refer to commercial paper, but the
increases are about the same in all categories.
"
39Lustig 1998, 26, 233. She cites economists including Guillermo Ortiz, Carlos biazdresch, and Rudiger
Dornbusch (conservative to mainstream), as well as Jaime Ros and Lance Taylor (progressive).
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and irrationally demanding that its petroleum customers pay more than the world price, a
performance that cost it not only a billion dollars but, far worse, private-sector confidence.
Struggle over presidential succession was the source of these problems. Pemex
Director Jorge Diaz Serrano, a friend of the president, was so flagrantly angling to be his
successor that, even if the economic cabinet might have been in an ideological dispute for
the nation, it could unite in wanting his scalp. It saw his extravagant spending as promoting
waste and corruption (Oteyza; de la Madrid; Castafieda 1999, 187-88; Teichman 1988,
106-7), in addition, of course, to providing resources for his presidential ambitions. He was
importing production machinery that, with a more moderate rate of expansion, could
perfectly well have been made in Mexico; he even imported the Pemex office tower in
Mexico City, module by module, from the United States (Oteyza). He disdaned to call
required meetings of Pemex's administrative council - prominently including Jos6 Andr6s
de Oteyza (council president), Miguel de la Madrid, David Ibarra, and Commerce
Secretary Jorge de la Vega Domfnguez - instead asking the president personally to
approve key decisions. These same officials also happened to be Dfaz Serrano's rivals for
the presidency, except Oteyza, ineligible because his parents were Spanish. 140 "We were
fighting with him all day long," says Oteyza (likewise de la Madrid; L6pez Portillo quoted
by Castafieda 1999, 126).
A dip in world oil prices in May 1981 gave the economic cabinet its chance.
Without consultation, as usual, Diaz Serrano got L6pez Portillo's approval' 4 ' and
announced that Mexico would lower its oil prices $4 dollars a barrel. Oteyza relates the
upshot:
Dfaz Serrano was seen as a serious presidential contender, so everyone wanted to get rid of him.
When he took the step of lowering petroleum prices without notifying us - any of us - we were going
to cut his head off. The dispute was not over prices, but over the way he made the decision without
consultation. I went to protest it to the president, so he called a meeting and said, "Okay, we're going
to debate the matter." When the economic cabinet had gathered, I put a newspaper in front of the
President that said, "Mexico Reduces Oil Prices $4 Dollars" and banged on the table: "What's the
point of the meeting if the prices are already lowered?" The president was extremely angry, but.
actually, I think L6pez Portillo was the one who really wanted to knock Dfaz Serrano out of the game.
Dfaz Serrano was very pro-Yankee, a big friend of [then Vice President George] Bush, and I don't
think L6pez Portillo ever liked the Americans. So the president cut off his head with the pretext that
he hadn't submitted a major decision to the administrative council or the economic cabinet.
Again the environment of elite struggle thus promoted more struggle: the president and
cabinet seemed to accept without demur that if one made a bid for power that went awry,
the penalty was political exile. The only remedy for Diaz Serrano's hubris that anyone
seems to have conceived was to "cut off his head."
Having dispatched Dfaz Serrano on June 3, 1981 (Teichman 1988, 108), the cabinet
raised oil prices $2 dollars a barrel as justification. In an address to Congress, Oteyza
warned Mexico's clients that "a barrel lost by them today, may be lost forever" (Grayson
1984, 177). At the upcoming North-South Conference, President L6pez Portillo prepared
to sing the praises of primary products and rail at the "monsters of the north" (Castafieda
1999, 126). Strangely, many of Mexico's oil customers did not understand why they
140 It is sometimes said that one parent was Spanish, but both were (Oteyza).
14'~ There is some question whether L6pez Portillo approved. Ojeda says he did, as does Bailey 1988, 51-52,
and Grayson 1984, 177, infers that he did. L6pez Portillo himself claims he only approved the increase
pending a discussion in the economic cabinet (L6pez Portillo Romano 1994, 161).
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should pay above world prices, so Mexico lost revenue estimated at between one billion
(Grayson 1984, 178) and several billion dollars (Teichman 1988, 108).
The monetary loss was not the real disaster. By August Mexico lowered its price
and regained sales, and, as mentioned, in the end total oil export revenue rose from about
$10 billion dollars in 1980 to $15 billion in 1981. The real cost of the oil-price fiasco was
the private sector's conclusion that chaos prevailed within the economic cabinet. Says
Miguel Mancera, at the time subdirector of the Bank of Mexico and later its director:
A far more serious problem [than the price of petroleum] was the government's total lack of realism.
It seemed to think it could sell at whatever price it wanted. But how could it sell at $37 dollars a barrel
if others were selling at $35? The export volume fell off, and the public said, "This government is
loco. This is the way to the abysm." I think that was the turning point. A rapid deterioration began,
despite the fact that the situation should have been readily salvageable. Petroleum export was
increasing rapidly, and if the prices weren't $37 dollars, well, they still were plenty high at $35. If
there had been a little common sense, a little moderation in public spending, perhaps the 1982 crisis
wouldn't have occurred.
Officials across the ideological spectrum agree that June 1981 was the moment of
disaster. Planning and Budget Undersecretary Jos6 Ram6n L6pez Portillo, on the left, says
that "relative optimism prevailed into mid 1981.... The private sector forecast it would be
a very positive year," but after the oil-price fiasco, "suddenly, the universal impression of
success... was shattered" (1994, 158, 161).142 Ernesto Zedillo, a Bank of Mexico official
and subsequently president of Mexico: "The possibility of an exchange-rage devaluation
still looked somewhat academic just before the 'oil price affair.' Such a possibility became
an open threat by mid-June, however, leading to a tremendous capital flight" (1985,
313). 143 While good business relations had kept capital in Mexico - some was actually
repatriated in 1980 (Lustig 1998, 23) - in June 1981 capital flight "assumed tremendous
proportions," says Buffie (1990, 442). It became "rampant" says Lustig (1998, 27).
Mexican policymakers are often excused (Lustig 1998, 21) - and excuse
themselves (Oteyza, Ojeda) - as having made an understandable error, supposing with
everyone else that oil prices would continue rising. De la Madrid: "We were all wrong, but
so was the rest of the world" (L6pez Portillo Romano 1994, 163-64). The rest of the world
was not wrong in the same way that the Mexican economic cabinet was wrong. True, many
energy experts predicted that oil prices would keep rising, but it is one thing to err in a
medium-range prediction, quite another to demand that customers pay more today than the
going price. Indeed, the problem was precisely that the rest of the world considered that the
economic cabinet was not only wrong but so wrong as to appear crazy.
Political Struggle and public spending
Just because the economic cabinet opposed Dfaz Serrano's massive spending does not
mean that other members would not spend and disguise spending to win the presidency.
An important part of the problem, on top of the oil price affair, was that the budget deficit
went out of control, from a troublesome 7 percent of GDP in 1980 to a catastrophic 14
42 Oteyza, also on the left, concurs that the oil-pricing episode was when the economic situation became
"really grave."
143 Romero Kolbeck; Teichman 1988, 113-14; and Bazdresch and Levy 1991, 249, 251, also consider the oil-
price episode as critical turning point.
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percent of GDP in 1981 (Lustig 1998, 22; Buffie 1990, 435; Zedillo 1985, 311). 4'" The
rising deficit, along with the oil-price fiasco, is why economists concur that Mexico's
economic situation remained salvageable through 1980 and that the crisis was made in
1981 (Lustig 1998, 24; Zedillo 1985, 313; Buffie 1990,446). As Francisco Gil Dfaz,
Mexico's current finance secretary, writes, "Everything fell apart in 1981" (1984, 351).
The deficit resulted not primarily from declining revenue, which was constant as a
portion of GDP, but from expenditures' increasing by 6 or 7 percent of GDP (Zedillo 1985,
313; Buffie 1990, 442). Moreover, the spending drove a foreign borrowing spree (Buffie
1990, 437; Zedillo 1985, 310). The symbol of Mexico City - the image movie directors
flash to so that audiences know action takes place there - is the Angel of Independence,
standing over a grassy circle on Paseo de la Reforma. In 1981 Angel Gurri'a, director of
external borrowing in Finance, dubbed himself the Angel of Dependence, as he trotted
from one First World bank to another borrowing $20 billion dollars (Suirez Mier).
Mexico's external debt, 31 percent of GDP and considered reasonable in 1980 (Zedillo
1985, 306, 308; Lustig 1998, 21), surged to 39 percent of GDP in 1981 (Zedillo 1985, 306;
Buffie 1990, 440, shows a smaller increase). Worse, short-term debt, which must be
continually renewed to avoid economic crisis, mushroomed from a comfortable $1.5
billion dollars at the end of 1980 (a month of oil exports) to a perilous $10.8 billion by the
end of 1981 (Zedillo 1985, 314).
This spending did not result from some grave misconception about how economies
work. No one in the economic cabinet, left, right, or center, disagreed in principle that the
deficit was serious and had to be controlled, or at least no one says so now (de la Madrid;
Ibarra; Oteyza; Ojeda; L6pez Portillo from L6pez Portillo Romano 1994, 160). As
mentioned, L6pez Portillo had enjoined de la Madrid to contain spending. The 1981 budget
theoretically allowed no increases even to compensate for inflation, running at almost 30
percent (Zedillo 1985, 312, Buffie 1990, 442), an injunction that would have meant
substantial real cuts if heeded. The president insisted that the approved 1981 budget should
be "strictly observed" and follow the established timetable (L6pez Portillo Romano 1994,
160) - that the practice of cramming spending into the beginning of the year to build
political support before the destape should be avoided. Again in June L6pez Portillo
decreed an across-the-board 4 percent cut - now 4 percent below increases he had already
approved (Zedillo 1985, 313; Buffie 1990, 442; L6pez Portillo Romano 1994, 165). 14 5
Despite these proclamations, fears swirling around the contest for presidential
nomination boosted spending dramatically in 1981. L6pez Portillo personally approved
large expenditures on the run (Zedillo 1985, 312; de la Madrid; Oteyza). Planning and
Budget is said to have let public enterprises spend half their entire allotments by the end of
the first quarter (L6pez Portillo Romano 1994, 169), in effect a down payment on the
144 A better way to calculate deficits in an inflationary economy shows an even larger jump. Inflation erodes
the principal remaining on public debt (higher interest payments, adjusted upward for inflation, implicitly
pay that principal). A adjustment taking this phenomenon into account thus shows the state as paying off its
debt faster than unadjusted figures given in the text. By the adjusted method, the real public-sector deficit
was 3.7 percent in 1980, not a grave problem, and 13.76 percent in 1981 - disaster level (Gil Diaz 1984,
Table A-5).
145 Ojeda says that after the oil-price fiasco the president gave instructions that budgets should be cut 10
percent. Romero Kolbeck, director of the Bank of Mexico, doubts that there was any agreement to cut
spending: "I wish there had been." He says further that de la Madrid said nothing whatsoever about spending
or the exchange rate.
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nomination. Even de la Madrid's supporters concede that he bears substantial
responsibility for the spending. Manuel Sudrez Mier, a long-time Bank of Mexico official
and economics professor at the Technological Institute of Mexico, says: "De la Madrid
wanted to be president, so from June 1981 until his destape in September, he sort of kept
his mouth shut. And he was in a sense right because if he had been too critical, the
nomination would have gone to Ibarra or Tello"' 46 - who, Suairez believes, would have
been worse for Mexico in the long run. In short, though one could spend exorbitantly and
lose, as Diaz Serrano demonstrated, no one was going to win without spending. Jos6
Ram6n L6pez Portillo, says: "The political race, in a 'political year', and the resulting
anxiety among all [grnpos] to avoid affecting their respective clienteles... contributed to
the loosening of budgetary restraint" (1994, 160).
As late as August, relying on pre-oil-fiasco data from April, though July data were
available, Planning and Budget estimated a deficit of 490 billion pesos, or $20 billion
dollars, but only 45 days later, after the nomination, the estimate rose by more than half, to
767 billion pesos, or $31 billion dollars (L6pez Portillo Romano 1994, 168-69).14 7
Planning and Budget's statistical director, one Carlos Salinas (Castafieda 1999, 400-1),
well knew that his career depended on his boss' presidential nomination. Immediately after
the destape, Jos6 Ram6n L6pez Portillo notes, Planning and Budget turned around and
"insisted on budget control," recommending "a drastic cut in expenditure" (L6pez Portillo
Romano 1994, 167). But it was too late: the originally planned deficit of 415 billion pesos
had more than doubled to 865 billion pesos, or $35 billion dollars (Zedillo 1985, 313).
Economic secretaries obscured the data because they feared that confrontations
with the president or each other could get them ousted. Oteyza says:
After June 1981, four months before the decision about the presidential candidate, there were many
economic cabinet meetings in which we discussed what to do. Petroleum income kept falling, we kept
contracting short-term debt, and the deficit kept rising. But clear economic information was never
available, because everyone was playing with their cards face down. On a little piece of paper de la
Madrid would say the deficit was one thing, Ibarra would say another. On a little piece of paper!
Where did the figures come from? Nobody wanted to say. Nobody wanted to get into another conflict
because they had seen what happened to Tello and Moctezuma, what had happened to Diaz Serrano.
Nobody wanted to create conflict with the president just when he was going to select the candidate.
De la Madrid said he was going to cut spending 4 percent, but really he wasn't cutting it because if he
had his political possibilities would have been affected. Ibarra didn't stop contracting debt to feed the
spending because if he failed to obtain resources, his candidacy could have been affected. The
decision was made, Miguel de la Madrid was chosen, and we finished that year with an enormous
deficit, a barbaric deficit, great pressure and great capital flight.
Struggle - fear of the fate of Tello, Moctezuma, and Dfaz Serrano - thus motivated the
withholding of data.
L6pez Portillo bluntly says he felt deceived by the data (quoted in Castafieda 1999,
142). His son notes that "at one point the president felt he was without anyone he could
trust; those around him used or concealed information and distorted analysis in order to . . .
protect their political prospects" (L6pez Portillo Romano 1994, 145). To be sure, part of
the problem was purely logistical. Even under the best of circumstances, getting accurate,
timely information on public spending was extremely difficult. It came in under different
146 Ibarra (Castafieda 1999, 407); Guillermo Barnes, a former Finance official; Camacho Solis; de la
Madrid's undersecretary Jos6 Ram6n L6pez Portillo Romano (1994, 147); and Grayson (1984, 174) agree
that he spent to build support for the nomination.
147 Exchange rates from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 2000, 698.
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rubrics, spanning different time periods, and intended for different purposes from Planning
and Budget, State Industries, Finance, the Bank of Mexico, and other agencies. As finance
secretary, sitting at his desk surrounded by data, Moctezuma would sometimes find
himself simply unable to tell what it all meant (Moctezuma). But interagency cooperation
had produced better data in the 1950s and 1960s. By the L6pez Portillo administration,
even traditional allies such as Finance and the Bank of Mexico were quarreling over
calculations (Ghigliazza). In short, conflict produced conflicting information about
spending as well as producing spending itself. L6pez Portillo, the ex-finance secretary who
had bought his presidential nomination with a 27 percent, or 5 percent of GDP, real public-
spending increase in 1975, anid had silenced Bank of Mexico budget data by banging his
fist on the table, should not have been surprised when he in turn was deceived.
Ideological polarization?
There is a view that ideological polarization caused the crisis. It is certainly true that there
were continual and powerful conflicts over economic policy. But the usual history of those
conflicts - the pitched battle it tells about between Keynesian expansionists and cautious
monetarists - is not quite right and, most important, the crisis was not caused by a victory
of leftist big spenders over fiscal conservatives.
Newell and Rubio say that conflict between "radically opposed and mutually
exclusive philosophical differences" divided the L6pez Portillo administration (1984, 208).
The right advocated freer markets, "an open economy with a pragmatically defined role for
foreign investment, indirect government intervention in the economy when necessary,...
and fiscal conservatism." The left advocated "a closed economy with strong limits to
foreign investment, direct government intervention .... and a rapid growth of subsidies,
government spending, and government-owned corporations."' 4 8 Principal leftist ministries
were Planning and Budget under Tello and State Industries under Oteyza; rightist
ministries were Finance under Moctezuma, then apparently under Ibarra; and the Bank of
Mexico under Gustavo Romero Kolbeck (Newell and Rubio 1984, 207, 209, 224). The
leftists won during the transition years of 1978-79 as "expansionism . . . once again
triumphed"; then "the years of populism" 1980-82 brought crisis (Newell and Rubio 1984,
215,220). 149 Miguel Mancera, a high Bank of Mexico official who would soon become its
director, agrees that "there was one group led by Ibarra and Romero Kolbeck, and another
- more or less the rest - led by Oteyza. The financial group advocated a certain budget
moderation, a spending level that would be less overwhelming; the others thought those
were just monetarist ideas. And Oteyza and company won the battle."
There were powerful economic disagreements in L6pez Portillo's cabinet, but it is
impossible to draw a meaningful ideological divide with left-leaning activists in State
148 Nobody can seem to agree on terms. Newell and Rubio 1984 used the loaded (not to mention awkward)
"liberal-rationalists" and "nationalist-populists" (it is good to be rational, bad to be populist); others use other
expressions. Leftist versus rightist are the simplest terms I can find - none of the terms that have been used
are very accurate anyway.
149 Centeno (1994, 187-89) and Teichman (1988, 94-95, 102) line up the same opposing teams. Although
Centeno is not trying to explain the crisis, he seems to accept Newell and Rubio's view: "those who favored
unlimited production and the expansion of the state's role in the economy dominated"; with falling oil prices
and rising interest rates, the economy "went into a tailspin " (1984, 189). Teichman does not see ideological
struggle as having caused the crisis (1988, 127).
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Industries and Planning and Budget, on the one side, and right-leaning monetarists in the
Finance Ministry and the Bank of Mexico, on the other. Any such line disappeared when
L6pez Portillo's 1977 reshuffle of Finance and Planning and Budget that put "the nuns in
the bordello and the whores in the convent." Even before that episode, neither Tello in
Planning and Budget nor Moctezuma in Finance were such neat ideological packages as
usually said. As mentioned, though Tello supported spending, he emphasized that
excessive budget deficits would destabilize the economy, and though Moctezuma was
more fiscally conservative, he had dedicated much of his career to planning not only
government investment such as in irrigation and highways but public-enterprise investment
such as in steel and chemical plants - and he continued to see such investment as important
to economic progress (interview).
The story about leftists' winning an ideological struggle really breaks down when it
comes to explaining the crisis: institutional interests proved stronger than ideology.
Finance Secretary Ibarra, a center-leftist by all accounts' 50 who had spent 15 years at the
statist U.N. Economic Commission on Latin America and opposed Mexico's entering
GATT in an intense 1979 cabinet debate (Basaifiez 1996, 180), repeatedly and insistently
warned the president to cut spending. Not only does Ibarra himself say he warned about
cutting spending; the leftist Oteyza, the conservative Jesuis Silva Herzog (later finance
secretary), and the centrist Ojeda agree.'5 No doubt Ibarra is a wise economist, but, as
well, institutional interests prompted fiscal conservatism: the more the public sector spent,
the greater the pressure on Finance to obtain loans. Conversely, Planning and Budget
Secretary de la Madrid, a center-rightist who had worked for 20 years in Finance and the
Bank of Mexico and had supported joining GATT, turned out to be the biggest spender of
all. Jos6 Ram6n L6pez Portillo, who later became estranged from his ex-boss, says de la
Madrid "proved to be flexible enough to... disguise his own economic position in order
not to endanger his political future" (L6pez Portillo Romano 1994, 147). Labeling de la
Madrid is thus a thorny problem for the ideological-divide story: Newell and Rubio (1984)
skirt the matter by not assigning him to a camp; Teichman calls him "quasi-populist"
(1988, 102); Centeno puts him "in the middle" (1994, 187). What does ideological
polarization mean if the single most powerful economic official was "in the middle"?
The problem is that ideological labels may not match political interests. "De la
Madrid thought the way we did," says Bank of Mexico Director Romero Kolbeck, "but he
had an interest in the presidency."" 5And his entire grupo had that same interest. He had
brought them all from Finance and the Bank of Mexico, both with a tradition of fiscal
conservatism, but their interests as well as his drove them toward spending and
overlooking others' spending. Surely de la Madrid did not take it on himself alone to
provide bad fiscal data. He may not even have received figures - top Planning and Budget
officials were far more interested in the presidency than in statistical accuracy - but nor did
he insist on them. Contention for the presidency was a grupo effort.
150so Thus Oteyza and Alejo characterize him; I agree based on having interviewed him and read a good deal
by him. Jos6 Ram6n L6pez Portillo, who read the notes of all economic cabinet meetings during his father's
fresidency, says Ibarra "championed economic nationalism and moderate state lead growth" (1994, 146).
5 Likewise L6pez Portillo Romano 1994, 150, and Castafieda 1999, 391-92. There is substantial debate as to
whether Ibarra's presidential ambitions were serious enough to give him much incentive to spend: Mancera is
quite certain he was serious, Camacho Solfs more doubtful.
152 Similarly Camacho Solis.
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Where the money went
Exactly who spent all the money? De la Madrid and Oteyza, a leftist who did his share,
interestingly propose the same answer. Both say they advocated that spending be cut, but it
occurred in areas they could not control: agriculture, Pemex, and Mexico City.15 3 Says de
la Madrid, "President L6pez Portillo, in all good faith, authorized that spending on the
march, and when we learned about it, it was too late to stop." Oteyza: "As best I recall, all
the principal economic cabinet secretaries shared the consensus that we had to control the
spending of Pemex, Mexico City, agriculture, and several other branches. There wasn't
debate on this matter." The answer is partly true, partly convenient, and, in any case, quite
compatible with the nomination contest's having been the problem (see Table 7-1).
With an eye on his presidential ambitions, Diaz Serrano boosted Pemex spending
36 per cent, or 1.3 percent of GDP, in 1981 (Table 7-1), 154' but how much blame he
deserves for the deficit is debatable. The government collected massive revenues from
Pemex that never went into the oil company's coffers. When gasoline cost 6 pesos per liter,
1.25 went to Pemex and 4.75 to the government; some 70 percent of petroleum export
revenues went straight to the government (Moctezuma). Julio Rodolfo Moctezuma, the
fiscal conservative who resigned as finance minister in 1977 and was appointed to replace
Dfaz Serrano in Pemex, says that the government did not leave the company adequate
resources to invest in infrastructure: "Though Pemex contracted a lot of debt, the truth is
that it was just channeled though Pemex to the public sector. It was a way for the
government to borrow." Including the taxes it paid, Pemex ran a surplus of 4.1 percent of
GDP in 1981, though that surplus had fallen sharply from 6.3 percent of GDP in 1980
(Buffie 1990, 436).
Like Dfaz Serrano, Carlos Hank Gonzailez, governor of Mexico City, was a close,
profligate ally of the president - he felt compelled to import police cars when perfectly
good cars were made in Mexico (Oteyza) - who increased spending 30 percent in 1981,
after large increases in preceding years. But that total increase was still only 0.3 percent of
GDP. There were bigger culprits.
So-called agriculture spending included just about everybody. The Mexican Food
System (SAM), a plan to achieve national self-sufficiency in food, embraced not only the
Ministry of Agriculture, concerned with commercial agribusiness, and Agrarian Reform,
concerned with peasant farming, but also the national food-distribution firm CONASUPO,
under Commerce; major state enterprises such as the fertilizer producer FERTIMEX, under
State Industries; agricultural banks such as BANRURAL, under Finance but heavily
influenced by Agrarian Reform; and indeed almost a third of all the 966 public enterprises
that existed (Fox 1992, 89-90). When L6pez Portillo presented the Mexican Food System
to his cabinet as afait accompli on March 18, 1980, just as the presidential succession
contest was getting underway, he emphasized that "we must make a team effort, leavitig
behind.., bureaucratic fiefdoms" (Fox 1992, 70). In other words, the plan had its well
placed enemies. Food self-sufficiency meant a pro-peasant strategy because corn, beans,
and other basic grains are predominantly grown by peasants. Of course, Javier Garcia
Paniagua, the new agrarian reform minister, could embrace the program. Finance Secretary
Ibarra and State Industries Secretary Oteyza saw it as an important goal (Fox 1992,72).
153 Likewise Ojeda and Gustavo Carvajal, president of the PRI.
154 All spending figures that follow, except as otherwise noted, are from the same table.
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The agriculture secretary, closer to agribusiness interests, and Miguel de la Madrid, who
considered it a rival to his Global Development Plan, opposed it (Fox 1992, 78).
L6pez Portillo's solution to this struggle among presidential contenders was to
expand the food "system" into a "vast influx of resources" for all sides, except precious
little for peasants, to buy compliance (Fox 1992, 122-23). National accounts are not
organized in rubrics that indicate which presidential contender spent how much, but "food
spending" went from 8.2 percent of GDP in 1979 to 10.8 percent in 1981 (Fox 1992, 123,
footnote 82) - half of the total GDP increase in public-sector spending during that period.
Interestingly, neither the Agrarian Reform nor Agriculture ministries themselves accounted
for much money; it was everywhere else. The food-distribution firm CONASUPO, under
Commerce Secretary - and presidential contender - Jorge de la Vega Dominguez,
increased spending 55 percent, or 0.6 percent of GDP, in 1981, after a hefty increase in
1980. Government subsidies to BANRURAL, the largest agricultural bank, nominally
under Finance Secretary - and presidential contender - David Ibarra but closely allied at
the time to Agrarian Reform Secretary - and presidential contender - Garcia Paniagua,155
increased 37 percent. Garcia Paniagua also managed to double the number of peasant
families receiving land in 1980, and double it again to 93,000 in 1981 (Fox 1992, 68).156
After distributing land, the government must pay the former owners.
Oteyza was not exactly a miser. Even after the oil-price affair, he kept demanding
"more dollars for investment" in State Industries, says Bank of Mexico Director Romero
Kolbeck.'157 Indeed, investment of the principal industrial firms, such as FERTIMEX
(fertilizers), PIPSA (paper), or AHMSA (steel), grew an astronomical 58 percent in 1980,
67 percent in 1981, and even 21 percent in 1982 when most budgets were slashed., 58
However, in absolute terms, it was not much of the total: the entire increase from 1979
through 1982 added up to less than 0.2 percent of GDP, or a third of CONASUPO's
growth in 1981 alone. All capital spending overseen by Oteyza, including the huge electric
utilities, actually shrank as a percent of GDP.' 5 9 Overall, his firms raised spending less
than average in 1981, though hardly modestly: 16 percent versus 22 percent for the public
sector (Table 7-1 and 3-3). This total increase comprised 0.3 percent of GDP in 1981, still
only half of CONASUPO's. Moreover, the one ultimately responsible for controlling state-
firm spending was de la Madrid (Ibarra). 16' If he let it go, it was partly because Oteyza,
leftist though he was, supported him and not Ibarra for the presidency (de la Madrid,
quoted in Castafieda 1999, 187). Political alliances ran stronger than ideologiai affinities.
Finance Secretary Ibarra might have spent in two big-growth areas, according to
two high officials'16 if he was serious about building support for the presidency: revenue-
155 Two high officials in off-the-record interviews.
156 An alternative tally of land area distributed to peasants suggests that the biggest increase was in 1980 (2.3
million hectares), and that almost as much again was distributed in 1981.
157 Miguel Mancera, who became Bank of Mexico director in 1982, says that "Oteyza and company" won the
spending battle.
158 Figures calculated from de la Madrid 1986, Cuarto Informe de Gobierno, table 4.21.2, p. 141, using the
consumer price index to deflate them.
159 From 1.75 percent of GDP in 1979 to 1.65 percent in 1981 and 1.51 percent in 1982. Electric utilities
spending from de la Madrid 1986, tables 4.4.2, p. 117 (CFE), and 4.5.2, p. 118 (Compafifa de Luz).
60 Planning and Budget was officially supposed to control parastatal spending; I only cite Ibarra on the point
because the government so often did not operate the way it was supposed to on paper.
161 Off-the-record comments in interviews.
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sharing with states and development-bank lending. 6 2 In 1981 the first grew 37 percent in
real terms, or 0.6 percent of GDP; the second - an enormous figure - grew 26 percent in
real terms, or 2.3 percent of GDP - more than Mexico City and Pemex spending increases
combined. Possibly, Ibarra's fiscal conservatism applied mainly to Planning and Budget's
areas. Then there was Education (23 percent, or 0.5 percent of GDP) - Secretary Fernando
Solana was a long-time ally of presidential contender de la Vega Dominguez in Commerce
- and Commerce itself (20 percent, or 0.1 percent of GDP), in addition to the much larger
sum mentioned for the food-distribution firm CONASUPO. The Labor Ministry's budget,
under presidential contender Pedro Ojeda, rose 110 percent, but in absolute terms it was
almost nothing, 0.05 percent of GDP. The large federal government investment budget, a
flexible area under Planning and Budget, grew fast (26 percent, or 0.8 percent of GDP).
The motivation of struggle
Power struggle caused politically motivated spending, but to what extent was it motivated
by ambition to win, which presumably always existed and always will, and to what extent
was it motivated by an increased fear of losing? A number of remarks point to increased
fear: De la Madrid's warning to his team that if their work went badly "we will be thrown
out"; Oteyza's remark that presidential contenders hid data, avoided conflict, and spent
because "they had seen what happened to Tello and Moctezuma, what had happened to
Diaz Serrano"; Jos6 Ram6n L6pez Portillo's view that de la Madrid disguised his real
fiscal conservatism "in order not to endanger his political future"; Tello's vision of a
coming Armageddon between neoliberals and nationalists - a vision reflected in some
other histories of the era such as Miguel Basaifiez' Stnrugglefor Hegemony in Mexico.
Aside from direct statements, fear of political exile is the most plausible way to
understand two critical facts about L6pez Portillo's presidency. The first critical fact was
the prominent and frequent expulsion of high officials and their gnrupos. The most
prominent expulsions before the destape included the echeverristas; Tello and Moctezuma:
Garcfa SAinz and the May 15, 1979. political massacre; and Dfaz Serrano. As if to confirm
the pattern, after the destape Ibarra and Romero Kolbeck were fired for little apparent
reason other than that they had lost the bureaucratic conflict - and Ibarra had lost the
presidency - and had been too critical in their insistence that L6pez Portillo curb spending
and devalue. Then when de la Madrid entered the presidency, he confirmed fears by
expelling losers wholesale. Pedro Ojeda was the only former cabinet secretary left -
in the Ministry of Fisheries. The second critical fact about L6pez Portillo's presidency was
the unusually intense conflict among officials, a level of conflict that all sources agree on,
including those that see it as resulting from ideological polarization.
Struggle is the plausible link between those expulsions and that conflict. A grupo
has two motives to best rival grupos: ambition to advance its members' careers and fear
that rivals might end its members' careers. Fear is the more powerful motive. Many
officials might contentedly remain directors, director generals, or subsecretaries rather than
engage in high-stakes power struggle, but fear obliges them to take the offensive so their
inaction does not cede all-or-nothing victory to opponents. The situation is analogous to
Hobbes' state of nature. All are motivated by self-interest to protect their security. Only a
162 Such loans are not part of the budget but can very well increase the money supply and thus help cause
economic crisis.
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few are motivated to get more power than their security requires, but the rest are afraid of
those few. People who "otherwise would be glad to be at ease within their powers" must
instead strive to "increase their power," attacking others just to protect themselves. Since
such aggression is "necessary to a man's conservation," Hobbes says, it ought to be
"allowed." If cooperative norms of mutual survival erode, as evidenced by prominent and
frequent dismissals of losers, fear of dismissal should well be expected to increase,
promoting conflict and pushing elite competition closer to Hobbes' raw state of nature.
In the end, even President L6pez Portillo was motivated by fear - fear that amidst
the struggle between grupos over succession, the whole succession mechanism might
break down, causing untold damage to the political system and, even, to him personally.
Such fear at a minimum contributed to his decision not to devalue before the destape.
Jos6 Ram6n L6pez Portillo says that in October 1980 businessmen led by Agustin
Legorreta, director of Banamex (a private bank, not the Bank of Mexico), tried to convince
the president that economic stability depended on devaluing the peso. In the ensuing
"bitter" cabinet fight, Ibarra in Finance and Romero Kolbeck in the Bank of Mexico
advocated devaluation; de la Madrid in Planning and Budget and Ojeda in Labor proposed
a faster "crawling peg" (ongoing, smooth devaluation); and Oteyza in State Industries and
unspecified "others" opposed devaluation but privately urged the president to impose
capital controls (L6pez Portillo Romano 1994, 171-73). The outcome, neither one
approach nor the other - neither imposing controls to check capital flight nor devaluing
and cutting spending to check it - was a setup for crisis (177).
One coherent approach or the other would surely have been better than the ill-
conceived hybrid (Ros 1987, 80-81), but the history seems amiss. Ibarra does concur that
he recommended devaluing, indeed since 1977. Romero Kolbeck says that he too urged the
president to devalue starting in early 1981,163 but that de la Madrid said nothing about
matter. De la Madrid agrees that he said nothing: he favored a "smooth, planned"
devaluation, but exchange rate policy was not discussed in the economic cabinet, only
among the president, finance secretary, and Bank of Mexico director: "They didn't even
include the planning and budget secretary." Oteyza says he supported a gradual, controlled
devaluation but emphatically not capital controls: "I thought if we had to take some action,
it was better to fight with ten bankers [he agrees that he favored nationalizing the banks]
than ten million Mexicans. Capital controls were going to get us in a confrontation with ten
million Mexicans and weren't worth that cost."' •6 4 In any case, "The exchange rate was
discussed in the economic cabinet, but mainly after the PRI had selected its candidate" -
thus de la Madrid would have been absent on his campaign. "Beforehand, nobody wanted
to engage in such polemics; a devaluation could have hurt candidates' chances."
Undoubtedly, Ibarra and Romero Kolbeck had been urging the president privately
to devalue since before the destape, but, as Ojeda put it, "as always, soto voce and in
whispers." The one who would not devalue was the president. When Romero Kolbeck
persisted in advising him to devalue, L6pez Portillo said, "We are not going to, and if you
keep on this way, I will not give you any more appointments" (Romero Kolbeck). The
163 Mancera concurs, noting that the Bank of Mexico was not, and is not to this day, independent of the
•resident in setting the exchange rate.
SHe adds that Carlos Tello, still a presidential adviser, and Jorge Espinoza de los Reyes, director of the
National Development Bank, did recommend capital controls, though neither was in the economic cabinet at
the time.
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president opposed devaluation partially on general political grounds, repeatedly saying,
"The president who devalues is devalued." But, as Ojeda notes, he especially did not want
to devalue before the destape. On this critical point the president's son agrees: L6pez
Portillo "feared that a devaluation would jeopardize the process of succession in power."
Javier Garcia Paniagua's alleged bid to threaten L6pez Portillo militarily suggests
just how delicate that process was. Though he was the agrarian reform secretary, Garcia
Paniagua had formerly been director of the Federal Security Directorate, the principal
secret police agency; his father had been defense secretary; and the current defense
secretary supported his presidential candidacy. As the destape was approaching, Interior
Minister Enrique Olivares Santana took Porfirio Mufioz Ledo aside, explicitly to a spot
where possible military eavesdropping devices could not hear them, and said, "I wouldn't
want the defense secretary to present himself before the president one day and tell him,
'We want the candidate to be Javier'" (Castafieda 1999, 406). Mufioz Ledo relayed to the
president these concerns about the possibility that Garcia Paniagua might invoke military
force, and he believes he confirmed the president's decision to cut short possible trouble by
announcing the destape a month earlier than planned. In such a tense situation, the last
thing a president would want to do is devalue, curb spending, increase revenue, or take any
other measure that would produce an immediate political shock.
The economy just had to endure. After the destape was settled but before the
election, L6pez Portillo did devalue - by 40 percent in February (Buffie 1990, 433).
Despite 1982's being an election year, real public-sector spending (excluding interest) was
slashed 8 percent. L6pez Portillo decreed a 30 percent wage increase in March, mainly to
propitiate labor boss Fidel Velaizquez and the official union apparatus, who were unhappy
with the technocratic presidential candidate and functioned as an important cog in the
electoral machinery (Bailey 1988, 182). In any event, real wages rose less than 1 percent
for the year, and the minimum wage fell 11 percent.' 65 The crisis broke out in August.
L6pez Portillo had gone through four secretaries of Planning and Budget, three secretaries
of Finance, and three directors of the Bank of Mexico - in each case (considering
Presidency as the predecessor of Planning and Budget) more than filled those posts
throughout the entire period from 1952 through 1970. Pedro Ojeda says, "Each of us did
our job very well, and the result was very bad."
165 The nominal annual wage index deflated by the consumer price index, both from IMF, International
Financial Statistics CD, give 0.8 percent real growth for 1982. A lower figure, 0.1 percent real growth, is
obtained by using real manufacturing wages and benefits, INEGI 1994, table 5.12. Minimum wage in Mexico
City from ibid., table 5.2.1, deflated with the cost of living for workers in Mexico City from ibid. table 19.11.
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Chapter 8
Elite Fracture
The last chapter argued that ideological polarization - extreme and coherent left-right
battles for hegemony over policymaking - was not the fundamental problem under L6pez
Portillo, but rather that elite struggle was: escalation of political conflict because fear that
the stakes in winning or losing had risen. What would happen if ideological differences
were eliminated from the economic cabinet because all secretaries shared the same
fundamental perspective? If the real problem had been ideological polarization, there
should have been relative peace. If what had really invaded the system was a growing
belief that elite struggle had replaced elite cooperation - that if you did not build support
and push your opponent out, he was likely to build his support and push you out - then the
problem should nave continued. It did continue.
Struggle erupted despite de la Madrid's effort to restore political and economic
order, as he saw it, at the start of his administration; neither his nor L6pez Portillo's failure
to achieve these goals was a matter of simply not trying. Indeed, there was a definite aura
of restoration to the de la Madrid presidency (Hernfindez Rodriguez 1987, 34). The new
president saw the Echeverria administration as having been "disorderly, anarchic,
conflictive." As for the L6pez Portillo administration, he says:
I saw polarization: on one side expansionists, Keynesians, supposed progressives; on the other,
finance officials, conservatives, monetarists. The lesson I learned is that we wasted time trying to
resolve disagreements and arguments. Though the president said he liked the dialectic process of
confronting thesis and antithesis to derive a synthesis, I don't think it worked. The synthesis was
neither the one nor the other but halfway measures. So, in fact, I wanted a homogeneous cabinet, in
basic agreement, even if there were debates about implementation.
De la Madrid's error was to see the problem just in terms of ideological polarization.
He chose as his most important collaborators officials whose careers had begun in
what he saw as a golden age under Ortiz Mena in Finance and Rodrigo G6mez in the Bank
of Mexico (Hernaindez Rodriguez 1987, 34-35). This inner circle, individuals who had won
the president's confidence through long-term relationships with him in Finance, the Bank
of Mexico, and allied public banks and development funds, included Carlos Salinas in
Planning and Budget, Jesus Silva Herzog in Finance,' 66 Francisco Labastida in State
Industries, Bernardo Sepuilveda in Foreign Relations, Ram6n Aguirre as governor of
Mexico City, and Francisco Rojas as comptroller, a new position intended to symbolize the
administration's lemma of honesty (Hernandez Rodriguez 1987, 36). Under de la Madrid,
says Oteyza, "Finance and the Bank of Mexico took power and never let it go. Even the
agriculture minister was from the Bank of Mexico." While on average 32 percent of
cabinet officials since Alem in had come from the financial sector of government, under de
la Madrid almost twice that portion - 59 percent - did (Hernaindez Rodriguez 1987, 15).167
In a detailed study of the de la Madrid cabinet, Hernaindez Rodriguez argues that this group
shared Ortiz Mena's belief that the last two administrations' bungling was the "principal
cause" of Mexico's major political and economic problems (1987, 35).
166 For reasons I do not understand, HernAindez Rodriguez does not include Silva in the "inner circle," but his
career had paralleled de la Madrid's in Finance, and they were long-time friends (de la Madrid).
167 L6pez Portillo Romano (1994, 225) says that 13 of 18 secretaries came from the financial sector.
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Within this homogeneous economic cabinet, deliberately chosen to avert
counterproductive ideological conflict, struggle nevertheless erupted between Finance
Secretary Jestis Silva Herzog and Planning and Budget Secretary Carlos Salinas. The issue
was power: who would become economic czar within an increasingly free-market
framework, who would secure the presidential nomination, and who be ousted. It was "the
same old story," reflects Silva Herzog. Again, Planning and Budget would use spending to
build political support, and it would win; Finance would insist that spending was excessive
and disguised, and it would lose.
The economic context could hardly have been more different from that of the
L6pez Portillo administration. Then the economy had grown faster even than in the 1950s
and 1960s, and measures to avert crisis were reasonably clear: cut public expenditure to
some halfway sensible level, devalue the peso moderately, and not charge more for oil than
everyone else did. Under de la Madrid, the economy was in terrible shape, and there may
have been no good way to fix it, let alone clear understanding of what it was. Throughout
the administration, Mexico was forced to make net payments to First World creditors
averaging 6 percent of GDP per year (Lustig 1998, 55). Those payments thus amounted to
slashing investment by 6 per cent of GDP, and Mexico's historical 6 percent growth rate to
collapsed to zero.
At first de la Madrid's ticnicos (Salinas, Ph.D., Harvard; Silva Herzog, M.A., Yale;
de la Madrid himself, M.A., Harvard) thought a year or two of IMF shock therapy -
slashing budget deficits, drastically devaluing the peso, and driving down wages - would
solve Mexico's economic problems (Lustig 1998, 29). They rushed to be the IMF's star
performers, devaluing about 50 percent on taking office' 68 and slashing public-sector
deficits to the IMF target (Lustig 1998, 29, 35). The IMF said inflation would fall from 100
percent to 55 percent, but it stayed at 80 percent; the IMF said the economy would
experience zero growth, but it shrank 4 percent (Lustig 1998, 35). Real wages plunged
more than 20 percent (Lustig 1998, 40). In short, the results were disastrous.
Now the rivals' paths began to diverge. Silva Herzog traveled the world,
renegotiating external debt and being declared "finance minister of the year" by
Euromoney (Castafieda 1999, 417). However, Jorge Castafieda, today Mexico's foreign
minister, notes in his account of presidential succession in Mexico (1999, 416): "Every
foreign magazine cover where Silva Herzog appeared represented a blow, slight at first,
sharp at the end, to Miguel de la Madrid's ego."
Carlos Salinas played the president's loyal operative (L6pez Portillo Romano 1994,
297-98) and, at the same time, began to relax fiscal controls to revive the economy (Lustig
1998, 36) and build support. 169 The 1985 midterm elections (which, as always, the PRI did
not stand a chance of losing) provided a pretext, according to Silva Herzog:
I got wind that an international airport, not in the budget, was being built in Piedras Negras, Coahuila.
So I called the undersecretary of Regional Development [in Planning and Budget], Manuel Camacho
Solis: "Manuel, how can you have committed to that airport, when there isn't a single airplane that
lands in Piedras Negras?" He told me, "Sefior secretary, we had terrible political pressure from the
authorities there, and with this we've got them all on our side." At about that time 40 airports were
168 As noted in chapter 1, I am defining the exchange rate as dollars per peso; thus, a 50 percent devaluation
means that one peso is worth half as much U.S. currency. Using the more common (but confusing) definition
of pesos per dollar (as Lustig does) makes the devaluation 100 percent: twice as many pesos, or 100 percent
more pesos, equal one U.S. dollar.
169 Urquidi and Castafieda (1999, 417-18) agree that Salinas inflated spending.
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built in Mexico, some without the least justification, but all the governors wanted an international
airport. There was Toluca, with a five-kilometer runway. At the inauguration, I said to the mayor,
"Where are the planes." "They'll come." Five years later! Millions of dollars were invested in an
empty runway for five years. And Tlaxcala, an hour from Mexico City, where there still isn't a single
commercial flight. Already in 1985 we were buying political favors and support for Carlos Salinas.
By mid 1985 Mexico was badly missing IMF targets - it was supposed to run only
a 3.5 percent of GDP budget deficit, but the actual deficit was 9.6 percent of GDP - so the
IMF suspended financing, and there was another peso crisis. That was just the beginning.
Oil prices collapsed - and now they really collapsed - from an average of $25 dollars a
barrel in 1985 to $12 in 1986. Petroleum exports fell by $8.5 billion dollars in a single year
- a quarter of public-sector revenue, half of export revenue (Lustig 1998, 39) - and
inflation headed back up over 100 percent. Again the economy shrank 4 percent, though
this time wages only fell 5 to 10 percent (Lustig 1998, 39-40).
The economic cabinet argued continually about what the problem was, the size of
the deficit, and what to do (Labastida). In 1986 Silva Herzog estimated revenue loss at $6
billion dollars and proposed to cut public spending by $2 billion, secure $2 billion in
foreign loans, and let the deficit rise by $2 billion (Silva Herzog). Salinas famously
proclaimed that spending had been cut "to the bone" and said the deficit was not so serious
(Silva Herzog; Labastida; Castafieda 1999, 418-20). If Finance would only do its job of
securing adequate foreign loans to tide over the emergency, Mexico could achieve 3 or 4
percent growth in 1986 and 1987 (L6pez Portillo Romano 1994, 298) - coincidentally, just
when the next presidential candidate would be selected. Silva Herzog saw "deliberate
deception" in Salinas' budget figures. For example, Planning and Budget estimated interest
payments for a large state-owned enterprise at 4 billion pesos, when in fact they were
known to be 44 billion: "In other words, the budget was overspent from the start."
Francisco Labastida, secretary of State Industries under de la Madrid and the PRI's
presidential candidate in 2000, concurs with Silva Herzog:170 "He was right; the financial
problem was worse than Salinas was saying. Salinas was really manipulating the theory of
expectations: you have to say inflation is 30 percent, even if the figures would indicate 60
percent, in order to influence economic agents' behavior." U.S. economists' terms of art
had thus became political weapons. The only problem was that if the theory of rational
expectations is actually correct, it says that economic actors should see through invented
projections. Labastida says they did: "Both the figures that were announced and the
policies that were adopted lost credibility."
The president asked Salinas and Silva Herzog to resolve their differences - they
even played tennis on weekends - but the dispute, Salinas saying that Mexico needed to
borrow more, Silva Herzog that it needed to spend less, reached the point of no return
(Silva Herzog). Silva Herzog was more experienced, more independent, more of a rival
even to de la Madrid (Urquidi). And, as David Ibarra might have told him, harassing the
president about deceptive spending practices was no way to win at palace politics. Furthr,
as Silva Herzog himself acknowledges, he was harsh, even "disrespectful" towards the
president, saying, "If you can't control Salinas' spending, it is going to be useless."'17 He
resigned, but if he had not, he agrees he would have been fired.
170 L6pez Portillo Romano (1994, 233), citing the president's notes: "De la Madrid confirmed that one of his
main disappointments and at times even causes for despair was the frequent lack of reliable and timely
information and analysis."
171 Urquidi (interview) supplied this quote.
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De la Madrid had had enough conflict, so he appointed Gustavo Petricioli, a
capable, responsible, "negotiator," as he says, to be finance secretary. Silva Herzog says
Petricioli was "intelligent, but saw that the president as leaning toward Salinas and
became, in effect, undersecretary of Planning and Budget." Salinas had won his place as
the economic czar,' 72 and the economic cabinet infighting ended.
The way positions in this conflict - Planning and Budget pushing more spending,
Finance insisting on caution - parallel those of de la Madrid versus Ibarra in 1981 and
Tello versus Moctezuma in 1977 suggests that they had little to do with ideology. It was
irrelevant that the ideological lineup kept changing: further left in Planning and Budget
versus further right in Finance in 1977; further right in Planning and Budget versus further
left in Finance in 1981; and on the right in both ministries in 1986. The secretaries'
positions seemed to have little to do with the state of the economy, either - so-so in 1977,
boom in 1981, and disaster in 1986. Institutional differences were behind the positions on
spending: Planning and Budget spends, Finance has to raise revenue. And the lesson of the
past, that the winner of the policy contest became president, the loser was evicted, drove
what might otherwise have been manageable conflict towards struggle.
Splitting Finance in Half
Finance autonomy in the 1950s and 1960s could not have been the political requisite of
economic stability, since no such autonomy existed, but was L6pez Portillo's decision,
ratified by de la Madrid, to split Planning and Budget from Finance, putting the former in
charge of expenditure, the latter in charge of revenue collection, the fundamental cause of
economic instability? An important line of thought, particularly among individuals who
looked to the Ortiz Mena era as a golden age, held that, at a minimum, this institutional
change was a recipe for economic disaster (Suarez Mier). In fact, one of those individuals
was Miguel de la Madrid. He opposed L6pez Portillo's plan to split up Finance: "[Finance
Secretary] Mario Ram6n Beteta and I even prepared a white paper opposing the idea of
establishing a Ministry of Planning and Budget, urging [the president] to leave Finance in
charge of revenue, expenditure, and credit. But L6pez Portillo had made up his mind, and
he divided Finance up." It might be that L6pez Portillo persisted because of obtuse ideas
about organizing government. But why, after becoming president, did de la Madrid not
take his own advice, reinstituting the old Finance? The tradition of Finance pre-eminence
was long-standing; the separation had lasted a mere term; and it had produced terrible
results. Nor was administrative reform some matter of patriotic fervor such that reversing it
might cause national resentment, as an effort to reverse L6pez Portillo's expropriation of
private banking would have. Presidents always reshuffled the cabinet, just as a signal that
they were going to fix old problems and abuses.
One possibility is that the increasing size and complexity of the statist economic
apparatus constituted a structural problem for the old system of governance: Echeverrfa,
L6pez Portillo, and de la Madrid (dissimilar though they were as presidents) came to fear
the concentration of so much economic power in one ministry. Even in the 1950s and
1960s under Ortiz Mena, in addition to collecting revenue and allocating budgets under the
president's watchful eye, Finance had insinuated itself into practically every industrial and
172 Urquidi says Petricioli was a "mild person who would go along with things." Bravo says Salinas became
the "secretary of the whole economy."
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social question via its array of development banks and funds. The national development
bank, Nafinsa, created in 1934, invested in infrastructure projects across Mexico, as well as
more than 500 firms such as the major cement manufacturer Cementos de Guadalajara and
the telephone company Telmex; it owned majority shares in state enterprises such as Altos
Hornos (steel) and Guanos y Fertilizantes (fertilizers) (Ortiz Mena 1998, 130-31, 205,
207); and it engineered corporate take-overs of foreign subsidiaries such as the electric
utilities and sulfur mines (Ortiz Mena 1998, 191-205). In those take-overs it did not balk at
securing $100 million-dollar foreign loans, assembling banking syndicates from New York
to Hong Kong, and putting up straw men to hide its identity (Ortiz Mena 1998, 200-1). Nor
did Nafinsa run a bad business: electric generation growth nearly doubled after the
takeover (Ortiz Mena 1998, 216); Mexican sulfur production rose to second place in the
world (Corona del Rosal 1995, 156). Just a few of the other banks under Finance were the
Banco Nacional de Cr6dito Ejidal for peasants, the Banco Nacional Agropecuario for
agribusiness, Banobras for infrastructure and housing, and the Banco Nacional de
Comercio Exterior for export industries.
Then there were thefideicomisos, or development funds. When a bank made a loan
for a project, afideicomiso, often attached to the Bank of Mexico or Nafinsa, would
guarantee it, repurchase it, and provide technical assistance. For example, FIRA provided
crop credits; FOGAIN promoted medium and small industry; FOMEX assisted Mexican
export firms; FOVI financed housing for the middle and working class; INFRATUR
developed tourist centers such as Cancun and Ixtapa (Ortiz Mena 1998, 134-35).
Growth of the public sector of course continued throughout the 1970s. When
Echeverria entered office in 1970, the entire public-sector's expenditure (including
interest) was 22 percent of GDP, while the loan portfolio of the Finance Ministry's
development banks was 11 percent of GDP (Tables 2-5 and 7-1). In 1982 when de la
Madrid entered office, public-sector expenditure was 46 percent of GDP, while the loan
portfolio under Finance was 26 percent of GDP.
"Ortiz Mena was a powerful finance minister," says Flores de la Pefia, who as a
high official in State Industries in the 1960s waged a rear-guard action against Finance
over the control of state-owned firms (Moctezuma). "[Ortiz Mena] wanted to manage the
whole economy; he had an unlimited thirst for power." Echeverria may have made Flores
de la Pefia his state industries secretary, and issued his infamous remark about running the
economy from Los Pinos, precisely to weaken Finance. But he did not completely succeed.
L6pez Portillo hit upon a better strategy. Already as undersecretary of Presidency
under Diaz Ordaz - the same ministry that he would later elevate to Planning and Budget -
he conceived a jealousy toward Finance. "The guy who discovered that there were 870
fideicomisos in the Bank of Mexico is named L6pez Portillo," says Muiioz Ledo, his
successor in the same subsecretariat of Presidency. "He found that the government's right
wing, which kept complaining about growth of the bureaucratic apparatus, had created its
own bureaucratic apparatus, thefideicomisos. The only thing he wanted to do was get
those fideicomisos out of the Bank of Mexico. He created Planning and Budget, and he
moved thefideicomisos to their respective sectors" - that is, put them under related
ministries such as Tourism, Agriculture, or Public Works. Oteyza, one of L6pez Portillo's
closest advisors, concurs: In the Ortiz Mena era, "a fideicomiso would be created precisely
to make an end run around budget restrictions and other agencies; it was what would really
manage sectoral matters. And all those fideicomisos were under the finance secretary. That
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is why Finance had such enormous power. Ortiz Mena had it, Margin maintained it under
Echeverria, and so did L6pez Portillo himself [when he was finance minister]. That is why
[when L6pez Portillo became president] he said, 'I am going to break up that ministry; it's
too powerful; I don't like it.' And he split it in half."' 73
Though de la Madrid tried to restore the old Finance thinking, he conspicuously did
not restore its old structure. Why not? It is inconceivable that he preserved the Finance
versus Planning and Budget split merely because of oversight, since he had written the
white paper with Beteta explaining why it was a bad idea. But, he said, he spent so much
of his time as president making economic decisions - "eighty percent" by 1987 - that
delegating them to a principal economic secretary would be tantamount to creating a
"parallel presidency" (L6pez Portillo Romano 1994, 232). The idea of restoring the old
Finance Ministry was never discussed in economic cabinet meetings (Silva Herzog) - any
such discussion would have been too divisive - but Finance Secretary Jestis Silva Herzog
did talk about it alone with the president "very cautiously." He notes, "Clearly I was
seeking more power, and that isn't easy to bring up, right? I think de la Madrid was
convinced that he couldn't give the finance secretary all that power, particularly because I
was a popular secretary; I was called charismatic." The remark may be egotistic, but he
was called charismatic. "If [de la Madrid] had given me that economic power, it would
have been clear who his successor was. But in Mexican politics, there must always be
weights and counterweights."
Silva's comment points to the precise kind of power presidents may have feared to
lose. This was not the same type of relationship sometimes seen as arising between public
and private sectors during the course of import substitution: at first the state nourishes
domestic firms through protectionism and subsidies, but over the decades, as those firms
grow into robust producers, their sheer economic might lets them tip the balance of power
against the state. A single Finance Ministry in Mexico had that economic might, but unlike
the private sector, it could not so easily wield it, since presidents in the 1970s and 1980s
could, and repeatedly did, fire finance secretaries and key members of their grupos. Recall
that de la Madrid called all cabinet secretaries and directors of state enterprises, along with
those under them, mere "auxiliary collaborators dependent on the unique office-holder, the
president" (Ortiz Salinas 1988, 14). Rather, the principal problem with retaining a unified
Finance Ministry would seem to have been, as Silva Herzog suggests, giving it
preeminence over other grupos. As Fernando Solana noted, secretaries in the economic
cabinet were the ones who counted - others were mere operatives - and one economic
supersecretary might look too much like the next president designate.
One preeminent competitor for presidency, without adequate counterweights, might
damage the system of political succession, as Silva Herzog says. Even if presidents knew
who they wanted to name as successor, they had to fabricate rivals - relleno, or filling,
they were called - to sustain hopes of other grupos and keep them playing within the
system for their favorites' nomination. In 1987 the "real" candidates were widely
considered to be Carlos Salinas, Alfredo del Mazo, and Manuel Bartlett, yet de la Madrid
held a sort of mock national primary debate among these and three more. He declared all
had done well, then finally picked Salinas, who in truth was the only real candidate. But
presidents needed the relleno to keep everyone hoping until the destape.
173 L6pez Portillo Romano 1994, 123, confirms the transfer offideicomisos to administrative sectors, though
without saying why.
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Splitting Finance in half was certainly part of the problem that led to crises. The
idea, to sum it up, is that the increasing size and complexity of the public economic sector
put pressure on presidents to break up what threatened to become a superministry; the
resulting division of authority created opposing institutional interests; conflict between
these interests escalated into power struggle; and struggle led to crises. However, on closer
look, the story turns out to be less clear or persuasive than this formulation of it seems. The
size and complexity of the public economic sector and the breakup of Finance surely
contributed to elite struggle, but they were only elements of a far broader problem.
Splitting Finance in half was hardly a necessity, since Salinas in fact eliminated
Planning and Budget, restoring Finance to its former eminence, in 1992. President Ernesto
Zedillo, dismissed as planning and budget secretary in 1992 (and sent to run Education,
outside the circle of power that was the economic cabinet), left his old ministry in the
grave. Moreover, de la Madrid's statement that delegating decisions to a principal
economic secretary would be tantamount to creating a "parallel presidency" rings odd,
since he actually did create an economic czar, Salinas, when he fired Silva Herzog and
installed Petricioli as Salinas' operative. If presidents rightly feared that an economic
superagency might deceive them - Finance Secretary L6pez Portillo had declared the
deficit to be half its real size by banging his fist on the table to silence Sergio Ghigliazza;
and economic czar Carlos Salinas would cook economic data as the 1987 destape
approached - they should also have feared that a twin-agency rivalry would generate bad
data, as Planning and Budget did when de la Madrid was in a power struggle with Ibarra,
and again when Salinas was in a power struggle with Silva Herzog.
Splitting Finance in half did not by itself cause crises because, of the four principal
post-1970 crises, only one occurred under divided economic management. After
dismissing Margaiin from Finance in 1973, and even more so after he dismissed Flores de
la Pefia from State Industries in 1974, Echeverri'a had one economic supersecretary,
namely L6pez Portillo. President and Finance Secretary jointly steered the nation toward
economic crisis. Divided economic authority, between Ibarra's Finance and de la Madrid's
Planning and Budget, was an important cause of the 1982 crisis. However, de la Madrid
made Salinas economic czar in 1986, in time to start inflating the financial and economic
bubble that would contribute to the 1987 crisis. And after Salinas restored Finance to its
former eminence under Pedro Aspe in 1992, the two of them proceeded to overvalue the
peso on the way to the 1994 crisis.174 The amount of responsibility that might have been
restored to economic management by combining Finance with Planning and Budget is
exaggerated because neither the finance secretary nor planning and budget secretary -
but rather always the president - was blamed for crises. The 1976 crisis was seen as
Echeverria's fault; though L6pez Portillo had been secretary of a still preeminent Finance,
Mexico looked to him to solve the crisis when he entered office, as Sainchez Navarro
noted. The 1982 crisis was seen as L6pez Portillo's fault; even though de la Madrid had
been in charge of expenditure, everyone looked to him to rescue the nation.
Finally, it is not certain that an economic czar would necessarily be the preeminent
presidential competitor, despite what Silva Herzog thought. In 1987, though Salinas was
economic czar, the political system did not see him as anything like a sure bet. Francisco
Labastida, a former member of de la Madrid's economic cabinet and the PRI's presidential
174 Taking 1989, the first full year of Salinas' presidency, as a base, the peso was overvalued by 14 percent in
1991, 25 percent in 1992. and 33 percent in 1993 (CAirdenas 1996, 213, table A.3).
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nominee in 2000, says: "I think that even when Salinas actually became the candidate, it
was a surprise for many. I would say that many thought the candidate would be someone
with more capacity to understand the political situation, such as Del Mazo." Indeed, there
was such uncertainty about the candidate that on the very morning of October 4, 1987,
when Carlos Salinas de Gortari was nominated, his rival Afredo del Mazo committed an
awful blunder by publicly congratulating Attorney General Sergio Garcia Ramirez, one of
the relleno crew who had participated in the mock debate. Del Mazo had received news
that Garcia had won from a seemingly reliable source, but in fact that source, having
ascertained that "SG" was the winner, had misinterpreted the initials as standing for Sergio
Garcia instead of Salinas de Gortari (Castafieda 1999, 437-38).
If anything, what would seem to matter most was not splitting Planning and Budget
from Finance per se, but the increasing size and complexity of the state economic sector.
This change certainly constituted an economic and institutional structure on which struggle
played out. But it is hard to see precisely why greater size and complexity should produce
struggle, that is (it bears repeating) fearing loss more because losers were ousted, hence
going on the offensive to stay in the game. In fact, there is good reason to think that an
increasingly large, complicated state sector should alleviate elite struggle: it meant more
agencies, more state enterprises, more banks, more fideicomisos - that is, more jobs - for
politicians to occupy. If gnrupos lost the big contest for the presidency, there should be
more secondary prizes to go around. The cost of losing should diminish.
Certainly other factors more obviously promoted struggle. Ideological escalation -
the pervasive belief that fundamental change of some sort or other was inevitable, hence
winners stood to win decisively, and losers to lose decisively - derived from the
intellectual and political climate, everything from the dependency literature to Vatican II,
from Paris 1968 to the march on the Pentagon. These generalized calls for change gained
potency in Mexico because Echeverria so stridently proclaimed the need for change,
denouncing "emissaries of the past," without even saying what or whom he meant; then
because L6pez Portillo promoted cabinet debates between "thesis" and "antithesis," often
only to dismiss proponents of one or both sides. The way Echeverria churned officials
through high office at five times the customary pace; his gambit to extend his power
behind the scenes by installing in the presidency a boyhood friend with little elite support
and (by his own admission) not even a grupo of his own; L6pez Portillo's move to fire the
echeverristas and his May 15, 1979, political massacre - these violations of the old rules
would evidently trigger of fear of the cost of losing.
Conversely, the 1950s and 1960s were hardly devoid of economic conflicts that
might have provoked firings: the 1954 devaluation in the face of opposition by banking,
the United States, and part of the political class such as former President Alemain (Carrillo
Flores diary); the 1958 clash among Finance, Presidency, and State Industries over the
Administrative Law; the foreign borrowing spree in Social Security and other state
enterprises in 1963 and 1964; Ortiz Mena's bid to bring state enterprises - thus half of
public expenditure - under his control and State Industry's continuing but muffled
rearguard action to reassert control. If increasing oil exports drove Diaz Serrano's fateful
presidential bid, why should not increasing cotton exports - Mexico's oil of the 1950s,
indispensable to its industrial strategy - not have launched Agriculture Secretary Gilberto
Flores Mufioz, presidential contender under Ruiz Cortines, on the same trajectory?
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Irreversible elite split: the Democratic Current
Mexico underwent structural economic change as it progressed from manufacturing basic
consumer goods in the 1950s to producing more advanced goods such as automobile
transmissions and chemicals in the 1960s, beginning to export those goods in the early
1970s, using petroleum to fuel a boom in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and slashing trade
barriers to promote large-scale manufactured exports in the mid-1980s. But what affected
the political system was not structural economic change per se; it was how presidents
managed such change.
There is no clearer illustration of this point than the way President de la Madrid
mismanaged the politics of lowering trade barriers and introducing freer markets. He might
have moved Mexico away from import substitution toward a freer-market regime without
provoking an elite fracture. The problem was his belief that transforming economic policy
categorically and abruptly, along the lines of what came to be called the Washington
Consensus, mattered more than honoring the unwritten rule that promised all grupos
survival. By imposing Carlos Salinas as his successor to guarantee decisive economic
transformation, he broke the rules of elite cooperation, gave the so-called Democratic
Current no option but to split off and run an opposition campaign, and alienated many
factions that stayed in the PRI, silent but resentful.
This story of elite fracture begins when de la Madrid appointed a government
virtually run by former Finance and Bank of Mexico officials. In shutting out Echeverria's
and L6pez Portillo's factions, he broke the unwritten rule that no major grupo should be
excluded from power.' 75 Even cabinet secretaries who did not come from the financial
sector, such as Interior Secretary Manuel Bartlett, were nearly all de la Madrid's close
collaborators; 76 only four lacked personal ties with him, and they were in posts such as
Fisheries, occupied by Pedro Ojeda, where differences would hardly matter (Hernindez
Rodriguez 1987, 36). Not since President Miguel Alemain, the last administration that
provoked a powerful elite split, had the president's team been so closely identified with
him or so completely determined by personal friendship (1987, 37).
Even more unusual than de la Madrid's takeover of the central administration was
his takeover of the party apparatus and state governorships. Presidential candidates would
install one - and only one - close associate in the National Executive Committee of the
PRI during the electoral campaign, but de la Madrid unprecedentedly filled almost the
entire committee with close allies (many of the individuals just mentioned, such as Bartlett,
Salinas, Septilveda, and Rojas, who were later appointed cabinet secretaries). Adolfo Lugo
Verduzco, the party president named in 1982, had had no prior electoral or party
experience, a rarity for that post, and was under orders to favor politicians like those in the
president's inner circle (Hernaindez Rodriguez 1992, 253). De la Madrid only introduced
subtle changes in the legislature (Hernaindez Rodriguez 1992, 258-59) - it was truly the
U.N. General Assembly of the Mexican state anyway, all chatter and no power - but his
175 This conclusion, also, is the consensus. Langston (1997b, 30) says that only one member of Echeverria's
or Lopez Portillo's factions secured a cabinet post, Pedro Ojeda. A few others such as Reyes Heroles in
Education were at least debatably in one of those factions, but all sources agree with the general conclusion,
for example, L6pez Portillo Romano (1994, 201), Castafieda (1999, 148-49).
176 Hernindez Rodriguez does an especially persuasive job of articulating this view, that de la Madrid drew
his cabinet from friends and close associates in Finance and the Bank of Mexico, but far from being unusual,
it is the consensus, for example, shared by Bailey (1988, 57) and Langston (1997b, 29).
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appointment of officials with central-administration careers to 23 of 26 governorships,
including four secretaries and four subsecretaries from his cabinet, was a systemic shock
(Hernaindez Rodriguez 1992, 260). Electoral and party posts traditionally constituted their
own sphere to reward the leaders in the PRI sectors - labor, peasant, and "popular" - who
handled societal pressures that might boil up and made sure the party won overwhelming
electoral victories. To shut them out from the best jobs they could aspire to was dangerous.
When Salinas defeated Silva Herzog, things turned decidedly grimmer for political
elites on the out. Not only had de la Madrid marginalized them, but if Salinas became
president, they could expect to be gone for good. Those who would split off to form the
Democratic Current - such as Cuauht6moc Cardenas, governor of Michoacin and son of
the popular ex-president; Porfirio Mufioz Ledo, cabinet secretary under Echeverria and
L6pez Portillo; and Ifigenia Martinez, a former official in Finance and in Presidency
known for her work on income inequality - belonged to the generation of the 1930s or
earlier. They were on the left and many had close ties to the Echeverria faction (Langston,
1997b, 31). Salinas, born in 1948, could be expected to favor the 1940s generation in
making appointments. According to long-standing political tradition, presidents of a given
generation dominated two successive administrations and would name predominately their
age cohort, with whom they had established the closest networking ties, to the hundred or
so highest offices (Camp 1995a, 50).'77 Thus, the generation born in the teens dominated
the administration of both L6pez Mateos, born 1910, and Diaz Ordaz, born 1911 (Camp
1980, 50). As mentioned, Echeverria, born 1922, broke the rule (as he broke so many
others) and favored the younger 1930s generation in filling top posts, but L6pez Portillo,
born in 1920, restored the 1920s generation to high office (ibid.). De la Madrid, born 1934,
favored his generation as expected, 178 and Silva Herzog. born in 1935, would likely honor
political tradition and reappoint the 1930s generation again. Salinas, born in 1948, would
end that generation's hopes - they could expect no other chance - and install his peers.
Denying a political cohort its expected time in high office might always provoke
instability, but especially in this case. As mentioned in chapter 6, the sharpest generational
divide among Mexican elites, in social background, educational attainment, and historical
outlook, falls between those born before and after 1940 (Camp 2002, 235). A quarter of
Mexican elites born before 1940 (now including public sector, private sector, church, and
military) came from the working class, but practically none born after 1940 did; elites born
after 1940 were dominated by natives of Mexico City rather than the provinces, and, unlike
their predecessors, they always had university degrees, half of them Ph.D.'s (Camp 2002,
236-37). The older generation had seen the political system end two decades of violence -
the last serious military revolt and the bloody Cristero religious rebellion were not over
until 1930 - and establish an age of order and progress. The younger generation had
watched that order and progress unravel in Tlatelolco, economic crises, and conflictive
politics (Camp 2002, 250). High government officials born before 1940 were importantly
shaped by ideals transmitted through the National University. Those born after 1940
increasingly attended private Mexican universities and received advanced degrees in the
177 Ruiz Cortines (born 1890) was the exception in the period I am studying. Appointed as a compromise
candidate after Alemin (born 1900) had tried to succeed himself or appoint his peer Casas Alemin (born
1905), Ruiz Cortines continued to favor the AlemAin generation in appointments (Camp 1995a. 50).
'78 He probably favored the generation of the 1930s, but I only have data that he favored the broader
generation of the 1920s and 1930s. In any event, he favored those born before 1940 (Camp 1995a. 45).
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United States, typically in economics (Camp 2002, 239). Ideology is always fungible, but
leaders of the Democratic Current, born predominately in 1930s, were the generation of
state-led development, while Salinas' allies, born in the 1940s and mostly after 1945, were
to be the generation of the Washington Consensus. It was the sociological divide between
generations that made ideological differences matter. The older group knew its political
days in the PRI were numbered if Salinas became president.
Those who would form the Democratic Current broke the unwritten rules because
they had no political choice. As de la Madrid proceeded to marginalize them - a tactic they
explicitly recognized as violating elite political norms (Bruhn 1997, 86) - their only
plausible strategy for retaining influence was to retaliate in kind. At first, Cuauht6moc
Cirdenas, Porfirio Mufioz Ledo, and Rodolfo Gonzailez Guevara, the ambassador to Spain,
began to hold informal chats (Bruhn 1997, 325-26), only seeking to influence policy within
the PRI (Bruhn 1997, 76). But after Salinas won primacy in the economic cabinet, ousting
Silva Herzog on June 17, 1986, and menacing the older generation's hopes for the next
administration, they began to raise the stakes. A few weeks later they held their first larger
meeting, at Ifigenia Martinez' house in the fashionable old Mexico City neighborhood of
Coyoacain. In July, Gonzalo Martinez Corbali, senator from San Luis Potosf, invited 15 or
20 potential Democratic Current members to what would prove a fateful dinner. The
ostensible purpose was to discuss policy proposals (Bruhn 1997, 326), but the dinner
turned more serious than expected. August G6mez Villanueva, agrarian reform minister
under Echeverria, recalls his feelings of ill-ease:
The meeting was called to talk about the political situation and how we might organize a group in the
party to be sure the leadership did not stray from the Mexican Revolution's historical project....
[But] there were two tendencies at the dinner. One was saying, let's run Cuauht6moc Cirdenas as the
party's presidential candidate and then negotiate. I was opposed. Other people had spontaneously
come, and it seemed disloyal to commit them to something they had not been previously informed
about. A dinner should not be manipulated into a meeting to make political decisions - decisions that
seemed to me to go dangerously far, because they amounted to initiating a schismatic process within
the heart of the party. I even said, clearly, that I was concerned that whatevei happened would get out:
'I want to make it clear that we are not conspiring against President de la Madrid, who is Mufioz
Ledo's and my personal friend, nor are we forming a coalition that could play a schismatic role within
the heart of the party.' Such a process would only play into the hands of [the conservative] National
Action Party and right-wing forces in the United States - as in fact did happen.
There can have been no one there who did not know the unwritten rules. Political
currents could try to build support for a presidential contender in any number of discrete
ways, from networking with friends of friends to strategically disbursing public-works
funds, but they must not establish a formal power base, sign up supporters, and openly
defy the president. No mechanism existed to end such a challenge, other than a genuine
primary, which the party had never admitted (when one PRI president in the mid-1960s
tried to institute primaries even for unimportant municipal offices, he lost his job and died
in a suspicious plane crash), or a schism. In fact, the unwritten rules about not organizing
an open schism turned out to be written, too. The PRI leadership told the Democratic
Current in no uncertain terms that it was welcome to join an established party sector such
as the Mexican Workers Federation or the National Peasant Federation - had it done so, it
would of course have been smothered by whatever sector it joined - but party statutes
prohibited creating any new formal institution (Bruhn 1997, 92).
When Porfirio Mufioz Ledo leaked news of the dinner at Martinez Corbalhi's house
to the newspaper Unomdsuno, his claim that he was merely seeking to clarify the group's
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unsubversive nature and democratize the party (Bruhn 1997, 88) was disingenuous. As a
former president of the PRI's National Executive Committee, he well knew that nothing
could be more subversive than organizing a pressure group within the party. Says G6mez
Villanueva, "In time, Porfirio and I came to a divide. At that moment I said good bye:
'From this point on, our lives in the battle. I respect your decision, but it is not my path.'"
The allusion is surely to the Revolution, when those who parted ways did meet in battle.
But Mufioz Ledo's leak was a necessary step, to see how the message would be received
and seek supporters for a potentially overt power base.
A few newspaper stories were still far from the point of no return - Party President
Adolfo Lugo Verduzco at first said the PRI leadership "welcomed" the initiative and
would soon meet with Mufioz Ledo (Bruhn 1997, 89) - but only failed negotiations,
missed telephone calls, and public recriminations followed. De la Madrid left matters in
the hands of the party presidents, first Lugo Verduzco, then Jorge de la Vega Dominguez:
"They tried to negotiate; they each met 15 or 20 times with the Democratic Current; they
had infinite patience. Porfirio and Cuauht6moc persevered in their project." The leaders of
the current thought they tried negotiating, too. When de la Vega was installed as party
president, in good part to negotiate with them, they were the first to congratulate him
(G6mez Villanueva). De la Madrid authorized G6mez Villanueva as a messenger of truce
between himself and the current, but his telephone messages never got past Emilio
Gamboa, the president's private secretary (G6mez Villanueva).
Failed negotiations and missed communications merely obscured the fact that de la
Madrid would only give the Democratic Current two options: surrender or revolt. He made
this point unmistakably on March 4, 1987, after convoking what was billed as a "unity"
assembly of the PRI. "And then we discovered that the idea was to expel part of the party,"
says Oteyza, not a member of the Democratic Current. On de la Madrid's orders - not even
the National Executive Committee had discussed the matter (Bruhn 1997, 97) - de la Vega
refreshed everyone's memory about the party's prohibition against subgroups other than
the established sectors, and closed the ceremonies by saying:
From this great Assembly, we say to all those who from here on do not wish to respect the will of the
immense majority of [PRI members], that they resign from our party and seek affiliation in other
political organizations .... In the PRI there is no room for fifth columns nor for Trojan horses. (Bruhn
1997,97)
The leaders of the Democratic Current still hung on within the PRI, hoping against hope,
but when Salinas was in fact nominated on October 4, 1987, they revolted.
The upshot was the PRI's worst political crisis since 1952, in fact, the worst ever,
since it would never be repaired. It had arisen from within the elite. Civil society was
discontented, to be sure, after years of zero growth and falling wages, but it played no role
in organizing the Democratic Current. Only after Salinas had been nominated, after the
Democratic Current had seceded from the PRI to form an opposition party - the
Democratic Front - and well after the campaign set out to mobilize electoral support did
civil society begin to join, and reluctantly at that (Bruhn 1997, 113).
Though the results are disputed, the PRI probably won the election, but its blatant
fraud and the damage it caused the political system are undisputed. The election day story
merits a brief retelling.179 Interior agreed to let representatives of the conservative National
Action Party (Partido de Acci6n Nacional, PAN) and the Democratic Front watch the
179 This retelling is from Castafieda 1999, 449-50.
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results come in, but their terminals, not directly linked to the central computer, were fed
doctored numbers that showed votes from "good" districts where the PRI was winning and
held back votes from "bad" districts. The problem was that a PAN technician had
discovered the setup and figured out how to hack into the central computer. On election
night, as votes from "good" districts started appearing on the oppositions' screens, he did
hack into the central computer. Now the real figures showed the Democratic Front winning
by a landslide in Mexico City. No surprise - the capital was its stronghold and was where
results would come in first - but the ruse was appalling. The technician was forcibly
yanked from his chair, and on orders from the interior secretary himself, the oppositions'
screens went blank. The PRI said the "system" had crashed. As political metaphor, it could
hardly have been more apt. When the computers, if not the political system, came back on
line, to no one's surprise they indicated that the PRI had won.
The fracture with the Democratic Current was not an inevitable result of a need to
restructure the economy; de la Madrid could have moved Mexico toward freer markets
more gradually, probably more successfully, and avoided the fracture. True, de la Madrid
says - and there is no reason to disbelieve his sincerity - that he chose Salinas because he
"guaranteed the continuation of my economic policies." A number of scholars concur.
Langston says the president closed off the highest ranks of the elite because he was "forced
to impose a new economic model" (1997b, 28, likewise Hemrnaindez Rodrfguez 1992, 252).
But with hindsight, admittedly a great advantage over de la Madrid's position in
1987, it is clear that more or less the same free-market restructuring would have occurred a
little sooner or a little later, as it did across Latin America, no matter which candidate had
been chosen. A more moderate pace might well have benefited Mexico, particularly if the
government helped smaller firms prepare for more foreign coiipetition and privatized
banks more carefully. Poor regulation and bankers' inexperience in the headlong rush to
privatize caused the banking system's collapse, cost Mexico $100 billion dollars to fix, and
contributed importantly to the 1994 crisis. But the key point in regard to the political
system is that, at a minimum, slower economic liberalization would not have been worse
than cataclysmic liberalization, and the principal candidates other than Salinas, namely,
Interior Secretary Manuel Bartlett or State Industries Secretary Alfredo Del Mazo, would
have liberalized the economy anyway in the end. Francisco Labastida, the PRI's
presidential candidate in 2000 and a supporter of Salinas' basic economic program, says
Mexico "would have done better" with either of these other candidates:
At least Alfredo [del Mazo], whose thinking I know better, would have promoted economic
modernization, perhaps more gradually, with more negotiation and less of a shock - and I think he
could have negotiated better with the Democratic Current - but I insist that all of us in the economic
cabinet believed in economic opening.
Neither Bartlett nor Del Mazo would have provoked anything like the fear of
political exile that Salinas did among leaders of the Democratic Current. Even de la
Madrid says, "They almost told me they would accept any candidate but Salinas"" -
despite the grave danger of telling the president pointblank that one opposed any candidate.
The Democratic Current did not even form until shortly after Silva Herzog's firing made a
Salinas presidential candidacy seem more likely. The other PRI candidates left more
possibilities open to the current. Bartlett, born in 1936, belonged to the same generation
and had been Cairdenas' friend in youth (Castafieda 1999, 427). Del Mazo, born in 1943,
180 De la Madrid makes a similar though slightly less explicit statement in Castafieda 1999, 162-63.
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fell on the other side of the 1940 generational divide but was close enough, in the
approximate world of politics, to pose less of a threat than the decisively younger Salinas,
born in 1948. Moreover, leaders of the Democratic Current had no personal conflicts with
del Mazo, as some did with Salinas, and del Mazo's support from the labor sector and
L6pez Portillo gave him a profile closer to theirs.' 8 '
The political system could have survived economic restructuring per se. It was the
way that - la Madrid injected restructuring into the system, catalyzing elite struggle, that
proved explosive. For the Democratic Current, the Washington Consensus not just an
objectionable ideology; it was an ideology incarnate in Salinas' grupo of Ph.D.'s from
American universities - Salinas himself (Harvard), Pedro Aspe (MIT), Jaime Serra (Yale),
Ernesto Zedillo (Yale), Jos6 Cordoba (Stanford) - that constituted a clear and immediate
threat to political survival. The very sociological divide between the post-1940 generation
of Mexican politicians and its predecessors that now seems so visible might not have been
had Del Mazo or Bartlett - National University graduates who had studied abroad, but in
England and France, not in the United States - been nominated for the presidency.
Struggle and the 1987 crisis
Mexico's 1987 economic crisis was not caused because of the struggle over the nomination
- too many other factors contributed, such as the burden of debt payments throughout the
administration, probable errors in managing that difficult situation, and the October 1987
U.S. stock market crash - but Salinas did inflate the economy to build support for his
nomination, and he did aggravate the crisis.
If the Democratic Current was Salinas' most outspoken opposition - and it is
important to recall that it remained within the party until after the official nomination -
many others liked him little better but kept their mouths shut. De la Madrid says Salinas
had the political skill to "build his candidacy," gaining the most widespread support among
cabinet secretaries, state governors, party leaders, businessmen, and workers, but few
informed observers agree. In his book on presidential succession, Jorge Castafieda says
that Salinas carried too many "drawbacks, hostilities, and outright deficiencies to be
imposed without cost" (1999, 436). Jos6 Ram6n L6pez Portillo says that many party
members, the official labor movement, old-guard politicos, the federal bureaucracy, and
intellectuals opposed him (L6pez Portillo Romano 1994, 348). Francisco Labastida agrees
about the labor movement, party members, and politicos. Victor Bravo, advisor to Del
Mazo, says that "the political class obviously wasn't with Salinas." Party militants
demonstrated their antipathy toward Salinas in their deliberately lackluster campaign
management (Bruhn 1997, 122-22; Hernmaindez Rodriguez 1992, 263; Langston 1997b, 24).
For example, at one supposed Salinas rally on February 10, 1988, the crowd hurled orange
peels and even stones at him, shouting "Cirdenas! Cdirdenas!" (Bruhn 1997, 130).
Salinas had a comprehensive strategy for winning the nomination, beyond just
building airports in towns like Piedras Negras. He had made himself the economy minister,
Planning and Budget combined with Finance, whose political capital was his technocrats'
vaunted economic management ability - "they know how to do it" was the refrain (El
181 Labastida says del Mazo did not have personal conflicts with the current, unlike Salinas who did; he also
says del Mazo had support from the labor sector. Bravo and Castafieda (1999, 425) both note del Mazo's
closeness to L6pez Portillo and support from labor.
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Financiero 15 December 1996, 69). To build support and soften opposition to his
candidacy, he had to make the economy look good through the destape in October 1987.
As mentioned, his plan called for 3 to 4 percent growth in that year, provided Mexico
could secure plentiful foreign loans. Even before Silva Herzog's departure, the Salinas
team was in Washington negotiating for those loans. They ultimately got a $12.5 billion
dollar package from the IMF, World Bank, and private banks pressured to provide new
money (Lustig 1998, 46-47), four to six times what Silva Herzog had even sought. 182
Where did the money come from? One theory, that Washington wanted to support
Salinas' candidacy (Castafieda 1999, 423-24), seems too elaborate. Why favor Salinas over
Silva Herzog as the presidential candidate? Silva Herzog was just as committed to the
Washington Consensus (indeed more committed to fiscal austerity). "Washington plays
with whoever is in the field," he says. Further, Washington would hardly understand the
intricacies of Mexican presidential succession - that one has to inflate the economy in the
pre-electoral year - and suggesting that the IMF finance any political campaign would
seem a dangerous move, even for Salinas' operatives.
Even without that twist, the loan diplomacy was anything but straightforward.
Washington had begun to recognize the gravity of the Third World debt crisis and was
pushing banks to extend lending under the Banker Plan. Mexico wheedled its way into
becoming the pilot case,'183 on the one hand insinuating that it might default, Silva
Herzog's role, while on the other hand parlaying connections and expertise earned in U.S.
economics departments to its advantage, Salinas' role. Silva Herzog hinted that Mexico
might take a hard line on debt, for example, mentioning in a speech in London that it had
to put responsibility to its people before that to its creditors. He also started moving Bank
of Mexico deposits from the Federal Reserve of New York to Switzerland, implying that
Mexico wanted to keep them from being frozen should it default. In fact, the economic
cabinet had no intention of defaulting - it was too concerned about the harm that creditors
and the U.S. government would inflict - but the threat was just part of the negotiation.184 It
apparently worked: Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volker later testified before Congress
that Mexican default would have a "domino effect" (L6pez Portillo Romano 1994, 305).
At the same time, the Salinas team talked up the idea in Washington that the
inflation-adjusted, or "operational," government deficit should count, rather than the deficit
as usually calculated, namely the simple difference between expenditure and revenue
(Lustig 1998, 44; Castafieda 1999, 420-21). The operational deficit is smaller, implies
more success at paying off debt, and strengthens the case for generous lending. Actually, it
is also a legitimate idea, accepted even by some critics of de la Madrid's economic policies
(Ros 1987, 86). The gist is that when inflation is high - it was about 100 percent - the huge
interest payments on domestic public debt (in pesos) actually include a substantial portion
of principal, while inflation rapidly erodes the real value of the remaining principal. The
operational deficit properly counts this effect. The argument worked: technical expertise,
correct in this case, had been parlayed into a political tool.
182 Silva Herzog mentioned seeking to borrow an additional $2 billion dollars; Castafieda (1999, 418) says
the Finance team thought it could not obtain more than $3 billion. L6pez Portillo Romano (1994, 316)
mentions a loan package to the Salinas team of $14.4 billion, though much was not made available until mid-
April 1987 - still in time to help with the nomination (it occurred on October 4).
18 Lustig 1998, 46, notes that it was tae pilot case.
184 The information about the threat of default is from Silva Herzog.
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Now Salinas had his chance to make the economy work. The new economic
program, the Plan of Promotion and Growth (Aliento y Crecimiento), adopted shortly after
getting rid of Silva Herzog, would be more expansionist, particularly encouraging
investment by making more credit available (Cirdenas 1996, 146). Real development-bank
lending, which after falling almost 40 percent had taken a big step back toward its former
level in 1985 under Silva Herzog, now rose 29 percent more in 1986 and another 11
percent in 1987. In all it rose from 22 percent of GDP to 33 percent of GDP under Salinas
(Table 7-1). Although public spending, excluding interest, was about flat in 1987, that
performance was far better than average for the administration, and areas of spending that
Salinas might plausibly use to build support did unusually well.' 85 Revenue sharing with
states rose 8 percent in real terms: outside the central administration, governors are far the
most important centers of political power in Mexico. Planning and Budget's own spending
rose 12 percent but was minor as a share of GDP. Though privatizing state-owned firms
was one of de la Madrid's great goals and Salinas' accomplishments, in 1987 investment in
them rose by 2.5 percent of GDP, the only year during the administration when it did not
contract. Federal government investment fell 6 percent, the smallest decline during the
administration.
Salinas' economic salesmanship especially zeroed in on an unstated policy:
launching the Bolsa, or securities exchange, to heights that seemed to defy all financial
laws of gravity. After ending 1985 at an index level of 11,197, the Bolsa shot up to 47,101
in 1986 (Basafiez 1996, 253) - a 320 percent gain, and an almost 220 percent real gain,
corrected for inflation.86 By September 1987, it had shot up further to 343,545: in round
numbers, a nominal gain of 630 percent, a real gain of 530 percent, or five to six times as
much as it had grown in its previous 93 years of existence (Basifiez 1996, 254). This was
no mere data for the financial pages. Brokerage houses opened on plazas of all the main
provincial cities from Ciudad Juirez along the U.S. border to Merida in the Yucatain, as
little investors jumped into the market, their numbers swelling from 186,000 in 1986 to
374,000 in September 1987 (ibid.).18' Housewives would start investment societies (vacas,
or milk cows, in Mexican vernacular) to buy packages of securities (Silva Herzog). Capital
that had fled the country after the 1982 and 1985 crises began to return (Basaihez 1996,
257; Cardenas 1996, 147). A few hundred thousand happy investors might not swing an
election (then again they might: Mexican voters are influenced by their perception of
national economic performance, not their personal financial situation 88), but anyway, it
was an impressive display for the purpose at hand: winning support and disarming
opposition within the political elite to improve Salinas' prospects of being the tapado. The
point was, as Silva Herzog says, breaking into English, "We made it, we made it again."
The government sold the financial bonanza as proving Mexico's great economic
expectations and investors' confidence in its policies (Basifiez 1996, 257). Some interest is
almost always busy manipulating financial bonanzas, and this time it was Salinas' team.
To begin with it had worked to improve the general economic climate. The $12 billion
ls Two former high officials agreed in off-the-record comments that revenue sharing with states,
development-bank lending, and public investment are areas of spending that Salinas might have used to build
support, if he sought to so do. Development bank lending had risen even faster under Silva Herzog, but it
contracted precipitously in 1988 (Table 7-1).
186 All inflation corrections calculated from quarterly CPI, from IMF International Financial Statistics CD.
187 L6pez Portillo Romano says 520,000 in 1987 (1994, 334).
188 Jorge Domfnguez, talk to Mexican Studies Group, MIT, April 10, 2002.
165
dollar loan package that the team landed itself created positive expectations, as did the
partial recovery of oil prices to $16 a barrel (Cirdenas 1996, 147), the latter obviously just
good luck. The government slowed the peso's depreciation against the dollar, thus tending
to stabilize prices - always a political advantage for incumbent economic managers - and
promised still lower inflation. The Bolsa's impressive growth "was very largely provoked
by expectations that did not correspond to reality," says Labastida. "If you sell
expectations of lower inflation than will really occur, then expectations of growth are
higher. You create an environment of euphoria."
The Salinas team turned to hands-on manipulation of the Bolsa, as well as general
salesmanship. De la Madrid had opposed L6pez Portillo's 1982 bank nationalization, and,
after paying bankers handsome compensation, he reprivatized businesses that the banks
had owned, including brokerage houses. To strengthen those houses, the government
moved away from its traditional borrowing method, namely requiring banks to deposit
large quantities of reserves (the encaje legal) at relatively low interest rates in the Bank of
Mexico; instead it increasingly placed bonds at higher interest rates - thus greater cost to
itself - through the brokerage houses. The government promoted these houses by paying
considerably lower interest rates on bank deposits than on government bonds, principally
treasury certificates known as CETES. As the volume of bank deposits sank, private firms
also turned to the Bolsa for financing. The government had thus transformed the Bolsa into
a parallel - and almost completely unregulated - banking system, owned principally by
many of the same individuals who had formerly owned banks, which by 1986 and 1987
was providing spectacular returns to small, middle-class depositors.189 By 1987 Finance
Secretary Gustavo Petricioli, former director of the National Securities Commission, was
reporting to Salinas daily about the Bolsa, even as he maintained its momentum by placing
government bonds at good interest rates while holding bank deposit interest rates down' 90
- it turns out that even deficits per se have their political uses - and possibly by buying
securities directly.191 Again the struggle for power had contaminated the economy.192
Salinas was nominated as the official candidate on October 4, 1987. The Bolsa rose
for a couple of days (Basave Kunhardt 1996, 154) on the news, then started to fall and lost
14 percent by October 16 (Basave Kunhardt 1996, 155). On October 19 the New York
Stock Exchange plunged 23 percent, sending shock waves around the world, but the
market that fell the furthest, by a lot, was the Mexican Bolsa (Basave Kunhardt 1996, 154).
From an index value of 373,216 points in October it fell to 87,199 points in early January,
losing three quarters of its value (not even counting the additional erosion caused by
inflation). On November 18 capital flight forced Mexico to devalue 25 percent.19 3
19 The account of how the Bolsa was established is from Basdfiez (1996,254-57).
90 L6pez Portillo Romano (1994, 331) says real interest rates reached zero by August 1987.
191 BasAfiiez 1996, 257, argues that the government manipulated the Bolsa through bond placements. Del
Mazo, one of Salinas' principal competitors for the nomination, and an anonymous economic cabinet
member both told Castaiheda (1999, 436) that Salinas manipulated the Bolsa. A high official in a position to
know told me off-the-record that Petricioli manipulated the Bolsa and discussed developments daily with
Salinas. Victor Urquidi believes, without direct evidence, that the government bid up securities prices.
192 An off-the record comment of one interviewee.
'9 Heath 1999, 28. Most sources, including de la Madrid, agree that Mexico was forced to devalue. Miguel
Mancera, director of the Bank of Mexico, says the controlled exchange rate was devalued partly to
compensate for the process of slashing trade barriers from 1985 through December 1987 after Mexico's entry
into GATT. He notes that although devaluation increases the price of imports, the drastic cut in tariff levels
had reduced their price, so there was little or no overall inflationary effect.
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Chapter 9
1994 and Beyond
This thesis reaches two general conclusions about Mexican economic policymaking from
1952 through 1988. First, the principal internal threats to economic stability were conflicts
within the political elite. The nature of those conflicts shifted from one political succession
to another. Social Security Director Benito Coquet's and others' gambit in the 1960s to
build support was just a matter of power seeking, while Miguel de la Madrid's crusade to
destroy the Democratic Current in the 1980s was ideologically driven. While Echeverria
provoked elite conflict partly because of his obsession to improve social conditions and
partly because of his political manipulations, L6pez Portillo lost control of the succession
process amid the political massacres that led up to 1981. But, in any event, how the
political elite succeeded or failed in handling its internal conflicts was critical; no conflict
between state and society mattered enough to cause crises. For all the talk about loss of
legitimacy after 1968, no such problem seriously threatened the PRI's continuing rule.
The second general conclusion is that the political system was better able to handle
elite conflict when there was a cooperative system and contending factions could expect to
survive politically; struggle produced crises. Though cabinet secretaries sought the
presidency, and turnover in cabinet posts provides a gauge of elite career stability, concern
for survival was even more acute among the people beneath them. De la Madrid says that
members of David Ibarra's grupo such as Oscar Levin kept orchestrating golpes bajos, low
blows, including press attacks against him, so he said to Ibarra, "David, your people are
attacking me. Isn't there some way to smooth things over? Why should you and I be
fighting if we're good friends?" (Castafieda 1999, 168). Ibarra, for his part, says that de la
Madrid's subordinates such as Carlos Salinas spent massively to recruit governors,
deputies, and senators to support his presidency (Castafieda 1999, 407). The Salinas
grupo's strategy evidently worked better. But it was the logic of the system that the grupos
under the candidate, even more than the candidate himself, should wage the succession
battle. If he lost the presidency, he had, in any event, reached nearly the pinnacle of
political office as cabinet secretary. His subordinates had not; their careers depended
critically on his nomination. The fear of political exile was a collective, grupo fear. Who
today, outside of a small circle, has heard of Oscar Levfn?
Which parts of the Mexican story extend to other countries, and how might elite
politics affect economic policymaking elsewhere? If elite struggle exists, and opposing
factions reasonably fear for their very existence as political forces, crises should be
expected to erupt. If losing a succession contest amounts to political death, the incentive to
spend excessively or make other economic gambles - inflating the stock market, loosing
bank lending, overvaluing the currency, or whatever other techniques can be invented - is
enormous. The need gain support at any cost trumps concerns about economic stability, so
crisis should erupt. Conversely, assurance of all powerful factions' political survival
moderates their incentive to take economic gambles to win support in succession contests.
The penalty for losing is less; there will always be another chance. And if all factions arc
confident of medium-term survival, if not running this administration then perhaps the
next, they have a common interest in the system's durability. This common interest
strengthens norms or "independent" institutions that promote macroeconomic stability.
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Factions' assurance of survival does not guarantee economic stability: nothing does. Crises
can erupt for any number of reasons, from external economic shocks to pure error, so no
political system can be certain to avoid it. Still, a system in which the most important
political elites are confident of their survival should be expected to do better.
Mexico 1994
Mexico's 1994 crisis raises questions that may never be resolved. Did the political enemies
of the presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio provoke the rebellion in Chiapas to
destroy his campaign, as Jos6 Patrocinio Gonzalez Blanco, at the time interior secretary
and formerly governor of Chiapas, believes (Gonzilez Blanco)? Was the Colosio
assassination in March a plot by "backyard politicians, local caudillos .. . to destroy
Salinas," as the prominent economist and former president of Colegio de Mexico Victor
Urquidi supposes (Urquidi)?' 94 Carlos Salinas has repeatedly blamed the "nomenclatura,"
unnamed authoritarian and retrograde factions of the PRI, for orchestrating both events to
destroy him. Did Carlos Salinas' brother assassinate the president of the PRI, a close friend
of the Salinas family, Jos6 Francisco Ruiz Massieu? The Mexican courts decided so, but it
was a bizarre and corruption-ridden trial that, for sheer intrigue, far surpassed the
contemporaneous soap opera on TV Azteca about corruption in the attorney general's
office. Definitive answers do not exist, and perhaps never well, about political shocks and
their ramifications that contributed importantly to the 1994 crisis.
Still, some attempt to unravel 1994 is in order. It was Mexico's worst crisis, on the
order of twice as severe as 1982 by some economic measures (Heath 1999, 7). That
Mexico recovered more quickly than in 1982 should not distract attention from 1994's
severity. In 1994 the Clinton administration and the IMF rapidly provided a roughly $50
billion dollar bailout that stopped the panic, allowed Mexico to resume growth - and was
paid off within three years. After 1982 the Reagan Administration and IMvF drew all the
blood they could from Mexico, short of actually killing the patient, until they finally
provided the roughly $15 billion dollar loan package in late 1986 and early 1987.
A look at the political situation is useful before considering what caused 1994.
There is no doubt that elite struggle was the worst ever. Whatever the truth of intra-elite
accusations, their very virulence and multitude proves as much. In late 2000 when what
seems to be a responsible deputy attorney general's report came out with thousands of
pages about the Colosio assassination and surrounding political environment, the respected
weekly Proceso put it on the cover three weeks running, parsing its highlights into The
War I, The War II, and The War III- that is, the war among political elites. When asked to
gauge the level of elite struggle in 1994 from 1 to 10, Raul Salinas Lozano, a high
economic official in the 1950s and 1960s as well as father of Carlos Salinas, said, "Now
we're talking seriously," and put it at 9. Alfonso Corona del Rosal, a political dinosaur if
not a card-carrying member of the nomenclatura, says: "Our people have not forgotten
[Salinas'] authoritarianism, his recurring deceptions, and his self-worship. If he should
appear in a public place, he would probably be attacked" (1995, 290-91). This is a stunning
statement coming from the person who had nothing but kind words for Luis Echeverria,
who had bested him for the presidency and ended his own political career. The year after
the crisis, Joy Langston (1995, 276) wrote that "until recently competition [for the
194 Likewise Gamboa de Buen and Corona del Rosal in interviews and many sources quoted in the press.
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nomination] was neither so bloody nor so open, but in recent years political assassinations
have made the news, and members of the PRI have publicly menaced their fallen
companions with witch hunts." Smith says (1997, 36) that nothing in the 1970s and 1980s
"would compare with the fissures of the 1990s."
Why such powerful struggle? It was the same old story: in part struggle was
cumulative; in part the president's particular ambitions and errors aggravated it. Salinas'
dynastic ambitions (again, a recurring theme) aggravated it because whoever wound up on
his good side stood to retain power for years to come, and whoever did not end up on his
good side - or, alternatively, did not manage to destroy him - would be out for years to
come. Victor Urquidi, who knew "Carlitos" Salinas as a youth, says:
Every Mexican president thinks he can be reelected, and every president is a failure at the end. I think
Salinas knew he couldn't be reelected, but with all the money he and his brother were accumulating
and with the influence they had over many others, he wanted to be the power behind the throne, as
Calles was after he ceased being president.
Jorge Gamboa de Buen, an official close to presidential contender Camacho Solils:
There was a conspiracy in Salinas' closest circle: his brother Raul, [his private secretary] Jos6
C6rdoba, [de la Madrid's private secretary who had supported Salinas as president] Emilio Gamboa,
and others. They convinced Salinas to chose Colosio [as his successor] because they thought they
could control him, while with Camacho they could not have. They told [Salinas], "Donaldo is your
little brother, your creation; he is going to be loyal and faithful." And they even got it through to him
- when I was told so I thought it was a lie, but it was true - they said: "Look, you're going to run the
World Trade Organization with some help from your buddies the gringos, and when you return,
Donaldo is going to change the Constitution and you will be the first president of the twenty-first
century at age 52. You will end up the best president in the history of Mexico; you're going to
complete your economic project." It sounded logical, so they convinced him.
Camacho Sol's himself says that the "strange thing" was actually that the president's
dynastic plan ended up in disaster: "It was built to last for 15 years; it was incredibly
powerful, really founded on international alliances."
Though Interior Secretary Patrocinio Gonzilez Blanco considers Colosio to have
been a strong candidate and envisions a very different scenario from his opponent
Camacho, he concurs about the talk of Salinas' reelection. As for the difficulty of changing
the Constitution, he says: "How easy it was!" Salinas changed the state's relationship with
the Catholic church - priests had not even been allowed to vote - established under Benito
Juairez in the mid 1800s; Salinas changed Article 27 of the Constitution, the basis of land
reform and symbol of the Revolution. "Why couldn't the Constitution be revised so that a
man that all Mexico loved should remain in office? The only problem is, in Mexico,
presidents who are reelected are assassinated. But aside from that, there was no difficulty."
To what extent did elite struggle, aggravated by Salinas' dynastic ambitions, cause
the 1994 crisis? Substantially, but there were other causes too. One was error. All the
economics Ph.D.s in the Salinas cabinet did not realize what grave danger they were
putting the nation in as the peso became somewhere between 25 and 40 percent overvalued
by 1993 (Dornbusch and Werner 1994, Ros 1995, Lustig 1998; Cairdenas 1996; Velasco
and Cabezas 1998, 139; Eichengreen and Fishlow 1998, 50).195 Rudiger Dornbusch of
MIT, former professor of the finance minister, publicly warned about the problem as early
as 1992 (Edwards 1997, 107). You could see overvaluation even at the supermarket, says
Sergio Ghigliazza, director of the Center of Latin-American Monetary Studies:
"Housewives were saying, 'How is it possible that stores are selling Perrier and Evian
195 Robert Bartley of the Wall Street Journal remains a prominent dissenter about this point.
170
water cheaper than [the Mexican brand] Tehuacin? How can it cost less to take the kids to
Orlando than Cancun?'"
Yet Mexican authorities imagined, among other things, that the currency could not
be overvalued since financial markets did not perceive it to be (Ros 1995) as more and
more billions of dollars of investment kept flowing into Mexico. The IMF, the business
pages of newspapers, and other credulous financial cheerleaders helped inflate this belief.
Although he surely knew better - undersecretaries of Treasury are not in the business of
alarming financial markets - Lawrence H. Summers only contributed to the false euphoria
when he said in late 1993, "Countries that do things right will be rewarded with rapid
capital inflows. Those that do things wrong are punished" (New York Times, 17 December
1993, D-1). An independent member of the Bank of Mexico board, Victor Urquidi kept
saying he was worried that overvaluation was causing $20 billion dollar trade deficits:196
They'd stare me and say, "You don't understand economics. All this trade deficit is because we have
these capital inflows." I said, "Yes but I distinguish between foreign direct investment, which is fine"
- a lot of it was really going into office buildings and the like, though a lot of it was going into
manufacturing - "and short-term money, which is not a guarantee of anything." They said: "Don't
you know that the money going into the stock exchange, buying stock in Mexican companies, is very
favorable because Mexicans take that money and put up new investments." I said, "Give me one
example." And I never got it. Serious people in the bank were telling me those things.
How much of this wishful thinking was fanned by Mexican financial authorities'
desire to be part of the Salinas dynasty and thus by their hesitancy to criticize the
president? It is impossible to say - it would probably even be impossible for financial
authorities themselves to tell how heavily they were influenced by that political
environment - but Camacho insists that the adulation surrounding Salinas, hence lack of
any serious criticism, was a principal cause of the crisis:
I mean something like an eighteenth-century European court. There are people who dedicate
themselves to reading the king's thoughts, saying yes to everything, providing him with beautiful
women, satisfying his appetites and - an important part of this politics - without accountability,
without transparency, without social control, manipulating his weakness.
Compared with Salinas' ambitions and internecine elite struggle, the 1994 electoral
contest was a relatively minor affair. Experienced observers of Mexican politics doubt that
power was ever really at stake in the 1994 elections; even if the PRI might not win by fair
means, it was still ready to deploy all the foul ones at its disposal (Castafieda 1999, 456;
Smith 1997, 43; Camacho Solis). The very essence of the Democratic Front's success in
1988 - a mass protest cobbled together by an elite faction against six years of zero growth,
plummeting wages, a stock-market crash, an economic crisis, austerity, and technocrats'
broken promises; a helter-skelter group with no internal democracy, indeed hardly any
internal order at all - would undermine itself in the medium term as it sought to convert
itself into a political party, the Partido de la Revoluci6n Democrdtica (PRD) (Bruhn 1997).
No sooner did the conservative PAN candidate Diego Fernandez de Cevallos rout both PRI
candidate Ernesto Zedillo and PRD candidate Cuauht6moc Cirdenas in a 1994 debate than
he mysteriously stopped campaigning (Smith 1997, 43). It seemed as if the PAN cared
more about preserving its defacto economic-policymaking pact with Salinas than posing
196 In 1992 and 1993, trade deficits were about $21 and $19 billion dollars. These figures exclude the export-
oriented maquiladora plants, which were not an integral part of Mexican industry. They essentially just
provided cheap labor to foreign-owned firms that imported all their inputs and exported all their production.
The trade deficit including maquilas was $16 billion in 1992 and $8 billion in 1993; the current account
deficits were $24 billion in 1992 and $23 billion in 1993. All data is from the Bank of Mexico.
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any real challenge to the system. Zedillo won by more than 20 percent of the vote. If
Salinas' real concern had been to avoid devaluing before the elections, now, in the wake of
this mandate, was the time. For all his economic blunders, Echeverra devalued in 1976, on
his watch, leaving L6pez Portillo a clean slate; Salinas did not.
The politics of bank privatization likewise point to the predominance of Salinas'
dynastic ambitions over any electoral concerns. One of the principal causes of the 1994
crisis, in addition to peso overvaluation, was weakness of the recently privatized banks
(Lustig 1998, 163-67; Velasco and Cabezas 1998, 153). From 1990 through 1993 they
expanded credit at around 35 percent a year in real terms - "a phenomenal increase," says
Ghigliazza. Meanwhile, the economy itself was essentially stagnant, growing 3 percent a
year on average'"97 and practically not at all per capita. From 1989 through September
1994, the portion of bad bank loans increased from 1.3 to 8.3 percent of their portfolios
(Lustig 1998, 164). If the Bank of Mexico had increased interest rates to slow capital
flight, it would have forced more borrowers to default, putting the banking system at
deeper risk.
The problem was the way the government had privatized the banks. It left them
almost free from supervision, eliminated reserve requirements, and decontrolled the
interest rates at which they could lend, while protecting them from foreign competition
despite NAFTA (Kessler 1998). The banks were thus set up to make huge profits and did
so (until, of course, the 1994 crisis, when most of them failed). The new private bankers -
more or less the same individuals who had owned banks before their nationalization in
1982 - paid for these privileges, too, often three or more times the book value of the banks
(Lustig 1998, 162). Since most major industrial groups in Mexico have close ties with a
particular bank, Salinas thus bought business support, and he bought middle-class support
with banks' consumer lending spree, the "home appliance boom." Both of these
achievements were compatible with building electoral support. But Salinas used the $12
billion of revenues (Lustig 1998, 162) to fund Solidarity, his anti-poverty program
designed to function as a political machine. The point was specifically to weaken the PRI's
electoral apparatus, and thus undermine the dinosaurs within the party, by constructing an
alternative machine that he controlled (Dresser 1991).
The political shocks of 1994 - Chiapas, Colosio, Ruiz Massieu - surely contributed
to the December crisis. Chiapas was actually not a serious threat (Smith 1997, 40), and
indeed after it erupted in January, Mexico's reserves increased by several billion dollars
(Lustig 1998, 159). The Colosio assassination was serious: it cost the central bank $10
billion dollars of reserves and cost the political system some unquantifiable loss of
confidence. Whether or not elite struggle caused the assassination, elite struggle certainly
amplified it. Salinas could not replace Colosio with another of his close associates because,
except for Camacho Solfs, they were all cabinet secretaries and the Constitution forbade
nominating a cabinet secretary so close to the election. The Constitution could have been
amended, as it had been several hundred times since 1917, or the elections could have been
postponed, a more apt solution under the circumstances. But key figures in the PRI
refused. Camacho was publicly accused of being Colosio's assassin - their relations had
sharply deteriorated - and when Colosio's wife refused to sign a letter exonerating him, he
was effectively out of the running, if indeed Salinas would have picked him. The PRI thus
'97 Cirdenas 1996, table A.4, 214-15, for real GDP. Growth averaged 3.1 percent under Salinas (1989-94).
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destroyed Salinas' plans for presidential succession. How many billions of dollars that
revenge cost the Bank of Mexico is anyone's guess.
Finally, elite struggle turned what would have been a painful devaluation into a
runaway crash. One of the cardinal facts about crises is that just because one was
disastrous does not mean it had to be. As economists say, an economy can settle at
different equilibriums; some are not so terrible and others really are. The 1994 Mexico
crisis was a lot worse than anyone predicted (Lustig 1998, 167; Edwards 1997, 118) in part
because it was handled so badly. Gonzalez Blanco, a friend of Salinas' finance minister,
Pedro Aspe, puts it this way:
Cardinal [Juan Jesis] Posadas was killed [in Guadalajara in 1993], the Chiapas conflict exploded,
Colosio was shot, Ruiz Massieu was killed, and nothing terrible happened to this fragile economy.
Zedillo won with 17 million votes, nobody contested the triumph, there was national and international
rejoicing. And then came the economic problems. It was an error in the way they were managed.
Sebastian Edwards, who had been warning for a couple of years that the peso was
overvalued, asks why the outcome was so unexpectedly severe (1997, 118). "The answer
resides in the almost complete loss of confidence in Mexico, its institutions, and its leaders
in the aftermath of the crisis." As speculators and investors fled Mexican markets, the peso
crashed beyond anyone's worst fears.
The problem, at one level, was that the now infamous "errors of December"
converted an attempted 15 percent devaluation on December 20 into a rout. Nora Lustig, a
Mexican economist at the Brookings Institution, says that the way the Zedillo
administration devalued made it look "inexperienced and confused." Investors felt
deceived because the administration had promised only days earlier not to devalue, then
after devaluing it made no attempt to reassure them or explain itself (1998, 168). Gamboa
de Buen, also a friend of Aspe's:' 98
When capital movements started, the Americans tried to get in touch with [Zedillo's new finance
secretary] Jaime Serra, and they couldn't find him. Nobody knew what was happening. The U.S.
treasury secretary called up Pedro Aspe and asked him, "What is going on?" Aspe said, "I don't know
- I'm not finance secretary any more - call up Serra." "I already called him; he says he'll get back.
What is going on?" "I don't have the slightest idea." That is the way all the money fled.
Finance authorities had apparently not even made contact with the U.S. Treasury before
the devaluation (Edwards 1997, 117), and they announced it without providing any
coherent program to underpin the economy. The administration did not even wait for
Friday to devalue, when it would have had a weekend to get in touch with the U.S.
Treasury and calm markets. Investors pulled $5 billion dollars out in two days (Lustig
1998, 162).
Aspe had offered to stay on as finance secretary long enough to assume
responsibility for stabilizing an economy that he himself admits was "stuck together with
pins" (Proceso 15 October 2000, 31, quoting Sainchez Diaz). Antonio Sainchez Dfaz, then
president of the Mexican Employers' Federation, says that if Aspe had been allowed to
stay on, "as all of us hoped and expected," things would have worked out much better: "I
don't say he would have avoided the crisis, but I do say it would have been milder, less
drastic .... [Serra] did not have the experience, contacts, or imagination of Aspe" (ibid.)
Aspe did not stay on because his presidential rival and political enemy Zedillo -
whose Ministry of Planning and Budget had been dissolved into Aspe's Finance Ministry -
would not let him stay on (Gonzailez Blanco, Gamboa de Buen, Proceso 15 October 2000).
A- spe nas maintainea a policy or not commenting or giving interviews on the 1994 crisis.ý -- L -- 
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That much was understandable, but it was not understandable that Zedillo virtually cleaned
out the Finance Ministry, dismissing not only Aspe but all subsecretaries below him, 90
percent of the director generals at the third level, 79 area directors, and 176 subdirectors
(Salinas 2000, 1114). For no apparent reason other than to obliterate Aspe's grupo, Zedillo
broke a tradition predating the Mexican Revolution of maintaining continuity in Finance, a
tradition that ironically the PAN restored after it won the July 2000 elections. It was a
striking contrast to 1964, when Dfaz Ordaz kept his presidential rival Ortiz Mena and the
whole finance team on to handle the precarious economic situation left by L6pez Mateos'
and precandidates' excessive spending (lzquierdo 1995, 47).
Argentina 2001, Thailand 1997
Argentina's continuing economic crisis was caused in some real measure by elite political
struggle, first within the Justicialist (former Peronist) Party when Carlos Menem was
president in the late 1990s, then within the Alianza, an alliance of parties that captured the
presidency from October 1999 through December 2001. These political problems exhibit
striking parallels to conflicts between Salinas and the PRI: it was not a question of societal
demands but of struggles over power, and over the rules for ascending to power, within
each ruling coalition.
Argentina's economic crisis rivals Indonesia's for the worst that has befallen any
nation since the Great Depression. The peso plummeted something like 75 percent against
the dollar; economic output sank to its level of almost a decade earlier; virtually all debts
fell into default; official unemployment rose to 22 percent; and in just the first six months
of 2002, one and a half million people fell below the poverty line (Corrales 2002, 2). As
Paul Krugman argues, this crisis has important economic causes unrelated to any recent
political problems.199 Argentina's so-called currency board, not a board at all but a
mechanism for fixing the peso one-to-one against the dollar, was undoubtedly a bad idea,
particularly given that the nation's principal trading partners are Brazil and the European
Union. From the start it was apparent that if the dollar became overvalued compared with
the Brazilian real and the Euro, as was bound to happen, the Argentine peso would get in
trouble, as it did. Especially the crisis and devaluation of the real in late 1998 and early
1999, making Argentina's exports uncompetitive in Brazil, eroded its access to foreign
reserves. Dollarization of the Argentine banking system - the fact that many borrowers
took out loans denominated in dollars - has made the crisis much worse because now
borrowers theoretically owe four times as many pesos to repay debts. 200 Of course, they
cannot pay (which dollar debts will finally be converted to pesos at which rates is still in
199 My economic account of the Argentine crisis comes from a talk Paul Krugman gave at the University of
Texas on April 22, 2002 <www.utexas.edu.cola/llilas/centers/argentine/crisis02> (cited 7 October 2002).
Krugman emphasizes the importance of external shocks and circumstantial economic events in causing the
crisis; he does not believe Argentina has underlying structural economic problems, nor does he believe that
the fiscal deficit was big enough to explain the crisis. Aside from finding Krugman persuasive, I follow his
account because it is the most difficult one to square with any internal political causes. If most other
economic stories (including the IMF's). emphasizing domestic fiscal deficits, are correct, they leave more
room for domestic political causes, strengthening the argument that I lay out, following Corrales (2002) and
Schamis (2002).
200 Precisely why borrowers took out loans denominated in dollars when the peso was supposed to be
interchangeable is rather a puzzle, but in any event they did.
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dispute), so the banking system collapsed. Finally, the IMF's and Treasury's brutal
treatment of Argentina, in sharp contrast to support for Mexico after 1994, has prevented
the crisis from bottoming out and produced far worse damage than was ever necessary.
That said, Javier Corrales of Amherst College argues plausibly that a political
condition he terms the "state without a party" - struggle in the sense of an all-or-nothing
power contest between the president and his own ruling party - has been a real part of
Argentina's problem (2002, 26-27). While Krugman bases his economic account on
overall macroeconomic data, Corrales looks more closely at how political events may have
affected that data month by month.
Carlos Menem, Argentine president from 1989 through 1995, secured a 1994
constitutional reform allowing presidential re-election for a second term, was re-elected,
and served again from 1995 through 1999. About mid-term he succumbed to the Latin
American caudillo, or strong-man, mentality (or it was always his mentality) and began
seeking an unconstitutional third term in 1997. He planned to win support from his own
party and exert enough pressure on the Supreme Court to declare that his first term did not
count as one of the two permitted by the new Constitution. But, aside from being opposed
by 80 percent of the electorate, his gambit threatened the political futures of powerful
Justicialist governors, notably Eduardo Duhalde of the Province of Buenos Aires. The
result was an intra-party power contest, not just over who would be the next presidential
candidate but over the fundamental rules of ascending to power.
This power contest "unleashed a spending race between the president and the
leading Peronist governors," according to Corrales (2002, 11). In particular, Duhalde
pushed the important Buenos Aires deficit from 7 percent of current revenues in 1997 to 25
percent of current revenues in 1999. Economic officials recommended increasing taxes,
decreasing expenditures, and using funds from privatization to pay off the "ever-rising
debt," but neither Menem nor the governors cared about the debt. Corrales concludes:
The only recourse left to economic officials was to increase the already high debt and to delay
payments to public sector suppliers. This alleviated the rising deficit, but it restored the credibility
deficit that plagued the state in the 1980s. Once again, the Argentine state was in the business of
cheating private agents (and] repeating its predatory behavior... When the aftershocks of the Russian
crisis hit Argentina in mid 1988, the "concern" of business skeptics turned to panic. (2002, 12)
The problem with this argument is that overall Argentine fiscal deficits in 1997 and
1998, as the Menem-Justicialist contest proceeded, were quite modest. Without interest on
the debt - principally incurred to carry out a social security privatization and bank
restructuring supported by the IMF (Schamis 2002, 84-85) - Argentina was running a
small fiscal surplus (Corrales 2001, 21). Including interest, the total deficit both years was
2.1 percent of GDP - not enough to be expected to produce a crisis.201 For example,
Mexican fiscal deficits approaching the 1976, 1982, and 1987 crises were on the order of
10 percent of GDP. The key problem must have been, as Corrales puts it, the "credibility
deficit." As in the case of Mexico's June 1981 oil price fiasco, that kind of deficit can
contribute to a crisis, too. If business responded to the policy arguments between economic
and political officials, the power contest between Menem and the governors, and the sense
that the state was once again out to cheat private agents, that fear alone, combined with the
Russian crisis, could well trigger an investment strike. Between the July 1988 Russian
20 1 The deficit comes from the Corrales 2001, 21; the judgment that it was not enough to cause a crisis is
from the Krugman talk cited above.
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crisis and mid-1999 industrial production fell almost 20 percent, to nearly its 1993 level
(Corrales 2001, 20), initiating the deep recession that Argentina is still mired in.
Corrales' argument about political causes of the 2001 crisis seems doubtful. The
Alianza that won the 1999 presidential elections, he says, suffered from a problem of "non-
adaptation" (2002, 13-15): Of the two parties in the alliance one was led by an old
patriarch, Rail Alfonsfn, who had outstayed his time, distorting the process of leadership
renewal, and the other had charismatic grassroots leaders rather than seasoned
administrators. Too many Congressional leaders of both parties were lawyers and too few
were "technical experts": while 12.2 percent of Menem's Justicialists were economists,
only 2.9 percent of the principal Alianza party were. Thus, when the new Alianza
president, Fernando de la Riia, tried to cut social spending and raise taxes on taking office
in late 1999, both Alianza parties revolted. Alfonsin turned against the minister of the
economy, his own former central bank president, but the intra-coalition attack was
widespread: "Until the last days of the De la Ria administration, the most serious critic of
the government's economic policy was the ruling [Alianza] coalition itself" (2002, 15).
Corrales implies that De la Riia and his economics ministers were right, and severe
spending cuts and tax increases were needed, while the rest of the Alianza was wrong. But
suppose Paul Krugman, no economic illiterate himself, is right that the deficits were not so
terrible. Excluding interest payments, Argentina ran a 0.8 percent deficit in 1999 and a 0.5
percent surplus in 2000 (Corrales 2001, 21). At a minimum, it is unclear which side was
right and which was wrong on the economic debate.
The political impetus behind Argentina's crisis seems to have been intra-party
conflict itself. The Alianza was cobbled together in 1996 as an alliance between the
Radical Civic Union, a long-established party that had done badly in the 1995 presidential
elections, and Frepaso (Front for a Country in Solidarity), an ad hoc party comprised of
renegade Peronists, socialists, and human-rights leaders, which had done surprisingly well
in 1995 but recognized its long-term weaknesses (Schamis 2002, 86-87). The Radical
presidential hopeful, De la Ria, won a primary against the Frepaso candidate, producing
considerable resentment. One Frepaso leader told Hector Schamis that the alliance had
resuscitated the Radicals only to become their "casualty" (2002, 87). When De la Ria took
office in October 1999, he gave Frepaso only two second-class cabinet posts and, perhaps
worse, shut out his own party, according to Schamis, surrounding himself with "a clique of
unelected, nonpartisan advisors, several of whom had no previous political experience of
any kind" (2002, 86). Within a year Vice President Carlos Alvarez had resigned, and intra-
coalition struggle proceeded to deteriorate. In December 2001, as De la Ria's
administration was about to collapse, he asked the Justicialist opposition to form a unity
coalition, but it refused. Fearing a possible breakdown of democracy itself, Schamis asked
a Justicialist official why. The answer was that even congressional leaders of the
president's own party had refused to take part in any government he might lead (2002, 85).
Fernando de la R6a fell as he had ruled, concludes Schamis, "at odds with his own party."
Intra-party conflict, erupting in economic debates - two economics ministers in two
weeks were hounded out by Alianza opponents in spring 2001 (Corrales 2002) - and
founded in struggles over the legitimate process for acceding to power, could well have
frightened foreign lenders, leading them to demand higher interest rates. Interest rates on
external debt rose in parallel with the conflict. When Vice President Alvarez' fight with De
la Rua heated up in fall 2000, Argentina's country-risk rating, along with interest rates it
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had to pay, began to climb (Schamis 2002, 85, 87). By spring 2001, as economics
ministers were being paraded through, Argentina was forced to pay 12 percent interest on
debt (Schamis 2002, 85). The budget deficit was only 3.6 percent of GDP in 2000, hardly
disaster level, but the increase since 1998 had been entirely due to rising interest payments
(Corrales 2001, 21). When U.S. officials made it clear that they would not bail out
Argentina in spring 2000, an economic crisis was probably unavoidable.
A fractured ruling coalition played an important role in Thailand's 1998 crisis,
Andrew Maclntyre argues, but the fracture was an intermediate-level problem, ultimately
caused by a dysfunctional electoral system.202 It was a parliamentary system, so the
government needed to retain a majority to stay in office, and it had multi-member districts:
a number of candidates from the same party ran against each other, as well as against
candidates from other parties, for several seats. Thus, every politician won or lost on an
individual basis. Since vote-buying was a regular feature of campaigns - an estimated $1
billion dollars were spent to buy votes in the notoriously dirty 1997 elections - each
member of parliament needed to generate cash to cover these costs when in office. To
make matters worse, there were many small parties, so each government had to forge a
multi-party coalition in order secure a majority of votes in parliament. The New Aspiration
Party led by Chavalit Yongchaiyudh had to persuade five other parties to join it in order to
take office in late 1996. A few defectors would bring the government down: the very
electoral system was a formula for fracture.
The Thai crisis had economic causes, as always - a fixed exchange rate against a
strong dollar, financial liberalization without adequate oversight, a growing proportion of
bad loans in banks' and finance companies' portfolios, and falling values of the real-estate
that served as collateral for many of those loans (Maclntyre 1999, 144, 146, 150) - but the
government's failed efforts to deal with these problems can only be understood in political
terms. After the Bank of Thailand had been forced to spend some $7 billion dollars to keep
afloat BBC, a mid-sized bank with ties to several members of the previous government,
Chavalit came to power promising to install a so-called economic dream team (1999, 149).
After the financial weakness of many of the financial companies came to light, on March
3, 1997, Finance Minister Amnuay Viruwan and the central bank governor announced a
series of emergency measures, including that the ten weakest would have to increase their
capital base within 60 days or be shut down. However, senior members of Chart Pattana,
the second-largest party in the coalition, who had controlling interests in several of those
financial companies, vetoed the plan and forced the central bank to inject large sums of
new capital in them to keep them afloat.
So it went: again and again reasonable government initiatives to put the financial
system in order were blocked not because they faced populist pressures or even
parliamentary opposition, argues Maclntyre, but because they were "vetoed by other
members of the ruling coalition." By July 1997 it was revealed that the central bank had
pumped the equivalent of $12.3 billion U.S. dollars into failing finance companies
(Maclntyre 1999, 148, 152). The money supply ballooned, financial investors fled, and the
baht crashed. Even if a majority of Amnuay's coalition was in favor of implementing
reasonable policies, a minority used political blackmail to protect its future by threatening
to walk out. It was another conflict over political survival but played out within its
particular set of rules.
202 The description of the electoral system in this paragraph is from Maclntyre 1999, 146-49.
177
Stability in Colombia and stabilization in Bolivia
The experience of Colombia during much of the second half of the twentieth century and
of Bolivia during the post-1985 stabilization that ended hyperinflation suggest the
importance of elite pacts for economic stability. Colombia's unusual stability among the
large Latin American nations in 1970s and 1980s is often attributed to relatively
independent economic ministries. The Colombian economist Miguel Urrutia argues:
There has been, since [widespread civil violence was ended in 1958], the practice of naming an
industrialist or a technocrat as the minister of finance. In addition, institutional innovations, such as
the creation of the Monetary Board to handle monetary policy, .. . have given the minister of finance
virtually total power in the areas of monetary, fiscal, and exchange policy. These areas have therefore
been isolated from day-to-day politics and put in the hands of technocrats. (1991, 384)
Urrutia says that "given the danger of concentrating the clientelistic potential of the
Ministry of Finance in the hands of a politician" (ibid.), the state instead put the ministry in
the hands of a technocrat. He makes a roundabout attempt to suggest why what he calls a
clientelistic state - a trickle-down system of distributing money through the political ranks
to build support - should cede such a potentially fabulous resource to a technocrat, but the
argument is not even clear enough to summarize.
The economist Albert Hirschman (1979) suggests another answer argument along
the lines of elite cooperation. His principal concern is actually the military coups that
swept Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s but that Colombia escaped. He argues that,
contrary to a widely accepted argument (O'Donnell 1973, Kaufman 1979) that the
underlying problem was not societal struggle provoked by industrial stagnation as "easy"
import substitution became exhausted, but was instead ideological escalation. Colombia, at
about the same industrial stage as other large Latin American nations and therefore
presumably facing the same sort of exhaustion (to the extent that it existed: Hirschman is
skeptical), was able to avoid a coup in the 1960s and 1970s because the tight-knit nature of
its political elites muted such escalation. As elsewhere, elites were split between defenders
of business and the "entrepreneurial function," on the one hand, and defenders of workers
and the "reform function," on the other. But unlike their counterparts in Argentina, Chile,
or Brazil, they all belonged to one durable "oligarchy" (1979, 95). This fact was critical in
rescuing a "limited pluralism" (ibid.):
Communication between the two groups was often strained, but was never quite cut off, in part
because of personal relationships and in part because, after a while, it became obvious that the
reformers.., were by no means revolutionaries, but were acting in the best interests of their brethren.
In a seemingly odd omission for an economist, Hirschman does not ask whether
this working relationship between political elites also improved macroeconomic
management, which was notably better in Colombia. Probably he passed over that point
because he was writing in 1979 before the devastating crises of the 1980s, but especially
during that "lost decade," Colombia's stability, compared with other large Latin American
nations' crises, stood out. Despite some internal banking problems in the early 1980s, it
avoided the debt crisis (Stallings 1990, 156-59).
Colombia's elite politics, cooperative in much the same sense that Mexico's was
before 1970 - the Liberals and Conservatives traded the presidency back and forth in a de
facto coalition government - would seem to be a plausible reason both parties might be
concerned enough about the regime's long-term stability to put technocrats in charge of
Finance and other economic ministries. The Liberal-Conservative coalition emerged from
a pact ending an ongoing civil war that had taken a turn for the worse after 1946. As
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peasants allied with the Liberals fought other peasants allied with the Conservatives,
largely over land, some 200,000 people were killed, and a whole generation came to see la
violencia as just a normal aspect of life. In 1957 and 1958 leaders of the two parties met
secretly, initially in Spain (Field and Higley 1985, 27), to work out a power sharing pact
termed the National Front. The presidency would alternate between them every four years;
they would evenly divide high administrative posts and the legislature; and no other party
could even participate in elections. Spelled out in a formal declaration and approved by
plebiscite, the pact formally lasted until 1974, but even afterwards the Constitution
required that whichever party lost the presidency should retain "adequate and equitable
participation" in the executive branch (Kline 1990, 240-42).
The strange fact that Colombia avoided debt crisis in the 1980s despite guerrillas,
drug traffickers, and death squads roaming the countryside would only seem to underscore
the importance of elite consensus as opposed to generalized social peace. However, such
an consensus only works as long as it embraces all politically important elites. If external
violent challengers begin to overwhelm the state - that is, the elites that belong to the pact
- as began to happen in the late 1990s, it could be expected to break down.
An elite pact in Bolivia in 1985 ended one of the worst hyperinflations of all time.
With at inflation over 10,000 percent and calculated to have risen to an annual rate of
60,000 percent in summer 1985 (Gamarra 1994, 104 and footnote 1), it would be
impossible fix the foreign exchange rate, so in some sense there was an ongoing currency
crash, but the principal problem was inflation itself. At those kinds of rates shoppers have
to pay more for a loaf of bread hour by hour. The new president, Vfctor Paz Estenssoro,
sought to impose his New Economic Policy plan, which included cutting public-sector
employment, reducing fiscal deficits (they had reached an unbelievable 23 percent of
GDP), and freezing wages and salaries. He could call a state of siege to block the Bolivian
Labor Central, poised to challenge austerity measures as it repeatedly had in the past, but
he could not maintain the state of siege without congressional support, and his party, the
MNR (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario), did not control a majority in Congress.
Paz Estenssoro solved his political problem by forging elite cooperation. His pact
with the principal opposition party, Gen. Hugo Banzer's ADN (Acci6n Democratica
Nacionalista), publicly secured legislative support for the plan in exchange for patronage -
public-sector jobs - and, in a secret addendum, pledged to back Banzer as president in the
next election. The idea was to rotate the presidency between the two parties, in short, to
guarantee political survival in exchange for presidential supremacy over policy during each
president's term. The Pacto por la Democracia, as it was called, did effectively neutralize
Congress - a majority now voted as it was told - and allowed Paz Estenssoro to install a
"super-minister" of planning to manage the economy relatively unfettered. Eduardo A.
Gamarra argues that the Pacto, a smaller-scale version of the pact between Colombian
Liberals and Conservatives, "was key to ensuring the continuity" of the economic plan
(1994, 107). As mentioned, Paz Estenssoro brought inflation down to the 15 percent range,
and while growth remained stagnant - 2 to 3 percent a year by the late 1980s - at least it
was better than the negative growth of the early 1980s. Later the principal party of the left
was brought into the Pacto, pledging to vote for tax reform in exchange for an electoral
reform engineered, or so the parties hoped, to give the three of them an oligopoly on
political power (Gamarra 1994, 109).
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The Pacto fell apart in 1989. The MNR candidate, the former super-minister of
planning, Gonzalo Sainchez de Lozada - so much for any notion that political
independence is a requisite of economic stability 20 3 - broke with ADN and launched an
American-style negative campaign (Gamarra 1994, 110). He did not get a majority, so, in
accordance with the Constitution, it fell to the Congress to designate the president. Now no
one was willing to cooperate with MNR, but having seen how well the pact idea had
worked in the past, the left party MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria) now
made a surprise move, forging a new and renamed pact with ADN. This pact too had its
problems, but the basic principle was clear: elite pacts were an effective way to govern the
Bolivian economy.
Elite politics and policymaking
The idea that elites matter politically is, of course, nothing new; perhaps Vilfredo Pareto
and Gaetano Mosca, responding in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to
liberal and marxist mass-based theories of politics, are modem political science's starting
point on the topic. Elite pacts or fissures are seen to play important roles in broad
transitions from one regime to another - in creating schisms that bred the French, Russian,
and Chinese social revolutions (Skocpol 1979), in promoting or retarding uncertain
transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986), even in
joining factions to consolidate democracy (Burton, Gunther, and Higley 1992). The
structure of elites itself has also been examined; this account has often referred to the
literature on Mexican grupos or camarillas. Yet how the relations among political elites
affect ongoing policymaking within a regime is not so well understood.
The literature on grupos, for example, focuses principally on how they themselves
work: why do they exist? what rules govern relationships between leaders and followers?
what role do they play in political succession? Miguel Angel Centeno's Democracy within
Reason is almost alone in asking how gnirupos affect policymaking, and even he seems to
lose the courage of his convictions at a critical point. He situates his account so resolutely
within the idea of state autonomy that he misses the importance of observations he himself
makes about interactions among grupos.
Centeno says that, whereas before 1970, "cabinet positions had been . . . divided
among the various factions of the 'family,' the new elite [appointed by Echeverria]
represented nobody and no interests other than those of the president" (1994, 153).
Presidents tended increasingly to install their own grupos and exclude others, culminating
with Carlos Salinas: "Even more so than in previous administrations, the relationship with
the president became the most important factor in anyone's career. The extended
'Revolutionary Family' was reduced to a nucleus surrounding the president" (1994, 166).
Centeno argues that the ascendancy of such a "powerful, cohesive, and homogeneous elite"
allowed the state to restructure the economy from dirigiste to free-market fast and radically
(1994, 171). His argument seems sensible. Though foreign and business pressure promoted
freer markets, de la Madrid dropped tariff levels to less than half what GATT requested:
where it sought a maximum of 50 percent, in 1986 he cut the maximum to 20 percent and
lowered many tariffs at 10 percent or 5 percent (Urquidi). Even private sector spokesmen
203 Gamarra does not claim that such independence was a necessary ingredient, or any ingredient at all, but it
seems useful specifically to point out that it was not.
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such as Gilberto Borja of Grupo ICA, a construction and industrial conglomerate that
benefited enormously from free trade, say that from an economic viewpoint, Mexico ended
protectionism too fast. Salinas then cemented these free-trade measures in NAFTA and
aggressively privatized state-owned firms.
The problem with Centeno's picture of Mexican politics is that it builds up to a
static snapshot of Salinas at the height of his power, manipulating grupos so that the
unitary leviathan of the state could turn industrial strategy around. But other than
describing the steady exclusion of competing grupos, Centeno does not pay real attention
to anything going on inside this leviathan. Actually, he observes that by 1992 the Salinas
group had begun to split into sub-factions already vying for presidential succession (1994,
170), but this observation does not enter his argument. It does not need to because radical
economic restructuring, once effected by a powerful elite, is hard to undo, especially if
written into an international treaty such as NAFTA. But his political account is incomplete
if one wants to understand other policymaking, particularly policies that must be
continually revisited. No momentary decision can economic secure stability once and for
all; the threat of crisis is perpetual, and policies to prevent it must be sustained forever.
The question thus arises as to how elite politics plays out over time, how elites
handle internal conflicts. Since, as Centeno argues, presidents from Echeverria to Salinas
increasingly favored their own cliques, excluding rivals, the struggle for power during
political succession would tend to become all-or-nothing, and politics inside the leviathan
of state would be anything but static. To avoid repeating a story that is by now familiar, the
dynamics among political elites over years and decades will importantly affect policy.
As suggested by the accounts of Argentina, Thailand, Colombia, and Bolivia, elite
cooperation and struggle mright play out quite differently in different political systems.
Perhaps in part because of this variety, the authors who propose these accounts do not
reference each other. In effect, they each notice similar phenomena but lack a more general
way to frame the phenomena as a kind of elite politics. 2° This deficiency means that when
one thinks about economic crises, one is less likely to think in these terms; there is not
even a vocabulary to do so. Simply underlining the themes of elite cooperation and
struggle may make it easier to notice them when they matter.
204 The possible exception is Corrales whose book on the "state without a party" is due to appear this fall.
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Appendix I
Regression to Isolate Political Spending Cycle
A regression is used to capture how the Mexican political cycle affected public spending,
as distinct from principal economic factors - GDP growth, providing resources to spend
and increases in foreign reserves, indicating that external resources are available. The time
span is 1960 through 1988, but other time spans are also tested. The regression is based on
Ames' model (1987) covering all Latin American nations but omits factors irrelevant to
Mexico, such as military coups and change of political parties, and is modified to accord
more closely with how Mexican officials say the expenditure process unfolded. As with
Ames' model, the dependent variable, current spending, is assumed to depend on its
previous value, last year's spending, a typical approach for time series. (Such
autoregression involves statistical complications to be discussed shortly.) Current spending
is also assumed to increase (or decrease) in proportion to the growth (or decline) of the
previous year's GDP and foreign reserves, as well as in response to whether it is a pre-
election, election, or post-election year.
Why should public spending depend on the previous year's GDP growth? 20 5 There
is no automatic mechanism that feeds a change in GDP into a change in public spending.
(Indeed, in advanced nations, "automatic stabilizers" such as unemployment insurance are
actually supposed to inc:case public spending when GDP declines and vice versa, but they
are not important in Meic,.o.) Rather, economic performance provides a signal to
policymakers - but with a substantial lag. Mexican public budgets were set in the fall of
the previous year. They were then modified, sometimes by huge amounts, during the
course of the year, but in a developing country before the widespread use of computers,
changes in economic performance only became apparent with a long lag. For example,
though the presidential economic advisor Leopoldo Solis believed that Mexico was in
recession in 1971 and cutting investment back sharply to curb inflation was ill-advised,
hard data were not available. Only in 1972 did the government respond when it "became
clear that the economic slump was far more severe than anyone had imagined" (1981, 62).
Thus, independent variables assumed to affect spending in year t are:
Spndg(t-1I) Spending in the previous year
ChngGDP(t-1) Percent GDP growth (or decline) in the previous year
ChngRsrvs(t-1) Percent growth (or decline) in foreign reserves in the previous year
YI 1 in the first, post-election year, of each administration, otherwise 0
Y5 1 in the fifth, pre-election year, of each administration, otherwise 0
Y6 I in the sixth, election year, of each administration, otherwise 0
If the bi are coefficients to be determined by the regression, the model is:
Spndg(t) = b0o+ bSpndg(t-1) + b2ChngGDP(t-1)*Spndg(t-1) + bChngRsrvs(t-1)*Spndg(t- 1) +
b4 Y 1*Spndg (t-1) + bsY5*Spndg(t- 1) +b6Y6*Spndg(t-1)
205 Ames uses the change in reserves from the previous year but current GDP. Instead of expressing the
change in reserves as a percentage, he sets a dummy equal to I if reserves increase 50 percent or more and
another equal to I if they fall 50 percent or more. The 50 percent mark does not capture the Mexican
situation well; for example, during the late 1970s when resources were pouring in from abroad because of
petroleum exports and foreign loans, reserves rose 35 or 40 percent a year for several years in a row. I could
have used 30 percent instead of 50 percent as a cutoff, but it seemed less arbitrary to simply use the
numerical percentage of change in reserves. The point is not to predict how reserves affects spending but
only to control for them.
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A word explaining the equation is in order. Since public spending rose by almost a factor
of ten over the period, the independent variables ChngGDP(t-1), ChngRsrvs(t-1), Y I, Y5,
and Y6 cannot be treated as increasing spending by some given quantity of pesos but rather
by some portion of the previous year's spending; their effect on current spending is thus a
result of multiplying them by the previous year's spending. The coefficients are estimated
based on data from 1960 through 1988.
Though Ames found significant increases in electoral-year spending across Latin
America, they did not occur in Mexico. In election year spending decreased 12.7 percent,
but in spending the pre-electoral year it increased of 11.6 percent, both statistics significant
at better than the 99 percent level. While Ames found that spending dropped in post-
election years across Latin America, there was no such pattern in Mexico. The change in
spending in the post-election year is not statistically significant at all.
Because this is an autoregression, the OLS method estimates coefficients that are
biased but consistent - as sample size increases, the bias disappears - and is generally
adopted as the most appropriate method (Kennedy 1992, 140-41). A problem arises if the
errors are autocorrelated, i.e., if there is a systematic correlation between the error for one
period and the error for the next. The Durbin-Watson statistic for the regression (1.82)
indicates lack of autocorrelation but is inappropriate; the so-called Durbin m test is the
correct one (Kennedy 1992, 257). In this test, the OLS residuals are regressed on the
lagged (previous year's) OLS residuals and the original regressors; an F test is then used to
check whether the coefficients of the lagged residuals are significantly different from 0. (If
so, ther. ;s systematic correlation between residuals and lagged residuals, i.e.,
autocorrelation.) These coefficients were not significantly different from 0: the F statistic
was 0.186, yielding a probably p = 0.671 that they were no different from 0.
How closely do these results depend on the particular model used? Very little: a
variety of alternative models, including one duplicating Ames' approach and using current
GDP growth instead of the previous year's, yield the same results, though with lower
levels of confidence.2W6 An alternative model, regressing the change in spending on the
change in the previous year's GDP growth, change in the previous year's reserves, and Y I,
Y5, and Y6 - thus avoiding autoregression - produced essentially the same results, with a
Y5 (pre-electoral year) increase of 8 percent and a Y6 (electoral year) decrease of 9
percent, both significant at better than the 99 percent level. Regressing change in spending
over dummies for the six years of each administration - that is, simply ignoring
contributions of economic factors - again shows a large and significant fifth-year increase.
Extending the time period through 1994 administration, when electoral
competition had become a real factor, weakens the results without fundamentally changing
207them. However, extending it back to 1948 does change them. 2 7 The significant increase in
pre-electoral spending remains (again at better than the 99 percent confidence level), but
there is no longer a significant decrease in election-year spending. As might be expected,
large increases in 1952 when Henrfquez Guzmin ran his powerful opposition campaign
and the 1958 election attended by massive strikes blot out that pattern.
206 This replication, however, still expressed the change of reserves in percent rather than via dummy
variables.
207 This regression has a major problem, though: it uses only government spending, since total public-sector
spending. which even in the 1960s could be twice the size of government spending, is not available. There
could well be patterns in public-sector spending that cannot be seen for lack of data.
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Regression to control for economic factors on public-sector spending
Variables:
Spndg(t)
Spndg(t-1)
ChngGDP(t- 1)
ChngRsrvs(t- 1)
Y I
Y5
Y6
Spending in year t
Spending in the previous year
Percent GDP growth (or decline) in the previous year
Percent growth (or decline) in foreign reserves in the previous year
1 in the first, post-election year, of each administration, otherwise 0
I in the fifth, pre-election year, of each administration, otherwise 0
1 in the sixth, election year, of each administration, otherwise 0
Equation estimated:
Spndg(t) = bO + blSpndg(t-1) + b2ChngGDP(t-1)*Spndg(t-1) + b3ChngRsrvs(t-l)*Spndng(t-1)
+ b4Y l*Spndg(t- 1) +b5Y5*Spndg(t- 1) + b6Y6*Spndg (t-1)
Coefficient estimates:
Coefficients
Constant 14.47
Spndg(t-1) 0.899
ChngGDP(t- 1) 0.0156
ChngRsrvs(t- 1) 0.000968
YI 0.0038
Y5 0.116
Y6 -0.127
Model summary:
R Square
0.986
Standard error
8.54
0.037
0.0033
0.000294
0.0503
0.036
0.033
Adjusted R
square
0.982
t statistic
1.69
24.29
4.77
3.30
0.08
3.22
-3.79
Durbin-Watson
statistic
1.819
Significance
0.1049
0.000000
0.000104
0.00345
0.9406
0.0041
0.0011
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Appendix 2
Data notes
Mexican fiscal data
Revenue and spending figures are often taken from Instituto Nacional de Estadfstica,
Geograffa, e Informaitica (INEGI), Estadisticas Hist6ricas de MWxico. They give fiscal data
from the best and most basic source, the Finance Ministry's Cuenta de la Hacienda
Paiblica Federal, published in yearly volumes and not widely available outside of the
Finance Ministry's own library. For example, Cirdenas 1994, Table A.25, and Cirdenas
1996, table 1.7, use Estadisticas Hist6ricas.
Unfortunately, the way Estadisticas Hist6ricas - and many other secondary sources
- present fiscal data poses serious problems. For one thing, Estadisticas Hist6ricas data
prior to 1980 treats borrowing as part of revenue and includes it in data on revenue (INEGI
1994, Table 17.6, pp. 760-61; also graphics 17.6a and 17.6b). Obviously, if borrowing is
included in revenue, there is no such thing as a deficit or surplus (except to the extent that
the government over-borrows or under-borrows in any year). This problem can be
corrected easily: Estadi(sticas Hist6ricas gives the amount of borrowing, so one can net it
out to obtain real revenue, as I have done.
The other major problem - found in a great deal of Mexican fiscal data from
secondary sources as well as Estadisticas Hist6ricas and often not identified - is not so
easy to correct: amortization is included as well as interest in debt payments. Amortization
is not real spending. For example, suppose a government raises $100 billion in revenue,
spends $105 billion, and must borrow $5 billion; its total spending is, obviously, $105
billion. Now suppose everything is the same but the government has $15 billion worth of
short-term debt to pay off and renew during the course of the year (many Mexican
government 28-day bonds must be constantly paid off and renewed). Now the government
raises $100 billion in revenue, spends $105 billion, borrows $20 billion, and amortizes, or
pays off, $15 billion worth of principal. Its real spending is still obviously $105 billion, but
if amortization is included, the data indicates that it spent $120 billion. Typically, on the
order of 15 percent of Mexican government spending, even during the 1960s, actually was
amortization of debt, and the portion varied considerably from year to year. Budget data
that includes amortization (properly called "gasto bruto" or "gross spending" in Mexican
statistics, but often not properly labeled) is therefore erratic and extremely problematical,
especially for tracking yearly changes. Amortization is also often included in state-
enterprise spending, where it can be particularly hard to detect or weed out.
The best long-term series of fiscal data, going back to 1965, excluding amortization
(properly referred to as "gasto neto"), is found in the appendices to the Carlos Salinas
Informes de Gobierno. Unfortunately, the Zedillo administration discontinued that long-
term data series. Even in other series, fiscal data given in the "situaci6nfinanciera" of the
federal government, Mexico City, and state enterprises typically does excludes
amortization, or indicates it and nets it out, but unfortunately this type of data usually only
gives current spending and the capital-spending deficit, but not total spending or revenue.
(And the situaci6n financiera is not provided at all in Estadfsticas Hist6ricas.)
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Unless one goes to the Finance Ministry for data before 1965, one is therefore stuck
with Estadisticas Hist6ricas (and other sources that are no better such as Nacional
Financiera, Economia Mexicana en Cifras). Amortization is not indicated and so cannot be
netted out. Izquierdo 1995, Tables VII.4 and VII.5, using the same basic series, does give
amortization figures separately for the years he covers, 1959-70. Likewise, INEGI,
Informacion sobre gasto piblico, 1970-1980, Table 1.6, p. 5, details amortization as a
portion of public-sector spending for the decade of the 1970s. Correcting data from
Estadisticas Hist6ricas by netting out amortization given by either of these sources gives
essentially the same figures as the Salinas Informes for 1965 on.
I have always deducted borrowing from revenue figures, but since I do not have
data on amortization before 1959, I have simply left it in total spending, as almost
everyone one else does. Thus, data on total spending and the total deficit for the period
before 1959 should be treated with more than the usual suspicion.
Spending excluding debt service - thus excluding both amortization and interest -
is reliable, as far as I know. Spending growth can therefore be calculated from it with
reasonable confidence, and it is a good indicator of deficits (but of course lower than the
total deficit would be).
Izquierdo's figure for total debt payments in 1965 is incorrect - it is lower than the
amortization figure - apparently because of a clerical error. His amortization figure is
correct for this year, as it checks with Salinas 1992, Cuarto Informe, giving the correct
gasto neto, net of amortization. Thus, I kept his amortization figure and corrected his total
debt figure, available in INEGI, Estadisticas Hist6ricas de Mixico 1994, Table 17.10.
Regression data
The regression is based on spending excluding interest payments, but including them does
not change the basic results or significance. All public-sector spending and GDP data is in
real pesos, recalibrated to an index value of 100 in 1963 (the method Ames uses), so it
could be used in a cross-national comparison.
* Federal government spending from 1948-1960, used to test the model before 1960, is
from INEGI 1994 (Estadisticas Historicas) Table 17.10. For these years, consolidated
public-sector spending is not available.
* Total public-sector spending from 1960-65 is from Izquierdo 1995, 250 (Table VII.22).
Public-sector spending net of interest is not available for these years. State and Mexico
City spending is not available, either, but their deficits are available, and are included in
public-sector spending.
* Total public-sector spending from 1965-88, including state enterprises, with and without
interest payments, is from Salinas 1992 (Cuarto Infonnrme de Gobierno), 168.
* Total public-sector spending from 1989-93, including state enterprises, with and without
interest payments, is from Salinas 1994 (Sexto Informe de Gobierno), 59.
* Total public-sector spending for 1994, including state enterprises, with and without
interest payments, is from Secretan'rfa de Hacienda y Cr6dito P'iblico 1994, Cuenta de la
Hacienda Publica Federal, 60, 76.
* GDP and deflators for 1948-70 are from INEGI, Estadisticas Historicas 1994, Table 8.1
(GDP in current and 1970 pesos), and for 1970-94 are from Cardenas 1996, table A.4
(GDP in current and 1980 pesos, recalibrated to 1970=100). These are the same series on
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GDP. Using the IMF's GDP deflators makes no significant difference. Using the consumer
and wholesale price indices only accentuates the predicted fifth- and sixth-year effects in
1987-88 and slightly increases the overall significance of the results.
* International reserves are all in U.S. dollars. Reserves from 1950-1960 are from
Cirdenas 1994, Table A.21. Reserves from 1960-1970 are from Ortiz Mena 1998, 149.
Reserves including gold from 1970-1994 are from International Monetary Fund 2000,
International Financial Statistics Yearbook 2000, 698-99, gold values from 78-79.
* Ames includes a dummy variable with a value of I if there was an IMF agreement late in
the previous year or early in the current year, otherwise 0. Including such a dummy did not
substantively affect the results, but it seems inappropriate since while some IMF
agreements are bad deals, others are good deals: whereas Mexico's 1976 and 1982 IMF
agreements were harsh, in 1986 the Salinas team got a large sum - $12 to $15 billion
dollars - of fresh loans (see chapter 8). In any event, IMF agreements were: none in 1954
despite devaluation (Ortiz Mena 1998, 37), February 1959 (Ortiz Mena 1998, 86), end of
1976 (Lustig 1998, 19), end of 1982 (Lustig 1998, 29), end of 1986 (Lustig 1998, 47).
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Interview list
This list includes public officials, as well as a few private-sector and labor leaders, who
were interviewed; academics who were interviewed are generally only included here if
they were also high officials who had first-hand knowledge about policymaking.
Abedrop, Carlos (president of Banco Atlintico) 14 August 1997, Mexico City.
Alejo, Francisco Javier (secretary of National Industries, 1975-76), 11 October 2000,
Mexico City.
Barnes, Guillermo (subsecretary for administration, or oficial mayor, and other posts in
Finance; leader of PRI delegation from Mexico City in late 1990s), 23 March 2000.
Bassols, Angel (academic; father was secretary of Interior and opposition party leader), 23
October 2000, Mexico City.
Bazdresch, Carlos (economist known for work on economic crises), 17 April 2000.
Beteta, Mario Ram6n (economic posts beginning in 1960, subsecretary and secretary of
Finance, 1970-76), 12, 16, and 24 October; 16 November 2000. Mexico City.
Borja Navarrete, Gilbeito (president of Grupo ICA), 7 April 1997.
Bracamontes, Luis Enrique (subsecretary of Public Works, 1952-64; secretary of Public
Works, 1970-76), 18 October 2000, Mexico City.
Bravo, Victor (advisor to Alfredo del Mazo, 1987 presidential precandidate; father was
education secretary, 1970-76), 7 December 2000, Mexico City.
Camacho Solis, Manuel (economic posts, 1972-88; Salinas political advisor; head of
Federal District, 1988-93; presidential precandidate), 5 December 2000. Mexico City.
Cirdenas, Enrique (economist known for macroeconomic history of Mexico), 14 April
2000.
Carrera, Eduardo (executive secretary, CIHAC, construction industry group), 3 February
1997.
Carrillo Gamboa, Emilio (Telmex official, 1960-75; director of Telmex, 1975-87; father
was finance minister 1952-58), 15 August 2000, Mexico City.
Carvajal Moreno, Gustavo (president of National Executive Committee of PRI, 1979-81;
father was interior secretary, 1952-58), 17 November 2000, Mexico City.
Chaivez Presa, Jorge (head of budget control in Finance in 1990s, economist in Bank of
Mexico in 1980s), 25 August 2000, Mexico City.
Corona del Rosal, Alfonso (politician since the 1940s, governor of Mexico City 1967-70,
presidential precandidate 1969), 31 March 2000, Mexico City.
De la Madrid, Miguel (Bank of Mexico and Finance, 1960-79; secretary of Planning and
Budget 1979-82; president of Mexico, 1982-88), 10 November 2000, Mexico City.
De la Vega Dominguez, Jorge (commerce secretary 1977-82; presidential precandidate
1981; president of PRI 1986-88). Mexico City, 12 December 2000.
De Oteyza, Jos6 Andr6s (economic posts since 1965, secretary of National Industries,
1976-82), 15 August 2000, Mexico City.
Echeverrfa Alvarez, Luis (subsecretary and secretary of Interior 1958-70, President of
Mexico, 1970-76), 16 and 19 December 2000
Fernfindez Hurtado, Ernesto (Bank of Mexico, 1948-70, director of Bank of Mexico, 1970-
76), 27 October 2000, Mexico City.
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Flores de la Pefia, Horacio (economic official, 1959-70; director of Economics Faculty,
UNAM; secretary of National Industries, 1970-75), Mexico City, 6 December 2000.
Gamboa de Buen, Jorge (urban development director of Mexico City, 1988-94), 9 August
2000, Mexico City.
Ghigliazza, Sergio (Bank of Mexico official since 1960s, assistant director, 1985-90;
director, Center of Latin American Monetary Studies), 20 October 2000. Mexico City.
Gimenez Cacho, Luis (industrialist, steel industry, beginning in 1940s), 3 February 1997,
Cuernavaca.
G6mez Villanueva, Augusto (secretary of Agrarian Reform, 1970-75; presidential
precandidate), 18 December 2000, Mexico City.
Gonzalez Blanco Garrido, Jos6 Patrocinio (official in Presidency, 1960s; interior secretary,
1992-94; father was labor secretary, 1958-70), 20 November 2000, Mexico City.
Gout, Gonzalo (construction industry entrepreneur, beginning in 1950s; vice president,
CONCAMIN, industry federation, 1960s) 25 February 1997, Mexico City.
Ibarra, David (ECLA official 1958-73, finance secretary 1977-82), 28 August 1997, 2 May
2000, Mexico City.
Izquierdo, Rafael (advisor to finance secretary, 1964-70, advisor to President, 1976-82), 12
May 2000, Mexico City.
Labastida Ochoa, Francisco (national industries secretary, 1982-86, governor of Sinaloa;
interior secretary, 1998-99, presidential candidate 2000), 7 December 2000, Mexico
City.
Lujin, Berta (leader of independent union, FAT), 26 August 1997, Mexico City.
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